because it was tendered below a place known as "Johnson's Lane." He refused to pay any additional fare, and was ejected from the car. He resisted removal, and the conductor rang for the motorman, who came back with a crank in his hand, with which he struck the plaintiff across the knuckles to make him let loose of the bar to which he was clinging.

So much of the transfer as is material reads as follows:

Free Transfer.

Good only as indicated, if presented within one hour from time and date punched in margin- not transferable- and is accepted by passenger upon condition that the Company is not responsible for any error upon the part of the conductors in punching time

It does not disclose any such limitation as to the place at which it must be used as was enforced by the conductor. It appears from the testimony of a witness for the defendant that there was a rule forbidding its acceptance below Johnson's Lane, posted, among others, in the defendant company's barn, to which the public were not admitted.

The plain and undisputed state of facts, shown by the evidence, renders it unnecessary to consider many of the principles of law applicable to the rights of passengers and common carriers, respectively, growing out of contracts for carriage. On the face of the transfer but one limitation appeared, namely, that it should be used within one hour after the issuance thereof. If presented within that time, on the face thereof, it entitled the holder to a westward passage on any car of the company running on Fourth avenue. There is no evidence tending in the slightest degree to show that the plaintiff had any knowledge of any limitation upon that right. According to all the authorities, a paper so handed him, without any explanation, or any knowledge on his part of any limitation, constituted the contract between him and the company. Unlike steam railroads, street railways do not have a certain fare for passage between given points. The nature of their business is such as to compel them, for the most part, to charge a certain fare for a passage without reference to the distance; this, at least, was the method of the defendant company. The paper, on its face, therefore, entitled the plaintiff to carriage, and knowledge of a secret limitation embodied in some rule which he had never seen could not be imputed to him. That rule, therefore, constituted no

part of the contract. "Railway passengers are not required to know the rules and regulations made by the directors of a company for the control of the actions of its agents and the management of its affairs." Hufford v. Railroad Co., 64 Mich. 631, 8 8 Am. St. Rep. 859. In that case, this principle was applied in favor of a passenger who had relied upon the representations of an agent as to the extent to which a ticket purchased by him was good for passage. It seems that the ticket on its face was a little uncertain. It was not controverted that the purchaser had read the ticket. Being uncertain as to what its language meant, he applied to the agent for an explanation, and was informed that it was good for a passage to the point to which the purchaser desired to go, and to which he had paid the fare. The conductor refused to carry him to that point, and required him to pay an additional fare for a portion of the distance. The authorities agree that the purchaser of a ticket, or a contractor for carriage, in order to be bound by a limitation, must have knowledge of it, but there is a disagreement among them as to what amounts to notice, and as to the extent of the duty of a person contracting for carriage to carefully examine all of the stipulations written or printed in the contract.2

CHENEY v. BOSTON & MAINE RAILROAD CO.
11 Met. 121. 1846.1

DEWEY, J. This case involves no question of the general duty of railroad companies to carry passengers who offer themselves and are ready to pay the usual rate of fare. It is only a question whether one who purchases a ticket, entitling him, by the rules of the company regulating the tariff of fares to a continuous passage through, and avails himself of the reduction in price allowed to such passengers, can insist upon being taken up as a way passenger, at such stations as he may elect to stop at, he having voluntarily abandoned the train that went through.

The question really is, what was the contract between the plaintiff and defendants. Now the case stated by the parties expressly finds that the price of tickets entitling the party to a passage in the cars from Durham to Boston, in one continuous passage,

was

2 A verdict for the plaintiff having been set aside by the court below, that order was reversed and set aside, and the case remanded for the rendition of judgment on the verdict.- ED.

1 The statement of facts is omitted, the facts sufficiently appearing in the opinion.- ED.

$1.87% for each, and for a passage from Durham to Exeter, and from Exeter to Boston, as separate trips, $2. Such was the regular and ordinary charge. It is true that the tickets themselves do not describe the passage to be one by the same train. Nor do they purport to entitle the holder to a conveyance by two separate trips, first by taking the cars to Exeter, and thence by a subsequent train passing from Exeter to Boston. They are silent as to the mode. It therefore was a contract to carry in the usual manner in which passengers are carried who have tickets of that kind.

It is said that the rules of the company were unknown to the plaintiff when he purchased the tickets, and therefore he ought not to be affected by them. This might very properly be insisted upon in his behalf, if it were attempted to charge him with any liability created by such rules; especially if it were attempted to enforce any claim for damages by reason of them.

2

The question, as to the right of the plaintiff to be transported as a passenger, does not depend upon his knowledge, at the time of the purchase of his ticket, of the difference of the price to be paid for a passage through the whole distance by one train, or that of a passage by different trains. The plaintiff might have inquired and informed himself as to that. If he did not, he took the mode of conveyance, the price of the ticket, and the superscription thereon, secure to him under the rules and regulations of the company. It appears, however, that before reaching Exeter, the plaintiff was fully apprised of the different rates of fare, and the rules applicable to way passengers, and that the agent of the defendants, the conductor of the train, offered to refund to him the money that he had paid for his tickets, deducting the usual fare from Durham to Exeter, which the plaintiff refused to accept. In the opinion of the court, this was all that the defendants were required to do; and as the plaintiff declined this offer, and thereupon left the train, stopping at Exeter, he voluntarily relinquished his passage through by a continuous train, for which he held a ticket, and whatever loss he has sustained was occasioned by his own act, and occurred under such circumstances as preclude him from all claim for dam

2 As to stop-overs generally see Note, 28 L. R. A. 773.

As to coupon tickets see Brook v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (1867), 15 Mich. 332; Auerbach v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. (1882), 89 N. Y. 281.

Nor can he

ages for any default in the company in the matter. sustain any legal claim to recover back the sum paid for his first ticket, or any part thereof. The offer to that effect was refused by him.

Judgment for the defendants.3

LAKE SHORE AND MICHIGAN SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO. v. GREENWOOD.

79 Pa. St. 373. 1875.1

October 20th, 1875. Before AGNEW, C. J., SHARSWOOD, WILLIAMS, MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON and WOODWARD, JJ.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Erie county: Of October and November Term 1875, No. 135.

This action was in case and was brought November 23d, 1873, by J. L. Greenwood and Sarah E., his wife, in her right, against The Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company. The cause of action was removing Mrs. Greenwood from one of the way freight train cars of the plaintiff at a distance from a station, be

3 In accord Johnson v. Concord R. R. Co. (1865), 46 N. H. 213; Dietrich v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. (1872), 71 Pa. St. 432.

See Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Moody (Tex., 1895), 30 S. W. 574 (regulation forbidding use of more than one seat); Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Spiller (1914), 157 Ky. 222 (regulation forbidding turning over of seat) Florida E. C. Ry. Co. v. Carter (Fla., 1914), 65 So. 254 (regula tion forbidding alighting except at destination); Western Un. Tel. v. Neel (1894), 86 Tex. 368 (regulation as to time of receipt of messages).

As to waiver of regulation, see Pickford v. Grand Junction Ry. Co. (1884), 12 M. & W. 765; Greenfield v. Detroit & M. Ry. Co. (1903), 133 Mich. 557; Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Herring (Tex., 1910), 130 S. W. 1039.

With regard to breaches of regulations as affecting right of recovery for injury, see Macon & W. R. R. Co. v. Johnson (1868), 38 Ga. 409: Baltimore Ry. Co. v. Wilkinson (1868), 30 Md. 224; Renaud v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co. (1912), 210 Mass. 553: Coburn v. Ry. Co. (1910), 243 Ill. 448. As to liability in deceit for publishing false time-tables, see Denton v. Great N. Ry. Co. (1856), 5 El. & Bl. 860.

1 The arguments of counsel are omitted.- ED.

cause she had no ticket, although she offered to pay the conductor the proper fare. She was removed under the following rule of

the company: "NOTICE. On and after February 1st, 1873, passengers will not be carried under any circumstances upon any freight trains, except such as are designated as way freights upon the time tables, and they will not be carried upon way trains unless they are provided with tickets. Way freights will not stop at the stations where tickets are not sold to receive nor to let off passengers."

On the trial before Vincent, P. J., April 16th, 1875, Mrs. Greenwood testified that in August, 1873, she started from Erie to go to Harborcreek Station, seven miles east of Erie, on the defendants' road; she had missed the early passenger train and got on the way freight train; no one came around till she had got about two miles; the conductor then came; she offered him money, he declined to take it and asked for her ticket; she said she had none; he said he must put her off, he could not help it; he was obliged to put her off if she had no ticket; she had been accustomed to ride on that train back and forward, and always had paid her fare on the train; had ridden on it frequently after February 1st, 1873. She did not see the notice that passengers should not be carried on a freight train without a ticket.

Mr. Greenwood testified that he went with his wife to the depot, the ticket agent said the passenger train had gone, but the way freight was just going, starting from the upper end of the depot; he put his wife aboard there; the ticket agent did not say he needed a ticket; he had often ridden on the train without a ticket, did not know a ticket was required; he had not seen the notice in the depot that passengers would not be carried on freight trains without a ticket.

Plaintiff gave in evidence the following order from the company to their employees:

"Conductors of way freight trains must visit their cabooses immediately before starting from each station, and not permit any passengers to ride upon their trains except such as are provided with tickets. . . . Ticket agents will take pains to inform passengers of this order, so that the public may experience no inconvenience."

Defendants gave evidence that the notice was hung in conspicuous places in the ladies' and gentlemen's rooms in the passenger station at Erie, and had been put up a week or ten days before the order took effect; the notice was in the caboose when Mrs. Greenwood got on the train; the notice was in each of the waitingrooms at Harborcreek Station.