duly impanelled, but during the progress of the trial fled. After repeated delays and unsuccessful efforts on the part of the court to obtain his presence, the jury was discharged without rendering a verdict. Held, that as in cases of felony the defendant must be personally present during the trial, the defendant by voluntarily absenting himself created the necessity for a discharge of the jury, and no jeopardy attached. The contrary was held in a case of counterfeiting, Fight v. State, 7 Ohio, 180. This is somewhat analogous to the question of the right to remove Guiteau for turbulent conduct, and try him in his absence, commented on by Prof. Smith, post. Wharton approves U. S. v. Davis, cited by Prof. Smith, observing: "Unless such a check be applied, the defendant, by violent and turbulent conduct, could at any time either bring his trial to an end, or compel its extension under circumstances destructive of public decorum." Bishop expresses no opinion on that case. The question in Guiteau's case is considered by A. G. McKean, in the Central Law Journal, and we agree with his conclusion: "At any rate the court thus far has shown rare good sense in allowing him to remain, notwithstanding his violent behavior. For, by allowing him to remain, all questions of this kind, which might be good ground for a new trial, will thereby be avoided." The court cannot take judicial notice that the wretch is not insane, and he must be treated as a raving maniac, i. e., he must be kept in court and allowed the free use of his tongue. question, it is not unreasonable to hold that the employer should answer therefor in damages." This case is supplemented by a good note, by W. E. Benjamin, in the report from which we quote. We do not remember any other case arising under similar circumstances, but probably there will be one within a few weeks. In State of Iowa v. Baldwin, 10 N. W. Rep. 645, Iowa Supreme Court, Dec. 8, 1881, the articles of incorporation of the corporation for the erection of a meeting-house of the Methodist church, provided that it should be the duty of the trustees to admit all evangelical ministers of other churches at any time the Methodists were not using the house themselves." In certain legal proceedings had, the trustees were commanded to admit the ministers of the Adventists to the use of the building when not used by others. Held, that the trustees were liable for contempt in refusing to allow such ministers to use the church, and the fact that such refusal was made in obedience to a provision in the discipline of the Methodist church and a two-thirds vote of the Methodist society, was no excuse, the court making the order having had jurisdiction to make it. Also that proceedings for contempt were proper to compel obedience to such order. The objection to the Adventists was that they were not "evangelical," denying the immortality of the soul and the resurrection from the dead, and ignoring and violating the Christian Sabbath. Besides, they broke open and abused the house, and caused strife, contention and hard feeling in the neighborhood. But to all this In O'Neil v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern the court turned a deaf ear, holding that the adjuRy. Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 337, it was held by Treat, D. dication of contempt foreclosed an inquiry into J., in the Federal Circuit of the Eastern District of these matters. They observed: "We need not deMissouri, that where an accident occurs to an em- termine whether these articles of the discipline apployee of a railroad company in consequence of the ply to the case of admitting evangelical ministers introduction of a foreign and defectively con- of other churches to the use of the house. If they structed car into the train on which he is employed, do, they are clearly inconsistent with the articles of he may maintain an action of damages against the incorporation, which makes it a duty of the trustees company therefor. The court said: "It is of great to admit all evangelical ministers of other churches importance to hold employees on railroad trains to at any time the Methodists are not using the house the fullest measure of duty, for on their skill and themselves. If these articles of discipline in any fidelity life and property depend; and it is equally way qualify the right of the trustees to control the important for their protection that their employers use of the house, they should have been presented shall furnish them with reasonably adequate and to the court in the injunction proceediugs, and insafe appliances whereby they can perform their du- sisted upon as a reason why the order entered in ties with safety to themselves and to the lives and that proceeding should not have been made. If property at stake. To relax the rules so that the they were called to the attention of the court in that employer may escape liability, would be as detri- proceeding, and notwithstanding the court erronemental to public interests as if the rules by which ously ordered the trustees to do what is beyond the employee is to be governed were to be relaxed their power, the order may, upon proper proceedin favor of the latter. An employee, as charged in ings, be reversed. But the order of the court, even this case, must be supposed to know the nature of if erroneous, was not void. The court had juristhe employment, and to possess the skill and dili- diction of the parties and of the subject-matter, gence requisite for the proper discharge of his du- and its adjudication cannot be disregarded with imties. He takes the hazard of the employment. punity. So long as it remains unreversed it must Still, if the employer introduces, without notice to be obeyed. There would be an end of all subordithe employee, some new and unusual machinery in- nation and social order if parties could disregard volving an unexpended or unanticipated danger, judicial orders, and when proceeded against for through the introduction of which the employee, contempt, call in question the correctness of the while using the care and diligence incident to his order itself. In such a proceeding the only legitiemployment, meets with an accident like that inmate inquiry is, did the court have jurisdiction, and did it make an order which has been violated?" | Annual, 71 Maine, 52, 53 Maryland, 42 Michigan, 71 But how could the court below consider the Adventists as "evangelical?" Missouri, 13 Vroom, 33 New Jersey Equity (6 Stewart), 80 New York, 91 Penn. St., 13 South Carolina, 52 Texas, 52 Vermont, 33 Grattan, 15 West Virginia, 50 Wisconsin. The principal notes are on the following subjects: Allocution; confidential communications between attorney and client; promise to discharge debt barred by statute of limitations; carrier's contract for carriage of goods by connecting carriers; contract for location of railway stations; consent in rape; damages by mental suffering disconnected from physical injury; remote injury; way by necessity when not implied on severance of estate; evidence of opinion of value; evidence of declarations of grantor; evidence of declarations of servant; deserted wife's contract for necessaries; ca The following are among the more noteworthy decisions reported: ABATEMENT.- An action for breach of promise of marriage abates by the marriage of the parties, and the counsel for the plaintiff cannot prosecute it under a statute giving him a lien for fees. Harris v. Tyson, 63 Ga. 629. In National Feather Duster Co. v. Susan M. Hibbard, U. S. Dist. Court, Northern District of Illinois, 14 Chic. Leg. News, 107, Mrs. Hibbard's husband was experimenting with a view of making a feather duster; his wife made a valuable suggestion in the progress of the experimenting, upon which he acted; and a duster was produced which was a success. Held, that the suggestion did not make the wife the inventor. Blodgett, D. J., said: “The idea of a feather duster to be made of feathers of the common turkey or other domestic fowls, seems clearly to have originated with George W. Hibbard. The desideratum was to make those feathers pliable. He was seeking to accomplish this, when the sug-pacity of testator as affected by spiritualism. gestion was made to him by Mrs. Hibbard to try cutting or splitting them. The proof on the part of Mrs. Hibbard fails to show, indeed it falls far short of showing, that she ever made a feather duster or thought of making one from turkey feathers made pliable by splitting them, until after her husband had been for some time at work in that direction. The most the proof does show is, that she suggested the mode of making feathers limber and pliable which were used for the purpose of making the feather dusters described in this patent. The successful feather duster covered by both these patents was, it seems to me from the proof, the invention of George W. Hibbard. While he was experimenting, I may say, perhaps, groping, for some method of rendering his feathers pliable, Mrs. Hibbard suggested the experiment of splitting the feathers; he acted upon that suggestion, and finding that the feathers were thereby made pliable combined them with the other material and made the feather duster which, before that time, had only had existence in his mind. Although Mrs. Hibbard may have made a valuable suggestion in the progress of the experiment, yet that does not make her the inventor. Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 7 Wall. 602; Pitts v. Hall, 2 Blatchf. 229." We do not under-turning the fare paid, the passenger having offered stand how our esteemed brother, Mrs. Bradwell, editor of the News, can report this case so calmly. It seems to us well calculated to make the feminine feathers erect themselves. It may be law, but it is hard measure for the wife, the meritorious cause of the invention. It is well understood around here that Mrs. Burden, of Troy, was the real inventor of her husband's famous horse-shoe or railroad spike machine. It stands to reason that the wife should have superior knowledge on the method of rendering feathers (or broom-splints) pliable. ANIMALS. In an action for injury by the bite of a dog, it appeared that the dog was ferocious, to the knowledge of his owner, and that his owner had sometimes confined and muzzled him. Held, that it was unnecessary to prove that he had ever bitten mankind, and the fear and solicitude as to poison are proper elements of damage. Godean v. Blood, 52 Vt. 251. ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS. -An assignee for the benefit of creditors may set aside a prior fraudulent transfer by his assignor. Pillsbury v. Kingon, 33 N. J. Eq. 287. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.- An attorney employed to collect a note has no implied authority to receive any thing but money in payment. Herriman v. Shomon, 24 Kans. 387. CARRIER. A carrier has no right to expel a passenger for non-payment of full fare without first re to pay the balance before expulsion but after the train is stopped. Bland v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 55 Cal. 570. Proprietors of hacks are common carriers, bound to the utmost care and skill. Bonce v. Dubuque Street Railway Company, 53 Iowa, 278. A railroad company is not liable for the accidental its rules, to ride gratuitously on the train to sell death of a boy permitted by the conductor, against newspapers. Duff v. Allegheny Railroad Company, 91 Penn. St. 458. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-A statute imposing a penalty for keeping a place in which it is reputed that intoxicating liquors are kept for sale, without license, is not unconstitutional. State v. Thomas, 47 Conn. 546. A Sunday law making it a misdemeanor "for any person engaged in the business of baking to engage, or permit others in his employ to engage, in the business of baking for the purpose of sale, between the hours of six o'clock P. M. on Saturday and six o'clock P. M. on Sunday," etc., is a special law, and as such, unconstitutional. Ex parte Westerfield, 55 Cal. 550. A student attending college, and having no other residence at the college town, and no intention of remaining there permanently, is not entitled to vote there. Vanderpoel v. O'Hanlon, 53 Iowa, 246. CONTRACT. A man being in jail on a charge of false pretenses, his wife executed her note and mortgage to the complainant in consideration of the withdrawal of the prosecution. Held, that the instruments were void. McMahon v. Smith, 47 Conn. 221. CORPORATION. A corporation is liable to indictment for Sabbath-breaking, but in the case of a railroad company, its assent cannot be inferred by proof of the passage of a single train over the railroad on Sunday. State v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, 15 W. Va. 362. CRIMINAL LAW.-The court will not entertain the appeal of an escaped prisoner. People v. Redinger, 55 Cal. 290. Where one aiming at A. misses him and wounds B., he cannot be convicted of assault with intent to kill B. Lacefield v. State, 34 Ark. 275. Where insanity is set up as a defense in a criminal case, the defendant is bound to satisfy the jury of the insanity by a preponderance of evidence; State v. Redemeier, 71 Mo. 173; to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Baccigalupo v. Commonwealth, 33 Gratt. 807. An objection to a grand juror on account of his expression of an opinion cannot be pleaded in abatement. State v. Hamlin, 47 Conn. 95. One wrongfully taking the property of another, but too drunk to entertain a felonious intent, cannot be convicted of larceny. Wood v. State, 34 Ark. 341. A criminal conviction will be set aside, if the officer in charge of the jury remained in their room during their deliberations, although he did not speak to them. People v. Knapp, 42 Mich. 267. The defendant in a criminal case has no right to poll the jury. State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518. In sentencing for murder, it seems, it is not necessary to ask the prisoner if he has any thing to say against sentence. At all events, a motion in arrest of judgment, in which the omission is not set up as error, is a waiver of such right. Id. If a woman finally consents to sexual intercourse, although such consent is reluctant, and is obtained through fear, duress, and fraud, or partly by fear and partly by force, the offense is not rape. Whittaker v. State, 50 Wis. 518. DAMAGES.- Exemplary damages cannot be recovered in a civil action for an assault and battery which is also punishable by a criminal prosecution. Huber v. Teuber, 3 McArthur, 484. In an action of damages for injury to real estate by blasting, the mental anxiety of the plaintiff for the personal safety of himself and his family is not a proper element of damages. Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227. In an action brought by a person for a personal injury, sustained by him through the negligence of another, his mental suffering is a proper element of damage. Porter v. Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad Company, 71 Mo. 66. In an action on a bond given on an injunction restraining the erection of a stable, it was held that injury done to the plaintiff's cows, by exposure to the weather, and the consequential diminution of their flow of milk, was a proper item of damage. Lange v. Wagner, 52 Md. 310. DEED. A deed cannot be impeached on the ground that the grantor at the time of execution was a monomaniac on the subject of religion. Burgess v. Pollock, 53 Iowa, 273. EVIDENCE. In an action for breach of promise to marry, evidence of the defendant's financial standing is admissible, also evidence of seduction; but evidence of an offer to marry, made after the action was brought, is inadmissible to reduce damages. Bennett v. Beam, 42 Mich. 346. In an action on a policy of life insurance, where the issue is upon the death of the insured, testimony of witnesses that they have seen the insured alive since the time of his alleged death is competent, and the insurer is not bound to bring him bodily before the court. Schneider v. Etna Life Insurance Company, 32 La. Ann. 1049. On a prosecution for theft of a seal-skin cloak, which the owner had worn, she may testify to its value, having priced similar articles. Printz v. People, 42 Mich. 144. EXEMPTION. An unmarried woman, keeping house, and there bringing up two children of her deceased sister, is the "head of a family," and entitled to a homestead exemption. Arnold v. Waltz, 53 Iowa, 706. FERRY.-- Where rates of ferriage for wagons are fixed by statute, a ferryman cannot charge for the contents of a wagon separately from the wagon, although wagon and contents belong to different persons. Kelly v. Altemus, 34 Ark. 184. INNKEEPER. An innkeeper, who also keeps a sea-bathing house, separate from the inn, is not liable for goods and clothes of his guests, left there while the guests were bathing, and stolen therefrom. Minor v. Staples, 71 Me. 316. INSURANCE.-The entire omission to answer, a question in a written application for insurance does not avoid the policy. Armenia Insurance Company v. Paul, 91 Penn. St. 520. In a policy of fire insurance, forfeiting the insur ance in case the property insured shall become incumbered in any way without the consent of the insurer written on the policy, applies only to voluntary incumbrances, and does not apply to an involuntary judgment. Baley v. Homestead Fire Insurance Company, 80 N. Y. 21. The doctrine of marine average is not applicable to fire policies on vessels. Merchants and Miners' Transportation Company of Baltimore v. Associated Firemen's Insurance Company of Baltimore, 53 Md. 448. JUROR.— A juror who would be incompetent by relationship to a party is equally incompetent if he sustains the same relationship to counsel whose fees depend upon the recovery. Melson v. Dickson, 63 Ga. 682. LIBEL. A retraction of a libel, published after the suit, cannot be considered in mitigation of damages. Evening News Association v. Tryon, 42 Mich. 549. LIEN. A laborer's statutory lien is assignable. Murphy v. Adams, 71 Me. 113. municipal water-works, and the contractor having in the performance of such work negligently caused a personal injury to a third person by blasting in the street, the city is liable in damages therefor, but only in case of negligence not contributed to by the sufferer. City of Logansport v. Dick, 70 Ind. 65. A county is not liable for personal injuries sustained by reason of the defective construction and imperfect lighting of the court-house. Kincaid v. Hardin, 53 Iowa, 430. A town carrying on a farm for the purpose of its poor is liable for an injury inflicted on a citizen by a ram owned by the town and kept on the farm for the propagation of sheep, but negligently suffered to run at large. Moulton v. Scarborough, 71 Me. 267. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. In an action for mali- A city ordinance prohibited "drumming" or socious prosecution the defendant cannot justify his liciting patronage for hotels, boarding-houses, bathaction by the advice of an attorney who was person-houses, physicians, quacks, and vendors of nostrums. ally interested in the subject-matter. White v. Carr, Held, void as to competent physicians; and so, it 71 Me. 555. seems, as to hotels, hoarding-houses, and bathMARRIAGE. A note given by a wife, whose hus- houses. Thomas v. City of Hot Springs, 34 Ark. 553. band had deserted her, while living apart from him, NATIONAL BANK.- A National bank is liable for for necessaries used by her in her own support, is a special deposit, received by its teller on behalf of void, and her promise to pay it, made after her di- the bank, in accordance with its usage, for gratuvorce and before her remarriage, is without consid-itous safe-keeping, and lost through its gross neglieration and invalid. Hayward v. Burker, 52 Vt. 429. The actual commission of a single act of cruel and inhuman treatment, accompanied by circumstances indicating a probability of a repetition of similar conduct, will warrant a divorce. Beyer v. Beyer, 50 Wis. 254. Money furnished to a deserted wife for purchase of necessaries, and so applied, may be recovered in equity from the husband. Kenyon v. Farris, 47 Conn. 510. A note executed by husband to wife for the separate moneys of the wife lent to the husband is valid. Hall v. Hall, 51 Tex. 294. Subse MASTER AND SERVANT.- The plaintiff engaged in the service of a corporation as a miner. At that time ordinary blasting powder was used. quently giant powder, a more dangerous explosive, was substituted by order of the president. The plaintiff was not informed of the proper mode of using it, although the corporation had printed directions. The plaintiff being injured by an explosion, held, that the corporation was liable. Smith v. Oxford Iron Company, 13 Vroom, 467. In the absence of his master a general farm servant working in his master's corn-field with other servants undertook to drive out a cow of the plaintiff which had broken into the field, and in so doing negligently struck her with a stone and killed her while she was in the field. Held, that the master was liable. Evans v. Davidson, 53 Md. 245. MISTAKE. The accommodation maker of a note which has been materially altered without his knowledge, having paid it in ignorance of the alteration, may recover the money so paid; even, it seems, if such payment was negligent. Fraker v. Little, 24 Kans. 598. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.- A city having contracted with private persons for the construction of gence. Y. 82. Pattison v. Syracuse National Bank, 80 N. National banks have no power to purchase negotiable paper except from surplus capital. Lazear v. National Union Bank of Baltimore, 52 Md. 78. NEGLIGENCE. The measure of skill which a physician is bound to exercise is not affected by his refusal of the proffer of assistance from other physicians. Potter v. Warner, 91 Penn. St. 362. A root passenger on a city street sat for a moment on the door-sill of a house fronting on the street, to tie his shoe, and there was injured by a brick falling from the dilapidated wall of the house, upon his head, which was within the street lines. Held, that the owner of the house was liable. Murray v. McShane, 52 Md. 217. In an action against a railway company for an injury by collision at a street crossing in a city, it being proved that the whistle was not sounded nor the bell rung, evidence is competent to show an ordinance prohibiting such signals. Pennsylvania Company v. Hensil, 70 Ind. 569. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT. A telegram in the words, "you may draw on me for $700," is not an acceptance, but it is an authority to draw at sight, and implies a promise to accept and pay. Franklin Bank of Baltimore v. Lynch, 52 Md. 270. The maker of an accommodation note, lent without restriction, is liable to a third person who acquires it for value after maturity. First National Bank of Salem v. Grant, 71 Me. 374. To hold one who indorses a negotiable note after maturity, payment must be demanded of all the makers within a reasonable time thereafter, and immediate notice of non-payment given to him. Graul v. Strutzel, 53 Iowa, 712. Where a note is payable at a bank whose usage it is to give notice of protest to indorsers residing in the place where the bank is located, through the post-office, such notice will bind such indorsers. Carolina National Bank v. Wallace, 13 S. C. 347. An oral promise that a note is good and will be paid when due, made by the owner on a transfer of the note for value, is valid. Milks v. Rich, 80 N. Y. 269. NUISANCE. A burial-ground near dwellings is not a nuisance per se. Monk v. Packard, 71 Me. 309. The keeping of gunpowder upon private premises may be a nuisance when in case of explosion it would be liable to injure the persons or property of those residing in the neighborhood, although it should be carefully stored or kept. Heeg v. Licht, 80 N. Y. 579. A railway company, having legislative authority to construct a tunnel, contracted with defendant to do the work. Defendant collected a magazine of explosives for the blasting. These materials exploded, injuring the plaintiff's property. Held, that defendant was liable without proof of negligence in the care of the materials. McAndrews v. Collerd, 13 Vroom, 189. OFFICE AND OFFICER.-An offer made by a candidate for a public office, for the purpose of gaining votes, that if elected he will pay into the public treasury all the fees of the office above a certain sum, invalidates his election and disqualifies him for the office. Carrothers v. Russel, 53 Iowa, 346. A policeman has no right to rouse up the family of a respectable citizen, after they have retired for the night, and force an entry of the house, upon the mere statement of some person to him that he has heard that a woman of bad character is stopping at the house. Bailey v. Ragatz, 50 Wis. 554. PARENT AND CHILD.- When a step-father has voluntarily assumed the care and support of his step-child, he cannot recover for compensation therefor. Smith v. Rogers, 24 Kans. 140. RAILROAD COMPANY.- A street railway corporation may exclude competing vehicles from the habitual and continuous use of its track. Citizens' Coach Company v. Camden Horse Railroad Company, 33 N. J. Eq. 267. RELIGIOUS SOCIETY.-A society incorporated for religious worship has no power to contract for a steamboat excursion to raise money for the church purposes, and cannot recover for expenses or loss of anticipated profits by reason of the defendant's breach of such contract. Harriman v. First Bryan Baptist Church, 63 Ga. 186. SALE.- Where personal property is sold and delivered on credit on the agreement that title is not to pass until payment is complete, the purchaser has no interest subject to execution of his creditors. Cole v. Berry, 13 Vroom, 308. -Specific performance of a contract to sell shares of a National bank will not be enforced where it appears that the shares were designed to give control of the bank. Whether the contract would be enforced if lawful, quære. Foll's Appeal, 91 Penn. St. 434. STATUTE OF FRAUDS.- An oral agreement by an employee that he will not leave the service of his employer for two years, nor in the summer, nor without two weeks' notice, is within the statute of frauds. Bernier v. Cabot Manufacturing Company, 71 Me. 506. TIMBER. A quantity of timber growing on a farm was blown down by wind, and by the trustee under the will of the former owner was converted into cooper stuff and firewood, and sold. Held, that the tenant for life of the farm was entitled to the proceeds of the firewood, and to the interest for life of the amount realized for the timber. Stonebraker v. Zollickoffer, 52 Md. 154. USURY. Where an agent for loaning money takes a security in his own name as principal, upon usurious interest, the borrower, supposing him the principal, may plead usury. Erickson v. Bell, 53 Iowa, 627. WILL.-Partial insanity does not disqualify from making a will; a will made in a lucid interval by a person habitually insane is valid; and where there is nothing unreasonable on the face of the will of one habitually insane, it will be presumed to have been in a lucid interval. Kingsbury v. Whitaker, 32 La. Ann. 1055. A belief in "spiritualism" does not incapacitate from making a valid will even where the testatrix acted under supposed instructions from the spirit of her deceased brother, unless actual unsoundness of mind is found. Brown v. Ward, 53 Md. 376. Is there any necessity for such exhibitions as are witnessed from day to day? Has the presiding judge no power to preserve order in his court? These questions are often asked; and in their rightful solution the profession and the public have a deep interest. It is said in justification of Judge Cox, that he is powerless to maintain order in his court, because the prisoner has a right to be present at his trial, and cannot be excluded, however disorderly and contumacious his conduct. That Guiteau's pretense of acting as his own counsel increases the embarrassment of the situation, and the suggestion is often heard that the prisoner is permitted thus to reveal himself in order to assist the experts and the jury in deciding correctly upon his mental faculties. It is insisted that none of these excuses are valid. True the accused has a right to be present at his trial; but it is not an unconditional right, and may be forfeited by its abuse. The right of a prisoner to be present at his trial does not carry with it the right to subvert the trial. First and paramount, the State has the right to try and punish parties for a breach of its laws; the accused has a right to be present at his trial, but this right is secondary and subordinate. The statement of the prisoner's right — the right to be present at his trial- assumes the primary and paramount right of the State, and also the fact of a trial. If the court has no power to suppress disorder that will prevent a trial aud obstruct the course of justice, then the State is at the mercy of its criminal subjects. A prisoner, accused of a crime, when brought to the |