Argument against the Motion.

1885, it was held, that the appellate jurisdiction of this court did not exist, because the validity of a statute of the United States, etc., was not drawn in question; and this upon the construction of § 702 of the Revised Statutes, to which we have already referred; and the court expressly said that Utah does not fall within the clause concerning constitutional questions, because the section is in terms limited to Washington alone.

In In re Schneider, 148 U. S. 157, decided in 1892, no question of the validity of a statute or of constitutional right was involved, and the application for a writ of error was denied, the court holding that the proceeding in habeas corpus below was a civil proceeding, and that the pecuniary clause in the statute did not apply.

All these decisions, and others of the same character, were made before the passage of the District Courts of Appeals act of 1893. It must be presumed that Congress was familiar with the course of these decisions when, in defining the jurisdiction of this court by the act of 1893, it reformed the language of former acts, and that it intended thereby to put its appellate jurisdiction on the same footing in respect to the highest court in the District of Columbia, with its almost illimitable jurisdiction, upon the same footing that Congress had provided by the act of 1891, in respect to all the Circuit Courts of the whole country.

II. The present case is one over which this court has jurisdiction, because there is a sum of money in dispute.

The statute under which the plaintiff in error was indicted, tried and convicted is one which provides, in section 1, that, upon conviction, the party shall be punished "by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars nor less than one hundred dollars, and imprisonment of not less than one month nor more than twelve months." There is, therefore, necessarily involved in this case a sum in dispute.

The language of the act, in substance, is, that if the validity of a statute is drawn in question in any case, the court shall have jurisdiction regardless of the amount in question; but in cases where the validity of a statute is not drawn in question, the amount in dispute must be not less than $5000.

Argument against the Motion.

Now, it is respectfully submitted that this is a case in which a money value is involved, because the statute is imperative that there shall be a judgment, in case of conviction, for at least $100, and it may be $1000, depending upon the decision of the court in view of the gravity of the offence. This question, so far as we have been able to find, has never been decided by this court.

In the case of Farnsworth v. Montana, 129 U. S. 104, the punishment inflicted was a fine of $50 and $17.50 costs. The statute under which that case was prosecuted provided that the case could not be reviewed in this court unless the matter in dispute amounted to $5000, and this court, in that case, said:

"The judgment of the Probate Court was imprisonment until the payment of the fine and costs, and, if the fine covered by the judgment of any one of the courts could be called a matter in dispute within the first section of the act of 1885, the pecuniary value involved did not exceed $5000, so that it is plain that the first section of the act of 1885 does not cover the case."

So it appears, in the above-named case, that it was decided solely upon the ground that the amount involved did not reach the statutory limit.

In the case of Snow v. United States, 118 U. S. 354, the plaintiff in error was convicted, in the Territory of Utah, on indictments found under section 3, of the act of March 22, 1882, for cohabiting with more than one woman, the judgment of the court being imprisonment for six months and a fine of $300. Section 1909 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provides, that writs of error and appeals from the final decisions of the Supreme Court of any one of eight named Territories, of which Utah was one, "shall be allowed to the Supreme Court of the United States in the same manner and under the same regulations as from the Circuit Courts of the United States, where the value of the property or the amount in controversy exceeds $1000."

In the opinion of the court, by Mr. Justice Blatchford, it is said: "In each of the present cases the pecuniary value

Opinion of the Court.

involved does not exceed $300, even if the fine could be called a 'matter in dispute,' within the statute."

It will be seen, therefore, that, in each of said cases, this court did not decide that the imposition of a fine could not be regarded as a matter in dispute capable of being valued in money, but merely decided that, in the cases presented, the amount of the fine did not equal the jurisdictional sum required by the statutes regulating the review upon writ of error. In the case at bar no such difficulty arises, as the statute provides for a review in this court of the cases enumerated" without regard to the sum or value of the matter in dispute."

There is one hundred dollars in amount and value in dispute in this case just as much and more than it could be in an ordinary civil case, and in connection with it there is the question of the validity of the statute which the court below has said authorized it to exact that sum from the plaintiff in error. This brings the case literally within section 8 of the act of 1893, even upon the contention of the other side in respect of its meaning.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellate jurisdiction of this court rests on the acts of Congress, and the question is whether we have jurisdiction to review on writ of error a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in a criminal case under section 8 of the act of February 9, 1893, c. 74, establishing that court. 27 Stat. 434. And the proper construction of that section is to be arrived at in the light of previous decisions in respect of similar statutory provisions conferring appellate jurisdiction.

Section 8 of the act of February 27, 1801, c. 15, entitled "An act concerning the District of Columbia," 2 Stat. 103, and creating a Circuit Court for the District, provided: "That any final judgment, order or decree in said Circuit Court, wherein the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the value of one hundred dollars, may be reëxamined and

Opinion of the Court.

reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States, by writ of error or appeal, which shall be prosecuted in the same manner, under the same regulations, and the same proceedings shall be had therein, as is or shall be provided in the case of writs of error on judgments, or appeals upon orders or decrees, rendered in the Circuit Court of the United States." In United States v. More, 3 Cranch, 159, 173 (decided in 1805), it was held that this court had no jurisdiction under that section over the judgments of the Circuit Court of the District in criminal cases, and Chief Justice Marshall said: "On examining the act, 'concerning the District of Columbia,' the court is of opinion, that the appellate jurisdiction, granted by that act, is confined to civil cases. The words, matter in dispute,' seem appropriated to civil cases, where the subject in contest has a value beyond the sum mentioned in the act. But, in criminal cases, the question is the guilt or innocence of the accused. And although he may be fined upwards of one hundred dollars, yet that is, in the eye of the law, a punishment for the offence committed, and not the particular object of the suit."

The section, as thus construed, was carried forward in the subsequent legislation on the subject, which is referred to at length and considered in cases hereafter cited, and need not be again reviewed.

The act of March 3, 1885, c. 355, 23 Stat. 443, consists of two sections, reading:

"That no appeal or writ of error shall hereafter be allowed from any judgment or decree in any suit at law or in equity in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, or in the Supreme Court of any of the Territories of the United States, unless the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the sum of five thousand dollars.

"SEC. 2. That the preceding section shall not apply to any case wherein is involved the validity of any patent or copyright, or in which is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of or an authority exercised under the United States; but in all such cases an appeal or writ of error may be brought without regard to the sum or value in dispute."

Opinion of the Court.

We have decided that this court has no jurisdiction to grant a writ of error to review the judgments of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in criminal cases either under the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826, In re Heath, 144 U. S. 92; or under the act of February 6, 1889, c. 113, 25 Stac. 655, Cross v. United States, 145 U. S. 571; or on habeas corpus, Cross v. Burke, 146 U. S. 82. And although the validity of any patent or copyright, or of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, was not drawn in question in those cases, it was distinctly ruled in reaching the conclusions announced that neither of the sections of the act of March 3, 1885, applied to any criminal case; and Farnsworth v. Montana, 129 U. S. 104; United States v. Sanges, 14 U. S. 310, and United States v. More, 3 Cranch, 159, were cited with approval. Cross v. United States, 145 U. S. 574; Cross v. Burke, 146 U. S. 87.

In Farnsworth v. Montana, in which it was claimed that the validity of an authority exercised under the United States was drawn in question, it was held that the second section of the act did not extend to criminal cases, but that both sections applied to cases where there was a matter in dispute measurable by some sum or value in money. The view taken was that the second section contained an exception or limitation carved out of the first section, and that the words, that in the enumerated cases, "an appeal or writ of error may be brought without regard to the sum or value in dispute," clearly implied that in those cases also there must be a pecuniary matter in dispute measurable by some sum or value, though not restricted in amount.

In United States v. Sanges, referring to Snow v. United States, 118 U. S. 346, we said: "The question whether the provision of the act of March 3, 1885, c. 355, § 2, authorizing a writ of error from this court to the Supreme Court of any Territory in any case in which is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States,' extended to criminal cases, was then left open, but at October term, 1888, it was decided in the negative. Farnsworth v. Montana, 129 U. S. 104."