"I have been specially pleased by the friendly wishes of the 'Independent Committee for a German Peace' and convey my thanks to all who have thought of me. "WILHELM, CROWN PRINCE." This telegram from the Crown Prince to Dietrich Schäfer possesses almost the same significance in relation to war-aims as the Prince's telegram to Frobenius, the author of the pamphlet The German Empire's Hour of Destiny, had at the time in connection with the provocation of war (see J'accuse, pages 43-44). Then the heir to the German Throne ostentatiously placed himself on the side of the inciters to war; today with equal ostentation he places himself on the side of the prolongers of the war. How long will the German people continue to tolerate such an incorrigibly infatuated intriguer and inciter as heir to the German Imperial Throne? As temporary success in the war furnishes the pitch for the manner and intensity with which the intentions of conquest are intimated on the side of Germany, so conversely it is possible to regard moderation and restraint in putting forward these intentions as a sure barometer indicating a depression in the internal and external situation of Germany. Like the needle of a magnet, the German war-aims themselves always remain pointing in the same direction. But their extent and the manner in which they are to be enforced oscillate to and fro like the indicator on a balance, according to the varying fortune of the iron game of dice. There was a moment when the scale containing the trophies of victory had rapidly risen so high that Herr von Bethmann suddenly acknowledged pacifist ideas, which he had throughout his life declared to be Utopian, and which he had unremittingly opposed. A month later the prospects of a victory of the Central Powers had sunk still lower and the dangers involved in a continuation of the war had so increased that the Governments of Germany and Austria had resolved on the portentous offer of their willingness to enter into direct peace negotiations with their opponents. The theoretical pacifism of November, 1916, had become a practical peace offer in December, but neither of these stages in the development had led to any express renunciation, or even to a material diminution, of the aims of conquest towards the East and the West which had been proclaimed up till then. No such renunciation, whether in greater or less degree, has ever at any time been expressed until the present day (April, 1917). On the contrary, the German Government has even quite recently answered the Social Democratic demand for a "peace without annexations and without war-indemnities, on the basis of a free national development of all peoples," with a tortuous statement which culminates in the sibylline sentence: The Government has communicated what it is in a position to say on the subject of war-aims, and is unable at present to make any further statement. Unaffected by pressure from either side, it will continue to pursue the path which is pointed out by its conscience and its responsibility to the country (see the resolution of the party-committee of the Social Democratic Party of Germany of April 19th, and the statement of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung on the subject on April 24th, 1917).1 Thus even now, in the spring of 1917, the German Government maintains intact the annexationist programme which the Chancellor intimated in his earlier speeches and which he has already realised by decisive actions, towards the West and the East alike. Thus the situation is clarified in a way for which we can only be thankful. My criticisms, which were written immediately after the earlier annexationist speeches of the Chancellor, appeared for a time rather to be of value merely as a historical retrospect, but they have now once more acquired actual significance, as a judgment of actual facts. Beneath all his pacifist disguises the Chancellor has until the present day remained what he was from the beginning: Bethmann the Annexationist. Until the present he has neither with I deal later with the Chancellor's speech of May 15th, 1917, which, in exactly the same way as the above notice from the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, maintains unaltered all the "basic lines" of German war-aims as previously expressed. drawn nor modified nor weakened the war-aims he proclaimed at an earlier date. It is only the powerful blows of destiny, it is only the dira necessitas that will compel the faithful servant of his Imperial Master-and above all this Master himself to renounce once for all their ambitious plans, to lay away in their knapsack the European marshal's baton, and as simple soldiers, in line with the leaders of other States, to enter the "Salvation Army" of the organised peace of the nations. BETHMANN THE ANNEXATIONIST. BETHMANN THE OFFERER OF PEACE. It is impossible in this place to follow in detail all the varying shades, all the more or less intentional ambiguities in the German demands as to war-aims. Bethmann the Annexationist became first of all Bethmann the "Pacifist"-for the time being, it is true, a platonic pacifist merely, a "pacifist" in inverted commas, who was still unable to conceal the Prussian Pickelhaube beneath the European olive branch, whose head, while proclaiming peace, was still anointed with whole gallons of annexationist oil. Bethmann the "Pacfist" then further became Bethmann the Offerer of Peace-for the time, it is true, only a specious offerer of peace who played with concealed cards, cleverly keeping in his hands the trumps of conquest.1 But who knows, The section on war-aims originally ended with the treatment of Bethmann's speech of November 9th, 1916, in the Essay on "Bethmann the Pacifist." As, however, the printing of the manuscript given to the Press in December, 1916, occupied a number of months, it appeared to me expedient, in a concluding essay on "Bethmann the Offerer of Peace," to subject to a short treatment on lines of principle the important events which were ushered in by the German offer of peace of December 12th, 1916. An exhaustive treatment of this far-reaching subject, which has become even more important as a result of the entrance of America in the war, was no longer possible within the scope of my work. The peace discussions form a subject apart, which will not be ripe for fruitful treatment and for comprehensive discussion until this constantly fluctuating subject-matter has taken definite shape, that is to say after the initiation of real peace negotiations. My concluding dissertation will merely furnish certain fundamental lines to be observed in passing judgment on the peace-demands of the two groups of Powers, not a detailed criticism of these peace-demands, perhaps the moment may no longer be far distant, when the pseudo-pacifist will be transformed into a real pacifist, when the specious offerer of peace will become a real offerer of peace, who will carefully leave the war-map at home and in its place will openly lay his peace-cards on the table. Perhaps matters may even proceed so far that the offerer of peace will in the end become a pleader for peace,-whereupon the line of development will have reached its conclusion. I look to a day no longer remote, and certainly I long for its arrival-when the Chancellor-General will hang up in the wardrobe, along with the Pickelhaube, the field-grey uniform in which, following Bismarck's example, he loves to show himself to the German people and to the world, and will sit down at the Council table, not in penitential sackcloth but in peaceful mufti, to deliberate on peace along with other civilian statesmen. Serious prospects of peace will not exist until the day when the Emperor and the Chancellor, instead of doing violence to others, will be glad if violence is not done to them, the originators of this enormous crime. The necessary basis for successful peace-negotiations will not be furnished until the day when the Emperor and the Chancellor will have realised that it would be for them a stroke of undeserved good fortune, if they could bring home from the Conference Hall to their ruined and mangled people, not profitable conquests but the bare status quo ante. INTENTION AND SUCCESS OF THE CRIME The political and moral judgment to be passed on the German war-aims does not, of course, depend on their success. The criminal intention to base the condition of Europe once more on violence, on ships, cannons and bayonets, on the formation of groups and alliances, instead of on an organisation of the whole and on justice, remains the same whether it does or does not attain its ends. I have already elsewhere emphasised the fact that the mere announcement of the German war-aims, in the form in which they were proclaimed when the military situation was favourable, represent a new and weighty item of guilt in the debit account of the German rulers and governors, which apart from this is already sufficiently burdened. This guilt against the future is at least as heavy as the guilt in the past and the present. The fact that this third crime, the crime against the future, cannot be committed, owing to force majeure, owing to the increasing strength and the increasing successes of their opponents in the last place owing to the adhesion of America, the strongest Ally, to the group of Germany's enemiesthis fact, which is quite independent of the will of the German rulers, in no way alters their criminal intention, and consequently the decree of guilt which the court of the world must pass upon them. We who seek to inquire into and determine the responsibility for this war are in no way concerned with the question: "What has Germany attained?" but solely with the question: "What did Germany want?" The former question can only be answered after the war is ended, after peace is concluded. It is a confirmation, on the facts, of military success or failure, the registration of a brutal matter of fact, and it is no more than this. The latter inquiry, on the other hand, the answer to the question: "What did Germany want?" is already possible at the present moment. It is independent of the events of the war. It does not rest on the uncertain ground of military events, but on the firm ground of official statements of rulers, Government and party-leaders. The determination of the question: "What did Germany want?" is the essential basis of our ethical judgment on the responsibility, and on those who are responsible, for this greatest crime in the history of mankind. I said above that there is no crime without a motive. of the war is the aim of the war. The motive of the crime When the aim of the war is determined, the crime of the war will not indeed be proved -the proof of the deed must be drawn from the facts, and not from psychological motives-but it will thereby be explained from within, and be rendered humanly credible. When therefore the proof of the deed has been furnished and at the same time the motives of the deed have been exposed, |