political department thought that its conciliatory attitude would "produce the best impression in Europe," and the foreign minister expressed himself as believing that as Serbia had yielded on nearly all points, a little mutual goodwill would bring about an agreement.10 Sir Edward Grey considered that Serbia had subjected herself to the greatest humiliation that he had ever known a country to undergo. He was therefore disappointed when Austria received the note as a flat refusal when she should, in his opinion, have accepted it as a basis for negotiation.11 As soon as Sir Edward Grey received a forecast of the note, he asked that Germany would try to influence Austria-Hungary to take a favorable view of the reply,12 and the Italian foreign minister joined him in this request.13 The German Government "passed on" the request to Austria, but declined to urge it.14 Serbia's reply was not acceptable to Austria. A comparison of the Serbian and Austrian notes shows that Serbia declined to meet the demand that Austro-Hungarian officials be allowed to participate in the trial of alleged "participants of the conspiracy of June 28th, who were (are) on Serbian territory." As to demand 5, that Austro-Hungarian officials be al 9 R. O. B., 27. 10 F. Y. B., 75. 12 B. W. P., 27. lowed in Serbia to "coöperate in the suppression of a movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy," Serbia declared her willingness "to accept every coöperation which does not run counter to international law and criminal law, as well as to the friendly and neighborly relations." Austria-Hungary claimed that on other points, too, the Serbian answer failed to meet the requirements of her note, and that the whole statement was an effort to deceive the powers, as Serbia knew that the promises given would not be kept.15 The German ambassador at Vienna was of the same opinion.16 Austria-Hungary, therefore, broke diplomatic relations at once 17 and notified France, July 27, that she would on the next day take steps to make Serbia give satisfaction.18 Germany supported Austria in this policy, and believed the latter had a right to "secure full guarantees that Serbia's promises should (shall) be also turned into deeds." 19 According to Russian and French sources, however, the Austrian and German ambassadors at Paris were surprised that the reply had not satisfied the Austrian Government,20 and Sir Edward Grey stated that 15 A. R. B., 34, enclosure and 39; B. W. P., 48. 16 B. W. P., 32. 17 A. R. B., 24. 18 F. Y. B., 75. 10 G. W. B., annex 22; R. O. B., 43. 20 R. O. B., 27; F. Y. B., 57. the German secretary of state admitted that "there were some things in the Austrian note that Serbia could hardly be expected to accept.'' 21 21 B. W. P., 48. CHAPTER V EFFORTS TO PREVENT WAR THE danger of a rupture between AustriaHungary and Serbia became imminent as soon as the former announced her refusal to give the latter a longer time in which to meet her demands. As Europe was divided into two rival groups, each composed of great powers tied together by alliances, a war between Serbia and Austria-Hungary would almost inevitably widen into a general conflict. The great problem, therefore, that confronted European diplomacy was to settle the Austro-Serbian quarrel without war or, if this could not be done, to prevent this local quarrel from widening into a European conflict. Two solutions were proposed. One was to allow Austria to punish Serbia but to prevent the trouble from spreading to other countries. The other was to settle the difficulty without a war between Serbia and Austria. A great war could therefore be avoided if the Austro-Serbian conflict could be either localized or prevented. Germany was the champion of "localization," Russia of prevention of war. 2 1 G. W. B., annex, 1 and 13; B. W. P., 9, 46; R. O. B., 18. 2 F. Y. B., 83; B. W. P., 56. The difficulties of this problem were greater than were those raised by the annexation (1908) of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. Now, as then, both Russia and Serbia were in violent opposition to the policy of the Dual Monarchy. Now, as then, the friends of Russia, France and Great Britain, were not sufficiently interested to go to war solely over an Austro-Serbian quarrel. Then Russia and Serbia were finally induced to yield to AustriaHungary. Both Serbia and Russia, however, considered that their grievance now against the Habsburg Government was greater than it had been on the former occasion; for if the Austrian demands were met in their entirety the independence of Serbia would, in their opinion, unquestionably be compromised. Besides, Russia, at the time of the annexation crisis, did not feel that she had the military strength to risk a war with Germany and Austria; now she was more hopeful as to the state of her military preparedness. In 1908-9 there was plenty of time for negotiations; now there were only a few days in which to settle the quarrel. These difficulties would have taxed the diplomatic skill of a Bismarck or a Talleyrand; but Europe at this time could not point to any great names in the list of her official diplomats. In fact, the inefficiency exhibited by European diplomacy during this great crisis is one of the |