Abstracts city from collecting a similar tax upon appellant's property for the year 1891. The petition contains some other averments tending to show personal animosity against appellant by a member of the council, in refusing to vote for an ordinance excluding its property from the city limits. These averments we do not regard as in any way material to the case. The court, upon final hearing, sustained a demurrer to the petition, and, appellant declining to plead further, its petition was dismissed. The objection that the city boundary is uncertain does not seem to us to be well taken. The case of Board v. Scott (Ky.) 42 S. W. 104, and the authorities there cited, seem to us to settle conclusively the question raised as to the power of the courts to correct such injustice as is here complained of, in the action of the legislature in fixing the territorial limits of the tax district. The case of City of Newport v. Com. (Ky.) 50 S. W. 845, 51 S. W. 433. 45 L. R. A. 518, is decisive of the question raised by the plea of res judicata. For the reasons given, the judgment is affirmed. Montgomery v. City of Lebanon. (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, Oct. 2, 1901.) Municipal Taxation-Abandonment of Country Domicile. Where a farmer removed his family to a neighboring town in order to have the advantage of the schools there while his children were within the school age, but never voted in town, and spent the greater part of his time on the farm, and left a part of his household goods in his dwelling house on the farm, reserving the right to remove his family back to the house at any time, he has not, though he has remained in town for two years, abandoned his domicile in the country, and his personal property, consisting of cash, cash notes, etc., is not subject to municipal taxation. Appeal from circuit court, Marion county. "To be officially reported." Action by E. A. Montgomery against the city of Lebanon for an injunction. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed. H. W. Rives, for appellant. H. P. Cooper, for appellee. GUFFY, J. In the case at bar it is clear that appellant never became domiciled in Lebanon unless he became so by reason of the facts occurring within two years preceding this litigation. His domicile was certainly in the county, not far from Lebanon, but outside of it. His only business is farming. He cultivates his farm, or has it cultivated. Part of his household goods remains in his house on his farm. He retains the right to remove his family back to his house at any time, and he says he spends most of his time on the farm, and that he removed his family to Lebanon to stay only. while his two children were in the school age, the youngest of Abstracts whom was 16 years old at the time of the trial. He says he never exercised any of the privileges of citizenship peculiar to the city, never registered there as a voter. It is true that he sends his children free to the free school in Lebanon, but it does not appear that there is any special municipal tax collected for the support of the free school, and it is claimed for appellant that, inasmuch as he pays his share of the state tax devoted to free schools, he should be allowed to send his children to the free school in whatever district they might for the time being reside. After careful consideration of the law and facts of the case, we have reached the conclusion that the appellant had not, at the time of the trial of this case, lost or abandoned his country domicile. It results, therefore, that the court erred in dismissing his petition. We do not mean, however, to determine or decide that an indefinite continuation of his residence in Lebanon, or other acts, may not work a forfeiture of his country domicile, and authorize the court to hold that his true domicile is in Lebanon. The judgment appealed from is reversed, and cause remanded, with directions to perpetuate the injunction against the collection of the taxes then assessed, and for proceedings consistent herewith. State ex rel. Wahoo Waterworks v. City of Wahoo et al. (Supreme Court of Nebraska, June 5, 1901.) [86 N. W. Rep. 923.] Mandamus to Compel Tax Levy for Water Supply-Refused.-City authorities not required by mandamus to levy tax for water supply in excess of limit on such tax existing at time of contract. (Syllabus by the Court.) Error to district court, Saunders county; Hollenbeck, Judge. Action by the state, on the relation of the Wahoo Waterworks, against the city of Wahoo and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed. Ira D. Marston and Frank Irvine, for plaintiff in error. H. Gilkeson, G. W. Simpson, and E. E. Good, for defendants in error. HASTINGS, C. It remains to mention the contention of relator that the council was empowered to contract for waterworks, and was by subdivision 2 of section 69 of the act of 1879, in all its forms and amendments, authorized to levy "any other tax or special assessment authorized by law," and therefore could and should make a special provision to meet this contract. We are not able to uphold this contention. Both the act of March 10, 1885, and that of March 31, 1887, expressly limit the tax that may be levied to pay on contract for water. This contract purports expressly to be one for the supply of water. That it is in the form of the rental of hydrants makes it none the less what it says it is,-an Abstracts agreement to supply water. We apprehend that relator would expect scant attention if its claim was only that it furnished dry hydrants. For the reasons above given, we think the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. DAY and KIRKPATRICK, CC., concur. PER CURIAM. For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. Madison County v. Frazier. (Supreme Court of Mississippi, March 11, 1901.) Taxation-Assessment by County Board -Premature Appeal.-Under Code 1892, 80, providing that an appeal lies to the circuit court from the decision of the assessment board if taken within five days after adjournment of the meeting at which the assessment was made, an appeal from an assessment levied in August, taken within five days after the meeting adjourned, was premature, where such assessment was not confirmed until September, at an adjourned meeting of the board, since no decision was made until the confirmation of the whole assessment. Appeal from circuit court, Madison county; Robert Powell, Judge. Proceeding by J. P. Frazier against Madison county to review a tax assessment. From a decree in favor of the complainant, defendant appeals. Reversed and dismissed. Chrisman & Howell, for appellant. W. H. Powell, for appellee. TERRAL, J. The board of supervisors of Madison county, at its adjourned meeting, on the 26th day of August, 1900, assessed J. P. Frazier for $17.464 as solvent credits, or directed him to be so assessed, and, not having finished a consideration of said assessment rolls, it adjourned on that day until its regular meeting, in September, 1900. At its September meeting it approved the assessment rolls of the county. However, on the 28th day of August, 1900, Frazier applied to the clerk of the board of supervisors, and obtained an appeal to the circuit court from the assessment of $17,464 of solvent credits made against him on August 26, 1900. The appeal was premature. The assessment was not approved until the 7th day of September, 1900, and until that day the matter was in fieri. No judgment had been made, and, no judgment having been made, there was nothing from which an appeal lay. The assessment of Frazier for $17,464 of solvent credits, made on the 26th day of August, 1900, was not approved by operation of law by reason of the adjournment of the board on that day until its September meeting. The assessment against Frazier was ineffectual until action was taken by the board after notice of the assessment being given to Frazier or his appearance thereto. The appeal of Frazier was premature, and it should have been dismissed from the Abstracts circuit court. Under section 80, Code 1892, an appeal lies to the circuit court from the decision of the board on the assessment of taxes, but here no decision had been made, nor was any attempted to be made, until the 7th day of September, 1900. Reversed and dismissed, at the costs of appellee. State ex rel. State of Minnesota et al. v. District Court of Fourth Judicial Dist. et al. (Supreme Court of Minnesota, May 10, 1901.) Taxation Purchase of Land for Park Purposes - Exemption of Contiguous Tract from Taxation - Statutes.-Chapter 30, Sp. Laws 1889, as amended by chapter 103, same laws, confers authority upon the board of park commissioners of the city of Minneapolis to contract for the conveyance of land to the city for park purposes in consideration of the exemption of other contiguous lands of the owner from assessments for park purposes, to the amount agreed upon. Same--Same-Same-Construction of Statutes.-Such exemptions are not limited by the act to a single assessment made with reference to the property so purchased, but include all assessments, present or future, and also installments not yet entered for collection, but which have been assessed prior to the execution of the contract. Same Same Same Construction of Contract in Deed.-A certain deed examined, which contained a contract to the effect that the consideration of certain lands conveyed to the city was $100,000, to be paid by the exemption of certain other contiguous lands of the grantors to the entire amount of $100,000: held, that the contract embraced an assessment which had already been made against such remaining contiguous property, but which had not been entered upon the tax books for collection. (Syllabus by the Court.) Application by the state, on the relation of the state of Minnesota and the city of Minneapolis, for a writ of certiorari to the district court of the Fourth judicial district of county of Hennepin and others, to review a judgment. Judgment affirmed. F. H. Boardman, Co. Atty., and C. J. Rockwood, for relat ors. A. H. Young and M. B. Koon, for respondents. McEntire v. Williamson, Sheriff, et al. Taxation Injunction Judgment-Res Judicata. A valid judgment against a city on coupons clipped from municipal bonds of such city, regularly issued, and the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus in a proceeding regularly brought for such purpose against the officers of such city and their successors in office, commanding such officers to levy a tax to pay such judgment, is conclusive upon the question whether the levy ordered is in excess of the statutory power of the city to levy taxes, and cannot be again raised or retried in a subsequent action for injunction brought by a taxpayer in such city. Abstracts Same Same Same Same Privity of Parties.-A taxpayer in a city is in privity with the municipal officers of such city in a proceeding brought against them in their representative capacity for the purpose of obtaining a writ of mandamus to compel the levy of a tax to pay a valid judgment against the city, and is concluded by the final decision and the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus upon all questions necessarily involved in the final decision and the granting of such peremptory writ as effectively as are the parties to the record. (Syllabus by the Court.) Error from district court, Pratt county; G. W. McKay, Judge. Suit by J. H. McEntire, receiver of the Wichita & Western Railway Company, against H. R. Williamson and others. Decree for defendants, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed. A. A. Hurd and O. J. Wood, for plaintiff in error. B. D. Crawford, for defendants in error. Martin v. Kearney County et al. (Supreme Court of Nebraska, Sept. 18, 1901.) Appeal-Waiver of Errors Not Argued.-Alleged errors not argued in brief of counsel for plaintiff in error may be deemed to have been waived. Taxation Property Sold for Taxes Illegally Imposed-Proceeds Not to Be Refunded.-Cities of the second class of less than 5,000 population, empowered by law to levy taxes for municipal purposes, cannot be required to refund money received for illegal taxes imposed by such city from a purchaser of real estate at a sale made thereof by the county treasurer for delinquent taxes, in the absence of statutory authority providing for the refunding of such taxes. McCague v. City of Omaha, 78 N. W. 463, 58 Neb. 37, followed. Delinquent Tax Sale-Purchaser a Volunteer. The purchaser of real estate at delinquent tax sale is a volunteer, and subject, ordinarily, to the rules applicable to voluntary payment of taxes. Same Same-Caveat Emptor.-The rule of caveat emptor applies to the purchaser of real-estate tax sales. McCague v. City of Omaha, supra. Same Same-Same-Public Records-Notice.-A purchaser of real estate at delinquent tax sale is charged with notice of the public records showing the manner in which taxes for municipal purposes charged against the real estate purchased were levied by the city authorities empowered by law to levy such taxes. Same-Irregular Levy Wrongful Act of Officers-County Not Liable to Refund Proceeds-Statute.-Irregular action by a city council in making a levy of taxes for municipal purposes, resulting in the levy being declared illegal and void, is not "a mistake or wrongful act of the county treasurer or other officer," within the meaning of section 131, art. 1, c. 77, Comp. St., for which the county can be held liable to refund to a purchaser at delinquent tax sale the illegal taxes so attempted to be levied. Recovery of Money Paid for Illegal Taxes-Compliance with Statute. -A party, to recover, under the provisions of a statute, illegal taxes paid, must bring himself within its terms. (Syllabus by the Court.) Error to district court, Kearney county; Beall, Judge. Action by James A. Martin against Kearney county and the |