visions of law and rules of the board which might be enforced relating to the appointment and compensation of teachers, estop him from attack- ing the constitutionality of the act in question, for he accepted the posi- tion subject only to valid and con- stitutional laws of the state. Ib.
Mandamus will lie to compel the president and business manager and clerk of the board of education of Toledo to sign and issue a warrant upon its treasurer for the full amount of salary coming to a teach- er, without deducting any part thereof, to apply to the school teachers' fund authorized by act 94 O. L., 683, the act being unconstitu- tional.
See also PUBLIC FUNDS.
It is competent for a state, by its legislature to provide that its agents and agencies, wherever throughout the state they may be situated, in the doing of a public work, shall pay the going wages wherever the work is to be done by day's work; and whenever it is to be done by con- tract, that the agent wherever sit- uated, shall put into the contract that it executes by authority of the state, a provision that the contractor shall pay such rate. Clements Brothers Construction Co. v. Cleve- land.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
The special act of the legislature of April 12, 1900, 94 O. L., 563, au- thorizing the board of education of a certain townsnip to pay to the
board of education of a special school district set off and created therein a sum of money equal to the equitable share due the latter from the township school fund, is an er post facto law in that it at- tempts to create and enforce a liabil- ity that did not before exist, and violates Sec. 28, Art. 2, of the con- stitution. State V. Board of Ed. 423
Where an act, local in its nature and its operation contains one sec- tion whose provisions, considered separately from the context, are "of a general nature," such section does not contravene Sec. 26, Art. 2, of the constitution. State v. Craig. 351
But this canon of construction does not apply where the revisory statute contains a repealing clause, limiting its operation upon the previous act.
The general rule of construction is, that where a later act covers the whole subject of an earlier act, and is plainly intended as a substitute for the former, the former act is im- pliedly repealed. Ib.
Section 8 of the salary law for Cuyahoga county, passed in 1889, 86 O. L., 264, was therefore not repealed by the revisory act of 1896, 92 O. L., 602, but remains in force as a con- stituent part of the salary law of said county. ib.
Where a statute is plain and unam- biguous (Sec. 4983, Rev. Stat., re- lating to limitation of actions for malpractice), it construes itself and whether its provisions are wise or equitable courts have no authority, by judicial construction, to read any- thing into or out of it. Fronce v. Nichols. 472
Section 2289a. Rev. Stat., curing irregularities in the passage of or- dinances in violation of Sec. 1694, Rev. Stat.. by passing several ordi- nances on one vote, is constitutional. Hutchinson v. Columbus.
Where an act repealing another act and providing a substitute there- for is found invalid the repealing clause must be found invalid, un- less it shall appear that the legisla ture would have passed the repeal- ing clause in any event. The legisla- ture by the act of April 19, 1898, 93 O. L.. 316, amending Sec. 384, Rev. Stat., relating to attachments before justices by limiting the jurisdiction of justices in certain countes named without otherwise changing the law
STREET RAILWAYS-
Where a steam railroad crosses a highway or a street, a street railway which has the right to lay its tracks in the street or highway may cross the tracks of the steam railroad with- out compensation to the steam rail- road company. Cincinnati & H. Elec. St. Ry. Co. v. Railway Co. 113 When a trolley wire of a street railroad crossing a steam railroad is placed twenty-five feet above the tracks of such stea railroad, the approval of the commissioner of rail- roads and telegraphs is not neces- sary under Sec. 3365-28, Rev. Stat., 93 O. L., 154, regulating the height of wires crossing steam railroads at twenty-five feet above the tracks and requiring the approval of such officer where trolley wires are placed at a lower height by agreement of those interested. Ib.
Streets railroads crossing steam railroads at grade are governed by Sec. 2503, Rev. Stat., requiring cross- ing frogs, and Secs. 3443-5 and 3443-7, requiring street cars to stop and a man to be sent ahead, before attempting to cross. Ib.
Therefore, an electric, suburban or interurban railroad is not required to prepare or present any interlock- ing or safety device for crossing a steam railroad at grade to the com- missioner of railroads before being entitled to make the crossing. Ib.
Section 247f, Rev. Stat., 93 O. L., 334, providing for interlocking or other safety devices at grade cross- ings where one railroad or an elec- tric railroad, crosses another, does not apply to street railroads cross- ing steam railroads at grade. Ib.
Suburban and interurban rail- roads, under Sec. 2780-17, Rev. Stat., 92 0. L., 17, having been classified by the legislature of the state of Ohio with street railroads, are governed by the laws relating to street railroads.
An ordinance granting an exten- sion of a street railway as an elec- tric passenger road to run in dif- ferent directions than the original
route, and providing that no in- crease of rates of fare shall be im- posed, etc., is valid. Cincinnati v. Street Ry. Co. 573
A company operating a street rail- way and the driver of a team of horses have equal rights at a street crossing, and the latter has the right, being at the crossing first, to go over the crossing ahead of the car, notwithstanding its speed must be retarded to prevent a collision. Toledo Eectric St. Ry. Co. v. West- enhuber. 22
Where a street car is stopped at a railroad crossing within the proper distance, to allow the conductor to go ahead and look out for approach- ing trains, as Sec. 3443-6, Rev. Stat., requires, it not being otherwise a regular stopping place for taking on or discharging passengers, the con- ductor and motorman of the street car are not required, as a matter of law, to look before the car is started again to see whetner any one is getting on, or about to get on the car. Packard v. Traction Co. 822
A person, who taking advantage of the stopping of the car, under such circumstances is in the act of get- ting on without giving notice of his intention of doing so, and is thrown off by the sudden jerk which is usual in starting an electric car, and dragged and injured, cannot have a verdict against him set aside on the ground that it is against the evi- dence. Ib.
See also HIGHWAYS.
use obstructs ingress and egress to and from their buildings and prem- ises, or interferes with their rights to light or air, in such manner as to cause some substantial injury. Ib. Where an ordinance accurately states the grade of a street improve- ment in feet and inches, and the notice served on a property owner sufficiently apprises him of it, it is immaterial whether the ordinance was properly passed, and having failed to file his claim for damages, within the time prescribed by stat- ute, no relief can be granted, not- withstanding it clearly and equi- tably appears he should be compen- sated for the damages done by the improvement. Jones v. Cincinnati. SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM-
Section 2781, Rev. Stat., providing that taxes on property omitted from the duplicate and subsequently en- tered thereon by the county auditor "shall be collected the same as other taxes" requires that such taxes shall be collected by the same methods and processes as other taxes, but not at the same periods for the semi- annual payments of taxes; that is, they are to be collected as delin- quent taxes, and it is the duty of the county treasurer after such taxes have been entered on the duplicate, to promptly institute proceedings for the collection of the same under Sec. 2859, Rev. Stat., by distraint otherwise, and an action so com- menced is not prematurely brought. Toledo Bridge Co. v. Yost.
It is the duty of the resident prop- erty owner to return his taxable property for taxation, but in order to render a return thereof a "false return," within the meaning of Sec. 2781, Rev. Stat., there must appear, if not a design to mislead or deceive on his part, at least culpable negli- gence. Ib.
Where there is no falsity in the returns of a taxpayer for taxes on property not returned, within the meaning of Sec. 2781, Rev. Stat., proceedings should be brought under Sec. 2742, Rev. Stat., and under no other section, and if brought under the section mentioned, the auditor
could not go back of the current year and enter upon his tax dupli- cate any alleged delinquent or omit- ted taxes for the years prior thereto, but if, in proceedings under such pro- vision, he finds omitted taxes of the current year, such taxes may be added by a method substantially, if not precisely, like that afforded by Sec. 2781, Rev. Stat., or a proceed- ing may be instituted under Sec. 2859, Rev. Stat., but in no event can taxes be collected back of the cur- rent year unless falsity in returns be established prior to the enact- ment of Sec. 2781a, Rev. Stat., March 22, 1900. Ib.
Material purchased in other states by a bridge manufacturing and con- struction company for use in its business in this state, which does not come to its factory to be changed or operated upon, but goes directly to the place of use, is subject to taxation under Sec. 2742, Rev. Stat., and a request to charge that all such property not produced at the factory, used in the construction of bridges generally, was properly refused. Whether such property not brought into or used in this state at all, is subject to taxation, quaere.
Where, in an action to recover omitted taxes, prior to the enact- ment of Sec. 2781a, Rev. Stat., the trial judge omitted to direct the jury that they could not enter into their verdict taxes for years prior to the current year unless upon a finding of false returns, and the verdict, in- cluding taxes for previous years re- turned without special findings, sug- gests, by omitting penalties, that the jury did not find that there had been false returns, a reviewing court, be- ing unable to be sure that the er- roneous charge did not result pre- judicially, should reverse the judg- ment. Ib.
Where courts, especially inferior courts, act without jurisdiction, either of the subject matter or the person, the act of the court is void and should be set aside whether it benefits the one who attacks the judgment or not. Hence, a bank, against whom taxes have been il- legally assessed, is not required to show that his property is taxed at more than its true value in money, but is entitled to enjoin the collec- tion of the amount irregularly as- sessed. Euclid Ave. Sav. & Banking Co. v. Hubbard. 179
Section 167, Rev. Stat., giving the auditor of state power to remit taxes and penalties and correct duplicates, does not afford a remedy at law or defeat the right to an injunction to prevent the collection of taxes legally imposed by the state board of equalization for banks in an amount exceeding one hundred dol- lars, it being a review by the same board of its action and contrary to the intent and purpose of such sec- tion. Nor was it intended that such section should apply to a case where the board acts without authority of law. The section referred to is di- rected to the correction of errors and oversights. Ib.
Under Sec. 2797, Rev. Stat., pro- viding for the valuation of land laid out in town lots between decennial periods, and requiring the lots to be entered on the duplicate in lieu of the land included therein, accord- ing to the valuation of the next pre- ceding decennial appraisement, neither the assessor nor the board of equalization has the right to in- crease the valuation of the platted property, where the valuation placed on the land by the acre at the pre- ceding decennial appraisement was fair as compared with the adjoining property. Ransom v. Potter. 478
There is no conclusive presump- tion that all appraisements of real estate in the decennial year were made as of the second Monday in April. State v. Auditor. 718
See also BOARDS OF EQUALIZATION; MANDAMUS; SCHOOLS; VERDICTS.
Whether or not petroleum or crude oil is a highly inflammable and dan- gerous substance, and a Constant menace to property in its vicinity, when stored in large quantities, are questions of fact to be determined by the jury; and when these ques- tions are determined in the affirma- tive, it is not ncessary to a recovery by a party whose property has been destroyed by fire arising from the escape of petroleum so stored, to show negligence upon the part of its owners, but such owners must keep the same upon their own premises at their peril. Langabaugh v. An- derson. 341
Whether the view of premises by the jury, provided for by Sec. 7283, Rev. Stat., be part of the trial or not, the accused may waive the priv- ilege of accompanying the jury, and it will not be improper for the jury to view the premises in the absence of the accused under such condi- ditions. Reighard v. State. 382
Section 7283, Rev. Stat., providing for a view of the premises where a crime has been committed, and di- recting the manner in which the jury shall be conducted to the place, makes no provision for the defend- ant, the judge or other officer con- stituting the court to accompany the jury; it makes no provision for anything that savors of a trial or the taking of evidence thereat. On the contrary, the view is not for е purpose of giving evidence to the jury, but is to enable them to under- stand and apply the evidence given in open court. However, if the ac- cused requests permission to ac- company the jury, he should be per- mitted to go.
Where a person accused of a crime is present in court, with counsel, and asks the court for an order to have the jury visit the premises where the crime with which he is charged was committed, and take part in the discussion, aiding in giv- ing directions as to the places to be visited, and the jury is taken from the court room in pursuance of such order without objection, request or intimation, by accused or counsel, that he desires to accompany them, and the view is had without any- thing improper having occurred, and upon the return of the jury, accused, through his counsel, in open court, expresses himself as satisfied with
Where counsel in his argument to the jury, in an action for personal injury, uses language calculated to prejudice the jury and divert their minds from the issues in the case on trial, and which should not have been used, but upon objection of op- posing counsel, and before the court has opportunity to interfere and ad- monish him, withdrew the statement and directed the jury to banish it from their minds, and the court in structed the jury that it was not proper argument, the judgment will not be reversed because of such mis- conduct of counsel. Cleveland City Ry. Co. v. Roebuck.
Where during the trial of a case the proceedings are frequently in- terrupted by reason of persons seek- ing naturalization before the fall election so that but little time each day was occupied in the actual trial of the case, and the trial was con- tinued several uays by consent of parties until after election when it is again taken up and proceeded with without interruption until con- cluded, the interruptions while un- fortunate and annoying to all con- cerned, no prejudice results to the defendant for which judgment will be reversed, especially not where the trial judge, having personal knowl- edge thereof, refuses to grant a motion for a new trial upon such grounds. Higgins v. Drucker. 220
Where a railroad train started out in good order and the brakes became gummed up, in the ordinary opera- tion of the train, and failed to op- erate properly, the case should go to the jury on the question whether the company was negligent or not, but should not be so submitted as to result in a shifting of the burden of proof upon the question of the ex- istence of the defect. Hill v. Rail- way Co.
Where, in an action to foreclose a chattel mortgage, the answer admits the averments of the petition, but by way of cross-petition sets up new matter as a defense, which consti- tutes the only issue on which the case goes to trial, the defendant is entitled to the opening and closing. Chicago Cottage Organ Co. v. Biggs. 497
Where it appears in the record of a criminal proceeding that the ac cused has been regularly found by a jury to be "not sane," before such accused can be put on trial under the indictment, the record should be made to show by an entry by the court that the steps provided for by Sec. 7243, Rev. Stat., relating to proceedings when accused is restored to reason, have been duly taken, and that the condition of the accused has changed from that of one "not sane" to that of the sane person. Brock v. State.
A charge, in an acuon for board, lodging and washing, that "I be- lieve there is one witness who testi- fies as to the value of services for board, lodging and washing, in which she testifies that the same are worth four dollars per week, you are, there- fore, in the absence of other testi- mony, bound to consider that as the value of the services," invades the province of the jury to give the evi- dence such credence and weight that under all the circumstances it was entitled to and is erroneous. Wil- son v. Brown. 719
Whether a child, not quite ten years old, walking upon a path used
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