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better job of coordinating themselves if the functional approach is to produce a coherent system of international institutions. The special session of the General Assembly on economic issues scheduled for September of this year provides a useful opportunity for governments to clarify their objectives and improve their internal processes for the achievement of this purpose.


Now let me close by suggesting some fundamental things the United States should be doing in the United Nations and multilateral institutions generally.

One obvious and pressing need is to take a hard look at the way the American government is organized to cope with the present sweep of multilateral negotiations. Multilateral diplomacy increasingly cuts across the interests of many domestic departments. The effort to resolve foreign policy conflicts between agencies has led during the past decade to excessive concentration of power in the White House. The new practice of having cabinet officers like the Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury double as assistants to the President, with responsibility for directing policy in certain areas, offers a new opportunity to coordinate our approach to different multilateral negotiations, achieve consistent solutions to structural problems, involve the necessary disciplines and interest groups in the policy process, and exploit potential “trade-offs” between different negotiating sectors. The staff of the National Security Council (NSC) could be used more than it has been to achieve these objectives. Alternatively, a new senior White House aide could be appointed to discharge this responsibility.

Moreover, for many of the multilateral negotiations discussed earlier, we could establish an interagency task force as a sub-group of the NSC, with a supporting staff in the executive department most directly concerned with the subject matter. The model could be the NSC interagency task force on the law of the sea and the new office established in the State Department for the law of the sea negotiations. It would also be useful for many of the ongoing negotiations to appoint an outstanding professional from within the government or from private life to serve as Ambassador-at-Large to direct the U.S. negotiating team. Regular congressional consultation and private sector involvement through a working (not ceremonial) public advisory group-as is now the case on the law of the sea-could assure a more open and democratic policy-making process.

It is people, of course, not just boxes on organizational charts, that determine the effectiveness of a nation's policy process. Our ambassadors to the United Nations and other international agencies should be individuals with broad experience and deep substantive knowledge; their staffs should consist of the best talent our country can make available, not only from the foreign service but from the business, academic, professional and scientific communities. We will know we are serious about our "world order business" when we stop using positions in our missions and delegations to international agencies for political payoffs, and start applying the same requirements of excellence here that we apply in negotiations with the Russians and Chinese. Another test of our seriousness will be the extent to which we include in the very top structure of decision-making-in the White House and the key executive departments—persons experienced in and committed to the multilateral approach.

Third, we need to put a new emphasis on world order issues in our bilateral negotiations with former adversaries, nonaligned nations, and old allies. In particular, this would mean using our negotiating leverage to encourage the Russians and Chinese to take a more affirmative position on such matters as the law of the sea, international programs to curb population growth, U.N. peacekeeping and U.N. financing, and the reform of the decision-making processes along the lines mentioned earlier. This will be a difficult and long-term effort, but there will be a growing number of people in both countries who understand the necessity of tackling such issues in a cooperative and non-dogmatic way; we could strengthen their hand by the right kinds of initiatives. For example, we have created a dozen U.S.-U.S.S.R. bilateral commissions as the result of the summit meetings : we could use the SALT Commission to explore the possibilities of mutual nonintervention by the superpowers in Third-World areas and of limiting the spread of nuclear and conventional arms; we could seek support for global health and population programs in the bilateral health commission; and we could press in the environmental commission for Soviet cooperation in global efforts to curb whaling, protect ocean fisheries, and regulate land-based sources of marine pollution. We could place a similar priority on world order issues in our relations with the European countries and Japan both bilaterally and in

regional forums like NATO and OECD. And we could work harder to strike a "world order bargain" with the developing countries—showing more interest in their priorities in order to encourage their support for ours.

Most important of all, we need a more principled approach to the conduct of foreign policy. Instead of citing the U.N. Charter and other sources of international law when it suits our short-term interest and ignoring them when it does not, we would recognize our long-term interest in strengthening the norms and processes of a civilized world community. We would make a greater effort to use our armed force and economic power consistently with multilateral undertakings and with other sources of international law, submitting disputes wherever possible to third-party settlement. We would resort to unilateral action only in very exceptional circumstances where multilateral processes were clearly unavailable, and any unilateral action on our part would be carried out in a manner calculated to promote the restoration of multilateral processes. To be specific, we would abolish the CIA's "dirty tricks" department, avoid the excesses of unilateralism that characterized our Vietnam and Dominican interventions, do more to strengthen multilateral processes in foreign economic policy, and show a really objective concern with human rights questions on a global basis—whether within the borders of former adversaries, neutrals, allies or in our own society. This does not mean unilateral disarmament or ignoring valid concerns of national security. It does mean recognizing that national security can only be promoted from now on by achieving a better balance between traditional preoccupations with power relationships and emerging requirements of global order.

Implicit in all these recommendations is a redefinition of our foreign policy objectives. We would make it clear that a "structure of peace" cannot be achieved merely by maintaining a precarious balance between five power centers—that it requires strengthened international institutions at the global and regional levels in which all interested nations have a chance to participate. By making “world order business" our central preoccupation we could help rebuild support for our foreign policy at home and abroad by identifying our purposes more closely with those of the rest of mankind. By demonstrating a commitment to constructive internationalism, we could find common ground between generations as well as political parties.

Were we to commit ourselves fully to the multilateral approach, were we to enlist the energies of our Congress and our citizens, were we to exploit to the full what leverage we still have with other nations, we might begin, very gradually, to deflect the divisive tendencies of nationalism that are now emerging and to exploit the latent possibilities for strengthening the international system. Some may object that a generation of arduous and possibly futile negotiations on specific functional problems is not a very inspiring prospect to put before a democratic electorate. The road to world order is indeed a long and hard one, but since the short cuts do not lead anywhere we have no choice but to take it.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, now we will hear from Dr. Yeselson. [Dr. Yeselson's biography follows:]


Abraham Yeselson : 226 Grant Avenue; Highland Park, New Jersey 08904; Telephone: (201) 249-8232.

General data.-Born April 5, 1921, in New York City. World War II Veteran; Married; one daughter born June 5, 1960.

Degrees.-B.A., M.A., Rutgers University, 1946, 1947. Ph. D., Brown University, 1954.

Teaching experience.-Teaching Assistant, Brown University, 1948–50. Lecturer, Swarthmore College, 1950–51. Rutgers University, 1951 to present.

Ranks and titles.-Full Professor Political Science. Chairman, Political Science Department, University College, Rutgers—The State University. Chairman, Political Science Section (all 5 undergraduate colleges), Rutgers—The State University, 1966-68. Member, Graduate Faculty, Rutgers—The State University. Special Assistant to the Dean for Curricular Development and Long-Range Planning, 1969–70.

Courses taught in universities. International Organization (graduate and undergraduates courses) ; World Politics; World Communist; U.S. Foreign Policy; American Government; American Political Parties and Pressure Groups.

University committees. Have served on nearly all important College Committees and many University Committees, including the Presidential Search Committee, 1970–71.

Television series.--20 Half-hour lectures, "Communism: Evolution of a Revolution," on NBC-TV (series shown three times in New York City, 1964). 54 Half-hour lectures, "The Politics of Peace," on CBS-TV network, Summer, 1965. This is a historical treatment of the role of International Organization, emphasizing the United Nations. 54 Half-hour programs, "Eisenhower: America at MidCentury," for CBS-TV network, Summer, 1970. An analysis of the Eisenhower Administration and of the United States in the 1950s. 54 Half-hour programs, "East against West: The Cold War and Beyond,' for CBS-TV network, Summer, 1972.

Teaching experience abroad.-Fulbright Professor, University of Helsinki in Finland, 1959-60. Summer School, Tampere, Finland, 1960. Seminar in Political and Social Science, Nice, France, Summer, 1960. Fulbright Professor, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, University of Toulouse, France, 1967-68.

Lectures at Universities or with University-U.S.I.A. sponsorship, 1967–68.France: Institut d'Etudes Politiques in Montpellier, Aix-en-Provence, Bordeaux and Paris. Germany: Frankfort, Cologne, Hannover, Kiel, Regensburg, Berlin. Panel member at Conference on "The Dimensions of Science in Politics" at Locum. Finland: Helsinki Summer Institute.

Planned and participated in first Rutgers Summer Program in Israel (1970), a seven-week program for college credit which utilized the land and people of Israel, as well as the resources of the Hebrew University. Director, Rutgers Junior Year in France, 1973–74. Taught course in International Organization in Tourse.

Publications and scholarship.-Books: United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations. 1883–1921, Rutgers University Press, 1956. (with Charles Blackmore, eds.) The Fabric of Democracy, American Book Company. Second edition, a complete and enlarged revision, appeared in 1969. (with Anthony G. Gaglione) A Dangerous Place: United Nations as a Weapon in International Politics, Viking, 1974.

Articles: (with David Knapp) "Finland's Manager Plan,” National Civic Review, February 1961. “The Meaning of Israel in World Politics,Jewish News, September 8, 1961. "La Position Politique de la Cour Supreme Des Etats Unis,” La Justice (Paris, 1961). "A Third Party for Labor," Labor Education Viewpoints, Fall, 1961. "The Assessments Crisis in the United Nations," in The Fabric of Democracy (New York, 1966). "American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age,” in National Council of the Social Sciences Yearbook (New York, 1966). A revision of this article appeared in Blackmore and Yeselson, The Fabric of Democracy, Second Edition. Six articles on "The United Nations and the Middle East Crisis.” The Daily Home News, New Brunswick, New Jersey, June 25-June 30, 1967. "Les rapports entre les aspirants a la Presidence americaine et la question vietnamienne." La Revue des Sciences Polítiques (Toulouse), Summer, 1968. "Challenges To An Adult College,” Rutgers-The State University, 1971-72. (with Anthony G. Gaglione) “The UN: A Dangerous Place,” Worldview, January, 1975. (with Anthony G. Gaglione) "What Really Happened When Arafat Spoke at the UN,” Worldview, March, 1975 (with Anthony G. Gaglione) “The Use of the United Nations in World Politics," Intellect, April, 1975.

Present Research: The Impact of Politicization of Human Rights at the United Nations (book). North Against South: The Future of the United Nations (book).

Reviews: In American Political Science Review; Labor History; The Middle East Journal.

Professional Societies and Activities.—Rutgers University delegate to U.S. Mission to United Nations for briefings on United Nations Policy, 1963 to present. Labor arbitrator on panel of American Arbitration Association and New Jersey State Board of Mediation,

Lecturing and Consultations: Has given over 150 lectures and/or short courses on political subjects, and especially problems concerning labor, labor in politics, labor history, etc. (e.g. fifteen consecutive years, 1950–1964, lecturer at the University of Rhode Island Steelworker Summer Institute). He also served as consultant on labor problems for labor and management groups. Lecturer-Consultant to U.S. Department of Labor on programs involving teams of trade-unionists from Europe Africa, and Latin America. AT&T Seminar, 1969–1971. Planned, headed, and taught in "World Around Us” section of Seminar for AT&T Long Lines

Division executives. This seminar lasted for two weeks of each month and involved about 600 AT&T executives.

Research Grant: Rutgers Research Council Grant for Spring Semester, 1967, to make a study of the Relevance of the United Nations to the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. Faculty Study Leave, 1975–1976. To research materials on the role of the UN in respect to Human Rights and Economic and Social development.



Dr. YESELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators.
I have a short statement and I will keep within the allotted time.

I feel a bit like the wicked witch in this distinguished company, especially after hearing the first two addresses by Senator Fulbright and Mr. Gardner.

I am especially unhappy to disagree so much with Senator Fulbright because I borrowed his name three times as a Fulbright Professor and I am certainly indebted to him, but I think I might precede my statement by presenting my motivation.

Like so much of my generation I came out of World War II as an idealist and believed that that war had a meaning and that we could build a better world. I wrote a Master's thesis on world federalism and went to Brown University to study with the man I considered to be the outstanding expert in international organization, Leland Goodrich.

The CHAIRMAN. You speak of your war service and I just happened to think I served in World War I. You know that was the war to make the world safe for democracy.

Dr. YESELSON. Yes. Well, both of us may be suffering from disillusionment.

The CHAIRMAN. We must keep the faith.


Dr. YESELSON. In my case I am not here surfacing as a new Cord Meyer. What has happened to me is that over a long period of time I began to question the knowledge which had been imparted to me and the theories upon which they were based and I came out in a very funny place in a very uncomfortable place. I came out in a place which says in effect that the proper approach to the United Nations is not from the aspect of the ideals of the Charter or the principles of the organization, but that in order to understand what happens there and how the organization is used, and especially its impact on conflict, it's necessary to approach the organization from the point of view of the motivation of those who use the organization. It took me, perhaps because I am slow, some 15 years to ask a new question. The new question was, “who brings what issues to the United Nations and why?”

And from that perspective those explanations for what happened at the United Nations acquired a completely different meaning. I understood things better and I believe that I now have the basis for really analyzing how the United Nations contributes to conflict.

From this point of view I answer your fundamental question by saying, yes, the United Nations is working but it is not working for advancing the purposes of the Charter, the principles of the organization, and it is not working in the interests of American foreign policy.


I am not going to be presumptuous and try to advise you on what American foreign policy should be; but if we view the United Nations, we see clearly that it is now an instrument for the advancement of the foreign policy of those who can dominate it. The targets of attack are apartheid in South Africa, colonialism in Rhodesia and elsewhere such as Puerto Rico, Israel, and it is also used as a weapon for the advancement of particular economic approaches to the problems of north and south, rich against poor.

These are the issues which dominate the organization. They will continue to do so. Other issues will be added. The Panama Canal issue, the South Korean issue, retention of American troops there.

I think we can predict if relations become worse between the United States and China, and/or between China and the Soviet Union, that new issues involving China will be introduced—Chinese attacks on the Soviet Union in respect to border difficulties, on the United States in respect to Taiwan, perhaps the British in Hong Kong. In every instance, using various strategies which I cannot detail here, states advance national interests, introducing an issue into the United Nations is always for the achievement of a conflict purpose. The effect is always to embitter relations among the States and the impact on the conflict as a result of the introduction of this weapon is to widen the conflict and make it more difficult to solve peacefully and less likely that the dispute will be resolved.


From my peculiar point of view I find, for example, that the Middle East conflict is in large part a result of the United Nations intervention, and that if peace wiĩl be achieved there it will be achieved in spite of the United Nations.

This was precisely what Mr. Kissinger's mediation mission was all about, and I know what I have to say here will have to be subject to questions and perhaps emotional attacks, or what have you, but I think we can go into that a bit later.

The same is true in respect to the Koreans. After 25 years of resolutions at the United Nations, essentially in support of South Korea, if and when any normalization of relations will be achieved in the Koreas, it will be accomplished in spite of what has happened at the United Nations and not because of what has happened.

The same is true in respect to Kashmir.


The United States is now a direct or indirect target of majorities at the United Nations; but unlike other States, such as, say, South Africa, or Israel, who do not have the capacity to fight back, because they do not have the national strength and influence to do so, the United States does retain considerable influence. We demonstrated this by winning narrow victories in the 29th Assembly in respect to what I call the status politics involving the attempt to have Prince Sihanouk replace Lon Nol, and in defeating the effort to have American troops removed from South Korea.

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