John v. Connell at tax sales, said: "Now, what was the object of this legislation? It was designed as an incentive and an inducement to persons to purchase real estate offered for sale by county · treasurers for the nonpayment of delinquent taxes thereon, so that the state might collect its revenues and discharge its obligations; and the legislature, having in mind the abhorrence of the courts for all forfeitures, and the disposition upon their part to put a strict construction upon revenue laws which deprived the citizen of his property for a tax much less than its value, provided that in no event should a purchaser at a tax sale whose title failed lose his money. If one purchased at a tax sale real estate on which no tax was due at the time, then the county was to hold the purchaser harmless by reimbursing him the money he had paid out at such tax sale; and if the land was liable for taxation, if taxes were due and delinquent against the land, then the owner of a tax-sale certificate was declared to be the assignee and the owner of the liens which the public had against that land, and for which the public had sold or attempted to sell it." The doctrine of subrogation has its foundation in the principles of a natural equity. and it is quite probable that the legislature contemplated, as a matter of justice as well as of policy, that, when the public received payment of any taxes from a tax-sale purchaser, the right of the public-its lien for taxes-should be transferred to and vest in such purchaser. The holder of a tax-sale certificate pays subsequent taxes with the understanding that he will be subrogated to the rights of the public; and the county treasurer, the agent of the public, receives payment with a like understanding of the effect of the transaction. This being so, it would seem that the statute (section 116. art. 1, c. 77, Comp. St. 1899) should be given a liberal construction, with the view of making the intention of the parties effective. To permit the extinguishment of a tax lien when the tax is paid by the holder of the treasurer's certificate would tend to frustrate the policy of the state with respect to the collection of its revenues, and would benefit no one except the delinquent landowner, whose attempt to escape the burdens of government renders him undeserving of its solicitude. Our examination of the record has not revealed any vital infirmity in the proceedings which resulted in the levy of the sewer tax, and defendant has not pointed out or even suggested the existence of any substantial defect in such proceeding. We conclude, therefore, that the special sewer tax is valid, and that the court erred in not enforcing it. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to the district court to render a decree enforcing the lien for general taxes and for the special sewer tax. Judgment accordingly. MICHIGAN LAKE SUPERIOR POWER Co. v. ATWOOD, City Treasurer. (Supreme Court of Michigan, May 21, 1901.) [86 N. W. Rep. 139.] Taxation-Return of Assessment Rolls-Unpaid Assessments-Failure of City Treasurer to Make Oath.-Under Sault Ste. Marie City Charter, c. 21, § 9 (Loc. Acts 1889, p. 545), providing that the treasurer of the city of Sault Ste. Marie, on the 1st day of November in each year, shall return to the comptroller all assessment rolls the time of returning which has expired, with a statement on oath of the parcels on which the assessments have not been paid, the failure of the treasurer to make oath to the list so returned is an irregularity, of which advantage cannot be taken in an action of replevin to recover property taken under a warrant to collect an assessment. Same-Assessment by Comptroller-Taxes Declared a Debt-General and Special Assessments.-Sault Ste. Marie City Charter, c. 24, § 13 (Loc. Acts 1889. p. 553), provides that the comptroller of the city of Sault Ste. Marie shall assess the tax apportioned to the city according to the valuation in the assessment roll, and assess and levy in the same roll, in a separate column headed "Special Assessments," on the land, property, and persons chargeable therewith, all special assessments returned as delinquent; that the total of all taxes assessed against any one valuation or piece of property shall be footed up, and carried out in the last column of the roll; and that all taxes there assessed shall become at once a debt to the city from the person to whom they are assessed. Loc. Laws 1891, p. 932, § 14, authorizes a levy by distress and sale of the tax assessed under a warrant which commands the treasurer to collect the several sums mentioned in the last column of the roll. Held, that there is no distinction between the right of the treasurer to levy for special assessments and for other taxes. Same Collection-Distress-Abutter Acquiring Title Subsequent to Assessment.- Under Sault Ste. Marie City Charter, c. 24, § 13 (Loc. Acts 1889, p. 553), providing that all taxes when extended on the roll shall become at once a debt to the city of Sault Ste. Marie from the person to whom they are assessed, and Loc. Laws 1891, p. 932, § 14, providing that such taxes may be collected on a levy by distress and sale under a warrant to the treasurer, the treasurer may collect an assessment for a sewer in front of certain lots by levy on the personal property of the present owner of such lots in whose name the assessment is made, though such owner acquired title to the lots after the sewer was constructed. Case made from circuit court, Chippewa county; Joseph H. Steere, Judge. Action by the Michigan Lake Superior Power Company against Frank B. Atwood, city treasurer of the city of Sault Ste. Marie. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error. Reversed. John W. Shine, for appellant. Oren & Webster (George A. Cady, of counsel), for appellee. HOOKER, J. The plaintiff is a corporation organized for the purpose of constructing an hydraulic canal in the city of Sault Ste. Marie, and the defendant is the treasurer of said city. The action is replevin for two locomotives seized by the defendant under his tax warrant attached to the general tax roll of the city for the year 1899, and the plaintiff claimed Michigan Lake Superior Power Co. v. Atwood upon the trial, and the circuit judge found, that the warrant conferred no authority to seize property for the assessment in question. The defendant has brought error. In the year 1896 a special assessment roll was made, to cover the cost of a sewer constructed in 1895, and included various parcels of land owned by different persons, none of which were then owned by the plaintiff, or by Mr. Douglass, who afterwards took title to some of them in trust for plaintiff. The greater part of the sum assessed was not paid, and in September, 1897, the common council determined that the roll was invalid for certain reasons, and a new roll was ordered. This was made in 1898, and it was approved by the board of review in December of that year, and placed in the hands of the treasurer for collection. In November, 1899, the roll was returned to the city comptroller, who spread the uncollected sewer tax taken from this special roll upon the general tax roll of the city for the year 1899, acting under section 9 of chapter 21 of the charter (Loc. Acts 1889, p. 545), hereinafter quoted. The sworn statement required by section 9 was not filed with the comptroller. The plaintiff came into existence as a corporation in 1898. Douglass was its promoter and president, and took title to the land in question in trust for the company, subsequent to the making of the first special assessment roll; but whether before or after its organization does not clearly appear, but all the parcels were formally conveyed by him to the plaintiff on May 29, 1899, upon a nominal consideration. The finding shows that of the 17 parcels of land only one was assessed to the plaintiff on the special roll of 1898, though others were assessed to Douglass, its trustee. The plaintiff paid the other taxes, but did not pay these assessments. The failure of the treasurer to make oath to the statement of unpaid taxes was an irregularity, which is not available in an action of replevin, because the statute forbids that remedy when property is seized for the collection of a tax in obedience to the command of a valid tax warrant. See Lumber Co. v. Scott, 82 N. W. 76, and cases cited. Plaintiff asserts broadly that this portion of the tax appearing upon the general assessment roll cannot be lawfully collected by the distraint and sale of its personal property, and that, unless voluntarily paid, the only method of collection permitted by law is by a return of the same as delinquent, and sale of the lands. This must depend upon the provision of the charter. It is undeniable that the charter confers the power of distraining the property of the owner of lands to pay a special assessment upon said lands appearing upon a special assessment roll against him, and this does not depend upon his having been the owner at the time the improvement was determined upon or made. If it did, the collector would have no means of knowing whether or not the ownership had changed. He would be justified by his Michigan Lake Superior Power Co. v. Atwood warrant in distraining the property of the person charged with the tax upon his roll. This is also true in case of a reassessment, or when the uncollected assessment is carried upon the general roll. The warrant authorizes the collector to collect the tax, as mentioned in the last column of the general roll, by distress against the property of the apparent owner of the property taxed, as shown by the roll, and unless the law (which he must be presumed to know and understand) applies only to the current tax, and not to items of special assessment brought to and put upon the general roll from an uncollected special roll, he may distrain for both. Counsel seem to recognize this, and plant their case upon the claim that the charter should be construed as limiting the right to distrain personal property to the period of 60 days under the warrant attached to the special roll, and that the warrant upon the general tax roll gives no such authority as to the special assessments appearing there in a separate column as prescribed by law. Section 9 of chapter 21 and section 13 of chapter 24 of the charter must determine this question. They are as follows: "Sec. 9. On the first Monday of November in each year the treasurer shall return to the comptroller any and all special assessment rolls remaining in his hands, the time of returning for which shall have expired, together with a statement on oath of the parcel or parcels upon which the amounts assessed have not been paid." "Sec. 13. Upon the equalizing of the said assessment roll by the board of supervisors of Chippewa county the comptroller shall proceed to assess the tax apportioned to the said city according to and in proportion to the valuation entered by the board of review in the assessment roll of the city for the year. He shall further assess and levy in the same roll in a separate column or columns headed 'Special Assessments' upon the land, property and persons chargeable therewith all special assessments returned as delinquent by the city treasurer and remaining unpaid. * * * The total of all tax assessed against any one valuation or parcel of property shall be footed up and carried out in the last column on the right-hand side of such roll. All taxes there assessed shall become at once a debt to the city from the person to whom they are assessed." The latter section explicitly requires the inclusion of the special assessment in the footing contained in the last column on the right-hand side of the roll, and clearly makes all a debt to the city from the person assessed. Loc. Laws 1891, p. 932, § 14, authorizes a levy by distress and sale of the tax assessed under the warrant, which commands the treasurer to collect the several sums mentioned in the last column of the roll. We have, then, a case where the treasurer, in obedience to his warrant, has seized property for the collection of the amount remaining due of the aggregate of taxes as shown by Maxwell v. Auditor General the last column of his roll. as we have seen, and it as This the law explicitly authorizes, explicitly requires the contested items to be included in the aggregate contained in the last column. The judgment is reversed, and a new trial ordered. The other justices concurred. MAXWELL V. AUDITOR GENERAL et al. (Supreme Court of Michigan, Jan. 29, 1901.) Public Improvements-Assessments-Bill of Review-Setting Aside Decree. A decree setting aside certain taxes and assessments for local improvements in a city was properly set aside on bill of review filed by the city, where it was not made a party to the original suit. Appeal from circuit court, Bay county, in chancery; Byron A. Snow, Judge. Bill by the city of Bay City to review a decree which had been entered in plaintiff's favor in an action by Edna Maxwell against the auditor general and another. From a decree setting aside the judgment and dismissing the original petition, said Maxwell appeals. Reversed. A. C. Maxwell, for appellant. Horace M. Oren, Atty. Gen., for appellee auditor general. Brakie J. Orr, for appellee county treasurer. LONG, J. This proceeding is by petition in the above case for leave to file a bill in the nature of a bill of review against the complainant, Edna Maxwell, for the purpose of having a certain decree entered in said cause revised, reversed, and set aside; that the city of Bay City may be made a party defendant in the cause; that the cause may be reheard, and the city of Bay City given an opportunity to make a defense against the allegations contained in the original bill of complaint. The original bill was filed, as alleged in the petition, to set aside certain assessments upon property described in the bill for certain local improvements in Bay City, to wit, paving taxes for the year 1883, taxes for 1885 (being taxes for 1883 reassessed), paving taxes for the year 1894, 1895, 1896, and a sewer tax of 1898. The petition shows that, when the original bill was filed, subpoena was served upon defendant Smith in September, 1899; that the appearance of both defendants was entered by the then prosecuting attorney of Bay county; that the stipulations signed by the then prosecuting attorney, dated in December, 1899, admitted notice of hearing of the cause for the September term of 1899. This stipulation was filed in the cause in June, 1900. The petition states that the cause came on to be heard before Judge Snow of the Tenth judicial circuit; that no witnesses were examined, no testimony given or received to sustain the allegations con |