cuted like any craft, or trade, or adventure, solely for the purpose of gain. He who plies this art in that spirit stands in the market and lets himself to hire, and at the end of the day the fee in his hand is his reward; or if with a great enterprise of viciousness, he conceives the law as a dexterous art, contrived by lawyers for lawyers, in order to transmute the property of others into their own possessions, he answers St. Paul's description of certain Gentiles who were 'given over to work all uncleanness, with greediness.' The profession of law is not a craft, or a trade, or a venture. It is not a contrivance for the benefit of lawyers. It cannot be worthily or even decently practiced simply for gain. I do not say that the lawyer may not take rewards for his work; it ought to bring him gain-the gain at once of 'flowing fees' and honor among his fellow-men; and he ought to demand and care for these his dues. But they must be the incident of his service; they must come of themselves and not by much seeking. If in the act of plying this art the counsellor be intent on the fee, if he pursue it as his one object of desire, no matter how much it may increase and multiply, it will be a poor, sordid thing in his hands. On the other hand, if he will keep it in its due place, it will be the honorarium of the Roman jurisconsult and the English barrister. In this commercial age when wealth is held before the eyes of men as the one object of desire, and the getting and displaying of it is the chief end of man, the lawyer, whose life is in the very midst of the strife, is apt to lapse into the mercenary spirit. They who resort to him are busy in getting or recovering or fortifying the possession of property. The strifes of his days and the studies of his nights are to serve them in their pursuit of money. The very atmosphere of his office is redolent of gold. In the midst of such influences and constraints what is so natural as that he relax his hold upon any conception of the law which is not mercenary; how shall he resist the solicitations to make merchandise of it and pursue it as men follow trade?" IN NOTES OF CASES. Harris v. Carmody, Massachusetts Supreme Court, April, 1881, 11 Rep. 812, it was held that a father may avoid his note and mortgage given to the plaintiff under threats to prosecute and imprison his son for an alleged forgery of the father's name. The court said: "At common law, as a general rule, the defense of duress per minas must be sustained by proof of threats which create a reasonable fear of loss of life, or of great bodily harm or imprisonment of the person to whom they are made, and one man cannot avoid his obligation by reason of duress to another. There is a well-settled exception to this rule in the case of husband and wife, all the authorities agreeing that each may avoid a contract if it was made to relieve the other from duress. Sheppard Touchst. 61; Metc. on Cont. 280, note; Robinson v. Gould, 11 Cush. 55, and cases cited. The question whether this exception extends to the relation of parent and child does not appear to have been expressly adjudicated. But we find many dicta of judges and statements of authors, entitled to great respect, which show that from the earliest times it has been considered as the settled law that the relation of parent and child was within the exception. See the remarks of Lord Coke in Baylie v. Clare, 2 Brownl. 275, 276; S. C., 1 Rolle Abr. 687, pt. 4-6; and of Lord Bacon in Bac. Max. reg. 18. The same rule is explicitly laid down without question by the author of Bacon's Abridgment, and by Mr. Dane and by Mr. Justice McLean. Bacon Abr. Duress, B.; 5 Dane Abr. 166, 375; McClintick v. Cummins, 3 McLean, 158, 159. See, also, the remarks of Wylde, J., and of Twisden, J., in Wayne v. Sands, 1 Freem. 351. This case is too imperfectly reported to be of great weight, and the remarks attributed to Twisden, J., would exclude the case of husband and wife, in opposition to all the authorities; see the same case under the name Warn v. Sandown, 3 Keb. 238. We are not referred to any modern authorities opposed to the views of the learned judges and authors whom we have cited. The exception in favor of husband and wife is not based solely upon the legal fiction that they are in law one person, but rather upon the nearness and tenderness of the relation. The substantial reasons of the exception apply as strongly to the case of a parent and child as to that of a husband and wife. No more powerful and constraining force can be brought to bear upon a man, to overcome his will, and extort from him an obligation, than threats of great injury to his child. Both upon reason and the weight of the authorities, we are of opinion that a parent may avoid his obligation by duress to his child." This doctrine is recognized, without being directly decided, in Schultz v. Culbertson, 46 Wis. 313; 49 id. 122. In State v. Beal, Ohio Supreme Court, June 1, 1881, 1 Ohio L. J. 440, on the trial of an indictment for burglary with intent to steal from a safe, the court charged the jury that if the accused broke and entered the building with the intent to break into the safe and steal money supposed to be therein, and the safe was not used as a place for the deposit of money, and there was none therein at the time, he was not guilty. Held, error. The court said: "A distinction seems to prevail, in the English cases, between an attempt to commit a felony and an act done with intent to commit it. In Queen v. Goodall, 2 Cox's C. C. 41, the accused was indicted for using an instrument upon the body of Catharine Snowden with an intent to procure a miscarriage. The statute declared that whosoever, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman shall * unlawfully use any instrument, etc., be guilty of felony. It appeared from the evidence that the instrument was used with the intent laid in the indictment; but the medical witnesses stated, from the result of a post-mortem examination, that Catharine Snoden was not pregnant at the time the instrument was used. Upon reservation of the * * * * shall question for the consideration of the judges, it was held immaterial whether the woman was in fact pregnant or not. In McPherson's case it was held that where a statute makes it an offense to attempt to commit a felony, the attempt must be to do that which, if successful, would have constituted or resulted in a felony, and consequently, that where the attempt charged was to steal certain goods from a dwelling-house, no conviction could be had, it appearing that the goods had been previously stolen by some one else. Dearsley v. Bell, 197. Cockburn, C. J., in delivering the opinion, however, remarked that 'attempting to commit a felony is clearly distinguishable from intending to commit it.'" That this distinction is not supported by the American cases is asserted by Mr. Bishop, 1 Bish. Cr. Law, § 742; and by Mr. Wharton, 1 Whart. Cr. Law, § 186. See Holmes on Common Law, 69. In Hamilton v. State, 36 Ind. 280; S. C., 10 Am. Rep. 22, it was held that the prisoner might be convicted of assault with intent to steal a $5 bill, notwithstanding the person assaulted had no such bill. In Mullen v. State, 45 Ala. 43; S. C., 6 Am. Rep. 691, it was held that the prisoner might be convicted of assault with intent to murder, when he presented a loaded gun and snapped the trigger three times, supposing the gun to be capped, although there was really no cap on it. The Vienna “Juristische Blatter" reports the following case of larceny of lost goods: "L. W. was convicted of larceny on the following facts: S. L., a guest in a public house, in paying her bill, inadvertently dropped her purse on the floor. L. W. noticed it, picked the purse up and put it in his pocket with the intent to appropriate it to his own use. The court held that this was 'a taking of a strange (i. e., belonging to another) movable thing (over twenty-five florins in value) out of the possession of another without his consent, for the sake of his own gain,' which constitutes larceny by the Austrian law. The defendant appealed, and argued that his act was only the appropriation of a thing found, and punishable as a fraudulent taking only. The Court of Cassation affirmed the judgment, saying: 'By the findings of the court of first instance all the legal marks of the crime fully appear. The argument that the conviction is erroneous because the money taken must under the circumstances be considered as having been lost, without condition, and the crime is therefore a fraud only, cannot be sustained. The court below found that S. L. who had taken out her money to pay her bill, when she wanted to put it back, instead of putting it in her pocket, dropped it on the floor; L. W. noticed this, took up the money from the floor, and appropriated it to himself. Considering now that according to the general interpretation 'possession' as used in the criminal law does not have the civil-law meaning of the term, but refers merely to the actual relation of a person to a thing, by which the possibility of exclusive control is given, and considering that by dropping the money the possibility was not yet taken away that S. L. should continue any control she pleased over it, therefore within the meaning of the criminal statute the money must be deemed as being in her possession, and consequently not as a thing lost, it is apparent that the court below was right in holding the act of L. W. to be a taking of the money out of the possession of S. L., and therefore larceny, and not a finding.'' IN JUDGE COUNTRYMAN'S GOSPEL. N another column our readers will find Judge Countryman's rejoinder on the subject of taking causes on speculation." If such a thing were not morally impossible, we should suspect, from the tone of his writing, that he had embarked in this controversy on his favorite basis of compensation "no pay except in case of success." We did not suppose he would agree with our authorities, but we did not expect to see them so disagree with him. An angry philosopher is an incongruous and unpleasant spectacle. As an "advanced thinker," and the apostle of a lofty moral theory, Judge Countryman should preserve his equanimity. We are quite willing, however, to present the communication in the very words of the oracle, in order that our profession may see the candor, the manliness, and the logical perception which Judge Countryman's new gospel breeds in disputants. We shall have very little to say about the authorities hitherto quoted on either side. They may be left to the intelligence of a profession accustomed to judge of such matters. In passing, however, we must remark the candor of a disputant, who quotes a syllabus as the language of a court, and when his error is exposed, and the true decision is given, showing a materially different holding, still insists that the syllabus "is a correct abstract of the case!" We must also remark the logic of a disputant who insists that a court cannot pronounce that one party to a contract has not fulfilled his part of it, until they have pronounced that the contract is valid. We must also remark the consistency of a disputant who admits the force of "obiter expressions of opinion" when they make for his side, but denies it when they make against him. Keeping these things in view, we are quite satisfied to stand in our "tub," if Judge Countryman is satisfied with his "barrel." Let us glance a moment at the new authorities produced by Judge Countryman "without note or comment." With the exception of the first, they are not at all in point. Two of them-Fitch v. Gardenier and Wright v. Meek- have not the slightest connection with the question. In the others, more or less connected with the subject, the inquiry and discussion are always upon the legality, and never upon the morality or propriety, of such contracts. The same is true of Stanton v. Embrey, in 3 Otto. Schomp v. Schenck simply holds that an attorney, as distinguished from an advocate, may lawfully contract for a certain percentage of the sum to be recovered, as remuneration for his services, but it denies any such right to an advocate. We cannot conceive why Judge Countryman should have quoted this case, unless he assumes, being both attorney and advocate, that he may lawfully do that as attorney which is forbidden him as advocate. In Major's Exr. v. Gibson, 1 Pat. & II. 48, a contract like those in question was held valid, by the special Court of Appeals of Virginia, and the judgment below was affirmed by an equal division of the four judges. The two who went for reversal, put it on the ground of express statutory prohibition. Of the other two, one remarked that such contracts could no longer be considered immoral, because they had been legalized by subsequent legislation; and the other judge, Thompson, defended its morality at considerable length, and in very much such terms as Judge Countryman used in his address. He thought, too, that the practice would make counsel "zealous," and that it would be peculiarly proper in cases of slander, assault and battery, and the like! Judge Thompson is certainly a man after Judge Countryman's own heart. We may add, on the same side, some expressions in Allard v. Lamirande, 29 Wis. 502. This is not cited by Judge Countryman, and we hold it out to him as a peace-offering, to show him that we entertain no prejudice, and are not so agitated by his authorities as he is by ours. In respect to Ex parte Plitt, 2 Wall. Jr. 452, and Webster's connection with it, we must say that Daniel Webster was never credited with any very fine feelings about money matters. But does any body suppose that Daniel Webster would have made a business of prosecuting causes on contingent fees, and recommended it to the young gentlemen in his office as a handsome thing? Ready and willing as he was to have his constituents pay his debts, he would have hardly done this. It is hardly necessary to point out that a practice may be legal, and may be tolerated by courts, without being praiseworthy. Decoys and informers do not act illegally, but they are not generally admired. So a man who pleads infancy, or usury, sets up a legal defense, but the courts in pronouncing it legal do not thereby applaud it. So we may solve Judge Countryman's difficulty in understanding Commissioner Gray's characterization of contracts like that in Voorhies v. McCartney, as "not legalized,” but only made "tolerable" under certain circumstances -which Judge Countryman thinks "unintelligible" by suggesting that they are "tolerable, and not to be endured." If the plea of infancy or usury should come before the United States Supreme Court, that court would say that the validity of such a plea is "beyond all legitimate controversy," but that would not imply that the court did not regard the party who should set up such a plea with the same contempt with which he is generally regarded in the community. And we scarcely expect to hear even Judge Countryman addressing a class of law graduates on the illiberality of such a prejudice in the community, and recommending such pleas to their favor. Since sending in his communication, Judge Coun tryman has called our attention to some remarks in this JOURNAL, volume 10, page 193, which strongly approve his theory. To this we answer, we cannot be responsible for the opinions of our editorial predecessors. We happen to know, however, that Mr. Isaac Grant Thompson, in his last years, deplored the commercial proportions and aspects which this speculative law business seemed to be attaining in certain quarters, as much as we ourselves now do. As we wish to deal with Judge Countryman with perfect frankness and sincerity in this matter, we will admit that the practice looks to ourselves much more objectionable than it looked ten years ago. This modification is due to two facts: First, the prevalence of the practice has stirred up a great amount of speculative and experimental litigation that otherwise would not have existed; second, it has enabled lawyers to get exorbitant fees, which they could not have got except for such agreements. Seven and a half per cent satisfied three lawyers in Webster's day; now-a-days a single lawyer demands fifty per cent and all the costs! Disclaiming any intention to be arrogant, we think we can see this matter in its real moral bearings now better than we could when we were at the bar, and better than any man who is in the habit of making a great deal of money out of this mode of practice. In his close Judge Countryman asks where we will draw the line between the cases which a lawyer may take and those which he may not take on contracts of the kind in question. We would draw it exactly where professional opinion would say it ought to be drawn in the matter of an attorney's being a witness in his client's cases. An attorney may occasionally be a witness for the client whose cause he is advocating, but if he falls into that habit it is apt to make unpleasant remark. Judge Countryman would hardly recommend it as a practice. But why not? If the attorney does not volunteer, and his client subpoenas him, where is the harm? Is not this an old-fashioned prejudice, unworthy of these untrammelled days? The answer is, there is a tradition and instinct against it. Its tendency is bad. It is only to be excused by urgent necessity. The chance of the attorney to make some money will not excuse it. So in this matter. Now and then, in a few cases in a long practice, a lawyer may excuse himself for this practice, but not when it is his constant and notorious custom, and his aim is simply to make money by it. Take a lawyer with an income of $5,000. He can increase his income to $20,000 by letting it be known that he makes this his special practice. We say he is inexcusable for doing it. In nine cases in ten the necessity may be avoided, if the lawyer is in earnest in trying to avoid it. The difference between Judge Countryman and ourselves on this point is right here: we would take just as few cases of this kind as possible; he would get just as many of them as he could. We would publish our strong reluctance and disapprobation; he would advertise his approval and readiness to be persuaded. Judge Countryman reasserts his "delicacy" in this matter. He always leaves his client to make the advance. But we fear his delicacy is exceptional, and that the feeling of the average lawyer, who believed the system to be right, would be like that of the lady in the siege in Don Juan - "when will the ravishing begin?" We reiterate, if the practice is right, the delicacy is out of place; if wrong, the delicacy cannot excuse it. Dickens says "there never was a more delicate man than Dodson." But what is delicate depends upon circumstances. A wife's caresses of her husband are never immodest. A woman whose charms are known to be for sale, gets no credit for modesty by waiting to be solicited. If Judge Countryman's gospel gains credit, it will soon be abused. False prophets will arise. The high-toned manner in which he would conduct these matters will soon yield, among other practitioners, to the practices of trade. Some of our western Solons have found it necessary to enact a statute against "drummers" for physicians. So we shall see prominent law offices having their "drummers" and "touters." They will have their agents to drink with clients, play cards and billiards with them, and take them to the theatre and elsewhere. Prices-current for advocacy will be quoted. The newspapers will be full of advertisements like that from the Herald, sent us by Mr. Cadwalader, and printed in another column. Each office will have printed blank contracts ready for filling up and exchange, in anticipation of the "ravishing." Whenever a great casualty occurs, circulars will be sent out to the afflicted survivors, soliciting them to come and have their sorrows healed, without expense except in case of success, and as low as any other house. Banks and counting-rooms will be overrun with agents and runners, striving to catch business. Lawyers who do this sort of thing expertly and persistently will make great fortunes, but the very men who employ them will despise them. 6 Of one thing we are certain, namely, that Judge Countryman's theories are not in public or general professional favor. If he doubts it, let him poll the bench; let him ask the lawyers of any community, whose opinion would have any weight; let him communicate with the leading newspapers; let him consult the bar and the public of the very community in which he lives. The prevailing response would be, in the language of John H. Reynolds, when advocating the bare legality of such contracts, "reprehensible, immoral, and disgusting, as well as debasing to the profession of the law; but the law allows it and the court awards it." (We humbly submit this, despite our correspondent's indifference to the "deliverances of our local celebrities.") Or as a New York city lawyer writes us: "Quite concurring with the views you have expressed in your editorial, I am astonished to learn that they are disputed." If this practice is right, why do so many lawyers shrink from it, in spite of its pecuniary advantages? Why do most business men in any community spe... of it with a sneer or with outright enunciation? The moral sense of the profession and of the community is against it. No one doubts Judge Countryman's earnestness and sincerity in this matter. This is indeed the strangest part of it that a man so good, so wise, so experienced, can get so wrong without knowing it. VALIDITY OF STATE LICENSE LAWS. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, MAY 2, 1881. WEBBER V. STATE OF VIRGINIA. The right conferred by the patent laws of the United States to inventors to sell their inventions and discoveries, does not take the tangible property in which the invention or discovery may be exhibited or carried into effect from the operation of the tax or license laws of a State. It is only the right to the invention or discovery, the incorporeal right, that the State cannot interfere with. Accordingly, a State law requiring a license for the sale of a patented sewing machine would not, for that reason, be invalid. A State law requiring an agent for the sale of articles manufactured in other States to take out a license and pay a fee therefor, and not requiring an agent for the sale of articles manufactured in the State to take out a license or pay a fee, is invalid, as interfering with commerce between the States. IN N error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia. This case comes before this court on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia, and arose in this way: In May, 1880, the plaintiff in error, J. T. Webber, was indicted in the county court of Henrico county, in that State, for unlawfully selling and offering for sale in that county, to its citizens, certain machines known as Singer sewing machines, which were manufactured out of the State, without having first obtained a license for that purpose from the authorities of the county, or having paid the tax imposed by law for that privilege. The indictment was founded upon the 45th and 46th sections of the revenue law of the State, which are as follows: "§ 45. Any person who shall sell, or offer for sale, the manufactured articles or machines of other States or Territories, unless he be the owner thereof and taxed as a merchant, or take orders therefor, on commission or otherwise, shall be deemed to be an ageut for the sale of manufactured articles of other States and Territories, and shall not act as such without taking out a license therefor. No such person shall, under his license as such, sell or offer to sell such articles through the agency of another; but a separate license shall be required from any agent or employee who may sell or offer to sell such articles for another. For any violation of this section, the person offending shall pay a fine of not less than fifty dollars nor more than one hundred dollars for each offense. "§ 46. The specific license tax upon an agent for the sale of any manufactured article or machine of other States or Territories shall be twenty-five dollars; and this tax shall give to any party licensed under this section the right to sell the same within the county or corporation in which he shall take out his license; and if he shall sell or offer to sell the same in any other of the counties or corporations of this State, he shall pay an additional tax of ten dollars in each of the counties or corporations where he may sell or offer to sell the All persons, other than resident manufacturers or their agents, selling articles manufactured in this State, shall pay the specific license tax imposed by this section." Acts of Assembly, 1875 and 1876, p. 184, ch. 162, §§ 45 and 46. same. To the indictment the accused pleaded "not guilty;" and on the trial it was proved that he had sold and offered to sell sewing machines in Henrico county, as charged, but that at the time he was acting as agent or employee of the Singer Manufacturing Company, a corporation created under the laws of New Jersey; that this company had a place of business in Richmond, Virginia, where it was licensed as a resident merchant, for the year beginning May 1, 1880, and had paid the required license tax, and where it kept a stock of machines for sale; that the machines sold by the accused were the property of the company, and were manufactured by it out of the State, and in accordance with specifications of a patent of the United States, granted in 1879, to one W. C. Hicks, and by him transferred to the company. It also appeared that the accused had not taken out a license to sell the machines in Henrico county, and was not himself taxed as a merchant and had not taken orders for the machines on commission or otherwise. On the trial, his counsel requested the court to instruct the jury that if they believed the Singer Manufacturing Company had paid for a general merchant's license for the year beginning May 1, 1880, and received such license, or that the machines sold were constructed according to the specifications of the patent held by the company, and that the accused was acting in the sales made only as its employee, he was entitled to a verdict of acquittal. The court refused to give these instructions, and at the request of the attorney for the Commonwealth, instructed the jury, in substance, that if they believed the accused had, at different times within the year previous to the indictment, sold or offered to sell in Henrico county to its citizens, Singer sewing machines manufactured beyond the State, and at the time ho was neither the manufacturer himself nor the owner of them, and was not taxed as a merchant in the county, and had not taken orders therefor on commission or otherwise, and had not obtained a license to sell the same in the county, and had not paid to the proper officer the tax imposed by law for selling the same in that county, they should find him guilty. The jury found the accused guilty, and he was sentenced to pay a fine of fifty dollars besides costs. On appeal to the Circuit Court of the County this judgment was affirmed, and on further appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State the judgment of the Circuit Court was affirmed. To review the latter judgment the case is brought here on writ of error. FIELD, J. In the county court where the accused was tried, the only defense presented by his instructions, was that he was acting as the agent of the Singer Manufacturing Company, which had a license from the State as a resident merchant in Richmond to sell the machines, and also held a patent of the United States, authorizing it to manufacture and sell them anywhere in the United States. To this defense the answer is obvious. The license, being limited to the city of Richmond, gave no authority to the company to sell the machines elsewhere, and of course gave none to its agent. Besides, the question as to the extent of the territorial operation of the license depended upon the construction given by the Court of Appeals of the State to the statute, and its decision thereon is not open to review by us. And the right conferred by the patent laws of the United States to inventors to sell their inventions and discoveries does not take the tangible property, in which the invention or discovery may be exhibited or carried into effect, from the operation of the tax and license laws of the State. The combination of different materials so as to produce a new and valuable product or result, or to produce a well known product or result more rapidly or better than before, which constitutes the invention or discovery, cannot be forbidden by the State, nor can the sale of the article or machine produced be restricted except as the production and sale of other articles, for the manufacture of which no invention or discovery is patented or claimed, may be forbidden or restricted. The patent for a dynamite powder does not prevent the State from prescribing the conditions of its manufacture, storage and sale, so as to protect the community from the danger of explosion. A patent for the manufacture and sale of a deadly poison does not lessen the right of the State to control its handling and use. The legislation respecting the articles which the State may adopt after the patents have expired, it may equally adopt during their continuance. It is only the right to the invention or discovery-the incorporeal right which the State cannot interfere with. gress never intended that the patent laws should displace the police powers of the States, meaning by that term those powers by which the health, good order, peace and general welfare of the community are promoted. Whatever rights are secured to inventors must be enjoyed in subordination to this general authority of the State over all property within its limits. Con These views find support in the language of this court in Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501. There a party was convicted of violating a statute of the State regulating the inspection and gauging of oils and fluids, the product of coal, petroleum or other bituminous substances. The statute provided that such oils and fluids should be inspected by an authorized officer of the State before being used, sold, or offered for sale, and required the inspector to brand, according to the fact, casks and barrels of the oil with the words "standard oil," or with the words "unsafe for illuminating purposes." It imposed a penalty for selling or offering for sale in the State such oils and fluids as had been condemned. A particular oil, known as the Aurora oil, which had been thus condemned, was sold by the accused. A patent for the oil had been issued by the United States to a party who had assigned it to him, and in defense to the indictment he asserted the right under the patent to sell the oil in any part of the United States, and that no State could, consistently with the Federal Constitution and the laws of Congress, prevent or obstruct its exercise. But the court held this construction of the Constitution and laws to be inadmissible, and that the right was to be exercised in subordination to the general powers which the several States possessed over their purely domestic affairs, whether of internal commerce or police. After some just observations upon the police powers of the State, their extent and object, and a reference to previous decisions, the court said, speaking through Mr. Justice Harlan: "These considerations, gathered from the former decisions of this court, would seem to justify the conclusion that the right which the patentee or his assignee possesses in the property created by the application of a patented discovery, must be enjoyed subject to the complete and salutary power, with which the States have never parted, of so defining and regulating the sale and use of property within their respective limits as to afford protection to the many against the injurious conduct of the few. The right of property in the physical substance, which is the fruit of the discovery, is altogether distinct from the right in the discovery itself, just as the property in the instruments or plates by which copies of a map are multiplied is distinct from the copyright of the map itself." And again, the enjoyment of the right in the discovery "may be secured and protected by National authority against all interference; but the use of the tangible property which comes into existence by the application of the discovery, is not beyond the control of State legislation simply because the patentee acquires a monopoly in his discovery." In accordance with the views thus expressed we can find no objection to the legislation of Virginia in requiring a license for the sale of the sewing machines, by reason of the grant of letters-patent for the invention. There is, however, an objection to its legislation arising from its discriminating provisions against non |