dictate a German peace to the enemies of Germany, assumed the pacifist point of view which for decades had been put forward by the leading statesmen of the Entente, with the Tsar of Russia at their head, as the only possible sure foundation for the peace of Europe;

the fact that the unspeakable horrors of more than two years' international butchery, that the horrors of an unprecedented destruction of wealth had first to visit the most. civilised parts of the world before the German statesman arrived at the recognition of a fact which had long been clear to the statesmen of England, France, Russia, America, Belgium, Holland, etc., and generally to the most progressive minds of the whole world-the recognition of the necessity of an organisation of the nations on a basis of law in place of the former principle of force;

the fact that during the twelve critical days the war could have been avoided with ease had Herr von Bethmann then recognised the efficacy of the weapons of pacifism, which today he recommends as balm for the wounds inflicted on humanity,

all these facts justify the German people in demanding from its rulers and statesmen an account of their actions and their omissions.

If Bethmann's present war-aims were really sincerely intended, if they were really meant to pave the way to peacenegotiations and in the end lead to peace, this would be a consummation which should certainly be hailed joyfully and cordially from the standpoint of Europe and from the standpoint of humanity. From the standpoint of the German people, however, the crimes that have been committed merely become all the greater by virtue of the fact that the perpetrator by his present attitude acknowledges them himself. In the question of guilt he still lies. His denials neither move us nor exculpate him, since the demonstrations of his guilt have been strictly furnished. On the question of war-aims, however, he confesses. If to-day it is true that the peace of Europe can be guaranteed only by a pacifist organisation of

the European family of nations, it was also true in 1899, in 1907, and in the following years; above all it was true in the last days of July, 1914. If to-day international disputes can and ought to be submitted in future to the decision of arbitration, then the Austro-Serbo-Russian dispute at the end of July, 1914, could also have been referred to the Hague Tribunal for decision. For nearly twenty years the German Government-of course with the unfailing support of their Austrian ally-have repudiated all pacifist ideas; they have always scoffingly contrasted such "Utopias" with the "Real"-politics which could alone be justified; they have offered inexorable opposition to all practical proposals in a pacifist direction, and have found Germany's salvation only in the sharp, gleaming sword and the shining armour. The bloodiest war in the history of mankind had first to rage over the world for more than two years before the German statesmen recognised what the rest of the civilised world had already recognised in peace, what they had striven with unwearying zeal to accomplish despite all the opposition of Germany. That the path pursued by Germany in all these past years was a mistaken path is a fact admitted by Herr von Bethmann, if his utterances of November 9th are sincerely intended. It is these mistaken paths which have plunged Germany and the world into this unspeakable disaster. They prepared the ground for the war, they provoked the war, and they have prolonged it for more than two years down to the present day. What the Chancellor said on November 9th is merely the repentant sinner's confession of guilt. That he confesses is well; it is better for the prospects of peace that he should do so rather than that he should remain obdurate. But the guilt is not expiated by the confession. The triple guilt for which the German people has still to call its Rulers and Governors to account is:

The guilt in the past, the guilt in the present, the guilt in the future.

This guilt in the future-as I have already explained elsewhere also exists in its full dimensions, even if under the

pressure of external circumstances it cannot be committed. In Spring, 1916, the Chancellor was still willing, and in November he still announced by his actions that he was willing, to dictate to his opponents, whom he believed that he would be able to conquer, a German peace, that is to say a peace resting on force. His will was directed to establishing anew a so-called state of peace, resting on cannons and bayonets, that is to say to the perpetuation of international anarchy in Europe. This will in itself represents the crime against the future. It was only the power, the military and economic power, that was wanting to the German statesmen to enable them to convert their will into action. This explains the sudden change from the path of violence to the path of peace. The guilt is not thereby wiped out.

Germany by her action before the war prepared the ground for the war.

Germany herself provoked the war.

Germany intended to establish anew a latent state of war in Europe, and this intention was only shattered on the power of her opponents.

For this triple guilt the German people will call to account those who are responsible.

CHAPTER III

BETHMANN THE OFFERER OF PEACE1

WITH the foregoing chapters on "Bethmann the Annexationist" and "Bethmann the Pacifist" I believed that I had completed the last section of my book which deals with Waraims.2 The manuscript was already finished, when the German peace-offer of December 12th, 1916, was made, and the important discussions between the belligerent and neutral States ensued.

An exhaustive treatment of this far-reaching subject, which, by virtue of the intervention of the United States of America and President Wilson's monumental outline of an organised community of peace of all civilised States, has gained a significance for the future life of the nations reaching far beyond the present war-a detailed and comprehensive treatment of this world-moving and world-determining subject would demand a new book and would considerably exceed the limits of this present work. I reserve this attractive task for a later day. At this point, however, I should not like to omit, at the close of my present work, indicating at least a few fundamental principles according to which, in my opinion, the peace-conditions of belligerent parties in general, and those of the parties now at war in particular, must be judged.

This examination appeared to me indispensable in view of the more recent attempts made by the German Government and the defenders of their innocence to replace and obliterate the original question of guilt, that is to say the question of

1 Written in April, 1917, and amplified by some later additions. The three first volumes of The Crime are followed by a further volume, conceived as an Appendix, Belgian Documents. This treats of the Belgian Ambassadorial Reports published by the German Government, in connection with the two Belgian Grey Books and other publications on the Belgian side.

the authorship of the war, by a new question of guilt-by the question: "Who is responsible for the continuation of the war?" The line of argument runs as follows:

It is true that we are innocent of the provocation of the war. But even if we had been guilty, our initial guilt would be outweighed by the consequential guilt of our opponents, who have declined the peace offered by us, and have thereby led to the continuation of the war.

In his speech of January 31st, 1917, before the Main Committee of the Reichstag (in which unrestricted submarine warfare was announced) the Chancellor gave expression to this train of thought in the following words:

"On December 12th I explained in the Reichstag the considerations which led to our offer of peace. The answer of our opponents was sharply and decisively to the effect that they refuse to negotiate with us on the subject of peace, that the only peace with which they will have anything to do is a peace which they themselves dictate. In the eyes of all the world this suffices to decide the question of the guilt for the continuance of the war. The guilt rests on our enemies alone."

In order to demonstrate the untenability of this subtly devised proof of innocence, it is necessary to establish certain general principles according to which offers of peace should be judged, and in the light of these principles to answer the particular questions which have reference to the present war.

I have already explained elsewhere that in itself, and as a question of principle, no exception can be taken to the argument to the effect that a party which provoked the war need not be held unconditionally responsible for the continuance of the war at every subsequent stage. At some definite point in time the perpetrator may very well decide to put an end to the continued operation of the consequences of his deed, and