carrier; that the proceeding or process under which it was made appear to be valid, and that the carrier give prompt notice to the owner. Gibbons v. Farwell, 63 Mich. 344; Kiff v. Railway Co., 117 Mass. 591; Blivin v. Railroad Co., 36 N. Y. 403; Railway Co. v. Yohe, 51 Ind. 181. "The principle of the exception," it is said in Wells v. Steamship Co., supra, "is that the carrier is not obliged to violate the law of the jurisdiction to comply with its contract." In Atkinson v. Richie, 10 East 534, it is held that the contract of a common carrier is always subject to the implied condition that he may lawfully comply with its terms; and if its performance subsequently becomes unlawful without his fault he is not required to violate the law of the jurisdiction to complete his undertaking. We see no reason why the exception might not be extended to embrace cases where fire-arms, intended to be used in promoting riots and public disturbances, are seized by the public authorities to prevent such use of them. But the question is not fairly before us. The jury must have found that the arms and ammunition consigned to the plaintiff were purchased and intended for lawful purposes, unless, indeed, the sale of such property in this state is, of itself, unlawful. We have been referred to no statute making it so, and know of none, except the one prohibiting the sale of property of that description to minors under the age of fourteen years. The prohibition might wisely be much extended; but that is a matter of legislative policy. The record leaves no doubt that in causing the property to be removed from the state and withheld from the plaintiff the officers of the defendant were prompted by commendable motives, and acted under a sincere belief they were subserving the public good. But the motive by which the party was controlled in the conversion of property is of no avail as a defense, though it may be shown to prevent the recovery of exemplary damages. Gibbons v. Farwell, supra; Harker v. Dement, 9 Gill. (Md.) 7. . . . Judgment is affirmed.2 2 See Wells v. Marine Steamship Co. (1874), 4 Clifford 228; Note, 15 Ann. Cas. 538. Cf. Seligman v. Armijo (1870), 1 N. M. 459; Bennett v. American Exp. Co. (1891), 83 Me. 236 (officer acted illegally). As to what are to be considered the public authorities, see Nashville & C. R. R. Co. v. Estis (1872), 7 Heisk. 622. MORRISON & COMPANY v. SHAW, SAVILL [1916] 2 K. B. 783.1 SWINFEN EADY, L. J., read the following judgment:- The plaintiffs are holders for value of two bills of lading for a quantity of wool shipped at Napier, New Zealand, for London by the defendant's steamship Tokomaru. This ship was torpedoed on January 30, 1915, by a German submarine when between seven and eight miles from Havre, and ship and cargo were an actual total loss. The plaintiffs sue for breach of the contract evidenced by the bill of lading. The defendants, while admitting the total loss of the goods, dispute their liability. They say that the loss occurred by an expected peril, the King's enemies. The plaintiffs contend that the defendants are not entitled to rely upon the exception contained in the bill of lading, as they say the Tokomaru was deviating from the contract voyage by leaving the direct course for London and proceeding to Havre when the disaster occurred, and that the liberties contained in the bill of lading did not permit that to be done. This raises the first question, namely, whether the Tokomaru was deviating in proceeding towards Havre. If not deviating there is an end of the matter, and the shipowners are protected from liability by the bill of lading. If, however, the Tokomaru was deviating, the further question arises as to the liability of the defendants as carriers under the circumstances. The defendants contend that they incurred no greater liability than that of common carriers, and are therefore not liable for acts of the King's enemies. . [After determining that there had been a deviation, the LORD JUSTICE Continued:] If that be so, the remaining question is whether the defendants are protected from liability as carriers by the fact that the loss occurred through the King's enemies. If they, as carriers, were duly performing their contract of carriage, they would not be liable for loss occasioned by the King's enemies. But they are breaking their contract. They are quite unable to show that the loss must have occurred in any event, and whether they had deviated or not. True it is that there had been no previous warning of danger from submarines, and that the event which occasioned the loss was wholly unexpected, but this does not assist the defend 1 The statement of the case. argument of counsel, part of the opinion of SWINFEN EADY. L. J., and the concurring opinions of PHILLMORE, L. J., and BANKES, L. J., are omitted.- ED. ants. The answer to the argument of the defendants on this point is that given by TINDAL, C. J., in Davis v. Garrett (6 Bing. 724): 2 "But we think the real answer to the objection is, that no wrongdoer can be allowed to apportion or qualify his own wrong; and that as a loss has actually happened whilst his wrongful act was in operation and force, and which is attributable to his wrongful act, he cannot set up as an answer to the action the bare possibility of a loss, if his wrongful act had never been done. It might admit of a different construction if he could shew, not only that the same loss might have happened, but that it must have happened if the act complained of had not been done; but there is no evidence to that extent in the present case." In Parker v. James (4 Camp. 112) the loss occurred from capture by the King's enemies while the vessel was deviating, and LORD ELLENBOROUGH held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the value of their goods on board the ship at the time she was captured by reason of the deviation. Sleat v. Fagg (5 B. & Al. 342) and Lilly v. Doubleday (7 Q. B. D. 510) are also authorities against the defendant's contention. In my judgment the appeal fails and should be dismissed.3 ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN RAILWAY 150 Ala. 381. 1907.1 SIMPSON, J.-This was an action for damages resulting from the failure to deliver part of a certain lot of flour and delivering another portion of the same in a damaged condition. The assignments of error relate entirely to the ruling of the court on certain demurrers to pleas, and the facts, as set out in the pleading, are that the flour was delivered to the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company at Evansville, Ind., to be carried to the plaintiff at Moundville, Ala., a place of about 150 inhabitants, on the line of the defendant company. Said flour was delivered to the defendant company, at Birmingham, Ala., on the 17th day of January, 1904, and by it shipped out from Birmingham on the 21st day of January. It reached Moundville, in the same condition as received, 2 In this case damage was occasioned by a storm. ED. 3 Cf. as to deviation Walsh v. Homer (1846), 10 Mo. 7; Phillips v. Brigham Kelly & Co. (1859), 26 Ga. 617; Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Beck (1889). 125 Pa. St. 620; McKahan v. American Exp. Co. (1911), 209 Mass. 270. 1 The statement of the case and the argument of counsel are omitted.— ED. on said 21st day of January, at 1 o'clock P. M., and notice was sent to the plaintiff of its arrival; but on the morning of the 22d of January, at 1 o'clock, a violent cyclone swept over the country and caused the damage complained of. The only question presented by the assignments and briefs of counsel, is whether or not, admitting the delay at Birmingham, the defendant is liable on account of the damage done by the act of God, to wit, the cyclone, at Moundville, 12 hours after the goods reached said destination. In a recent case before this court, where the carrier to which the goods were delivered for shipment retained the same in its possession, without shipment, for a period of 11 days, and on the eleventh day said goods were practically destroyed by a cyclone, this court, recognizing the fact that there is a serious conflict in the decisions of other states, placed itself in the column of those holding the carrier liable. Ala. Great So. R. Co. v. Quarles & Couturie 145 Ala. 436, 40 South. 120, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 867. It will be noticed that the facts in this case are not identical with those in the case just cited, in that, in that case, the cyclone occurred while the carrier was in default, to wit, during the delay, so that the delay and the cyclone were concurring causes. This court said: "When there is an unreasonable delay on the part of the carrier in forwarding the goods, and they are destroyed by the act of God during this delay, he is not excused, for the reason that it was by his fault that they were exposed to the peril. Page 121, column 2, of 40 South. (5 L. R. A. [N. S.] 867). Again, in commenting on a Massachusetts case holding otherwise, though not considered strictly analogous, we said: "It cannot be held to have approved the proposition that a defendant, when liable as an insurer, being at fault at the time the act of God caused the loss, could invoke that act as a defense." Page 122, column 1, of 40 South. (5 L. R. A. [N. S.] 867.) In the case of L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Gidley, 119 Ala. 523, 24 South. 753, also, the leather was destroyed by fire while it was being unlawfully detained in the warehouse of defendant. Also, in the leading case on the side of liability, the goods were overtaken by a flood while being improperly detained at Albany. Michaels v. N. Y. C. R. R., 30 N. Y. 564, 86 Am. Dec. 415. The recent case of Bibb Broom Corn Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 69 L. R. A. 509, 94 Minn. 269, 102 N. W. 709, 110 Am. St. Rep. 361, holding in line with our decision, also emphasizes the fact, stating: "The rule that permits a carrier to excuse his negligence by an act of God, overtaking him while thus in fault, seems to us unsound." Page 512, column 2, of 69 L. R. A., page 275 of 94 Minn., page 711 of 102 N. W. (110 Am. St. Rep. 361). Also: "If a loss occurs while his wrongful act is in operation and force, and which is attributable thereto, he should be held liable." Page 512, column 2, of 69 L. R. A., page 276 of 94 Minn., page 712 of 102 N. W. (110 Am. St. Rep. 361). So, in the case of Wald v. Pittsburg, &c. R. R. Co., 162 Ill. 545, 44 N. E. 888, 35 L. R. A. 356, 53 Am. St. Rep. 332, where the passenger's trunk, in place of being sent on the train with him, was detained and sent on another, which was caught in the Johnstown flood, this was treated as a deviation, and, as the act of God occurred during the deviation, the company was held responsible. Page 338 of 53 Am. St. Rep. In the case of So. Pac. Co. v. Boothe et al. (Tex. Civ. App.) 39 S. W. 585, the goods were transported by a different route from that over which they were shipped, and in consequence of the deviation the consignee failed to receive notice of their arrival. The plaintiff sued in trover (the carrier having sold the goods because of the refusal of the consignee to receive them). The court denied the recovery, holding that the consignee should have received them, and would have been entitled to recover compensation for the difference in the value between the time when he should have received the notice and the time when he did receive it. In the case of Mich. C. R. R. Co. v. Curtis, 80 Ill. 324, the fruit trees were shipped from Rochester, through Chicago, to various points beyond, were delayed about 11 days at Chicago, and were frozen when received. The railroad company was held liable, the court saying: "They did not have the right to delay unreasonably the delivery of the trees, until they would inevitably be destroyed in the hands of the next carrier, and then be heard to say that they were destroyed in the hands of the company into whose hands they passed them for ultimate delivery" (page 327); also that "the jury were fully warranted in finding that it occurred (that is, the freezing) in Chicago, or at least in part, before leaving there," &c. (page 330). So it will be seen that this case is not analogous to the present one, as the freezing was a natural cause which might have been anticipated, and the jury were authorized to find that it actually occurred during the delay. It certainly did occur during the transportation. In the third edition of Hutchinson on Carriers numerous cases, pro and con, on the question of liability in this class of cases, are cited, including our own case of Ala. Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Quarles & Couturie (see sections 297308, inclusive), and in all of those holding the carrier liable the act of God occurred while the delay "continued and was operative," so that the two were concurrent causes. The appellant insists that under the influence of this class of decisions, the negligence having passed, the same could not be said |