Abstracts Broffee v. City of Grand Rapids. (Supreme Court of Michigan, June 4, 1901.) Defective Sidewalk-Personal Injuries-Presentation of Claim-Limitation Operation of Charter. Rev. Charter Grand Rapids, tit. 4, § 8, which is not retroactive, and which requires notice of an injury arising from a defective sidewalk to be presented to the common council within sixty days, and requires suit to be brought within one year after the council has had reasonable time to investigate the claim, does not apply to a claim for injuries received before the charter went into effect. Error to superior court of Grand Rapids; Allen C. Adsit, Judge. Suit by Bridget Broffee against the city of Grand Rapids for injuries alleged to have been received from a defective sidewalk. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant brings error. Affirmed. Lant K. Salsbury, for appellant. McKnight & McAllister, for appellee. It is insisted plaintiff's right of action was barred by her failure to present her claim. Counsel say: "The charter amendment of 1895, requiring the presentation of damage claims to the common council, dealt with the remedy only, and did not affect the right of action. It was the purpose of the amendment to allow the city authorities an opportunity to investigate the circumstances of the alleged injury before the evidence in the matter became lost, or obscured, or subject to distortion; and such a regulation is reasonable and valid. Selden v. Village of St. Johns, 114 Mich. 698, 72 N. W. 991; Davidson v. City of Muskegon, III Mich. 454, 69 N. W. 670; Mason v. City of Muskegon, 111 Mich. 687, 70 N. W. 332." A reference to these cases will show that the injury occurred after the charter provisions became law, and they are not controlling in this case. There is nothing in the provisions of the charter to indicate it was intended to be retroactive. If the contention of the counsel for the city is to prevail, persons having claims against the city would not be upon an equal footing. In the case at bar, if plaintiff's claim that she was injured on the 20th of May is true, she would have but 53 days after the law took effect in which to present her claim, while, if she had been injured 50 days earlier, she would have had but 3 days to present her claim, while persons receiving injuries after this charter provision became operative would have the full 60 days. We do not think the statute should be given a construction which will lead to such results. The case is governed by Angell v. City of West Bay City, 117 Mich. 685, 76 N. W. 69, and cases there cited. The judgment is affirmed. The other justices concurred. Defective Sidewalk-Notice of Injury. This is an action for damages caused by a defective sidewalk. It appears from the allegations of the complaint that the plaintiff signed the notice and statement of her claim with the initials of her husband's name, instead of her own: held, that the notice was prima facie sufficient. (Syllabus by the Court.) Appeal from district court, Rice county; Thomas S. Buckham, Judge. Action by Cora V. Terryll against the city of Faribault. Action dismissed. From an order granting a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Thomas H. Quinn, for appellant. Batchelder & Batchelder, for respondent. START, C. J. This action was brought in the district. court of the county of Rice to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff by reason of a defect in a sidewalk of the defendant city. On the trial of the cause the defendant objected to the introduction of any evidence, "on the ground that the party suing and the party who gave the notice is not the same party." The trial court sustained the objection and dismissed the action. The plaintiff then made a motion for a new trial, and the defendant appealed from an order granting it. damages * * * * * * * * * * * council, The only question presented by the record for our decision is whether the allegations of the complaint show a substantial compliance with the provisions of chapter 248, Laws 1897, the here material provisions of which are these: "Before any city shall be liable to any person for the person so alleged to be injured, or some one in his behalf, shall give to the city within thirty days after the alleged injury, notice thereof; and shall present his or their claim to compensation to such council or governing body in writing stating the nature of the relief demanded from the city, and such body shall have ten days' time within which to decide upon the course of action it will pursue with relation to such claim." The complaint alleges that the plaintiff caused notice of her injury and a written statement of her claim to compensation therefor to be given to the city council of the defendant, and that such council considered her claim and rejected it. The complaint then sets out in full the written notice and statement by her so presented to and acted upon by the council, from which it appears that the plaintiff complied with the statute in all substantial respects, except the notice and statement was signed, "S. G. X Terryll," with two subscribing witnesses. The complaint then alleges that "the initials preceding the surname of plaintiff, as subscribed to such notice, were the her mark. Abstracts initials of her husband, which she ordinarily employs in writing her name; her own Christian name being Cora V. as it appears in the entitling clause of this complaint." It thus clearly appears upon the face of the complaint that the party suing and the party who gave the notice are one and the same person, and the only question is whether the plaintiff must be turned out of court on the statement of her complaint because she did not sign her name to the notice with strict accuracy. We answer the question in the negative. If the allegations of the complaint be true, it is not apparent how the defendant could have been prejudiced by the mistake in the initials. The complaint shows on its face a prima facie compliance with the statute as to giving notice of the plaintiff's injury. Order affirmed. Second Appeal-Law of Case.-A former decision in this case (84 N. W. 458, 81 Minn. 519) with respect to the sufficiency of the notice of a claim for damages given pursuant to chapter 248, Laws 1897, followed. Defective Sidewalk-Amount of Recovery Not Limited to Amount Claimed in Notice of Injury.-In an action against a city or village for damages for injuries caused by a defective street, the injured party is not limited in his recovery to the amount claimed in his notice, given pursuant to chapter 248, Laws 1897. While that statute requires the notice to contain a specification of the compensation claimed, the injured party is not concluded by the amount stated therein, but may recover his actual damages. (Syllabus by the Court.) Appeal from district court, Rice county; Thomas S. Buckham, Judge. Action by Cora V. Teryll and others against the city of Faribault. Verdict for plaintiff. From an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Thomas H. Quinn, for appellant. Batchelder & Batchelder, for respondent. BROWN, J. This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defective condition of a sidewalk in defendant city. Plaintiff had a verdict in the court below, and defendant appealed from an order denying a new trial. Two questions are presented for consideration: (1) Whether the notice or claim for damages served upon the city pursuant to the provisions of chapter 248, Laws 1897, was sufficient; and (2) whether plaintiff is concluded with respect to the amount of recovery by the sum claimed in such notice. The case was here on a former appeal, and the notice of claim for damages was then held sufficient. 81 Minn. 519, 84 *For former opinion see preceding case. Abstracts N. W. 458. That decision, whether right or wrong, must be treated as the law of the case, and the question cannot be reexamined at this time. Chapter 248, supra, provides that before any city or village in this state shall be liable to any person for damages for or on account of any injury alleged to have been received or suffered by reason of any defect in any bridge, street, road, or sidewalk, the person so alleged to have been injured, or some one in his behalf, shall give to the city or village council, within 30 days after the injury, notice thereof, and shall present his claim for compensation to such council, stating therein when and where, and the circumstances under which, he was injured, and the amount of compensation demanded. By the notice served in this case plaintiff claimed the sum of $500 as compensation for her injuries, but subsequently brought her action to recover $1,000. The trial court was requested to instruct the jury that she was limited to the amount claimed in the notice, and could recover no more. The instruction was refused, and the refusal is assigned as error. We are of opinion that the learned trial court was right, and that plaintiff was not limited in her recovery to the amount claimed in the notice. The object and purpose of the statute requiring the notice to be given is to furnish information to the municipal authorities of the happening of the accident, and that a claim for damages is made therefor, to enable the authorities to make timely investigation into the cause of the accident, the nature and extent of the injuries claimed to have been received, and, if the municipality be found liable, to make settlement and payment of the claim. No reason occurs to us why the recovery in an action for such injury should be limited to the amount claimed in the notice. The case cited from Iowa,-Marsh v. Benton Co., 75 Iowa, 469, 39 N. W. 713, -though apparently in point, does not seem to us in harmony with the general principles of law in analogous cases, and we cannot follow it. An attorney frequently presents a bill to his client for services rendered making claim to a definite and specific sum, and, when the client refuses or fails to pay, action is brought to recover a much larger amount. It was held in Wilson v. Railroad Co., 31 Minn. 481, 18 N. W. 291, that the attorney was not bound by the bill rendered by him. See, also, Allis v. Day, 14 Minn. 516 (Gil. 388). The same rule should apply in all cases where specific claim is made for unliquidated damages, and we are of opinion that it does. The question has arisen in other courts, and the decisions have been adverse to appellant's contention, and to the effect that a party is not bound by the amount stated in his notice or claim, in case he is compelled to bring an action to enforce his rights. Minick v. City of Troy, 83 N. Y. 514; Reed v. City of New York, 97 N. Y. 620; City of Wyandotte v. White, 13 Kan. 191. Order affirmed. Abstracts McLean v. City of Boston. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk, Nov. 20, 1901.) [61 N. E. Rep. 758.] Personal Injuries-Sufficiency of Notice.-A sufficient notice of personal injuries given a municipal corporation within 30 days is not ineffectual because plaintiff has given an insufficient one before, and has failed for 5 days to comply with its request for a further notice. Exceptions from superior court, Norfolk county; Robert R. Bishop, Judge. Action by Margaret McLean against the city of Boston. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings exceptions. Overruled. It appeared that plaintiff first served a notice of injury on defendant which was defective in not stating the place of injury, but later, and within 30 days, filed a sufficient notice. The defendant requested the court to rule that, the plaintiff having served a notice on the city which was defective, and having been served with a notice requesting a further notice which should comply with the law, and the plaintiff not having given a further written notice within five days of the receipt of said request, the plaintiff could not recover. The court refused so to rule, the jury found for the plaintiff, and defendant excepted. David W. Murray and Wm. F. Nagle, for plaintiff. PER CURIAM. A sufficient notice given within 30 days is none the worse that the plaintiff has given an insufficient one before. Exceptions overruled. Fiske Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. City of Boston. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk, April 13, 1901.) [60 N. E. Rep. 7.] 5, Injuries to Wharves and Docks-Driftwood -Presentation of Claim Not a Condition Precedent to Right to Sue.-St. 1875, c. 185, providing that the board of park commissioners shall estimate and determine all damages sustained by any persons by the taking of land, or other acts of said board in the execution of the power vested in them, applies only to cases where land is taken by eminent domain; and hence the owner of a dock which has been injured by parts of an old wharf taken apart by order of such board being allowed to drift into and to the bottom of the dock is not required to petition for damages, as a condition to his right to sue the city in tort. Appeal from superior court, Suffolk county. Action by the Fiske Wharf & Warehouse Company against the city of Boston. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Saml. M. Child, for appellant. Henry F. Strout, for respondent. LORING, J. We understand that it is agreed by the parties that the old wharf was removed by the board of park |