quality appears, in nature, as a modification of the substance, and as it is thus expreffed in language, by a modification of the noun. fubftantive, which denotes that fubftance, the quality and the subject are, in this case, blended together, if I may fay fo, in the expreffion, in the fame manner as they appear to be in the object and in the idea. Hence the origin of the mafculine, feminine, and neutral genders, in all the ancient languages. By means of thefe, the most important of all diftinctions, that of fubftances into animated and inanimated, and that of animals into male and female, feem to have been fufficiently marked without the affiftance of adjectives, or of any general names denoting this moft extenfive fpecies of qualifications. There are no more than these three genders in any of the languages with which I am acquainted; that is to fay, the formation of nouns fubftantive can, by itself, and without the accompaniment of adjectives, exprefs no other qualities but thofe three above mentioned, the qualities of male, of female, of neither male nor female. I fhould not, however, be surprised, if, in other languages with which I am unacquainted, the different formations of nouns fubftantive fhould be capable of expreffing many other different qualities. The different diminutives of the Italian, and of fome other languages, do, in reality, fometimes, exprefs a great variety of different modifi modifications in the fubftances denoted by thofe nouns which undergo fuch variations. It was impoffible, however, that nouns fubftantive could, without lofing altogether their original form, undergo fo great a number of variations, as would be fufficient to exprefs that almost infinite variety of qualities, by which it might, upon different occafions, be neceffary to fpecify and diftinguish them. Though the different formation of nouns fubftantive, therefore, might, for fome time, foreftall the neceflity of inventing nouns adjective, it was impoffible that this neceffity could be foreftalled altogether. When nouns adjective came to be invented, it was natural that they should be formed with fome fimilarity to the fubftantives, to which they were to ferve as epithets or qualifications. Men would naturally give them the fame terminations with the fubftantives to which they were first applied, and from that love of fimilarity of found, from that delight in the returns of the fame fyllables, which is the foundation of analogy in all languages, they would be apt to vary the termination of the fame adjective, according as they had occafion to apply it to a mafculine, to a feminine, or to a neutral fubftantive: They would fay, magnus lupus, magna lupa, magnum pratum, when they meant to exprefs a great he wolf, a great he wolf, a great meadow. This variation, in the termination of the noun adjective, according to the gender of the fubftantive, which takes place in all the ancient languages, feems to have been introduced chiefly for the fake of a certain fimilarity of found, of a certain fpecies of rhyme, which is naturally fo very agreeable to the human ear. Gender, it is to be obferved, cannot properly belong to a noun adjective, the fignification of which is always precisely the fame, to whatever species of substantives it is applied. When we fay, a great man, a great woman, the word great has precifely the fame meaning in both cafes, and the dif ference of the fex in the fubjects to which it may be applied, makes no fort of difference in its fignification. Magnus, magna, magnum, in the fame manner, are words which exprefs precisely the fame quality, and the change of the termination is accompanied with no fort of variation in the meaning. Sex and gender are qualities which belong to substances, but cannot belong to the qualities of fubftances, In 'general, no quality, when confidered in concrete, or as qualifying fome particular fubject, can itself be conceived as the subject of any other quality; though when confidered in abftract it may. No adjective therefore can qualify any other adjective. A great good man, means a man who is both great and good. Both the adjectives qualify the fub ftantive; they do not qualify one another. On the other hand, when we fay, the great goodness of the man, the word goodness denoting a quality confidered in abstract, which may itself be the fubject of other qualities, is upon that account capable of being qualified by the word great. If the original invention of nouns adjective would be attended with fo much difficulty, that of prepofitions would be accompanied with yet more. Every prepofition, as I have already obferved, denotes fome relation con. fidered in concrete with the co-relative object. The prepofition above, for example, denotes the relation of fuperiority, not in abstract, as it is expreffed by the word fuperiority, but in concrete with fome co-relative object. In this phrafe, for example, the tree above the cave, the word above expreffes a certain rela tion between the tree and the cave, and it expreffes this relation in concrete with the co-relative object, the cave. A prepofition always requires, in order to complete the fenfe, fome other word to come after it; as may be observed in this particular instance. Now, I fay, the original invention of fuch words would require a yet greater effort of abstraction and generalization, than that of nouns adjective. Firft of all, the relation is, in itself, a more metaphyfical object than a quality. Nobody can be at a lofs to explain what what is meant by a quality; but few people will find themfelves able to exprefs, very distinctly, what is understood by a relation. Qualities are almost always the objects of our external fenfes; relations never are. No wonder, therefore, that the one fet of objects should be fo much more comprehenfible than the other. Secondly, though prepofitions always exprefs the relation which they stand for, in concrete with the co-relative object, they could not have originally been formed without a confiderable effort of abftraction. A prepofition denotes a relation, and nothing but a relation. But before men could inftitute a word, which fignified a relation, and nothing but a relation, they must have been able, in fome measure, to confider this relation abftractedly from the related objects; fince the idea of thofe objects does not, in any respect, enter into the fignification of the prepofition. The invention of fuch a word, therefore, muft have required a confiderable degree of abftraction. Thirdly, a prepofition is from its nature a general word, which, from its very first inftitution, must have been confidered as equally applicable to denote any other fimilar relation. The man who firft invented the word above, must not only have diftinguished, in fome measure, the relation of fuperiority from the objects which were fo related, but he muft. also have distinguished this relation from other relations, |