She declared war on Serbia July 28,31 and next day made a formal statement as to her reasons for so doing. The Serbian Government, she said, had "proceeded to the mobilization of the Serbian forces before it replied to her (our) note, and subsequently had (has) allowed three days to elapse without showing any disposition to modify its point of view." The Austro-Hungarian minister had also previously charged Serbia with having attacked Austrian frontier guards on July 27.32

The efforts to prevent war had failed, but all negotiations between Russia and Austria were not at an end. Russia had partially mobilized but was still anxious to come to an agreement with Austria. Both the Russian foreign minister and the German ambassador at St. Petersburg favored an "interchange of views between Austria-Hungary and Russia." M. Sazonof also thought well of Sir Edward Grey's plan of a conference of the four powers. Both plans for peace could, in his judgment, be wisely prosecuted simultaneously.33

31 A. R. B., 37.

32 A. R. B., 41, 44.

33 R. O. B., 49; B. W. P., 118.

CHAPTER VI

EFFORTS TO ISOLATE THE WAR

THE effort to prevent war having failed, the policy of "isolation" now offered the only hope for peace. Efforts in this direction had already been made. These had no chance of success unless Russia could be induced to stand aside and acquiesce in the punishment of Serbia, or Austria-Hungary could be persuaded to stop hostilities against Serbia and moderate her demands. Therefore, the great problem still was how to bring Austria-Hungary and Russia to an agreement.

Despite Russia's determination to stand by her protégé, there was still a possibility that the war between Austria and Serbia would not drag in the other European nations. Both Russia and the Teutonic powers seemed anxious to avoid a general war. The German chancellor said, as late as the evening of July 29, that he was still pressing the button' as hard as he could" at Vienna.1 The French minister at St. Petersburg more than once spoke of the anxiety of the Russian Government for peace.2 Accord

"

1 B. W. P., 71, 97, 107. 2 F. Y. B., 31, 38, 54.

3

ing to the British White Paper, Russia wanted a period of peace to develop her internal resources. It is true that the Russian ambassador at Vienna had declared officially (July 27) to the Austro-Hungarian Government that in case war broke out between the Dual Monarchy and Serbia "it would be impossible to localize it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions." The Teutonic authorities, however, seemed to think that Russia would not go to war at this time. She was having revolutionary troubles at home, and her military preparedness, it was thought, was not adequate, despite assurances to the contrary given out by the Russian Government.5 Britain and France had no interest in the Austro-Serbian dispute unless it grew into a Russo-Austrian quarrel."

The German Emperor felt that Russia ought not to interfere with Austria's purpose to chastise Serbia. His position was that the trouble between Serbia and Austria-Hungary was local and that the latter was justified in securing such guarantees as would force Serbia to turn her promises into deeds. Inasmuch as Austria-Hungary had promised to annex no territory from Serbia, Russia could afford to stand aside as a disinterested spectator."

3 B. W. P., viii.

4 B. W. P., 56.

• B. W. P., 48; A. R. B., 38. 7 G. W. B., annex 22.

5 B. G. B. (2), 12; B. W. P., 32; F. Y. B., 96.

Russia, however, took an entirely different view of her obligations to Serbia. Both sentimental and political considerations urged her to protect Serbia. Public sentiment, therefore, would not allow the Government to stand aside and see the little Slavic state humiliated. The feeling in Russia was that Russians could not desert their brethren in Serbia. Besides, the Russian Government felt that the real cause of the trouble was Austria's desire to be supreme in the Balkan peninsula. If Russia allowed Serbia's independence to be compromised, she considered that she would lose her position in the Balkans, and the hegemony of these states would in the future belong to Austria-Hungary. Therefore, she had, as has been seen, announced in the very beginning that if France would support her, she would intervene in case Serbia were attacked. It seems that Austria-Hungary, too, felt that her future with reference to the Balkan states was at stake, for Count Mensdorff, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador at London, told Sir Edward Grey on July 29 that "Serbia had always been considered as being in the Austrian sphere of influence" prior to the Balkan War.10

9

Austria's promise to respect the integrity of Serbia did not satisfy Russia, even though it

Ibid., annex 18.

9 F. Y. B., 103; B. W. P., 17; R. O. B., 10; G. W. B., annex 4. 10 B. W. P., 91.

was afterwards ratified by Germany. Besides, this promise was later (July 27) conditioned on the localization of the war between There was a dan

Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

ger, as England pointed out, that public sentiment in Austria might make it impossible for the Austro-Hungarian Government to redeem its pledge.12 Russia, however, insisted on the maintenance of the independence as well as the integrity of Serbia and she contended that the enforcement of Austria's demands would reduce the little state to a condition of vassalage under the Dual Monarchy. This would disturb the equilibrium in the Balkans and would thus touch Russia's interests. Therefore, the Russian Government could not, in the opinion of M. Sazonof, afford to allow Serbian independence to be jeopardized.13

Austria-Hungary declared (July 30) that she had repeatedly promised to respect the sovereignty of Serbia and accused the Russian Government of having suppressed information regarding these assurances. This charge was emphatically denied by the Russian ambassador at Paris.14 In support of Austria's claim regarding her promises as to the independence of Serbia, we have the following evidence: Count

11 Ibid., 97.

12 A. R. B., 32; B. W. P., vi-vii.

13 A. R. B., 47; B. W. P., 55, 90, 97, 111. 14 A. R. B., 50; R. O. B., 75.