accurate knowledge of the subject possessed by the speaker and the subtle contrivance of the untruth, can only be intentional. If instead of quoting the last two paragraphs Herr von Bethmann had quoted the whole of Note 51, in particular the second and third paragraphs, even the most uninformed reader would at once have recognised that Berchtold's readiness to accept a general mediation in the Austro-Serbian dispute was in no way identical with the acceptance of Grey's quite precise formula of agreement, which Herr von Bethmann professes to have recommended by his instruction to Tschirschky.

I repeat again with the utmost definiteness that Austria, so far as the documents show, never expressed any views regarding Grey's formula of agreement, much less did she accept it. If therefore this instruction to Tschirschky, this suspiciously belated production, is authentic, it at any rate achieved no success-a fact which again admits a doubt as to its existence, or at any rate its sincerity.

But let us assume that Note 51 of the Red Book was in fact an answer to Grey's proposal for agreement and to the support it received in Berlin; we are nevertheless forced to ask whether Berchtold's Note in fact contains an acceptance of the English proposal in its essential points. I answer this question bluntly in the negative. Berchtold's Note refers, it is true, not to the conversation between Grey and Lichnowsky on the afternoon of July 29th, but to the conversation on the morning of the same day (Blue Book, No. 84). But even the general proposals for mediation which Grey made on that morning encounter such grave obstacles on the part of Count Berchtold that the statement of the latter represents anything but a concurrence.

Herr von Bethmann himself quotes the "presuppositions of our acceptance" as formulated by Count Berchtold, and among these presuppositions appears in the first place "that our military action against Serbia should continue to take its course." Is that not exactly the opposite of Grey's proposal for agreement, which required the suspension of Austria's military action after "the occupation of Belgrade and

the neighbouring Serbian territory"? (This is how it is expressed in the telegram from the English King of July 30th, which in its meaning exactly agrees with Grey's various formulæ.) Is not, I ask, Austria's demand for a continuance of her military action diametrically opposed to Grey's request that this military action must be brought to a stop on the occupation of Belgrade and the neighbouring territory? Strictly read, the answer of Vienna is exactly the opposite of what the Berlin Government had asked of Vienna. In his telegram to Tschirschky, Herr von Bethmann rightly draws the attention of the Viennese Government to the point I have so often emphasised in my explanations, namely, that Grey's formula gave full satisfaction to all the justifiable claims of Austria for the maintenance of her military and political prestige; that these claims "could be sufficiently maintained by the occupation of Belgrade or other places." Did the Viennese Government by any chance realise this fact and thereupon accept Grey's formula? Not at all. They warmly thank Herr Secretary von Jagow for the communications made through the Ambassador in Vienna, and declare that they "are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to negotiate between us and Serbia." But there is not a suggestion of any restriction of their military action to the occupation of Belgrade or of other places, such as Berlin, in agreement with London, had demanded. A continuance of the military action against Serbia, in addition to this the demand that the Russian mobilisation directed against Austria must be brought to a standstill, that is to say that Russia with folded arms should tranquilly witness the crushing of Serbia that is the substance of Berchtold's Note of July 31st, and that is what Herr von Bethmann attempts to represent to us as an acquiescence in the English formula of agreement which, as is alleged, was supported by Berlin. The German Chancellor must indeed have a very low opinion of the intelligence of his hearers and readers if he does not give them the credit of being able to recognise the yawning gulf between his note of recommendation and the answer from Vienna. Anyone who confines himself to a comparison of

these two documents in the Chancellor's speech, even if he leaves aside all the other objections which I have raised against the sincerity of Bethmann's demonstration and even if he avoids the study of the original documents and their connection to each other, must recognise, merely from the quotations of the Chancellor, that Vienna never answered Grey's special formula of agreement, but that in its answer to Grey's general proposals for mediation it imposed conditions which are diametrically opposed to the decisive points in Grey's formula of agreement.

Had Grey's formula or Sazonof's later formulæ been accepted by Vienna, peace would have been preserved. If the Berlin Government in fact supported Grey's proposal as energetically as it now asserts, why, I ask, did it not insist on the acceptance of this proposal in Vienna; why did it not, in the event of a refusal, cut itself free from Austrian policy? Why, I further ask, did the Berlin Government on their own behalf directly refuse Sazonof's first formula of agreement and leave the second unanswered, if they intervened so energetically for the acceptance of Grey's formula? Sazonof's first formula (Orange Book, No. 60) did not even demand a suspension of Austria's military operations. It therefore demanded even less than Grey's formula (the occupation of Belgrade, etc.). How is it possible to reconcile the fact that Herr von Jagow on July 30th declined Sazonof's conciliatory formula, which demanded less, as “inacceptable to Austria," while he claims to have recommended in Vienna with so much urgency Grey's more exacting formula which demanded so much more. All these doubtful questions and grounds of suspicion are suggested by Bethmann's most recent revelation. For me the solution of all these riddles is impossible. One thing, however, I know, and state with the utmost definiteness: At no time did the Austrian Government accept Grey's formula of agreement of July 29th (Blue Book, No. 88).

X

Herr von Bethmann asserts the contrary-although he is wrong in so doing-and he then proceeds: "Thus in the night from July 30th to July 31st Russia was confronted with the fact that Austria-Hungary under our influence had assumed a compliant disposition which opened the way to the maintenance of peace. In the night from July 30th to July 31st-be it observed! Here Herr von Bethmann has been caught in his own snare. Even if Austria had revealed a pliant disposition by the acceptance of Grey's formula -which is not the case-this pliability would not have been expressed until Berchtold's despatch of July 31st, which Bethmann himself quotes as the document in proof of Austria's conciliatoriness. It was not until July 31st-presumably not before the afternoon of that day-that the conciliatory Viennese telegram could have come to the knowledge of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. It cannot therefore have done so in the night from July 30th to July 31st when this telegram did not exist, nor can it have done so before the Russian general mobilisation which, as I have elsewhere shown, was decreed on the morning of July 31st. When the order for the Russian general mobilisation was issued, there existed-apart from the previous Austrian general mobilisation and far-reaching German military measures-merely such diplomatic acts on the part of Germany and Austria as represented an absolute intransigence on the part of the two Central Powers, a refusal of all peaceful means of arriving at an understanding. As the last and decisive action of this nature, there was the refusal by Jagow of Sazonof's first formula of agreement. This brusque, unexplained refusal, as I have repeatedly emphasised elsewhere, could not but lead to the Russian general mobilisation. That was the last drop in the diplomatic game which filled the cup of Russian patience to overflowing. That was the situation which, taken in conjunction with the Austrian and German military measures, led at some time between July 30th and July 31st to the decision to

carry out the general mobilisation. Even if Berchtold's Note of July 31st had been a conciliatory act-with all its reservations and stipulations it was in fact the contrary-it would in any case have been too late in becoming known in Petrograd-that is to say, it would have been too late after the general mobilisation had already been ordered. The antedating of Berchtold's Note from July 31st to the night from July 30th to July 31st is such a flagrant act of falsification that it is sufficient to cause the collapse of the whole edifice of Herr von Bethmann's demonstration.

XI

The Chancellor's attempt to invoke a Russian army order of September 30th, 1912, as an alleged proof of the aggressive character of the Russian general mobilisation of July 31st, 1914, can be described only as an act of extreme desperation. No evidence has yet been given of the authenticity of this army order, which now for the first time appears upon the screen, arousing in the whole of Germany the cry of relief: "Now at last we have complete proof that Russia meant to attack us and did in fact do so." According to the detailed communication in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung this order was issued on September 30th, 1912, by the chief of the General Staff of the Warsaw military area to the commander of the Sixth Army Corps. In addition to a number of military orders, it contains the following sentence which, in the opinion of the German Chancellor, is supposed to furnish complete proof of Russia's war intentions in the summer of 1914:

"It is ordered by the All-highest that the proclamation of the mobilisation is also at the same time the proclamation of war against Germany."

The simplest logical examination of this sentence-always assuming that the whole document is authentic-is sufficient to prove the fallacy of the conclusions drawn by Herr von