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with the end of 1906, came the reaction; the revolution was soon crushed, and the years from 1907 to 1917 marked the last stable period of the tsarist monarchy. The masses deserted the revolutionary parties, and the Bolshevik party was reduced, too. In March, 1917, the tide of popular support began to rise again, once more filling the readymade party mold with human material, and by October, 1917, the Bolshevik party was the strongest of all the Russian parties.

As Bolshevism conceives it, a party is not a popular mass, and a popular mass is not a party. A party is solid, constant, a backbone; the people are unstable, changing, flesh and muscle. A party has a clear theory, a revolutionary conception; the people are subject to moods and hesitations. The party leads, the people follow. A party is a minority directing the majority. A party must not be too big; when it numbers millions it loses its stability and spiritual quality. It is possible to find a few thousand, perhaps a few score thousand firm, unbending enthusiasts, but millions cannot sustain this enthusiasm. From this flow all the difficulties of the present period, when the Bolshevik party has become an organization of millions.11

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Later, Stalin accepted and emphasized this view of the party:

The Party is not merely an organized detachment, but "the highest of all forms of organization" of the working class, and it is its mission to guide all the other organizations of the working class. As the highest form of organization, consisting of the finest members of the class, armed with an advanced theory, with knowledge of the laws of the class struggle and with the experience of the revolutionary movement, the Party has every opportunity of guiding—and is obliged to guide-all the other organizations of the working class."

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Like his predecessors in the 1870's, Lenin denied the ability of the working class to produce, out of its own midst, a theory and practice of socialism. Rather socialism was to be elaborated by intellectuals from among the "bourgeois intelligentsia," while "the masses" were expected to adopt, follow and obey.

. . . The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade union consciousness, i.e., it may itself realise the necessity for combining in unions, for fighting against the employers and for striving to compel the government to pass necessary labour legislation, etc. The theory of Socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical and economic theories that were elaborated by the educated representatives of the propertied classes, the intellectuals. . . . the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia. Similarly, in Russia, the theoretical doctrine of Social-Democracy arose quite independently of the spontaneous growth of the labour movement; it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome of the development of ideas among the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia.18

"Ibid., pp. 227, 228.

"History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course (New York: International Publishers, 1939), p. 48.

Lenin, "What Is To Be Done?" (1901-02), Selected Works, vol. II, p. 53.

3. The End and the Means

By this time (1903-05) Lenin's personality and methods of work had been definitely established. One of his early collaborators, and later antagonist, Alexander Potresov, says about his former friend:

The aim justifies the means! In his personal life Lenin was a modest, unpretentious, virtuous family man, who daily quarreled good-naturedlyand not without humor-with his mother-in-law-she was the only person of his immediate circle who dared to rebuke him and assert her personality. In politics he was the strict follower of Machiavellian principles.

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Within the social democratic party as well as outside it .. Lenin knew only two categories of people and events: his own and the strangers. His own people were those who were within the sphere of influence of his organization; the strangers were those who did not enter into this sphere and who thus-and because of this fact alone-were considered enemies. The intervening gamut of social and individual human relationships between these opposite poles-between the comrade-friend and the heretical enemy-did not exist.

It was in these "Iskra” years that Lenin laid the theoretical foundation for the conception of the revolutionary movement and of the revolution, according to which the masses are only the obedient tool of a group of revolutionists, the conscious minority, the bearers of the truth. . . .1

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Lenin possessed the traits and qualities of a dictator, says his former friend:

It must be said that no one was better fitted than Lenin to carry out the function of a sovereign head of a dictatorial group.

Because no one could better instill enthusiasm for his plans, so impress by his will, so captivate by his personality, than this man who at first glance seemed to be insignificant, somewhat coarse and without charm. . . .

Actually Lenin represented, especially in Russia, a rare combination of iron will, unbounded energy, and fanatical belief in the movement, the cause, and to a not lesser degree in himself. If the French King Louis XIV could say: "L'état-c'est moi!" Lenin . . . felt that the party was he, that he was the will of the movement concentrated in one person. And he acted accordingly. . .

...

He knew how to surround himself with efficient, capable, vigorous people like himself who had an infinite belief in him and who obeyed him unquestioningly, but people who had no independent personalities, who were incapable of differing from Lenin's opinions or of holding views of their own."

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"A. N. Potresov, Posmertnyi Sbornik Proizvedenii (Posthumous Collection of Works) (Paris: no pub., 1937), pp. 300-303.

"Ibid., pp. 301, 302.

This intransigency toward his political adversaries was confirmed somewhat later by Lenin himself. When he was cited before a party tribunal on accusations of slander after he had used untruths in assailing his adversaries, the Mensheviks, he expounded his principles on how to fight a political adversary: the adversary must be represented to the public in the worst possible colors in order to arouse disgust and hatred. This principle set forth by Lenin is important because it became, and has remained, a standard method of the Soviet press and propaganda.

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The wording [of our press campaign against our political foe] is calculated to provoke in the reader hatred, disgust, contempt. The phrasing must be calculated not to convince but to destroy the ranks [of the enemy] not to correct the adversary's mistake, but to annihilate, to raze to the ground, his organization. This wording must really be of such a kind as to provoke the worst notions, the worst suspicions about the adversary; it must sow discord in the ranks of the proletariat and be the opposite of phrasing which would convince and correct.

I am intentionally sowing discord in the ranks of that part of the Petersburg proletariat which followed the Mensheviks. . . . In regard to such political enemies I conducted at that time-and in case of a repetition or development of the split, I will always carry out—a fight of extermina

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They say: fight but not with a poisoned weapon. No doubt this is a beautiful and effective expression, but.

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From 1903 on, the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks lived separate lives, without, however, formally breaking their alliance. From time to time for about nine years they made efforts at collaboration, only to separate again after a violent fight. Lenin was never prepared to submit to a majority if it was not his majority; "coexistence" was possible on his terms only. Great political events developed in the years from 1903 to 1906, and on almost every issue bolshevism had its own policy, one strictly opposed to that of all other parties.

The war with Japan, which was started by the Russian government in 1904, proved, from the very beginning, an unpopular war. Losing battles as well as prestige both at home and abroad, the regime faced oppositionary trends and a growing revolutionary movement. "Peace at any price" became a slogan of both liberal groups and socialist parties.

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Lenin, "Doklad V S❞ezdu RSDRP po Povodu Peterburgskogo Raskola i Svyazannogo s nim Uchrezhdeniya Partiinogo Suda" (Report to the Fifth Congress of the RSDLP in Regard to the Petersburg Split and the Setting up in Connection with it of a Party Court), Sochineniya (Works) (4th ed.; Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury (State Publishing House for Political Literature), 1941-58), vol. XII (1947), pp. 382, 383, 385. The Fifth Congress took place May 13-June 1, 1907.

Lenin, however, refused to adopt such a slogan. To him, the war, which was destroying the people's confidence in the regime, was beneficial:

The cause of Russian freedom and the struggle of the Russian (and international) proletariat for socialism depend to a great extent on military defeats of the autocracy. This cause has gained a lot from the military rout which inspires fear in the European custodians of order. . . .

It was not the Russian people, but the Russian autocracy that started this colonial war which has developed into a war of the old and the new capitalist worlds. Not the Russian people but the autocracy has suffered an ignominious defeat. The Russian people has gained from the defeat of the autocracy. The capitulation of Port Arthur is the prologue to the capitulation of tsarism. The war is still far from ended, but each step in its continuation immensely enlarges the discontent and indignation of the Russian people, brings nearer the moment of a new great war, of a war of the people against autocracy, a war of the proletariat for freedom.17

Defeatism was an outstanding and constant element of Lenin's strategy; it was not restricted to issues of war and peace. To him, what was bad for the government was good for the revolution, even if it meant privation and death for the people. On another occasion Lenin had applied his defeatism to a situation caused by a great famine which broke out in the Volga region in 1892; the citizens were anxious to help the destitute. However,

Only Vladimir Ulyanov with his family and group that completely agreed with him in everything took another stand. . . . “the famine,” he asserted, "is the direct consequence of a particular social order; so long as this order exists, such famines are inevitable; they can be abolished only by the abolition of this order of society.

"Being in this sense inevitable, famine today performs a progressive function. Destroying the peasant economy it forces peasants from the village into the city, thus forming the proletariat and speeding the industrialization of the nation. . . . Famine will cause the peasant to reflect on the fundamental facts of capitalist society, it will destroy his faith in the Tsar and Tsarism and consequently will in time facilitate the victory of the revolution. It is easy to understand the desire of the so-called 'society' to come to the assistance of the starving, to ameliorate their sufferings. This 'society' is itself flesh and blood of the bourgeois order. . . . The famine threatens to create serious disturbances and possibly the destruction of the entire order. Therefore the efforts of the well-to-do to mitigate the effect of the famine are quite natural. . . . Psychologically this talk of feeding the starving etc. is nothing but an expression of the usual sugary sentimentality so characteristic of our intelligentsia." 18

"Lenin, "Padenie Port Artura" (The Fall of Port Arthur) (January 14 [1], 1905), Sochineniya, vol. VIII (1947), pp. 37, 38.

"V. Vodovozov, "Moe Znakomstvo s Leninym" (My Acquaintance with Lenin), Na Chuzhoi Storone (In a Foreign Land), Prague, December, 1925, pp. 176-178.

4. The Great Rehearsal

In Russia, the revolutionary movement of 1905 is often called the "first revolution." Although the movement was soon thereafter defeated, it had nevertheless been a movement of unprecedented force: between October and December 1905 the government had been forced to make substantial concessions and introduce political reforms.

The year began with a procession, on January 22[9], of thousands (estimates went up to 140,000) of striking St. Petersburg workers to the Tsar's Winter Palace under the leadership of the priest, Georgi Gapon; the intention was to submit to the Tsar a petition expressing loyalty but demanding improvements and reforms. A military squad opened fire on the peaceful marchers, killing and wounding thousands.

A wave of economic and political strikes followed which soon engulfed the whole country. In some provinces the peasants joined in the general movement. In June the sailors on the battleship Potemkin mutinied (the war with Japan was still on). On October 30[17], in the midst of a general strike, the Tsar's government issued a Manifesto promising essential political reforms: civil liberties; protection of the inviolability of the individual; freedom of conscience, speech, assembly, and association. A far-reaching amnesty for political prisoners was announced and, as a matter of fact, all political prisoners were set free. The formation of a Duma, a kind of elected legislature, was promised. The first "Soviets of Workers' Deputies" in Russia emerged spontaneously during those months. On the initiative of the socialist parties, mainly the Mensheviks, industrial workers in the city's factories proceeded to elect representatives to non-partisan bodies called Soviets. (At a later stage, in 1917, there also emerged "Soldiers' " and "Peasants' Soviets.) The Soviet (council) was to serve as a leader in economic and political strikes. At that time there existed in Russia neither trade unions nor political associations able to cope with these tasks; the Soviet was to be the first mass organization in a country where associations and parties were prohibited. The chairman of the St. Petersburg Soviet was a nonparty lawyer, Khrustalev-Nosar; the vice chairmen were Leon (Lev) Trotsky, a non-Bolshevik Social-Democrat, and Nikolai Avksentiev, a member of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Bolsheviks at first looked with suspicion upon this new "nonparty" formation.

Meantime Lenin's party had made great strides; local committees of the party had emerged in all important cities, and thousands of new members joined its organizations; hundreds of thousands of party leaflets were distributed. In May 1905 the "Third Congress" (at which only Bolshevik delegates were present) was convened in London. The theme of the congress was "the tactics of the Social-Democracy in a democratic revolution." Despite the fact, Lenin told the congress, that the current

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