sian mobilization. Concentration of troops on the east Russian frontier and a declaration of a state of war over all important parts of Russia's west frontier allowed no further doubt that Russian mobilization was in full swing, while such measures were all being denied on word of honor.11 The order of mobilization on the part of Russia did not cause an immediate break in the relations with Austria-Hungary. For the Russian ambassador at Vienna was still exchanging views with the Austro-Hungarian minister for foreign affairs on the 31st, after Russia's order for mobilization had been promulgated.12 Russia maintained that mobilization in her case did not necessarily mean war, as she could remain mobilized for months without making war. "This was not the case (with Germany). She had the speed and Russia had the numbers," and she did not propose to sacrifice that advantage by delay.13 So at midnight July 31, the German ambassador at St. Petersburg declared to the Russian Government that Germany would mobilize if Russia did not commence demobilization in twelve hours, not only against Germany but also against Austria. The German chancellor took the position that a general mobilization on the part of Russia necessarily 11 G. W. B., S., 777-8; exhibits 23, 24. 12 R. O. B., 66. 13 B. W. P., 138. meant a mobilization against Germany.1 Russia made no answer to this demand, and Germany declared war on Russia on the evening of August 1.15 Five days later Austria-Hungary followed her ally in a declaration of war against Russia.16 France and Germany were the next countries to go to war. The documents show conflicting accounts as to which power first began military preparations and it is hard to say which country took the initiative as to mobilization. The question of priority of mobilization, however, was of no great significance as a cause of war, for France was bound by treaty obligations to Russia, and let it be known before Russia and Germany went to war that she would stand by her ally. As early as July 27, the French ambassador at Berlin informed Von Jagow, German foreign minister, that the relations of Germany and Austria were no closer than those of France and Russia. On July 29 the French premier declared that Russia could count on his country, as France would fulfill all her obligations as Russia's ally. He was anxious, however, for peace and wanted England to renew her offer of the mediation of the four powers.18 The French ambassador at London told Sir Edward Grey 14 R. O. B., 70; G. W. B., 23, 24. 15 R. O. B., 76. 16 R. O. B., 79. 17 F. Y. B., 74. 18 F. Y. B., 101; R. O. B., 55. this same day that France "was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked." 19 Two days later (July 31), M. Jules Cambon, the French ambassador at Berlin, was informed by Von Jagow that his Government, owing to the general mobilization of the Russian army, had proclaimed Kriegsgefahrzustand (the state of danger of war). M. Cambon was also at the same time notified of Germany's demand on Russia that the latter cease mobilization.20 The French military authorities regarded this proclamation as tantamount to mobilization. It was, they said, "mobilization under another name." As the French frontier forces were faced by eight German corps, they were in imminent danger of attack by the latter. For these reasons the French Government in the afternoon of August 1 ordered a general mobilization, stating at the same time that it was taking this action purely for defensive purposes. The French troops were stationed ten kilometers from the frontier and were not to attack the Germans.21 In the evening of July 31, M. Viviani, the French foreign minister, was asked by the German ambassador at Paris to state "what the attitude of France would be in case of war between Germany and Russia." The French Government understood this inquiry, it declared, 19 B. W. P., 87. 21 B. W. P., 136, 140. to carry with it an intimation that Germany would recall her ambassador from Paris if a satisfactory answer were not given next day. The French foreign office regarded this as an extraordinary request and took the position that it did not have to announce its intentions to any power other than an ally.22 Therefore, when the inquiry was renewed next day, the French premier replied that "France would do that which her interests dictated." 23 This answer was, of course, not satisfactory to Germany, but her ambassador was not recalled until August 3, on which day war was formally declared on France by Germany.24 France maintained diplomatic relations with Austria-Hungary a week longer, and did not declare war on this power until August 12.25 Montenegro sympathized warmly with Serbia and decided early to help her against her enemies. She, therefore, declared war against Austria-Hungary on August 8 and against Germany four days later. 22 G. W. B., exhibit 25; F. Y. B., 117; B. W. P., 126. 23 G. W. B., exhibit 27. 24 F. Y. B., 147, 148. 25 A. R. B., 63, 65. CHAPTER VIII GREAT BRITAIN DECLARES WAR ON THE TEUTONIC POWERS GREAT BRITAIN was anxious that a European conflict be avoided,1 and, as has been seen, suggested several plans for settling the questions at issue. She was willing to support both the policy of isolation championed by Germany and the policy of prevention championed by Russia. She was the only great power whose hands were not tied by alliances. Her understanding with France and Russia did not impose upon her a treaty obligation to enter the war if either or both of these powers should be drawn into the conflict. Nor is there the slightest intimation in all the correspondence that France and Russia considered that she was bound by the terms of the Triple Entente to take sides with them against their enemies. Britain, therefore, declared herself interested in the quarrel only in so far as it jeopardized the peace of Europe and thereby menaced her own security. Her attitude toward the Austro-Serbian quarrel was in keeping with this general policy. 1 B. W. P., 1, 3. |