in the internal affairs of this country. I have observed these instructions scrupulously and, so far as my authority extends, have directed their strict observance by all connected with the American Embassy or under its control. The charge or insinuation that I was aiding Kaledin or any other of the numerous and varied factions in Russia is absolutely without foundation and my statement to this effect should be sufficient to convince all of its truth and correctness. The American Red Cross is an organization in my country supported by voluntary subscription and officially recognized by the Government of the United States, the purpose of the existence of which is the alleviation of human suffering. During the present war in which the United States is now engaged the American Red Cross maintains certain missions operating in the countries of its allies, among them a mission to Russia and one to Rumania, under the chairmanship of Lieut. Col. Raymond Robins and Lieut. Col. Henry W. Anderson, respectively. The American Embassy at Petrograd has never failed to afford all assistance and cooperation possible with the American Red Cross in Washington and with its missions in Russia and Rumania especially, one of its chief duties and privileges being the transmission to their respective destinations of cables between the respective missions and the American Red Cross in Washington. The bulletin of the Soviets published the text of a telegram from Colonel Anderson to Colonel Kalpashnikov relative to the shipment of certain motor cars to Rostov-on-Don, directing Colonel Kalpashnikov to apply to me for the advance of Rs. 100,000 for the account of the Red Cross. The bulletin does not publish the text of the two following telegrams from Colonel Anderson which, together with the text of the telegram published, were delivered to Colonel Kalpashnikov on December 1/14: AMERICAN EMBASSY, PETROGRAD. 575. Following signed Anderson for Kalpashnikov: JASSY, December 11 [1917]. Perkins and Verblyunski left for Petrograd 10th. In view changed conditions here disregard my 569, December 5. Have motors ready for shipment on arrival Perkins who carries instructions. Spend necessary funds up to Rs. 50,000. Move them promptly. See Robins about other supplies mentioned my 559, November 28, and act on Perkins's advice as to further purchase. 568. Please see my No. 569, to-day, which is for Colonel Kalpashnikov. Please supply him, for the purposes stated therein, necessary funds up to Rs. 100,000 and draw on American National Red Cross, Henry P. Davison, chairman, with this telegram attached to cover. It is most urgent that this matter be done at once, so please assist Kalpashnikov in the matter in every way possible. AMERICAN MINISTER In this connection I desire to state that I have never paid Colonel Kalpashnikov a kopek for this purpose or for any other, nor has he ever applied to me for any funds whatever. 20856-31- -26 Copies of these telegrams and of all others relating to Red Cross work are on file with the American Red Cross Mission to Russia, the chairman of which, Lieutenant Colonel Robins, is empowered to speak on all matters relating to his mission. On October 24/November 6 Lieutenant Colonel Anderson requested the Russian Red Cross to transfer to the American Red Cross Mission to Rumania, in order to relieve the Rumanian situation, the motor cars, ambulances, equipment and supplies originally obtained through the efforts of the Siberian Regiments American Ambulance Society in the United States, represented by Colonel Kalpashnikov, intended for use upon the various Russian fronts, which was granted. Since that time the respective missions have been engaged in an endeavor to fulfil the terms of the agreement. The charge that these motor cars are intended for the use of General Kaledin, which in itself is preposterous and impugns the good faith of the official representatives of a government known to be actuated by the most friendly motives toward the Russian people, is additionally disproved by the following letters to me from Colonel Anderson, which show his desire that the safety of the cars be assured: December 8, 1917. MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I hand you herewith copy of my recent telegram regarding the motor cars which Colonel Kalpashnikov is to bring to this commission. The American Red Cross recently placed at my disposal an additional appropriation of $1,000,000 and I am anxious that the motor cars and supplies of this commission shall not fall into the hands of the enemy in the event of further invasion of this territory. Major Perkins will explain more fully the plans of the commission and is fully authorized to act for me. Sincerely yours, HENRY W. ANDERSON Lieutenant Colonel and Chairman, American Red Cross Mission to Rumania [Enclosure] December 8, 1917. MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I thank you for your letter of November 13 enclosing copies of the notice in regard to the motor cars of Colonel Kalpashnikov. I desire to express my appreciation of your courtesies and the assistance rendered to Colonel Kalpashnikov in the matter. Major Perkins of this commission, who will call on you, will explain our present purpose in regard to these motor cars, and I will be grateful for any assistance you may be able to give in carrying that purpose into effect. I have determined that these cars and other property of this commission shall not fall into the hands of the enemy if it can be avoided. Sincerely yours, HENRY W. ANDERSON Lieutenant Colonel and Chairman, American Red Cross Mission to Rumania The document given by me to Colonel Kalpashnikov bespeaking assistance in the transportation of these automobiles from Petrograd to Jassy follows customary precedent in such instances, in fact, since the issuance thereof I have also given on December 1/14 a similar certificate bespeaking protection and safe-conduct for "ambulances, medicines and clothing" sent from Petrograd to Jassy by the American Red Cross Mission to Russia. It is inconceivable that further documentary evidence or statements are needed to disprove the incendiary allegations intended to arouse animosity towards the American Government, this Embassy of the American people, or to attribute to the American Government or its representatives an act so wholly contrary to its traditional policy. I trust it will be very difficult for any one to convince the Russian people that America does not feel friendly to Russia and that her people do not cherish an earnest and sincere sympathy for the people of this country in the difficulties that confront them. Many substantial evidences of such sentiment have been given [since] the revolution of March last. Only yesterday a delegation called at this Embassy and presented a floral offering as an expression of the effort I am making to have 1,075,000 pairs of boots and shoes shipped from America for the members of the railway union and their wives and children. FRANCIS File No. 861.00/808 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis) [Telegram] WASHINGTON, December 27, 1917, 7 p. m. 1938. Referring Department's 1906, December 15, 6 p. m.,1 and your 2133 Department thoroughly realizes chaotic conditions may arise, appreciates your purpose to remain and hopes you may judge it practicable to do so. LANSING File No. 361.61/4315 The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] PETROGRAD, December 28, 1917, 10 p. m. [Received December 30, 2.57 p. m.] 2154. Statement in my 2144 was published 25th textually in Soviet official publication and followed by number of impertinent questions indicating doubt as to truth my statement. If had official relations with the government officers would demand apology or explanation. Have not replied but sent Robins to Trotsky who repulsed first two efforts of Robins to explain. Yesterday received clear statement from Anderson which Robins to-day showed Trotsky and reports that Trotsky discredited. Anderson wires through American Legation, Jassy, that ordered automobiles to Rostov December 5 because "conditions became acute " and his plan was to save Red Cross units from Germans by southern route motoring from Rostov to British Army in Mesopotamia. Conditions improved few days later when order canceled and Kalpashnikov ordered to bring automobiles to Jassy where much needed, 1 Ante, p. 316. 2 Ante, p. 322. adding" further than this we have nothing whatever to do with any political or military conditions Russian either directly or indirectly." Suggest show Davison. FRANCIS File No. 861.00/864 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis) [Telegram] WASHINGTON, December 29, 1917, 2 p. m. 1946. Your 2138, December 24, 11 p. m. Department desires you to continue the course you have pursued in the past and which it has approved. Department relies on your good judgment to persevere in difficult situation. LANSING File No. 861.00/3478 The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] LONDON, December 29, 1917, 2 p. m. [Received December 30, 6.18 a. m.] 8090. The Foreign Office has given me the following memorandum: The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the United States Ambassador and has the honour to transmit herewith for his excellency's confidential information a copy of a memorandum regarding policy of the Allies in Russia which was agreed to at the conference held at Paris on the 22d instant. Foreign Office, December 28, 1917. Circulated to the King and War Cabinet MEMORANDUM PREPARED FOR LORD MILNER AND LORD R. CECIL ON SUGGESTED POLICY IN RUSSIA AND ACCEPTED BY M. CLEMENCEAU AND M. PICHON ON DECEMBER 22, 1917 At Petrograd we should at once get into relations with the Bolsheviki through unofficial agents, each country as seems best to it. We propose to send Sir George Buchanan on leave for reasons of health but we shall keep a Chargé d'Affaires there. We do not suggest that our allies should follow our example. Sir George Buchanan's long residence in Petrograd has indelibly associated him in the minds of the Bolsheviki with the policy of the Cadets and he stands to them for much the same as, say, M. Milyukov. We should represent to the Bolsheviki that we have no desire to take part in any way in the internal politics of Russia and that any idea that we favour a counter-revolution is a profound mistake. Such a policy might be attractive to the autocratic governments and Austria but not to the western democracies or America. But we feel it necessary to keep in touch as far as we can with the Ukraine, the Cossacks, Finland, Siberia, the Caucasus, etc., because these various semiautonomous provinces represent a very large proportion of the strength of Russia. In particular we feel bound to befriend the Ukraine since upon the Ukraine depends the feeding of the Rumanians to whom we are bound by every obligation of honour. As for the war, we should carefully refrain from any word or act counter to [sic] condoning the treachery of the Russians in opening peace negotiations with our enemies but we should continually repeat our readiness to accept the principles of self-determination and this includes that of no annexation or indemnities. We should present [impress] on the Bolsheviki the importance of not being satisfied with empty phrases from the Germans and point out that unless they get specific undertakings from them as to such questions as Poland, Bohemia, the Rumanian parts of Transylvania, not to speak of Alsace-Lorraine and the Trentino, they will get nothing. Meanwhile their powers of resistance are melting away and they will soon be, if they are not now, at the mercy of the German Kaiser who will then snap his fingers at all their fine phrases and impose on them any terms he pleases. They should be told that it is now probably too late to do anything to save the personnel of the army but the material of the artillery can still be preserved and at the very least it should not be transferred to our enemies to be used against the western democracies. Most important of all, the Bolsheviki should prevent if they can the wheat districts of Russia, such as the Ukraine, falling into the control of or being made available for the Central powers. This makes another reason why we are anxious to support and strengthen the Ukraine and why we urge on the Bolsheviki that far from trying to coerce the Ukrainians they should enter into close cooperation with them in southern Russia. Our principal object must be, if we can, to save Rumania. Next we must aim at preventing Russian supplies from reaching Germany. Finally we are bound to protect, if possible, the remnant of the Armenians not only in order to safeguard the flank of our Mesopotamian forces in Persia and the Caucasus, but also because an Armenian union, if possible with a Georgian autonomous or independent state, is the only barrier against the development of a Turanian movement that will extend from Constantinople to China and will provide Germany with a seaport of even greater danger to the peace of the world than the control of the Baghdad Railway. If we could induce the southern Russian armies to resume the fight, that would be very desirable, but it is probably impossible to secure these objects. The first thing is money to reorganize the Ukraine, to pay the Cossacks and Caucasian forces. The sums required are not, as things go, very enormous but the exchange presents great difficulties. If the French could undertake the finance of the Ukraine, we might find the money for the others. It is understood that the United States will assist. Besides finance, it is important to have agents and officers to advise and support the provincial governments and their armies. It is essential that this should be done as quickly [quietly] as possible so as to avoid the imputation as far as we can that we are preparing to make war on the Bolsheviki. We would suggest that the Ukraine should be again in this matter (dealt with?) by the French while we would take the other southeast provinces. A general officer from each country would be appointed to take charge of our respective activities but they would, of course, keep in the closest touch with one another through carefully selected liaison officers in order to ensure the utmost unity of action. It is for consideration whether we should facilitate the return to southern Russia of the numerous Russian officers at present in France and England. PARIS, 22 December 1917. PAGE Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly-Assumption of Definite Control by the All-Russian Soviet Congress-Proclamation of the Soviet Republic-The "Sisson Documents" File No. 861.00/914 The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State [Telegram] PETROGRAD, January 6, 1918, 6 p. m. [Received January 7, 6.52 p. m.] 2205. Constituent Assembly called for January 8 [18]. Third All-Russian Democratic Congress called to meet Petrograd three 1 1 The III All-Russian Congress of Soviets opened Jan. 23, 1918. |