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liarities in his pronunciation or manner of s E C T. fpeaking, became frequently the objects of imitation."

While Mr. Smith was thus diftinguishing himself by his zeal and ability as a public teacher, he was gradually laying the foundation of a more extenfive reputation, by preparing for the press his fyftem of morals. The firft edition of this work appeared in 1759, under the title of "The Theory of Moral "Sentiments."

Hitherto Mr. Smith had remained unknown to the world as an author; nor have I heard that he had made a trial of his powers in any anonymous publications, excepting in a periodical work called The Edinburgh Review, which was begun in the year 1755, by fome gentlemen of distinguished abilities, but which they were prevented by other engagements from carrying farther than the two first numbers.

To this work Mr. Smith contributed a review of Dr. Johnson's Dictionary of the English Language, and alfo a letter, addreffed to the editors, containing fome general obfer-. vations on the state of literature in the different countries of Europe. In the former of these papers, he points out fome defects in Dr. Johnson's plan, which he cenfures as not fufficiently grammatical. "The different fig"nifications of a word (he obferves) are "indeed collected; but they are feldom di

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gefted into general claffes, or ranged under "the meaning which the word principally "expreffes and fufficient care is not taken "to distinguish the words apparently fyno"nymous." To illuftrate this criticifm, he copies from Dr. Johnfon the articles BUT and HUMOUR, and oppofes to them the fame articles digefted agreeably to his own idea. The various fignifications of the word BUT are very nicely and happily difcriminated. The other articles does not feem to have been executed with equal care.

The obfervations on the state of learning in Europe are written with ingenuity and ele gance; but are chiefly interefting, as they fhew the attention which the Author had given to the philofophy and literature of the Continent, at a period when they were not much ftudied in this ifland.

In the fame volume with the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Mr. Smith published a Differtation" on the Origin of Languages, "and on the different Genius of thofe which "are original and compounded." The remarks I have to offer on these two dif courfes, I fhall, for the fake of diftinctnefs, make the subject of a separate section.

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Of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, and the
Differtation on the Origin of Language.

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II.

HE fcience of Ethics has been divided S E C T. by modern writers into two parts; the one comprehending the theory of Morals, and the other its practical doctrines. The quef tions about which the former is employed, are chiefly the two following. First, By what principle of our conftitution are we led to form the notion of moral diftinctions ;-whether by that faculty which, in the other branches of human knowledge, perceives the distinction between truth and falfehood; or by a peculiar power of perception (called by fome the Moral Senfe) which is pleafed with one fet of qualities, and displeased with another? Secondly, What is the proper object of moral approbation? or, in other words, What is the common quality or qualities belonging to all the different modes of virtue? Is it benevolence; or a rational felf-love; or a difpofition (refulting from the afcendant of Reafon over Paffion) to act suitably to the different relations in which we are placed? These two queftions feem to exhaust the whole theory of Morals. The scope of the one is to afcertain the origin of our moral ideas; that

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SE C T. of the other, to refer the phenomena of moral perception to their moft fimple and general

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laws.

The practical doctrines of morality comprehend all those rules of conduct which profess to point out the proper ends of human purfuit, and the moft effectual means of attaining them; to which we may add all thofe literary compofitions, whatever be their particular form, which have for their aim to fortify and animate our good difpofitions, by delineations of the beauty, of the dignity, or of the utility of Virtue.

I fhall not inquire at present into the justnefs of this divifion. I fhall only obferve, that the words Theory and Practice are not, in this inftance, employed in their ufual acceptations. The theory of Morals does not bear, for example, the fame relation to the practice of Morals, that the theory of Geometry bears to practical Geometry. In this laft fcience, all the practical rules are founded on theoretical principles previously established: but in the former fcience, the practical rules are obvious to the capacities of all mankind; the theoretical principles form one of the most difficult fubjects of difcuffion that have exercifed the ingenuity of metaphyficians.

In illuftrating the doctrines of practical morality, (if we make allowance for fome unfor tunate prejudices produced or encouraged by violent and oppreffive fyftems of policy), the

ancients

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ancients feem to have availed themselves of s E c T. every light furnished by nature to human reafon; and indeed thofe writers who, in later times, have treated the fubject with the greatest fuccefs, are they who have followed most clofely the foot-fteps of the Greek and the Roman philofophers. The theoretical quef tion, too, concerning the effence of virtue, or the proper object of moral approbation, was a favourite topic of difcuffion in the ancient fchools. The question concerning the principle of moral approbation, though not entirely of modern origin, has been chiefly agitated fince the writings of Dr. Cudworth, in oppofition to thofe of Mr. Hobbes; and it is this question accordingly (recommended at once by its novelty and difficulty to the curiofity of speculative men), that has produced most of the theories which characterize and distinguish from each other the later fyf tems of moral philofophy.

It was the opinion of Dr. Cudworth, and alfo of Dr. Clarke, that moral diftinctions are perceived by that power of the mind, which diftinguishes truth from falfehood. This fyf tem it was one great object of Dr. Hutchefon's philofophy to refute, and in oppofition to it, to show that the words Right and Wrong exprefs certain agreeable and difagreeable qualities in actions, which it is not the province of reafon but of feeling to perceive; and to that power of perception which renders us fufceptible

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