Holmes v. City of Atlanta E. 135, that: "The municipal government of Atlanta, though invested by statute with plenary powers over the subjects of streets, sewers, drainage, water supply, and sanitation, has no right to create and permanently maintain a nuisance dangerous to health and life, which nuisance consists of openings called 'manholes' in a sewer located in a public street contiguous to the dwelling of a citizen, the manholes being allowed to emit poisonous gases in large quantities through perforated covers placed over them." Where a nuisance is not of a permanent and continuing character, but such as a city may at will abate, a citizen has no right to assume that the same will be maintained indefinitely. His remedy, therefore, is not to recover in one action all past and future damages, but to bring from time to time separate suits for recurring injuries sustained, instituting each within the period prescribed by the statute of limitation for taking steps to recover damages actually suffered up to the time the action is filed. City Council v. Lombard, 101 Ga. 724, 28 S. E. 994. The present case is distinguishable from that of Atkinson v. City of Atlanta, 81 Ga. 625, 7 S. E. 692. There it appeared that the plaintiff brought against the city an action for damages which she alleged she had sustained "from the grading of certain streets and the construction of certain sewers by the city, by reason of which a large body of water was emptied upon her lots, and her property thereby injured." There was no suggestion on her part that the public improvements made were unauthorized; that there was no necessity, in carrying them into effect, to impose upon her land the servitude complained of: or that the work was unskillfully and negligently done. It did not, therefore, appear that the city had ventured beyond its corporate powers in thus throwing uncontaminated water upon her premises; and, while she undoubtedly became entitled to compensation for the damages incurred in subjecting her property permanently to an authorized public use, she allowed her cause of action to become barred by the lapse of time. She could not, of course, by arbitrarily characterizing as a nuisance a lawfully inaugurated flow of pure water over her land, take her case out of the operation of the statute of limitations. See, in this connection, the remarks of Blandford, J., who, in pronouncing the opinion of the court in that case, took occasion to differentiate it from that of Smith v. City of Atlanta, supra, by pointing out the fact that in the case last mentioned it appeared that the city, without any authority of law, caused surface water charged with filth to be "thrown upon the plaintiff's land, producing noxious scents and sickness, and rendering his premises untenantable." Let the plaintiff in the present case be afforded a fair opportunity to show by competent evidence whether or not, in point of fact, the city has been maintaining the alleged grievous nuisance of which he in his dismissed petition complained. Judgment reversed. All the justices concurring. HILL et al. v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS et al. (Supreme Court of Missouri, Dec. 18, 1900.) [60 S. W. Rep. 116.] Sewer Contractors-Special Tax Bills-Additional Remedies-Validity of Ordinance Prohibiting Connections.-St. Louis City Charter, art. 6, $22, provides that sewer contractors shall be paid by special tax bills against adjacent property, which are liens thereon, enforceable by suit. Article 3, 26, gives the city power to construct sewers, etc., and “to regulate the use thereof." Held, that the city had power to enact an ordinance (Rev. Ord. 1893, § 1630) prohibiting connections with sewers by owners of property against which there were unpaid sewer assessments, notwithstanding this gave the contractor an additional remedy for enforcing payment of special tax bills; there being nothing in the charter making the remedy provided by section 22 exclusive. Validity of Ordinance Which Aids in the Collection of a Private Debt. -The validity of the ordinance is not affected by the fact that it aids in the collection of a private debt and is not for the benefit of the public, in that the sum charged for the privilege of connecting with the sewer is not used in paying for sewer repairs and incidental expenses; section 22 requiring such repairs and expenses to be paid out of the general revenue. Validity of Ordinance Prohibiting Connections.* The ordinance is not invalid because the city requires all water-closets to be connected with sewers, and because if this were not done a nusiance would result; the house owner not being compelled to have a water-closet in his house. In banc. Appeal from St. Louis circuit court; John A. Talty, Judge. Suit by John Hill and others against the city of St. Louis and another. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal. Affirmed. This is a suit in equity to restrain the city of St. Louis and its sewer commissioner from issuing permits to the owners of property in Hodiamont sewer district, No. 1, to connect with the said district sewer, until the special taxes due plaintiffs as the contractors with the city and the builders of said sewer are paid. The petition shows that the city of St. Louis duly enacted a general ordinance which prohibited the connection of any private sewer with a public or district sewer unless a permit for the connection was first issued by the sewer commissioner, and which further prohibited the issue of a permit by the sewer commissioner for a sewer connection while an assessment made against the property to be drained for the construction of the district sewer remained unpaid; that while this ordinance was in force the city of St. Louis duly provided for the construction of a district sewer in Hodiamont sewer district, No. 1, and entered into a contract with the plaintiffs for the construction of that sewer; that thereon the sewer was constructed by the plaintiffs, and special tax bills issued to them in accordance with the charter of the city; that, in entering into this contract and in carrying it out, the plaintiffs relied upon the ordinance above mentioned; that *See Slaughter v. N. O'Berry, 48 L. R. A. 442, and note. Hill v. City of St. Louis a large number of the tax bills issued to the plaintiffs as aforesaid, to wit, tax bills amounting to more than $25,000, remain unpaid; that the plaintiffs have duly demanded payment from the owners against whom these tax bills were issued, but that such owners deny the validity of the tax bills issued against their property, and accordingly refuse payment; that these owners desire and intend to avail themselves of the sewers constructed by the plaintiffs, and to connect their respective lots and the dwellings erected thereon with these sewers, notwithstanding their denial of the validity of the tax bills and their refusal to pay the same; that the defendants, the city of St. Louis and the said sewer commissioner, pretend that said city had not the legal power or capacity to enact said ordinance, and on that ground refused to enforce any of its said provisions, and that the said sewer commissioner threatens and is about to issue, and unless restrained by injunction will issue, to each and every of the said owners a permit for sewer connection with said sewers, notwithstanding the failure and refusal of such owners to pay the tax bills issued against their lots, respectively; that, if the ordinance were enforced by the defendants, all the said unpaid tax bills would be paid at once, but that, if the same is not enforced, said permits will be issued to the owners against whose lots said unpaid special tax bills have been severally assessed, and that the plaintiffs will be deprived of the protection and benefit resulting from the ordinance, and will be put to the expense of $3,000 in the collection of said unpaid tax bills, which would otherwise be avoided and saved; and that the plaintiffs are without adequate remedy at law. To this petition the defendants interposed a general demurrer, which was overruled by the court, and thereon defendants refused to plead further, and judgment was entered against them. From this judgment the defendants have appealed to this court. B. Schnurmacher and Chas. C. Allen, for appellants. Collins, Jamison & Chappell and D. Goldsmith, for respondents. MARSHALL, J. (after stating the facts). 1. The city and its sewer commissioner base their action as to issuing permits to persons in the district to connect with the district sewer, notwithstanding such persons have never paid the assessment against their property for the building of such district sewer, solely upon the decision of the St. Louis court of appeals in the case of State ex rel. Peck v. Hermann, 3 Mo. App. Rep'r, 400. Section 1630, Rev. Ord. St. Louis 1893, provides: "No permit for a sewer connection under the preceding section shall be issued, if the property to be drained by the proposed sewer, or any part thereof, has ever been assessed for the construction of district sewers, until such assessment has been paid," etc. In the Peck Case it appeared that the property of relator had been assessed for the construction of this Hodiamont district sewer; that she had Hill v. City of St. Louis not paid such assessment; that she applied to the sewer commissioner for a permit to connect with the district sewer, and the sewer commissioner refused to issue the permit because, under said section 1630, Rev. Ord. St. Louis, she had not paid such assessment. She thereupon commenced a proceeding by mandamus to compel the sewer commissioner to issue the permit. The circuit court granted a peremptory writ of mandamus as prayed, and the sewer commissioner appealed to the St. Louis court of appeals. That court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, and held that said section of the city ordinance was void, for two reasons: First, because the city charter (section 22, art. 6) provides for the construction of district sewers, and the assessment of the cost thereof against the property in the sewer district; provides that the contractor who builds the sewer shall be paid by special tax bills against such property in such district, makes such tax bills a lien on the property, and provides for their enforcement by suit. Hence the remedy thus afforded the contractor was exclusive, and the municipal assembly had no power to amend the city charter and enlarge the contractor's remedy as section 1630 attempted to. And, second, because, while the city charter (section 26, art. 3) gives the city express power to construct and keep in repair all bridges, streets, sewers, and drains, and "to regulate the use thereof," still section 1630 is void, because, "if it be conceded that, under the power to regulate, the city may exact the payment of a sum of money for the privilege of connecting a private sewer with a public one, to make such exaction a valid regulation the sum to be taken shall be for the benefit of the public sewers, to be used in making repairs, for inspection, or to defray some other expense which the city may be put to, to maintain and keep the system in good repair and working order, and not for the use and benefit of some private person. The sum demanded of the respondents under the ordinance was not for the benefit of the city, not to pay any debt or discharge any obligation for which the city was legally or morally bound, but a demand that they should first pay a private debt due to a private individual, and to discharge a lien on their property. The ordinance is not one to regulate the use of sewers, but its purpose is to force payment of private debts. This is beyond the jurisdiction of the city," etc. The court of appeals recognizes the force of the decisions of this court in School Dist. v. Livers, 147 Mo. 580, 49 S. W. 507, and Board v. Woods, 77 Mo. 197, which held that it is within the power of school boards to require its contractors for the erection of its school buildings to give bond to secure the claim of subcontractors and material men, notwithstanding they would have no claim against the school boards and no mechanic's lien on the buildings; but the court of appeals draws a distinction between those cases and the case at bar, and says the power existed in those cases because the subcon Hill v. City of St. Louis tractors and material men would otherwise be without an adequate remedy, whereas in this case the contractor who built this sewer has a full, complete, and adequate remedy, by his special tax bills being a lien on the land in the sewer district and being enforceable at law. With great respect for the learned judge who wrote the opinion of the St. Louis court of appeals, we think he fell into error in that case, and that his decision is not supported by principle and is contrary to precedents. The charter of St. Louis provides that the cost of constructing district sewers shall be assessed as a special tax against the property in the sewer district, and that the contractor shall have no claim against the city for doing such work, but must receive tax bills for his pay, and that such tax bills shall be liens on the property, and may be enforced by suit. These charter provisions are valid and constitutional regulations. Heman v. Allen (Mo. Sup.) 57 S. W. 559. But there is nothing in the charter of St. Louis which, either in express terms, or by necessary implication or by reasonable intendment, makes the remedy thus given the contractor an exclusive remedy. Neither can the courts say it is such an adequate and complete remedy as to preclude the city, under the power conferred upon it by section 26 of article 3 of its charter, from enacting by ordinance other regulations for the use of the sewers which may have the effect of affording another remedy for enforcing the payment of such special tax bills. The fact that an existing state law provides a remedy does not prevent a municipal corporation from enacting another remedy as to a municipal matter, if it has the power to so enact, given it by its charter, either in express terms, or by necessary implication from the powers. conferred. City of St. Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61; Same v. Schoenbusch, 95 Mo. 618, 8 S. W. 791; Manker v. Faulhaber, 94 Mo. 430, 6 S. W. 372; State v. Walbridge, 119 Mo. 383, 24 S. W. 457; Ex parte Kilbury, 10 Mo. App. 442; Kansas City v. Hallett, 59 Mo. App. 160; State v. Noland, 111 Mo., loc. cit. 484, 19 S. W. 715; Same v. Slover, 113 Mo. 202, 20 S. W. 788; Rogers v. Jones, I Wend. 237. The decision of the court of appeals in the Peck Case gives full force to section 22 et seq. of article 6 of the charter, as to the method of constructing sewers, but it overlooks the power conferred upon the municipal assembly of that city, by section 26 of article 3, by ordinance "to construct and keep in repair all bridges, streets, sewers and drains, and to regulate the use thereof." If it had been the intention of the charter to make the remedy provided by section 22 et seq. of article 6 an exclusive remedy, the provisions of section 26 of article 3, giving the municipal assembly power, by ordinance, "to construct and keep in repairs sewers, etc., would not have been put into the organic law, but the provision would have been limited to power, by ordinance, to regulate the use of sewers after they were constructed as provided for by * * * |