than to " pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare," could not have been used. So intimately connected with, and dependent on, each other, are these two branches of power, that, had either been limited, the limitation would have had the like effect on the other. Had the power to raise money been conditional, or restricted to special purposes, the appropriation must have corresponded with it, for none but the money raised could be appropriated, nor could it be appropriated to other purposes than those which were permitted. On the other hand, if the right of appropriation had been restricted to certain purposes, it would be useless and improper to raise more than would be adequate to those purposes. It may fairly be inferred that these restraints or checks have been carefully and intentionally avoided. The power, in each branch, is alike broad and unqualified, and each is drawn with peculiar fitness to the other; the latter requiring terms of great extent and force to accommodate the former, which have been adopted, and both placed in the same clause and sentence. Can it be presumed that all these circumstances were so nicely adjusted by mere accident? Is it not more just to conclude that they were the result of due deliberation and design? Had it been intended that Congress should be restricted in the appropriation of the public money to such expenditures as were authorized by a rigid construction of the other specific grants, how easy would it have been to have provided for it by a declaration to that effect. The omission of such declaration is, therefore, an additional proof that it was not intended that the grant should be so construed.

It was evidently impossible to have subjected this grant, in either branch, to such restriction, without exposing the government to very serious embarrassment. How carry it into effect? If the grant had been made in any degree dependent upon the states, the government would have experienced the fate of the confederation. Like it, it would have withered and soon perished. Had the supreme court been authorized, or should any other tribunal, distinct from the government, be authorized, to interpose its veto, and to say, that more money had been raised under either branch of this power, that is, by taxes, duties, imposts, or excises, than was necessary; that such a tax or duty was useless; that the appropriation to this or that purpose was unconstitutional; the movement might have been suspended, and the whole system disorganized. It was impossible to have created a power within the government, or any other power distinct from Congress and the executive, which should control the movement of the government in this respect, and not destroy it. Had it been declared, by a clause in the constitution, that the expenditures under this grant should be restricted to the construction which might be given of the other grants, such restraint, though the most innocent, could not have failed to have had an injurious effect on the vital principles of the government, and often on its most important measures. Those who might wish to defeat a measure proposed, might construe the power relied on in support of it in a narrow and contracted manner, and in that way fix a precedent inconsistent with the true import of the grant. At other times, those who favored a measure, might give to the power relied on a forced or strained construction, and, succeeding in the object, fix a precedent in the opposite extreme. Thus it is manifest that, if the right of appropriation be confined to that limit, measures may oftentimes be carried, or defeated, by considerations and motives altogether independent of, and unconnected with, their merits, and the several powers of Congress receive constructions equally incon

sistent with their true import. No such declaration, however, has been made, and from the fair import of the grant, and, indeed, its positive terms, the inference that such was intended seems to be precluded.

Many considerations of great weight operate in favor of this construction, while I do not perceive any serious objection to it. If it be established, it follows that the words, "to provide for the common defence and general welfare," have a definite, safe, and useful meaning. The idea of their forming an original grant, with unlimited power, superseding every other grant, is abandoned. They will be considered, simply, as conveying a right of appropriation; a right indispensable to that of raising a revenue, and necessary to expenditures under every grant. By it, as already observed, no new power will be taken from the states, the money to be appropriated being raised under a power already granted to Congress. By it, too, the motive for giving a forced or strained construction to any of the other specific grants will, in most instances, be diminished, and, in many, utterly destroyed. The importance of this consideration can not be too highly estimated, since, in addition to the examples already given, it ought particularly to be recollected, that, to whatever extent any specific power may be carried, the right of jurisdiction goes with it, pursuing it through all its incidents. The very important agency which this grant has in carrying into effect every other grant, is a strong argument in favor of the construction contended for. All the other grants are limited by the nature of the offices which they have severally to perform, each conveying a power to do a certain thing, and that only, whereas this is coextensive with the great scheme of the government itself. It is the lever which raises and puts the whole machinery in motion, and continues the movement. Should either of the other grants fail, in consequence of any condition or limitation attached to it, or misconstruction of its powers, much injury might follow, but still it would be the failure of one branch of power, of one item in the system only. All the others might move on. But should the right to raise and appropriate the public money be improperly restricted, the whole system might be sensibly affected, if not disorganized. Each of the other grants is limited by the nature of the grant itself. This, by the nature of the government only. Hence it became necessary that, like the power to declare war, this power should be commensurate with the great scheme of the government, and with all its purposes.

If, then, the right to raise and appropriate the public money is not restricted to the expenditures under the other specific grants, according to a strict construction of their powers respectively, is there no limitation to it? Have Congress a right to raise and appropriate the public money to any and to every purpose, according to their will and pleasure? They certainly have not. The government of the United States is a limited government, instituted for great national purposes, and for those only. Other interests are committed to the states whose duty it is to provide for them. Each government should look to the great and essential purposes for which it was instituted, and confine itself to those purposes. A state government will rarely, if ever, apply money to national purposes, without making it a charge to the nation. The people of the state would not permit it. Nor will Congress be apt to apply money in aid of the state administrations, for purposes strictly local, in which the nation at large has no interest, although the states should desire it. The people of the other states would condemn it. They would declare that Congress had no right to tax them for such a purpose, and dismiss, at the next election, such of their representatives

as had voted for the measure, especially if it should be severely felt. I do not think that in offices of this kind there is much danger of the two governments mistaking their interests or their duties. I rather expect that they would soon have a clear and distinct understanding of them, and move on in great harmony.

Good roads and canals will promote many very important national purposes. They will facilitate the operations of war, the movements of troops, the transportation of cannon, of provisions, and every warlike store, much to our advantage and to the disadvantage of the enemy in time of war. Good roads will facilitate the transportation of the mail, and thereby promote the purposes of commerce and political intelligence among the people. They will, by being properly directed to these objects, enhance the value of our vacant lands, a treasure of vast resource to the nation. To the appropriation of the public money to improvements, having these objects in view, and carried to a certain extent, I do not see any well-founded constitutional objection.

In regard to our foreign concerns, provided they are managed with integrity and ability, great liberality is allowable in the application of the public money. In the management of these concerns, no state interests can be affected, no state rights violated. The complete and exclusive control over them is vested in Congress. The power to form treaties of alliance and commerce with foreign powers; to regulate by law our commerce with them; to determine on peace or war; to raise armies and a navy; to call forth the militia and direct their operations; belongs to the general government. These great powers, embracing the whole scope of our foreign relations, being granted, on what principle can it be said that the minor are withheld? Are not the latter clearly and evidently comprised in the former? Nations are sometimes called upon to perform to each other acts of humanity and kindness, of which we see so many illustrious examples between individuals in private life. Great calamities make appeals to the benevolence of mankind, which ought not to be resisted. Good oflices in such emergences exalt the character of the party rendering them. By exciting grateful feelings, they soften the intercourse between nations, and tend to prevent war. Surely, if the United States have a right to make war, they have a right to prevent it. How was it possible to grant to Congress a power for such minor purposes, other than in general terms, comprising it within the scope and policy of that which conveyed it for the greater?

The right of appropriation is nothing more than a right to apply the public money to this or that purpose. It has no incidental power, nor does it draw after it any consequences of that kind. All that Congress could do under it, in the case of internal improvements, would be to appropriate the money necessary to make them. For every act requiring legislative sanction or support the state authority must be relied on. The condemnation of the land, if the proprietors should refuse to sell it, the establishment of turnpikes and tolls, and the protection of the work when finished, must be done by the state. To these purposes the powers of the general government are believed to be utterly incompetent.

To the objection that the United States have no power, in any instance, which is not complete to all the purposes to which it may be made instrumental, and, in consequence, that they have no right to appropriate any portion of the public money to internal improvements, because they have not the right of sovereignty and jurisdiction over them when made, a full

answer has, it is presumed, been already given. It may, however, be proper to add, that, if this objection was well founded, it would not be contined to the simple case of internal improvements, but would apply to others of high importance. Congress have a right to regulate commerce. To give effect to this power, it becomes necessary to establish customhouses in every state along the coast, and in many parts of the interior. The vast amount of goods imported, and the duties to be performed to accommodate the merchants and secure the revenue, make it necessary that spacious buildings should be erected, especially in the great towns, for their reception. This, it is manifest could best be performed under the direction of the general government. Have Congress the right to seize the property of individuals, if they should refuse to sell it, in quarters best adapted to the purpose, to have it valued, and to take it at the valuation? Have they a right to exercise jurisdiction within those buildings? Neither of these claims has ever been set up, nor could it, as is presumed, be sustained. They have invariably either rented houses, where such as were suitable could be obtained, or, where they could not, purchased the ground of individuals, erected the buildings, and held them under the laws of the state. Under the power to establish postoffices and postroads, houses are also requisite for the reception of the mails and the transaction of the business of the several offices. These have always been rented or purchased, and held under the laws of the state, in the same manner as if they had been taken by a citizen. The United States have a right to establish tribunals inferior to the supreme court, and such have been established in every state of the Union. It is believed that the houses for these inferior courts have invariably been rented. No right of jurisdiction in them has ever been claimed, nor other right than that of privilege, and that only while the court was in session. A still stronger case may be urged. Should Congress be compelled, by invasion or other cause, to remove the government to some town within one of the states, would they have a right of jurisdiction over such town, or hold even the house in which they held their session, under other authority than the laws of such state? It is believed that they would not. If they have a right to appropriate money for any of these purposes, to be laid out under the protection of the laws of the state, surely they have an equal right to do it for the purposes of internal improvements.

It is believed that there is not a corporation in the Union which does not exercise great discretion in the application of the money raised by it, to the purposes of its institution. It would be strange it the government of the United States, which was instituted for such important purposes, and endowed with such extensive powers, should not be allowed at least equal discretion and authority. The evil to be particularly avoided is, the violation of state-rights; shunning that, it seems to be reasonable and proper that the powers of Congress should be so construed as that the general government, in its intercourse with other nations, and in our internal concerns, should be able to adopt all such measures, lying within the fair scope, and intended to facilitate the direct objects of its powers, as the public welfare may require, and a sound and provident policy dictate.

The measures of Congress have been in strict accord with the view ta ken of the right of appropriation, both as to its extent and limitation, as will be shown by a reference to the laws, commencing at a very early period. Many roads have been opened, of which the following are the prin cipal: The first, from Cumberland, at the head waters of the Potomac, in

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the state of Maryland, through Pennsylvania and Virginia, to the state of Ohio, -March 29, 1806. See vol. 4th, page 13, of the late edition of the laws. The. second, from the frontiers of Georgia, on the route from Athens to New Orleans, to its intersection with the 31st degree of north latitude: April 31st, 1806, page 58. The third, from Mississippi, at a point, and by a route described, to the Ohio: same act. The fourth, from Nashville, in Tennessee, to Natchez: same act. The fifth, from the 31st degree of north latitude, on the route from Athens to New Orleans, under such regulations as might be agreed on between the executive and the Spanish government: March 3d, 1807, page 117. The sixth, from the foot of the rapids of the river Miami, of Lake Erie, to the western line of the Connecticut reserve: December 12th, 1811, page 364. seventh, from the Lower Sandusky to the boundary line established by the treaty of Greenville: same act. The eighth, from a point where the United States road, leading from Vincennes to the Indian boundary line, established by the treaty of Greenville, strikes the said line, to the North Bend, in the state of Ohio: January 8th, 1812, page 367. The ninth, for repairing, and keeping in repair, the road between Columbia, on Duck river, in Tennessee, and Madisonville, in Louisiana; and also the road between Fort Hawkins, in Georgia, and Fort Stoddard: April 27th, 1816, page 104 of the acts of that year. The tenth, from the Shawneetown, on the Ohio river, to the Sabine, and to Kaskaskias, in Illinois: April 27th, 1816, page 112. The eleventh, from Reynoldsburg, on Tennessee river, in the state of Tennessee, through the Chickasaw nation, to intersect the Natchez road near the Chickasaw old town: March 3d, 1817, page 252. The twelfth by this act, authority was given to the president to appoint three commissioners for the purpose of examining the country, and laying out a road from the termination of the Cumberland road, at Wheeling, on the Ohio, through the states of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, to a point to be chosen by them, on the left bank of the Mississippi, between St. Louis and the mouth of the Illinois river, and to report an accurate plan of the said road, with an estimate of the expense of making it. It is, however, declared by the act, that nothing was thereby intended to imply an obligation, on the part of the United States, to make, or defray the expense of making, the said road, or any part thereof.

In the late war, two other roads were made by the troops, for military purposes; one from the Upper Sandusky, in the state of Ohio, through the Black swamp, toward Detroit, and another from Plattsburg, on Lake Champlain, through the Chatougee woods, toward Sackett's harbor, which have since been repaired and improved by the troops. Of these latter there is no notice in the laws. The extra pay to the soldiers for repairing and improving those roads, was advanced, in the first instance, from the ap propriation to the quartermaster's department, and afterward provided for by a specific appropriation by Congress. The necessity of keeping those roads open and in good repair, being, on the frontier, to facilitate a communication between our posts, is apparent.

All of these roads, except the first, were formed merely by cutting down the trees, and throwing logs across so as to make causeways over such parts as were otherwise impassable. The execution was of the coarsest kind. The Cumberland road is the only regular work which has been undertaken by the general government, or which could give rise to any question between the two governments respecting its powers. It is a great work, over the highest mountains in our Union, connecting, from the