under the rule that the carrier's liability does not cease until a reasonable time after the arrival of the goods. The duty of the consignee to take the goods away is as imperative as the duty of the carrier to deliver them. He cannot, at his option, continue the stringent liability of the carrier, but must act promptly, and, if he does not, the liability of the carrier as an insurer ends. Of course, I am not to be understood as saying that, after such reasonable time, no liability whatever rests on the railroad company. I mean only that its liability as carrier ends, and that it then becomes liable only as bailee. Tarbell v. Shipping Co. (N. Y. App.) 17 N. E. 721. See 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 270. What is a reasonable time is largely a question of fact, dependent upon the circumstances, to be decided by the jury. If the facts are accurate or undisputed, is is a question of law; otherwise it is a jury question. Id. Is it the duty of the railroad company to give notice of the arrival of goods? Some authorities say that it is as to persons living in the vicinity of the depot; but the better authorities, and the reason of the matter, declare that it is not incumbent upon the railroad to give such notice. Why? While the consignee need not be at the depot to take his goods at the moment of arrival, and the law retains the railroad company under the liability as carrier for a reasonable time, yet it does not indefinitely hold it under this high degree of liability, but requires the consignee to keep a lookout for the arrival of his goods by adopting such means as may be expected to inform him of their arrival. No notice from the company is necessary. Railroad Co. v. Carter, 165 Ill. 570 (46 N. E. 374); 4 Elliott, R. R. § 1527; Ror. R. R. 1289; 2 Redf. R. R. § 175, point 4. Railroad Co. v. Morehead, 5 W. Va. 293, seems to hold that notice is necessary, but it seems against the better authorities, and based on exceptional circumstances on account of inability to deliver at the point of destination. I remark that the provisions of Code, p. 550, refer not to notice of arrival of goods, but that notice which is requisite to enable a railroad company, after the lapse of 24 hours from the arrival of the goods, to charge storage therefor. The consignee is not entitled to a reasonable time to obtain knowledge of arrival of the goods, and then another reasonable time to remove the goods. If we hold that the carrier is under obligation to give notice, then the consignee would have a reasonable time after notice to remove the goods; but if we hold, in the absence of usage, that it is not necessary that the railroad should give notice of arrival, it follows that the consignee has a reasonable time after arrival in which to remove the goods. The goods arrived about 5 o'clock P. M. on the 9th of April, and were burned on the 9th or 10th. The jury found that a reasonable time had not elapsed after arrival in which the goods should have been taken away in this instance, so far as its verdict is based upon that question, and I cannot say that the time was beyond a reasonable time. In my view, if that time was a reasonable time, it is not material when within that time the plaintiffs knew of the arrival of the goods, because the entire time is not longer than a reasonable time. We would infer from some books that the consignee had a reasonable time after notice, but I hold that the reasonable time commences from arrival. Where the party is present on the arrival, or gets early notice of arrival, that fact enters as an important element in the decision of what is a reasonable time for removal, as, having notice, he should proceed promptly to consummate the removal; but he has a reasonable time, notice or no notice, after arrival of the goods to effect their removal. But there is one fact in this case which must decide it against the railroad company, regardless of when its liability as carrier ceased, and regardless of notice or diligence on the part of the plaintiffs, for a drayman called for this carpet on the evening before its destruction by fire, and was told by an assistant agent at the warehouse that the carpet had not arrived. But for this fact, it would have been removed and saved. The law seems to be very well settled that misinformation given by the railroad company or its agents to the consignee as to the arrival of the goods will bind the company, even though we regard it as only resting under the liability of warehousemen, when such information prevents the removal of the goods. 4 Elliott, R. R. § 1463; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 275; 2 Redf. R. R. § 175, point 10; Railroad Co. v. Cotton, 95 Am. Dec. 656. There is no sign of a plea in this case, and we might raise the question whether the defendant is entitled to have the points made by him considered, as we might say that it is a mere inquiry of damages by a jury in the absence of a plea. These facts lead us to the affirmance of the judgment. Affirmed. POYTHRESS v. DURHAM AND SOUTHERN 148 N. C. 391. 1908. Action heard on demurrer to complaint, by Cook, J., at May Term, 1908, of Vance, to recover the value of a moving picture outfit alleged to have been destroyed in the warehouse of the de fendant on the evening of June 6, 1907. The complaint contains two causes of action; one charging the defendant as a common carrier, and a second count charging it as a warehouseman. The defendant demurred to both causes of action. BROWN, J. The facts alleged in the first cause of action, which, for the purposes of the hearing only, are admitted by the demurrer to be true, appear to be substantially as follows: "On the 6th of June, 1907, the plaintiff delivered to the defendant, in good condition, at its station in Dunn, two boxes containing a moving picture outfit, consigned to the plaintiff at Duke, N. C., a station on defendant's road, which boxes and contents the defendants agreed to safely transport and deliver to plaintiff at destination; that they arrived at Duke on the same day, late in the evening, too late for plaintiff to remove the same on that day; that soon after the arrival of the boxes at Duke, N. C., on the same evening, June 6, 1907, after deposit of the same in defendant's warehouse, and before plaintiff had been notified of their arrival, or had time to remove the same, the boxes were destroyed by fire." The question raised by the demurrer is one which has been much debated by jurists, and about which they are not agreed, as to when the liability of a common carrier of freight ends and its liability as a warehouseman begins. Some courts hold that, when the transit is ended and the goods deposited in the warehouse of the carrier, the liability of such terminates, and the more modified liability of warehouseman begins. The leading case in this country entertaining that view is from the Massachusetts court, Norway Plains Co. v. B. & M. R. R., 1 Gray, 263, 61 Am. Dec. 423, where the subject is considered at length by Chief Justice Shaw. A comprehensive note, citing many cases, is to be found to the case of Schmidt v. Blood (N. Y.) 24 Am. Dec. 145, citing authorities taking the same view. Another class of cases hold that placing the goods in the warehouse alone does not discharge the company from its liability as a common carrier, until the consignee has had reasonable time after their arrival to inspect and take them away, in the ordinary course of business. The leading case holding this view was decided in a very elaborate opinion, upon almost the same state of facts as the Norway Plains Case, by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire (Moses v. B. & M. Ry. Co., 32 N. H. 523). Wood v. Crocker, 18 Wis. 363, Ayres v. Morris & Essex R. R., 29 N. J. Law, 393; Blumenthal v. Brainerd, 38 Vt. 413, support the New Hampshire rule. And still there is another class of cases which hold that the liability of the company as carrier continues until the consignee has been notified of the arrival of the goods and has had a reasonable time in the ordinary course of business within which to remove them. This view is maintained by Judge Cooley in a most elaborate and able opinion in McMillan v. Railroad, 16 Mich. 100, concurred in by his eminent associate, Judge Christiancy. In that case the Michigan court was equally divided, the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Campbell holding that notice was not necessary, and that the company was liable only as a warehouseman when the goods had been deposited in its warehouse. In 1905 the Supreme Court of Michigan unanimously adopted the views of Cooley and Christiancy in the case of Walters v. Detroit Ry., 139 Mich. 303. This view is also supported by McDonald v. W. R. R. Corp., 34 N. Y. 497, where the Court of Appeals of New York says: "In those cases, according to the weight of authority in this state, notice to the owner or consignee of the arrival of goods, and a reasonable time and opportunity after notice to remove them, would come in lieu of personal delivery, so far as to change the strict liability of the carrier to that of a warehouseman." See also, 2 Parsons on Cont. (5th Ed.) 189; Ang. on Carriers, § 313; Chitley on Carriers, 90; Pinney v. Railroad, 19 Minn. 251; Railroad v. Fuqua & Horton, 84 Miss. 490, Railroad v. Hatch, 52 Ohio St. 408. In the states of Alabama, California, Tennessee, and Texas the law is made to practically conform to this latter view by statute, as shown by adjudication of the courts. Collins v. Railroad, 104 Ala. 390; Wilson v. Railroad, 94 Cal. 166; Railroad v. Naive, 112 Tenn. 239; Railroad v. Haynes, 72 Tex. 175. Not only does the great weight of authority in this country sustain the view of Judge Cooley, but such is the English and Canadian law. Mitchell v. Railway Co., 10 L. R. Q. B. 256; Chapman v. Great Western R. Co., 5 Q. B. D. 278; Richardson v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 10 Ont. Rep. 369. Mr. Hutchinson, referring to the English law on this subject, says: "No trace is there to be found of the distinction which has been made in this country in favor of railway companies as common carriers, which converts them into mere warehousemen, without notice to the consignee. Notice, it is there held, is necessary to effect this change of character and liability; and after such notice, if the consignee fails to call for the goods, the carrier becomes, as to them, a warehouseman merely. And it is to be gathered from the cases that it is the universal course of business there, with this class of carriers, either to deliver personally, or to send to the consignees what are there denominated advice notes,' informing them of the arrival of the goods, and that until this is done the company remains subject to the liability of a common carrier." 2 Hutchinson on Carriers, p. 792. See, also, 4 Elliott, p. 146, where the cases are collected, showing that most of the courts in this country follow the English precedents. The rule subjecting common carriers to this strict responsibility as insurers is founded on broad principles of public policy and convenience, and, as said by Chancellor Kent, "it was introduced to prevent the necessity of going into circumstances impossible to be unraveled." 2 Kent, Com. 602. "It is a politic establishment," says Lord Chief Justice Holt in his celebrated judgment in Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Lord Raymond, 918, "contrived by the policy of the law for the safety of all persons, the necessity of whose affairs obliges them to trust to these sort of persons, that they may be safe in their ways of dealings; for else the carrier might have opportunity of undoing all persons who had any dealings with him, by combining with thieves, &c., and yet doing it in such a clandestine way as would not be possible to be discovered." Of course, the danger from loss by collusion is not near so great in these days as in the semibarbarous times; but upon this point it is well said by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in Moses v. Boston & Maine R. R., 24 N. H. 71, and again in 32 N. H. 523: "The immense increase of the business, the great value of the commodities now necessarily intrusted to the charge of the common carriers, and the vast distances to which they are to be transported, have multiplied the difficulties of the owner who seeks to recover for the loss of his goods, and have greatly added to the opportunities and temptations of the carrier who might be disposed to neglect or violate his trust." The reasons upon which the rule is founded continue to apply in full force to railway companies as common carriers, and any relaxation of it must be attended only with mischief. These reasons, founded on a sound public policy, require not only that the carrier shall be held as an insurer during transit, but until he has notified the consignee of the arrival of the goods at the point of destination, and until he shall have a reasonable time to effect their removal. The notice need not be served personally on the consignee. It is sufficient if deposited in the post office, addressed to him, as is provided in the regulations of the Corporation Commission, which provide: "Notice shall be given by delivering same in writing in person, or by leaving same at consignee's place of business or by depositing it in the post office." Rule 1. After service, or deposit of the notice, the consignee is allowed a reasonable time within which to take his goods away. If he fails to do so, the liability of the com |