effect, and should not perhaps have been made, had the desired effect. The defenders capitulated on the 31st October, and received honourable terms.

Wellington took strong measures, when he was first established on the soil of France, to repress the habit of pillage which he had constantly found it so difficult to check amongst the 'greatest blackguards on the face of the earth.' He declared that even if his army were 'five times stronger than it was, he could not venture to enter France, if he could not prevent his soldiers from plundering,'* and that he' was determined not to command officers who would not 'obey his orders.'† These, and others to the same purpose, were no idle threats. He afterwards caused some of his officers to be dismissed the service and some of his men to be executed for this crime; and he sent 25,000 Spaniards at a later period back into Spain, much as he wanted their services, under the conviction that his success depended more upon moderation and justice,' and upon the 'good conduct and discipline of the troops, than upon strength and numbers.' At the Nivelle his own genius and his army's valour again shone forth, in driving Soult from a fortified position which he had been perfecting (after the example of the lines of Torres Vedras) for three months, and in which he believed himself secure, but in which he lost 1400 prisoners, 50 guns, and his field magazines.

When the British army went into cantonments to await better weather, their commander was thoroughly satisfied with their ragged and ill-looking but really excellent condition. And he was at length enabled to report, as the result of his strong but judicious measures, that in no part of Spain had his army been better, or he might say, so well received,' as in France; and he again showed his foresight by expressing his opinion that success in the cause of one of the exiled princes would be still more certain a month or two later, when Napoleon should commence to carry into execution the oppressive measures which he would be compelled to adopt in order to try to retrieve his fortunes.'

After the passage of the Nive, with those splendid Generals Hope, Hill, and Beresford, in command, respectively, of his left wing, right wing, and centre, he was obliged again to disperse his army in cantonments, and once more to oppose the idea of removing himself and his army from the scene of their triumphs.

* Letter to Sir John Hope, 8th Oct. 1813.

+ General Order, 8th Oct. 1813.- Well, Des.' vol. xi. p. 168 (note); republished, 'Sup. Des.,' vol. viii. p. 293. Vol. 122,-Nɔ. 244. 2 N

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He objected to the proposed scheme of sending him to Holland, because he was already in a commanding situation on the most vulnerable, if not the only vulnerable frontier of France,' because if he could bring 40,000 Spaniards into the field he could advance to the Garonne; in fact, he did not know where he should stop. And could any man believe that Napoleon would not feel an army in such a position more than he would feel it laying siege to one of the fortresses of Holland?'

He had occasion, in the beginning of 1814, to combat Napoleon's ingenious proposition to restore Ferdinand to Spain on the conditions of the expulsion of the English army, and the liberation of his garrisons locked up in Spanish fortresses. He believed a general peace to be imminent, but he prepared never theless to open the campaign with the utmost vigour. Taking the field with 100,000 men and 100 guns, he again vanquished Soult at Orthez, and drove him completely behind the Adour, with the loss of six guns, nineteen magazines, and thousands of new levies, who threw down their arms. He was here knocked off his horse by a blow in the groin from a musket-ball; and Alava, who was by his side, thought at first that he had been killed. But he remarked, when he recovered his consciousness, that he was only ofendido' (slightly hurt), referring to an expression used by a Spanish soldier, which had been interpreted to him, and at which he had been laughing when he was struck.

The capture of Paris made Soult only the more anxious to preserve Toulouse. The battle of Mont Rave was hardly fought and dearly won, the allies losing more men in carrying that strong position than the French in defending it. The inhabitants of Toulouse were equally delighted at the exit of the French troops and at the entrance of the allies; and a dinner and ball were given by Wellington to celebrate the occasion. At five o'clock a British and a French officer arrived from Paris with the news of Napoleon's abdication, and the restoration of the Bourbons. Leaving Hill in command, he went in April to Paris. He returned, after his discussions in that capital, to Madrid, where he was worthily received by the King whom he had restored to power. His remonstrances had the happy effect of releasing General Alava, who had long been his constant companion, and the Spanish Commissioner with the British force, from prison.

He took leave, early in June, 1814, of the army which had raised him to the chief rank among Commanders, and which owed its renown to his guidance. His courage and caution, his energy and forethought, had proved, under Divine Providence, in combination with their valour, that British troops were as invincible

And this feeling

invincible by land as British sailors at sea. found full vent when he reached England on the 23rd of that month to meet the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, with Blucher, Platoff, and others, whom the Prince Regent had collected to celebrate the deliverance of Europe. His carriage was drawn by the people through the streets, he bore the sword of state at the right hand of the Prince Regent, and he returned thanks to Lords and Commons for the highest honours and the most liberal rewards that a British subject had ever received. His ultimate success was eloquently ascribed by Mr. Abbot, the Speaker of the House of Commons, to that ascendency of character which, uniting the energies of jealous and rival nations, enabled him to wield at will the fate and fortunes of mighty empires; and we cannot do better than add the further expressions of that orator :

'This country owes you the proud satisfaction, that amid the constellation of great and illustrious warriors who have recently visited our country, we could present to them a leader of our own, to whom all by common acclamation acceded the pre-eminence; and when the will of Heaven and the common destinies of our nature shall have swept away the present generation, you will have left your great name and example as an imperishable monument, inciting others to like deeds of glory, and serving at once to adorn, defend, and perpetuate the existence of this country among the ruling nations of the earth.'

And now to answer the practical questions,-What were the peculiar qualities by virtue of which our hero was so constantly successful, and which raised him to such a pitch of greatness? We described in a former article, his early training, his untiring industry, his high ambition, how he carved his way upward to that which his soul coveted while he was still in India,—a European command, and how he sallied forth in 1809, at the age of forty, to carry out his own views, under circumstances apparently so disadvantageous, in the Peninsula. We have, in the present article, hurriedly followed him through five years of warfare, conducted ultimately to a successful issue. Indomitable perseverance, unceasing labour, entire devotion to the cause he had in hand, almost prophetic foresight, and above all that sound sense, which he preferred in others to brilliant talents, and which enabled him always to appreciate so nearly at their proper value the objects to be attained, the difficulties to be encountered, the means at his disposal,-all contributed to this result.

His strategy throughout that long contest was as simple as it was admirable. He seized from the first, as if by inspiration, the proper principle of action, and persevered in it to the end. He defied the utmost efforts of the French hosts from a corner

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of Portugal,-convenient as containing the capital, being capable of defence, far from their base, close to his own—the sea. He starved his foes as they approached his stronghold, an example which the Russians followed with such frightful success. lost no opportunity of advance, nor once failed to make good the retreats which were necessary—pour mieux sauter. He did not lose a battle or even a gun. Beating each French commander at his own point of excellence, he acquired, as the war went on, greater confidence at home, greater influence in the Peninsula, and increased strength as his enemy became exhausted. When the proper time arrived, he bade Portugal farewell, threatened King Joseph's communications with France, routed him at Vittoria; and, rousing Europe, as he had roused Spain, to successful resistance, he fought his way through the Pyrenees, and finally dismissed his army, at the conclusion of a general peace, on the soil of France.

His tactics were equally happy. He was unfettered by any system; and he scrupled not to set aside established rules when he found it necessary to do so. Always desirous of sparing his troops, he was lavish of their best blood when a corresponding advantage was to be gained. Knowing their confidence in himself, and ever trusting them when hard fighting was required, he sometimes tried them severely. When he got into a scrape, they always, as he said, got him out of it. And Marshal Bugeaud has observed that they were the finest infantry in the world, and that it was a merciful dispensation of Providence that there were not more of them. He crossed rivers and attacked fortresses, without the appliances usually considered necessary; and dearly did he pay in blood and failure, at Badajoz, Burgos, and St. Sebastian, for the want of adequate means. He possessed the enormous advantage of fighting with troops that could be trusted, like the Prussians under Frederic the Great, to make up for inferior numbers by extended formations. But they did not beat the French only because they could fight in line. Rather, it might almost be said, were they able to fight so frequently in line because they were confident of their ability to beat the French.

Adaptation of action and means to circumstances and objects was the secret of Wellington's tactical success as well as of his success generally. He did not pin his faith to fighting in line, or to any pet theory. He was determined, as he said to Sir Brent Spencer, to beat the French. If he could not do it in one way he would do it in another. He did it in every way, and the feelings with which he did it are expressed in the words of his own chosen motto, Virtutis fortuna comes.

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We cannot conclude this paper without calling attention to the great value and interest of the 'Supplementary Despatches of the Duke of Wellington.' In them, better than in any biography, the reader will learn to understand and appreciate the character of this extraordinary man; and their publication by the present Duke is the noblest monument he could have raised to the memory of his father.

ART. XI.-1. Parliamentary Reform. A series of Speeches on that subject delivered in the House of Commons. By the Right Hon. B. Disraeli (1848-66). Reprinted (by permission) from Hansard's Debates.' Edited by Montagu Corry, B.A., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. London, 1867.

2. Speeches on Parliamentary Reform in 1866. By the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P. for South Lancashire. With an Appendix. 2nd edition. London, 1866.

3. Speeches and Letters on Reform, with a Preface. By the Right Hon. R. Lowe, M.P. London, 1867.

4. Speeches on Parliamentary Reform, &c. By John Bright, Esq., M.P., delivered during the Autumn of 1866, to the people of England, Scotland, and Ireland, at Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Glasgow, Dublin, and London. Revised by himself. Manchester.

OUR of our most distinguished orators in the House of Commons have published in a collected form the speeches lately made by them on Reform in Parliament. Mr. Disraeli's editor has added to the collection of his speeches of last session all those on the same subject made by him in Parliament from 1848 inclusive. Mr. Gladstone, in his volume, has given an appendix, which comprises some remarkable letters which he wrote to Mr. George Potter and others after the defeat of the late Government, and also his speech in 1854 on Mr. Baines's motion, with its explanatory advertisement.' Mr. Lowe has enriched his volume with a valuable preface, his speech in 1865 on Mr. Baines's Borough Franchise Extension Bill, some correspondence which passed last autumn between him and some of his constituents, the letter written to him by Mr. Guedella, ‘a member of the Reform League Executive,' and his own reply. Mr. Bright has excluded from his publication the speeches which

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