Слике страница
PDF
ePub

Town of Tonawanda v. Lyon

bear and are to the aggregate number of feet of frontage of all the lots of land so bounding on the portion of said street in front of which said improvement was made, was and were, and each and every of said provisions of said acts of the legislature of the state of New York, and all acts of said defendant, the town of Tonawanda, in levying said assessment in the manner and form aforesaid, are wholly unconstitutional and void as being contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States.

And thereupon the town of Tonawanda and John K. Patton as supervisor of said town were forever enjoined and restrained "from in any manner collecting or enforcing payment of such assessments against said complainant or his land or property.” 98 Fed. Rep. 361.

On January 17, 1900, an appeal from said decree to this court was prayed for and allowed.

Mr. John Cunneen for appellants.
Mr. Tracy C. Becker for appellee.

Messrs. Edward C. Mason and Ralph T. Kellogg, counsel for other landowners on this brief.

MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS delivered the opinion of the court: The complainant in the court below did not put his claim for equitable relief upon any allegation that, in the proceedings to pave Delaware street and to assess the cost of the improvement upon the abutting property, there had been any departure from the provisions of the statute, or that there had been attempted any discrimination against him or his property. Nor was it denied that it is the settled law of the state of New York that the method prescribed, of meeting the expense by apportioning the entire cost of such an improvement upon the abutting land according to the foot-front rule, is a valid exercise of legislative power. People ex rel. Griffin v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 55 Am. Rep. 266; Spencer v. Merchant, 100 N. Y. 585, 3 N. E. 682.

What was claimed was that a state statute which directs municipalities to assess the whole expense of paving any highway therein upon the lands abutting upon the highway so improved in proportion to the feet frontage of such lands, without providing for a judicial inquiry into the value of such lands and the benefits actually to accrue to them by the proposed improvement, is unconstitutional and void. And it was held by the court below that, notwithstanding the courts of the state may have held otherwise, it was its duty to follow the decision of this court in the case of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 43 L. Ed. 443, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 187, which was regarded by the court below as establishing the principle contended for, and accordingly the defendants were enjoined from enforcing payment of the assessment. But we think that, in so understanding and applying the decision in Norwood v. Baker, the learned judge extended the doctrine of that case beyond its necessary meaning,.

Town of Tonawanda v. Lyon

It was not the intention of the court, in that case, to hold that the general and special taxing systems of the states, however long existing and sustained as valid by their courts, have been subverted by the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The purpose of that Amendment is to extend to the citizens and residents of the states the same protection against arbitrary state legislation affecting life, liberty, and property, as is afforded by the 5th Amendment against similar legislation by Congress. The case of Norwood v. Baker presented, as the judge in the court in the present case well said, "considerations of peculiar and extraordinary hardships," amounting, in the opinion of a majority of the judges of this court, to actual confiscation of private property to public use, and bringing the case fairly within the reach of the 14th Amendment.

The facts disclosed by the present record do not show any abuse of the law, nor that the burdens imposed on the property of the complainant were other than those imposed upon that of other persons in like circumstances; and it is obvious, from expressions in the opinion of the trial judge, that he reached his conclusion because constrained by what he understood to be the principle established by the Norwood Case.

It is unnecessary to enter into an examination of the authorities on this subject, as that has recently been done in French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 181 U. S. -, post, 625. 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625, in error to the supreme court of the state of Missouri, and in Wight v. Davidson, on appeal from the court of appeals of the District of Columbia, in the former of which the effect of the 14th, and, in the latter, that of the 5th. Amendment was considered. 181 U. S. -, post, 616,

21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 616.

There were other questions passed upon in the trial court and discussed in the briefs, but the conclusion we now reach renders it unnecessary for us to consider them.

The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court with directions to dismiss the bill of complaint.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN (with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA) dissenting:

My views touching the general questions arising in this case have been expressed in French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 181 U. S., post, 625, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625, and in Wight v. Davidson, just determined, 181 U. S., post, 616, 21 Sup. Ct.. Rep. 616. I adhere to those views, and therefore dissent from the judgment in this case. As stated by the circuit court, the special assessment in question was "in the proportion which the number of front feet of each of said lots and parcels of land bounding and fronting on said Delaware street in front of which said improvement of paving said street was made, and which are assessed therefor in and by said.

Webster v. City of Fargo

assessment, bear and are to the aggregate number of feet of frontage of all the lots so bounding on the portion of said street in front of which said improvement was made." The case, therefore, is one in which, beyond question, private property is specially assessed by the front foot, in the interest of the whole public, for the entire cost of paving a highway, without reference to any special benefits accruing to it, and without the owner of the property being permitted to show that such cost amounts to the confiscation of his property to the extent that it substantially exceeds special benefits, or that it exceeds the value of the property assessed.

The court says that it was not the intention of this court in Norwood v. Baker to hold "that the general and special taxing systems of the states, however long existing and sustained as valid by their courts, have been subverted by the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States." The contrary was not asserted by the learned judge of the circuit court, nor has anyone in this case contended that the 14th Amendment subverted the taxing systems of the states. But it was contended, and such is my position, that nothing can be done by or under the authority of a state in violation of that Amendment. After that Amendment became part of the Constitution, the only provisions in the state taxing laws or systems that ceased to have operation were those that were inconsistent with the Amendment. No one, I assume, will dispute that proposition.

The court also says that the purpose of the 14th Amendment "is to extend to the citizens and residents of the states the same protection against arbitrary state legislation affecting life, liberty, and property as is afforded by the 5th Amendment against similar legislation by Congress.' I assent most cordially to this view, and therefore, in another case, felt obliged to express my objection to the intimation that possibly that might be done by Congress under the due process clause of the 5th Amendment which could not be done by a state under the same clause of the 14th Amendment.

MORTIMER WEBSTER, Plff. in Err., v. CITY OF FARGO
and Others.

(Argued and Submitted February 25, 26, 27, 1901. Decided April 29, 1901.) [21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 623.]

Constitutional Law-Local Assessments-Front-Foot Rule.* It is within the power of the legislature of a state to create special taxing districts, and to charge the cost of a local improvement, in whole or in part, upon the property in said district, either according to valuation or to superficial area or frontage.

*See note to French v. Barber Asphalt Pav. Co., ante, p. 1; note to Fay v. Springfield, 2 Mun. Corp. Cas. 183; note to Adams v. Shelbyville, 3 Mun. Corp. Cas. 652.

Webster v. City of Fargo

In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota to review a decision affirming a judgment dismissing a complaint in an action for an injunction against an assessment. Affirmed.

See same case below, 82 N. W. 732.

Statement by MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS:

This was an action brought by Mortimer Webster in the district court in and for the county of Cass and state of North Dakota, against the city of Fargo: James M. Fargo, as auditor of said city; D. C. Ross, as treasurer, and G. J. Olson, as auditor, of Cass county, in which the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from enforcing an assessment for grading and paving against certain lots or pieces of land belonging to the plaintiff, and abutting on the streets of the city of Fargo.

It was admitted, and indeed, alleged, in the complaint, that "each and every of the acts and proceedings required to be done and taken by the statutes of said state of North Dakota in making and return of said assessment, as aforesaid, were duly taken and done," but it was alleged that the state statutes, under which the work was done and the assessment made. were in violation of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in that they prescribed for paying for grading and paving the streets, by an assessment upon abutting lots by the foot-front rule.

The defendants demurred to the complaint upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrer, and, as the plaintiff declined to amend, entered a judgment dismissing the complaint. From this judgment an appeal was taken to the supreme court of the state of North Dakota, which court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint. A writ of error from this court was thereupon allowed by the Chief Justice of the supreme court of the state of North Dakota.

Messrs. Seth Newman and B. F. Spalding for plaintiff in

error.

Mr. S. B. Pinney submitted the case for defendants in error, and Messrs. John E. Green and H. F. Miller were with him on the brief.

MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS delivered the opinion of the court: It is conceded in this record that the plaintiff in error has no ground to complain of any discrimination attempted against him, either in the statutes of the state or in the proceedings thereunder, whereby the tax in question was assessed against his property. The sole contention on his behalf is that, under the decision of this court in the case of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 43 L. Ed. 443. 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 187, all special assessments upon the basis of frontage are in violation of the 14th Amendment to the constitution of the United States,

City of Detroit v. Parker

in that they may result in the taking of property without due process of law.

But we agree with the supreme court of North Dakota in holding that it is within the power of the legislature of the state to create special taxing districts, and to charge the cost of a local improvement, in whole or in part, upon the property in said district, either according to valuation or superficial area or frontage, and that it was not the intention of this court, in Norwood v. Baker, to hold otherwise.

It is unnecessary to enter upon an examination of the authorities, as that has recently been done in the case of French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 181 U. S. —, post, 625, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625; and, upon the authority of that case, the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Dakota is affirmed. For dissenting opinion, see Cass Farm Co. v. Detroit, 181 U. S., post, 645, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 645.

CITY OF DETROIT and Others, Appts.. v. RALZEMOND A.
PARKER.

(Argued February 25, 26, 27, 1901. Decided April 29, 1901.)

[21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 624.]

Constitutional Law - Local Assessments - Front-Foot Rule.*— An assessment of the cost of a street improvement, made arbitrarily according to the front foot, is not in violation of the Constitution of the United States for failure to provide any hearing or review thereof at which the property owner can show that his property was not benefited to the amount of the assessment.

Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan to review a decision granting an injunction against assessments and tax sales. Reversed.

See same case below, 103 Fed. Rep. 357.
The facts are stated in the opinion.

Messrs. Timothy E. Tarsney and C. D. Joslyn, for appellants.
Mr. Elbridge T. Bacon, for appellee.

MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS delivered the opinion of the court: This was the case of a bill in equity filed in the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Michigan by Ralzemond A. Parker, a citizen of the state of Michigan, against the city of Detroit and certain officers of said city, seeking to set aside certain assessments and tax sales of complainant's land for the paving of Woodward and Blaine avenues in the city of Detroit. The paving in question was done in pursuance of certain statutes of the state of Michigan, constituting the charter of the city of Detroit, and of ordinances of the common council of said city.

*See note to French v. Barber Asphalt Pav. Co., ante, p. 1; note to Fay v. Springfield. 2 Mun. Corp. Cas. 183; note to Adams v. Shelbyville, 3 Mun. Corp. Cas. 652.

« ПретходнаНастави »