within their shell; and, as it will not be worth our while to attempt to crush them, they will push out their heads again, by and by, and will have lost all the arrogance that they formerly discovered, Their intention may, however, be to get in all their ships, and then to send out privateers. We must, therefore, be upon our guard. It will not be amiss to give our commander, upon the Halifax station, orders to place a ship, of some sort, near the mouth of each of their principal rivers, with an order strictly to search every ship that is bound inwards, and to proclaim, that, if any one chooses to go out, bound to any part of the English dominions, she shall have free and safe passage. But, great care should be taken not to let any ship go off for the dominions of the enemy.

This is all, which, at present, it is necessary for us to do, except, perhaps, the issuing of a declaration, on the part of the king, offering the Americans advantageous terms of trade with us, during the war, provided they will have nothing to do with our enemies.-The present appears to be an excellent time for crushing the French faction in America. The election, which will come on soon, in consequence of Mr. Jefferson's notification of not standing another contest, will divide the people, upon the question of " war, or no war; and, if the no war" party prevail, the French faction is put down for many years

to come.

INDIA HEMP.It is stated, in the newspapers, that the ministers have entered into a contract with the East India Company to supply our dock-yards with hemp. This contract it is morally impossible for them to fulfil; but, I greatly fear, that it will be made the ground of a terrible demand upon the taxes of England. The affairs of that company are in a state that can no lʊnger be disguised. They must come again to parliament for money. The unreasonablenes, the injustice of this, will be evident to every man; but, the hemp argument will be made all-powerful. We shall be told, that we cannot have hemp without supporting the Company; and, that, without hemp, our navy cannot be supported. The hemp ought to be grown here, in England, where we have plenty of land and plenty of hands. To be dependent upon India would be worse than to be dependent upon Russia. In short, this hemp contract, if the report be true, will prove a most alarming evil.

PORTUGUESE EMIGRATION.-Already, we are told, that a hundred thousand pounds, taken out of the taxes of England, has been

sent off, in specie, to the Brazils, to assist her most faithful majesty. This is only a little beginning. We shall have to pay

half a million a year for this emigration, in one way or another. It will be a continual drain upon us. And, this, after all,

is the result of that "glorious event," which was to produce so much good to England! When will this commercial and colonising rage cease to beggar and enslave us? Never, till the political corruptions, which are found to be so conveniently carried on through the medium of commercial and colonial associations, are, by a radical change, banished from the state. When that inay be, I know not. I lament to say, that I do not, at present, perceive the elements of such a change; and I must content myself with the hope, that, some how or other, they will arise out of the present disordered state of things.

BANK OF ENGLAND PATRIOTISM.-An odd association of words, the reader will say; but, he will have seen, in the newspapers, a long statement respecting the generous intention of the Bank" to come," as it is called, "to the assistance of the country." It was my intention to have made some remarks upon the real nature of this generous intention; in the letter, however, which will be found below, this task has been executed in a manner much better than I could hope to have executed it. I, therefore, point out this letter, as being well worthy of the attention of the public, who ought to keep a watchful eye upon all the transactions between the ministry and the Bank, transactious in which the dis position of millions of money is insolved. It is curious enough, that both the parties the ins and the outs, claim the honour of this proposed "saving "to the 'public. The reader will see what sort of a saving it is; and, I would fain hope, that there will be found some few members of par liament, who will have the courage to speak of the transaction in appropriate terms, Westminster, 29th January, 1808.

BANK OF ENGLAND PATRIOTISM.

SIR; -As you have not hitherto noticed the second Report from the committee on Public Expenditure relating to the Bank of England, I beg leave to send you a few observations on the facts disclosed in that paper. Difficult as it is to follow any branch of the public accounts of this 'country through the endless mass of intended intricacy and expanded confusion, in which they are involved, it is still more difficult so to manage them in argument, as to leave

it embraces a knowledge of the manner in which the business of the Bank is conducted, and over which the directors have al ways studiously thrown a veil, yet sufficient is shewn to prove, that the balances most materially increase the profits; and it is certainly possible to shew, what is highly probable in itself, that they may increase them to the full extent of their amount.-What, for instance, should prevent the Bank from holding one set of securities, of a nature permanent and not negotiable, for the amount of their undivided capital and the average amount of the balances in their hands, and another set of a more current nature, for the amount of their notes in circulation?— Mr. Thornton expressly states, that there is a fallacy in the use of the term deposit, under which head the balances are classed, and that it is equally applicable to the amount of the notes in circulation, which he accordingly calls disposeable effects: and why should it not be also applicable to the undivided capital? Or, why should not one deposit pay an interest as well as another?Deducting the amount of bullion, consisting probably of a few prize kegs of Spanish dollars, and a little gold for the service of government, what should prevent the Bank from making an interest of capital, balances, and notes, in short, of all the securities of all kinds which they can accumulate, except their own discretion? Is it that the government, or the merchants, are so rich that the Bank can never find a borrower when they want one, or that the market is so bare of exchequer bills, that they can never find a seller, if required? And what possible necessity can ever now exist for government paying up their advance?-Even in the year 1797, the amount on which the Bank gained an interest, exceeded the amount of their notes in circulation by three fourths. It exceeded, too, the joint amount of notes, and the deposit account or balances; and, if ever then, (when they were liable to pay in cash) the amount of the advances, on which they received an interest from government alone, exceeded the amount of their notes in circu lation by one fourth, what probable limit may be affixed to those advances now, when they are withheld by the fear of no consequences, but what are of a remote operation, and in case of unlooked for events, are morally sure of a ministerial indemnity. -The only difficulty in the case seems to consist in conceiving how any banker can gain an interest on the security deposited and the note circulated at the same time, as the security is the medium, through which

the interest is gained; but if the reporters had found it convenient to state the amount of the securities, held by the Bank, on which they gain an interest, it would easily have appeared, that the amount of those securities infinitely exceeded the amount of the notes in circulation, and were no measure whatever of those notes, and it is even very possible to put a case to shew how the Bank may be gaining a double profit on the same sum at the same time. Suppose, for instance, that the cash balances, accumulating and lying in the exchequer from day to day, were actually appropriated to the payment of the dividends as they came in, that is to say, that no notes should be, in any manner, reissued in lieu of those cancelled by the cash balances, except in payment of the dividends; now, as the notes in circulation would evidently decrease in the same proportion in which the cash balances increased, one could scarcely consider those cash balances as yielding a profit to the Bank; but if those cash balances, as they accrued from day to day, should be (as they are) exchanged for exchequer bills bearing an interest, and at the same time should furnish (as they might) the means of making the usual advances on omnium bearing an interest also, which advances would, I presume, be only drawn by government from day to day as they were wanted, it is clear that those cash balances, merely by means of an interior arrangement, might furnish the Bank with the means of accommodating two sets of customers with the same sum at the same time, from both of whom they, might be receiving an interest, and that too, without necessarily increasing the amount of notes in circulation, as the advances on. omnium might not be immediately drawn, and of course without diminishing their power of making advances in other respects. -But, Sir, if the evidence of the report should fail to shew that the gross profits of this establishment very much exceed two millions per annum, although it was stated by Mr. Pitt on the renewal of the charter in 1500, that they would not probably exceed £400,000 per annum, yet it certainly does not fail to shew the enormous amount

of those profits. "For some successive years," says the report, an annual and temporary bonus of 5 per cent has been "added to the accustomed dividend of seven

66

per cent," that is to say, for some successive years the Bank proprietors have been receiving 12 per cent interest for their mo ney. But why did not the report tell us for how many successive years? How long was it after the renewal of their charter.by.

44

form proportion to the growing extent of the transactions of the Bank, and to the "advancing commerce of the country, an "addition also by the help of which they "have lately lent to government three mil"lions without interest, for a short term of 66 years, as the price of the renewal of their charter. They have thus strengthened "that security which the creditors of the Bank possess, so far as additional capital "can strengthen it, and they will be able hereafter, if it shall seem necessary, to invest in gold, in addition to what they "could otherwise have invested, a much

larger sum than they could with any propriety, have so invested in time past." Among all these good reasons for making a higher profit than seven per cent. not a word, not a hint is dropped about the prospect of any bonuses, or a future increase of dividends; but the Bank, it seems, have taken sufficient care not to add to their ability of investing in gold, (when it shall seem necessary, forsooth) by dividing their profits in due time. And will Mr. Thornton say that that dividend furnishes no moral impediment to such an investment? Again, Sir, why did not the report notice the amount of the undivided capital as well as the bonuses? Parliament would then have better known the amount of their profits. I do not remember that Mr. Thornton's book ever speaks of that capital as greater than it

was five years before, viz: in the year 1797, when it was stated at £3,800,000, although Mr. Thornton so early as the year 1800, saw the propriety of getting a renewal of the charter, 12 years being then unexpired. Why, too, did not the report notice the commutation of the Bank with government in liew of stamps, taken 1 believe at £30,000 per annum, when I have been credibly informed by a gentleman concerned in only two out of the 518 Country Banks 100 now existing in the country, that his two concerns alone paid not less than 1500 per annum for that purpose, a sum equal to a twentieth part of the Bank payment.But, it is not the interest alone of the Bank stock, which should fasten on our attention. -That, we are told, is a trifling consideration: let us then look to the principal.-In the month of June 1797, only ten years ago, the stock of the bank was at 1154 and now the report states it at 230, a rise in ten years of one hundred per cent.-And what greater risque I should be glad to ask, does the proprietor of Bank stock run than the proprietor of the three per cents? Why should the one receive a full dividend of ten per cent, with the prospect of additional bonuses on what was worth only 115 in the year 1797, while the other only receives 12, 14s. on what was then worth 461 What establishment in England besides the Bank has for several sucsessive years, divided by half yearly payments, a profit of 12 per cent, and at the same time doubled the value of its capital? But the Bank of England, Mr. Thornton tells us, is quite independent of the executive government, and so are the directors too, I dare swear, all independent. --He tells us, too, when speaking of the trifling consideration of the dividends (but it is in a note), that a large proportion of the Bank proprietors do not hold more than £1000 stock. He forgets however to tell us how much in general the directors hold. When there are accrued bonuses of five per cent for several successive years, one would think that there must be some secrets in the direction worth knowing, notwithstanding the dividends are such a trifling consideration. Would it be very uncharitable to suppose, that if any one of that direction were in the constant habit of proffering a set of laboured reasons for his uniform support of all ministers of all parties, that such a director's line of Bank stock might furnish one of those mighty good reasons ? Could not Mr. Thornton have dissipated the surprize expressed by his old friend Mr Tierney in the debates on the renewal of the charter" that it was strange that though the salary of a director was only

£150 the office was aspired to by the richest men in the kingdom, and more eagerly sought after than any one in the gift of the crown;" but Mr. Thornton, I believe, was absent from that debate?-Did the good old lady's dear departed Cicisbeo, the late Mr. Abraham Newland, too, hold only £1000 Bank stock? The cariosity of the town has been lately gratified with the particulars of that gentleman's will, by which it seems that tho' a mere groom of the chamber all his life time, he has left property behind him to the amount of €7000 per annum : but he, too, I presume had a full share of the old lady's bonuses.-Again Sir, Dr. Smith has long ago told us, that the stability of the Bank of England is equal to that of the English government; and who is there that doubts it? Without any question, the natural durability of the present paper system will go nigh to render them both eternal.-But then again I ask, why should the Bank proprietor who has the same security as the proprietor of the 3 per cents, have any preference over him since the year 1797.-Why should the Bank have an annual premium of three per cent paid to them never to pay in gold any more? Why should they reap the benefit of their own avarice and misconduct at the expence of every other class of the public creditors.-Why should they get their Income Tax paid, by profits arising out of the balance which they hold by stopping the income tax of the other public creditors? The Bank I am sure, will not contend that the price of their stock has been increased by the depreciation of their paper, because although there might be some truth in the argument, it would not be very convenient when applied to the holders of the other stocks, who having suffered full sorely from the effects of that depreciation in other respects, are nevertheless stripped of a tenth of its depreciated value-But, Sir, the Bank have never missed an opportunity of increasing or confirming their growing profits. To prove this, it will be only necessary to take a short review of the opinions of parliament as expressed in their own reports. By the report of the committee of finance in 1797, it appears that so early as the year 1720 the sum of £360 per million was chosen upon the express ground of being a reasonable compensation for the charges of management. Within seventeen years afterwards however, the Bank had managed to raise it to £562; 10s per million, at which sum it continued tilt the year 1786.-In that year it was reduced to £450 per million, although the conmmissioners of public accounts then stated upon full deliberation, that £350 per mil

lion was very sufficient compensation, and although it had been previously stated by the auditors of public accounts, that the business might be done for £187 10s. per million.So early then in Mr. Pitt's career as the year 1786, it appears that he had not public virtue enough left to carry the report of his own commissioners into effect :-That even then he had begun to feed and flatter the avarice of the Bank of England.--And was the sequel of his career less prodigal? In the year 1791, only five years after the report of 1786 had deemed the allowance for management excessive, the Bank would not even part with a balance of unclaimed dividends without having that allowance confirmed on the existing debt, and, according ly, the same act of parliament which granted the unclaimed dividends confirmed the excessive rate.--By this well-timed largess in a season of approaching difficulty, and at the same time by omitting to make any stipulation for the rate of allowance on any future debt, Mr. Pitt well knew that he was not only rewarding the Bank for their past support, but that he was also gaining a security for their good behaviour in the expectation of a similar rate of excessive allowance for the future, and accordingly the rate of 450 per million passed unnoticed till the year 1797-In that year the memorable stoppage, the natural death of the Bank, took place, and Mr. Pitt's committee of finance again expressed a strong opinion that £360 per million was a sufficient compensation for the management of the public debt; but again Mr. Pitt and Parliament in his wake passed over with neglect the suggestion of their own committee.

-So the matter rested till the year 1800, when Mr. Thornton, probably seeing the growing profits of the bank, with the provident caution of an experienced cap tain, set about securing the mouth of the cave before he would proceed to a division of the plunder. He, therefore, on the part of the bank came to an agreement with the minister for a further renewal of the charter for 21~ years, the bank consenting as a consideration for the extended charter to furnish government with a loan of 3,000,000, for six years without interest; but, at the same time ta king care to exact a promise, that the public balances should not be withdrawn without compensation. The result of this agreement therefore, was, that as even at that time the average amount of the balances was fully equal to the amount of the loan, the bank, in fact, obtained an extension of their charter for 21 years for nothing, and in addition thereto got the allowance of 450 per million