several members are elected (hereafter called "a multiple district") each voter has fewer than as many votes as there are members to be elected, but not fewer than half. In a ten-member district the voter would be given six or seven votes.

A defective system. Too rigid and inelastic, somewhat erratic in results, and invites sinister organization. Is only proportional to the extent that it gives one minority party a chance to put in representatives.

4. The Limited Vote (Special Form).If the limitation of votes is carried far enough it gives a fair measure of partial proportional representation. If in a fivemember district each elector is only allowed two votes, the result is that onethird of the voters, with two added, can elect two representatives. Example: 12,000 electors vote, each with two votes, and 24,000 votes are cast; 4,002 of the voters unite their 8,004 votes on the same two men, giving them 4,002 votes each. It is impossible for the remaining 7,998 voters, with their 15,996 votes, to elect more than three additional candidates; because if two more candidates are elected by the least number that can elect them, namely, 8,004 votes, there are only 7,992 votes left, not enough to put any two candidates above or on a par with the other four.

Although somewhat inelastic and uncertain in operation, this plan is a great improvement on the other form of the Limited Vote, if it is arranged so that at least one-third or one-fourth of the voters, acting independently together, can secure their proportional share of representation. The plan might be confined to giving two votes, no matter what the size of the district, and be called The Double Vote.

5. Cumulative Voting.-In a multiple electoral district, each voter has as many votes as there are seats to be filled, with the power to cumulate them all on one candidate or to give each of them to a different candidate, or to distribute

them amongst several candidates in any proportion he pleases.

This is a compromise between the proportional Single Vote and the unproportional Block Vote: giving the voter the option to adopt either or any medium between the two. If in a five-member district, for example, every voter were to concentrate all his five votes upon some one candidate, the result would be just the same as if each voter had one vote only; and so with any other multiple district. In a six-member district, if every voter voted in blocks of three votes for two candidates only the result would be just the same as if each voter had two votes only.

This suggests the idea that no elector can really have more than one vote, so long as each one is given the same voting power; and that the multiple vote is simply compelling the voter to divide his one vote into as many fractions as there are members to be elected, and penalizing him by the loss of some of the fractions if he does not vote for the full the full number. Similarly with the Limited Vote. The Cumulative Vote gives the voter the option of clipping his vote into fractions or not, as he pleases.

The Cumulative Vote is an objectionable compromise. It results sometimes in many wasted votes; is not always proportional; and has no merits which are not possessed by the simple Untransferable Single Vote used in a similar district, besides being cumbersome for the election officials.

6. The Cleveland System (Preponderance of Choice).-This plan was explained some years ago by the late Dr. Tuckerman as being in use in some organizations in Cleveland.

In a multiple district, each voter marks his ballot for a first choice, a second and third choice, etc., down to the number of seats to be filled; the figures 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., being used. In counting the votes, a specific number of "points" is credited to the candidate on each choice. In a five-member district a first

choice counts five points, a second choice four points, a third choice three points, a fourth choice two points, and a fifth fifth choice one point. The five candidates getting the greatest number of points are elected.

The Cleveland System is simply the Block Vote a little ameliorated by lessening in a descending ratio the power of each vote or of each fraction of a vote, whichever way you like to take it. There is a small proportional element in it, but the counting is tedious and cumbersome. The ordinary Limited

Vote is a better system.

The Cleveland plan might be simplified and improved by limiting the votes, thus: In a district or meeting electing five representatives or fewer, let each voter mark a first and second choice: the first choice to count two points and the second choice to count one. In effect this is giving two votes to one candidate and one vote to another; or, two-thirds of your vote to one candidate and one-third to another, according to the way in which you look at it. In districts or meetings electing six or more representatives, there might be three choices, counting three, two, and one points respectively.

7. The Free List With Multiple or Block Vote.-This is the plan used in several Cantons of Switzerland. In a district electing several members, the candidates of each party appear on the official ballot in separate lists, and each elector may vote for as many candidates as there are seats to be filled. When the votes are counted, a quota is ascertained, and the number of votes cast for each party is divided in turn by the quota, thus showing the proportionate number of seats to which each party is entitled. These seats are usually filled by those candidates of each party who receive the highest number of votes. There are many variations in detail.

The Free List with Multiple Vote gives Proportional Representation as between parties, but not as between

members of the same party. It is therefore defective. It puts too much power in the hands of the party organization, and restricts the free choice of the voter.

8. Other Forms of the Free List, and Quota Methods.-The Free List may be varied by using the following forms, amongst others:

(a) The voter may or may not cast a party vote at the head of a list, as well as or instead of individual votes. (b) The Cumulative Vote may be used instead of the Block Vote.

(c) Or various forms of the Limited Vote may be used. In France it has been proposed to give two votes where the number of seats is not more than six, and three votes where it is from seven to ten, and so on.

(d) Each elector may have one vote only, as in Belgium. This usually is fully proportional, and it will be more fully described. To this plan the proxy feature may be added; that is, each elected representative may cast on a division as many votes as he received at his election, in the manner later referred to, preferably without the coupon arrangement.

As to obtaining a quota in List systems, the principal methods are as follows:

(1) Divide the total number of votes by the number of members required. The quotient is the electoral divisor. Then, if the required number of members is not got on full quotas, the party or parties having the largest "remainder" "remainders," after the division, get the additional member or members.

or

by 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc., the electoral total of each of the lists, and arranges the quotients in the order of their importance, up to the amount of a total number of quotients equal to that of members to be elected. The last quotient serves as the electoral divisor. The division of seats amongst lists is effected by assigning to each of them as many as its electoral total comprises of times the divisor." (4) Exclude from the apportionment any party whose vote does not reach a certain defined percentage of the total vote cast, thus preventing a small party from getting one seat by means of a "remainder" when it had not a quota at all. For instance, when ten are to be elected, a party must get nine per cent. of the aggregate vote in order to be "in the count." This is a proposal of Professor Commons'. 9. The Single Untransferable Vote. In a multiple electoral district each elector has one vote only, and the required number of seats is filled by the candidates having the largest number of votes. Used in the Parliamentary elections of Japan. This is the simplest of all the systems of Proportional Representation, and is the one that gives the least work to the election officers. The only objection to it is that a very popular man may draw to himself so many votes from an associate of the same party as to allow the candidate of another party to get in the place of the latter, besides wasting a great many votes. If this kind of thing does not happen, the system is fully proportional. By reason of the freedom with which diverse interests are represented, the elector who votes for an unsuccessful candidate finds usually amongst those elected one who comes near enough to his own views.

10. The Single Transferable Vote.This title embraces a number of systems which incorporate different methods of direct or indirect transfer of votes from candidates obtaining more than a quota and from those without enough votes to be elected. Waste of votes is thus prevented, and an almost mathematically exact result is got. Specific descriptions follow.

11. The Hare or Hare-Spence System. In a multiple electoral district each elector has only one vote which finally counts, but he marks several candidates in the order of his choice with the figures 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., with the object that if the candidate of his first choice does not need or cannot use his vote, some other candidate may.

The first operation of counting the votes deals with the first-choice votes only, and an electoral quota is obtained by dividing their total, either by the number of seats to be filled, or by the number of seats plus one, with one added to the quotient, as already referred to. The latter is preferable, because it gives a candidate no more votes than are necessary to elect him.

If any candidate has a surplus over and above the quota, the surplus is distributed by a method based on the second and subsequent choices; sometimes by chance, sometimes mathematically. All surpluses having been distributed, the candidates having the lowest number of votes are successively eliminated, and their votes distributed according to the second and other choices, until the required number is elected.

The Hare system is the only one advocated in England and Australia, and has been well tested in Parliamentary elections in Tasmania. The objections to it are:

(1) It cannot be used with an automatic voting machine instead of with ballots.

(2) It demands particular care, intelligence and interest on the part of the election officers.

(3) When a large number of voters are illiterate, or have not entire reliance on the integrity of the election officials, the manipulation and apparent juggling with the ballots may cause suspicion and dissatisfaction.

(4) The ballots must all be taken to one central place to be counted.

The Hare-Spence system gives admirable results, and is theoretically an almost perfect plan.

12. The Gove System.-In a multiple electoral district each candidate, after nomination and before election, publishes

or may publish a preferential list of those to whom he desires that the Election Board shall transfer his surplus, if any, over and above the quota, or all his votes if he has not enough to elect him. He may bracket as equal such candidates as he does not desire to prefer one above another.

Each voter casts one vote only. The election officers count the votes, obtain a quota as heretofore indicated, and transfer surplus votes and ineffective votes on the basis of the candidates' lists.

This is a simple and practical system, giving absolutely proportional results, and one which can be used with an automatic voting machine, making fraud difficult or impossible.

The objection that the voter and not the candidate should decide the transfer of votes is answered thus: The voter knows the candidates' lists beforehand. Transfers often do not affect the result of a an election in any way.

An objection of more weight appears to be that candidates might feel it an invidious task to make preferential lists. The answer is that this would be largely a matter of mutual arrangement and consultation.

13. The Proxy System.—In a multiple district each elector has a single vote. At the time of receiving his ballot he receives also a set of transfer coupons, all numbered alike with his voting number, which is unknown to the election officers. The votes are counted in the ordinary way, the highest candidates being elected. If a voter finds that the candidate for whom he voted is not elected, he, without revealing his identity, mails to the proper officer one of his numbered coupons, requesting that his vote be transferred to one of the elected candidates whom he names. Each candidate is entitled to cast on a division in Legislature or Council as many votes as were cast for him on his election and have been subsequently transferred to him. Any voter dissatisfied with the course of his representative may take his vote away from that representative and give it to another who suits him better, merely by mailing a coupon

A simple system, with great merit, and one that would appeal strongly to popular imagination. It does not quite meet the objection of a popular candidate taking votes unwittingly from an associate, because the influence and personality of a member count. Votes on a division are not the only thing. But the Proxy system does prevent waste of votes, and it gives the voters great control of their elected representatives.

14. The Free List with Single VoteIn a multiple district the candidates of each party are printed in lists on the official ballot, and each voter has only one vote. Preferably he must give that vote to an individual candidate and not put it at the head of the list.

When the votes are counted, a quota is obtained in one of the ways already indicated. The totals of the lists are in turn divided by the quota, and the successful candidates are those receiving the highest votes on their respective lists, according to the number of seats each list gets.

This, with slight variations, is the plan which has been in successful operation in Belgium since 1900. It is an excellent and simple system, adapted to the use of an automatic voting machine.

The difficulty which attaches to the use of the Single Untransferable vote as already mentioned, is removed as between parties, and can only occur as between members of the same party. By adding the proxy feature the difficulty is reduced to a minimum.

15. The Absolute Majority Methods. -I have dealt hitherto with the election of representatives. When a single executive officer has to be elected, such as a Governor or a Mayor, he can and should be elected by a system which will ensure an absolute majority at one balloting, no matter how many candidates are in the field.

Either the Hare or the Gove plan can be modified so as to do this. No quota is used, and there are no surpluses to deal with; but the remainder of the process in each case is practically as already described. If no candidate gets a clear

majority on the count of first-choice votes, the one with the lowest number of votes is eliminated and his votes transferred in the way already indicated. This process is continued until some one gets a majority or until only two candidates remain; one or the other of whom must have the majority, because all the votes will have been concentrated on them by transfer.

Detailed descriptions of the foregoing systems may be found in past issues of the Proportional Representation Review, in reprints of articles published in THE ARENA,* in the book of Professor Commons, and in other publications.

To derive the full advantages of Proportional Representation not less than five members should be elected from a district, and a larger number is much better. Of course, where circumstances absolutely limit the size of a district, better results are derived from the use of Proportional Representation, even in a small district, than could be got by using an unproportional plan.

Much progress is being made by the reform in widely-separated countries, and the outlook for purified politics is encouraging and hopeful. ROBERT TYSON. Toronto, Canada.

HE IDEA underlying arbitration is generally considered to be: the effort to restore harmony by the establishment of a common ground on which the contestants may proceed with their activities without jostling one another, this common ground being but a compromise acceded to by the parties to the dispute, without special reference to the truth in the matter. Such measures as those wherein the truth is not revealed and sustained, we venture to assert, are but palliatives and hence temporary in nature.

An arbitrator is a judge. His function is, to extract and isolate the truth from the mass of evidence. His duty is to lay aside all prejudice, all promptings of emotion, all self-interest, and decide solely in the light of intellect, being careful to base his judgment not upon legal grounds alone, but upon considerations of equity and, in some cases, temperament as well.

Mere compromise can never be final. The arbitrator, be he an individual or a collection of individuals, should be sus*"A Primer of Direct Legislation." Price, 10

cents. Published by THE ARENA, Trenton, N. J.

tained in an absolute and unfettered discretion to decide solely in accord with the dictates of truth or of an expediency which has the truth for its goal.

Let us glance at the conditions surrounding all contestants, whether individuals, voluntary organizations, nations, or races. All are immersed in a mental atmosphere peculiar to themselves. This atmosphere, in the case of groups of individuals, is made up of the results of temperamental peculiarities, of prejudices due to provincial or national traditions, of thought-channels dug by forceful individuals, indeed of biases of all sorts arising from a common history, common interests, common thoughts and common feelings and desires; and, in the case of individuals, is made up of similar tendencies due to environment, predisposition, their own thinking and self-interest. Through this mental atmosphere surrounding each does each look as through a colored glass (each except the advanced few who can rise and look through the clear, crystalline atmosphere of Reason), and, so far as he alone is concerned, rightly does