health you must proceed to Sukhum." The funeral actually took place on Sunday, January 27. Trotsky could have been there. He has stated that Stalin kept him away deliberately. Stalin wanted to weaken the association in the people's minds between Lenin and Trotsky.98

While Trotsky was continuing his medical treatment, the Moscow leadership was consolidating its power. Stalin saw to it that no friends or supporters of Trotsky advanced to prominent position in the party or government.

... it was a real conspiracy [Trotsky wrote]. A secret political bureau of seven was formed; it comprised all the members of the official Politbureau except me, and included also Kuybyshev, the present chairman of the Supreme Economic Council. All questions were decided in advance at that secret centre, where the members were bound by mutual vows. They undertook not to engage in polemics against one another and at the same time to seek opportunities to attack me. There were similar centres in the local organizations, and they were connected with the Moscow "seven" by strict discipline. For communication, special codes were used. This was a well-organized illegal group within the party, directed originally against one man. Responsible workers in the party and state were systematically selected by the single criterion: Against Trotsky...

... From the end of 1923, the same work was carried on in all the parties of the Communist International; certain leaders were dethroned and others appointed in their stead solely on the basis of their attitude toward Trotsky.99

Zinoviev and Kamenev at first supported Stalin in the anti-Trotsky drive. Soon, however, they became apprehensive about Stalin's growing power and gradually moved toward opposition. Stalin

took the initiative in breaking up the triumvirate: he refused to consult his partners or to concert with them his moves before the sessions of the Politbureau. To all intents and purposes he was the indisputable master of the party, even though Kamenev was still entrenched in the organization of Moscow, while Zinoviev still led the Bolsheviks in Leningrad.100

The two antagonists held different views of the ideological divergencies between them. Trotsky, leader of the "Lefts," more extreme in some respects than the rest of the leaders, felt that the ruling group had lost its revolutionary fervor and developed into mediocre "bureaucrats"; they hated him, he believed, for his adherence to old ideals, to world revolution, to equality.

.. the ideas of the first period of the revolution were imperceptibly losing their influence in the consciousness of the party stratum that held the direct power over the country.

100 I. Deutscher, Stalin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 297.

In the country itself, processes were shaping themselves that one may sum up under the general name of reaction.

The visiting at each other's homes, the assiduous attendance of the ballet, the drinking-parties at which people who were absent were pulled to pieces, had no attraction for me. The new ruling group felt that I did not fit in with this way of living, and they did not even try to win me over. It was for this very reason that many group conversations would stop the moment I appeared, and those engaged in them would cut them short with a certain shamefacedness and a slight bitterness toward me.101

In Trotsky's view, the Stalinist group had become narrow-minded nationalists, concerned only with the fate of their own state. To Trotsky, Stalin's course in the Comintern was nonrevolutionary; Stalin's instructions suggesting collaboration with the Kuomintang in China in the middle 1920's were to Trotsky an act of treason; Stalin's scheme for building socialism in Russia was, to Trotsky, a ridiculous effort to erect "socialism in one country"; the pace of "industrialization" under Stalin was too slow; Stalin's rule in the party was contrary to the principles of inner-party democracy.

. . He blamed Stalin for the "absolutist bureaucracy" in power in Russia, for the development of an "unbridled oligarchy." He protested against the privileges enjoyed by the "higher-ups" and Stakhanovites. He perceived in the social structure of Soviet Russia a "monstrous perversion of the principles of the November revolution.102

Stalin's counterattack against Trotsky's vigorous criticism was likewise strong. Stalin adhered, of course, to the program of the world revolution.

. . . To overthrow the bourgeoisie the efforts of one country are sufficient; this is proved by the history of our revolution. For the final victory of Socialism, for the organization of Socialist production, the efforts of one country, particularly of a peasant country like Russia, are insufficient; for that, the efforts of the proletarians of several advanced countries are required. 103

The theory of "socialism in one country," Stalin maintained, emanated from Marx and Lenin, and Soviet Russia had no alternative but to follow this road. The kind of "party democracy" that Trotsky advocated was contrary to the decisions of the party congresses. Trotsky, the army leader, was a potential "Bonaparte." Trotsky had

103 David J. Dallin, The Changing World of Soviet Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), p. 213.

103

Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism," Problems of Leninism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1940), p. 153.

set himself up in opposition to the C.C. [Central Committee] and imagines himself to be a superman standing above the C.C., above its laws, above its decisions.

104

In his fight against Trotsky, Stalin joined with a group of Politburo members who constituted the emerging "right opposition," a faction which insisted on concessions to private peasant economy; 105 the group consisted of Nikolai Bukharin, Mikhail Tomski, and Aleksei Rykov. Stalin's highhanded methods, however, alienated his former partners, Zinoviev and Kamenev. Despite interdictions, organized factions continued to exist. Inner-party "discussions" and excited meetings took place; polemics were aired in newspapers and pamphlets. The fight reached a climax in 1926-27.

In January 1925, Trotsky was removed from his post as People's Commissar for War. In October 1926 he was expelled from the Politburo, at the same time that Zinoviev was removed from the presidency of the Communist International.

At the party's Fourteenth Congress in December 1925:

. . The resolution to approve Stalin's report on behalf of the Central Committee [was] carried by an overwhelming majority of 559 to 65. The Stalinist apparatus demonstrated itself in complete control of the proceedings.

By the beginning of 1926, the Stalinist machine was so solidly entrenched in all the key positions in the Party apparatus as to be virtually impervious to attack. . . . The opposition could muster a brilliant coterie of generals, but they were generals whose forces were scattered, disorganized, and improvised, and they confronted an enemy who securely controlled both the local organizations and leading organs of the Party.106

Two former adversaries, the Trotsky group and the Zinoviev-Kamenev faction, joined forces in 1926 to oppose Stalin's leadership. Despite its sporadic vigorous attacks on the "apparatus," however, it did not gain force. The political end of this opposition came in November 1927.

... On 7 November 1927, during the official celebration of the tenth anniversary of the October revolution, Trotsky and Zinoviev led their followers in separate processions through the streets of Moscow and Leningrad. Though the processions were of peaceful character and the banners and slogans carried by the demonstrators were directed against the ruling group only by implication, the incident brought the struggle to a head. Trotsky

204

Stalin, "Report on Immediate Tasks in Party Affairs," Delivered January 17, 1924 at the Thirteenth Conference of the RCP (B), Works, vol. VI (1953), p. 14. 105 For further discussion of the program and activities of the "right opposition," see pp. 152-155.

106 Fainsod, op. cit., pp. 164, 165.

and Zinoviev were immediately expelled from the party. . . . On 18 December the congress expelled seventy-five leading members of the opposition, in addition to many others already expelled or imprisoned.

A day later the opposition split. Its Trotskyist section refused to yield to the demands of the congress. Trotsky was deported to Alma Ata, Rakovsky to Astrakhan. Zinoviev, Kamenev, and their followers, however, issued a statement in which they renounced their views. The opposition was defeated by this defection no less than by Stalin's reprisals.107

Trotsky stayed in Turkestan until February 1929, when he was exiled abroad. He lived successively in Turkey, France, Norway, and Mexico. He was assassinated in Mexico by an agent of the Soviet secret police in August 1940.

8. The End of Opposition; Stalin as Autocrat

No sooner had the "Leftist" groups (Trotsky's and Zinoviev's) been suppressed and their leaders exiled than a new rift occurred in the apparently solid majority of the party's leadership. A fight developed between the "Rights" (Bukharin, Rykov, Tomski) and Stalin's faction. Within a comparatively short time-less than 2 years the "Rights" were defeated, dispersed, and removed from leadership.

The essence of the "Rightist" program consisted in demands for continuation of the NEP, further concessions to the peasantry, no compulsory collectivization, and consequently, a slower pace of industrialization. The program was opposed to "liquidation of the kulaks" 108 except on a gradual and voluntary basis; "enrich yourselves" was a slogan of Bukharin's addressed to the individual farmers. The "Rights" protested the terroristic acts of the government against the peasantry. They maintained that "the state," as embodied, in the first place, in the police and army, must "wither away" (in accordance with the teachings of the founders of the Communist movement) and a gradual liberalization of the political system ensue. Some members of the "Rightist" group advocated the admission of a second political party to activity. Stalin, on the other hand, was for rapid industrialization and collectivization of farming, goals which could be attained only by application of tremendous pressure; terrorism was an inevitable part of this policy. Despite his hatred of Trotskyism, Stalin maintained that "Right deviation [is] the chief danger in the Party at the present time." 109 Stalin denounced the right faction as pursuing a “liberal bourgeois policy."

In the fight between the factions, Stalin proved to be far shrewder, more ruthless, and the better master of intrigue; his opponents lacked

107

Deutscher, op. cit., p. 311.

108 For further discussion of the drive against the so-called "kulaks," see ch. VI, p. 159.

109 Stalin, "Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B.)" (June 27, 1930), Works, vol. XII (1955), p. 364.

the stamina for the life-and-death struggle with their formidable adversary. Personal relations within the Politburo were disrupted; tension mounted. In their despair, the "Rights" tried to make contact with the recently removed "Leftist" group of Kamenev and Zinoviev, which in itself was a crime in the eyes of the Stalinists.

On July 11, 1928, Bukharin and Kamenev had a secret interview arranged by Sokolnikov.

[Bukharin] gave the impression of being "at bay"; his lips "trembled with emotion"; he was terrified of carrying on him anything "in writing." Why? "Do not let anyone know of our meeting. Do not telephone; it is overheard. The GPU is following and watching you also." 110

In his conversation with Kamenev, Bukharin described the essence of Stalin's program and its shortcomings. Stalin, Bukharin said, proceeded on the following theory:

"Capitalism has developed through its colonies, through loans, and by exploiting the workers. We have no colonies and no loans, so our basis must be tribute paid by the peasants.". . . According to Stalin, [Bukharin said] "the more socialism grows, the stronger will grow the resistance" (which Bukharin describes as "idiotic illiteracy") and as a result “a firm leadership is necessary." . . . "This [Bukharin declared] results in a police regime."

[Bukharin charged that] "He [Stalin] is eaten up with the vain desire to become a well known theoretician. He feels that it is the only thing he lacks."

... Stalin knows only vengeance . . the dagger in the back. We must remember his theory of sweet revenge." (One summer night in 1923, opening his heart to Dzerzhinsky and Kamenev, Stalin is supposed to have said, "To choose one's victim, to prepare one's plans minutely, to slake an implacable vengeance and then to go to bed. . . . There is nothing sweeter in the world.") 111

To inform Zinoviev of his conversation with Bukharin, Kamenev made a written record of it, a copy of which fell into Stalin's hands. This aggravated the situation in the extreme, and the fate of the "Rights" was sealed.

Events now unwound toward a familiar denouement. In a speech before a joint session of the Politburo and the presidium of the Central Control Commission at the end of January 1929, Stalin announced the "discovery" of a factional right-wing group led by Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov. Bukharin, he pointed out, had engaged in negotiations with Kamenev to establish a bloc with the former Left Opposition. Bukharin's article, "Notes of an Economist," was a veiled attack on the Politburo line. Stalin warned

110

Boris Souvarine, Stalin (New York: Alliance Book Corporation, Longmans, Green & Co., 1939), pp. 482, 483.

111

Ibid., pp. 483, 485.