reason to the master of the offending vessel, at the time of capture; he takes at his own peril, and on his own responsibility, to answer in costs and damages, for any wrongful exercise of the rights of capture. At the same time it may be a matter of convenience, that some declaration should be made; because it is possible, that if the grounds are stated, it may be in the power of the neutral master to give such reasons as may explain away the suspicion that is suggested. (Lord Stowell, Jungfrau Maria Schroeder, 3 Rob. 152.)

Though the offence is consummated by the act of sailing, yet if, between the times of sailing and of capture, the blockade has been raised, the offence is held to be wiped away. "The blockade being gone," said Lord Stowell, in The Lisette (6 Rob. 395), “the necessity of applying the penalty to prevent future transgression, cannot continue. It is true that the offence incurred by a breach of blockade generally remains during the voyage, but that must be understood as subject to the condition, that the blockade itself continues. When the blockade is raised, a veil is thrown over everything that has been done, and the vessel is no longer taken in delicto. The delictum may have been completed at one period, but it is by subsequent events done away with."

Officers enforcing a blockade illegally, but through ignorance occasioned by the neglect of their government, must be indemnified by their government. In the case of The Mentor (1 Rob. 183), Lord Stowell, said, "If an act of mischief is done by the king's officers, in a place where no act of hostility ought to have been exercised, it does not necessarily follow that mere ignorance of that fact would protect the officers from

civil responsibility. If by articles, a place or district was put under the queen's peace, and an act of hostility was afterwards committed therein, the injured party might have a right to resort to a court of prize for compensation; and if the officer acted through ignorance, his own government must protect him; for it is the duty of government, if they put a certain district within the king's peace, to take care that due notice shall be given to those persons by whose conduct that peace is to be maintained; and if no such notice has been given, nor due diligence used to give it, and a breach of the peace is committed through the ignorance of those persons, they are to be borne harmless at the expense of that government, whose duty it was to have given that notice."

Blockading ships are at liberty to take a prize if it come in their way, but they are not to chase to a distance, for that would be a desertion of their duty of blockade (La Melanie, 2 Dod. 130); but chasing suspicious vessels in the neighbourhood of a blockaded port by the blockading squadron is held not to work a cessation of the blockade. (The Eagle, 1 Acton, 65.)

The latest case which has occurred on the subject of blockade is that of the English brig Fame, which was condemned at Paris on the 23rd of February, 1849, for an alleged breach of the blockade of Buenos Ayres, established by England and France in the Rio de la Plata. It was contended in that case that the condemnation was illegal, mainly on the ground that the blockade had not been fairly enforced by the French squadron. The whole of this question is discussed in a pamphlet recently published by M. Bellemare, entitled "Questions Importantes d'Actualité, Droits des Neutres, &c." Pau, 1854.

COASTING TRADE.

There is a species of commerce which either belligerent forbids to neutral states in time of peace, but permits to them to enjoy in time of war; possibly, indeed, with a fair design, but more probably with the fraudulent and collusive intention of covering and withdrawing his own possessions from the grasp of his enemy's hostility. The possibility of fair dealing makes it impracticable to decide, ipso facto, on any particular adventure, that it is fraudulent and collusive; and therefore, on the other hand, the strong probability of fraud and collusion has made it necessary for the other belligerents to declare that such adventures shall not be tolerated at all.

The principal branches of trade which are thus incessantly liable to abuse, and from which it has therefore been deemed necessary that neutrals shall be totally excluded, are the enemy's coasting trade, and the enemy's colonial trade.

"Is it," asked Lord Stowell, in The Emanuel (1 Rob. 300), "nothing like a departure from the strict duties imposed by a neutral character and situation to step in to the aid of the depressed party, and take up a commerce, which so peculiarly belonged to himself, and to extinguish which was one of the principal objects, and proposed fruits of victory? Is not this, by a new act, and by an interposition neither known nor permitted by that enemy in the ordinary state of his affairs, to give a direct opposition to the efforts of the conqueror, and to take off that pressure which it is the very purpose of war to inflict, in order to compel the conquered to a due sense and observance of justice? As to the coasting-trade, supposing it to

be a trade not usually open to foreign vessels, can there be described a more effective accommodation that can be given to an enemy during a war, than to undertake it for him during his own disability? Is it nothing that the commodities of an extensive empire are conveyed from the parts where they grow and are manufactured, to other parts where they are wanted for use? It is said, that this is not importing anything new into the country, and it certainly is not; but has it not all the effects of such an importation? Suppose that the French navy had a decided ascendant, and had cut off all British communication between the northern and southern parts of this island, and that neutrals interposed, to bring the coals of the north for the supply of the manufacturer, and for the necessities of domestic life in this metropolis, is it possible to describe a more direct and more effectual opposition to the success of French hostility, short of an actual military assistance in the war?" The duties of neutrality are clearly expressed in Lord Howick's letter to Mr. Rist (10 Cobbett's Parl. Deb. 406), in the following words:" Neutrality, properly considered, does not consist in taking advantage of every situation between belligerent states, by which emolument may accrue to the neutral, whatever may be the consequences to either belligerent party; but in observing a strict and honest impartiality, so as not to afford advantage, in the war, to either; and particularly in so far restraining its trade to the accustomed course, which is held in time of peace, as not to render assistance to one belligerent in escaping the effect of the other's hostilities. The duty of a neutral is 'non interponere se bello, non hoste imminente hostem eripere;' and yet it is manifest that lending a

neutral navigation to carry on the coasting-trade of the enemy, is in direct contradiction to this definition of neutral obligations, as it is, in effect, to rescue the commerce of the enemy from the distress to which it is reduced by the superiority of the British navy, to assist his resources, and to prevent Great Britain from bringing him to reasonable terms of peace."

The strict ancient law, and the modern relaxations, are thus collected and digested in the reply of the King's Advocate in The Johanna Tholen (6 Robinson, 72).

"The principle on which this country formerly acted was to consider neutral vessels altogether excluded from the coasting trade of the enemy, under the penalty of condemnation. In later times, which have admitted many relaxations in favour of the navigation of neutral states, the penalty on vessels so employed in an open and undisguised manner has been reduced to a forfeiture of freight. But if that penalty attends the carrying on the coasting trade of the enemy, in an open and undisguised manner, it is natural to expect greater rigour in cases accompanied with a concealment of the purpose and a falsification of all the ordinary documents, which are by the law of nations required to disclose the real nature of the voyage. In such cases, the course which this court has pursued in various instances has been to resort to the more strict principle of former times, and to hold the vessel herself subject to confiscation. Two cases on this point are The Edward (4 Rob. 68) and The Hoffnung (2 Rob. 162). In the former case, some observations passed in argument and in the judgment on the quality of the cargo, which was wine, going to the neighbourhood of Brest; the latter was a cargo of wine also going to