1917. In this place I would only again point out that on this occasion the Chancellor once more expressly referred to his war-aims already proclaimed in the Reichstag, and added: "I have adhered to these principles without modification." After the Chancellor's speech, the representative Dr. Spahn, in the name of the Centre Party, the progressive "Volkspartei," the National Liberal party and the majority of the German Socialists, made a statement expressing their concurrence, which like the former statements of the groups in question accepted the standpoint of Bethmann's annexationism:

The Chancellor has described his aims in former speeches. We are in agreement with him when he now declines in the present conditions to expose to our enemies the details of his war-aims. It is enough for us if those who govern the Empire neither pursue boundless plans of conquest nor bind themselves to the idea of a peace without annexations and without war indemnities.

Thus, then, "boundless" plans of annexation are repudiated. The same, however, is true of the renunciation of plans of annexation in general. In other words the aims of conquest of the German Empire should, according to the wishes of these civil parties, be kept within certain limits—within the limits which the Chancellor indicated in his former speeches; that is to say, Belgium, Poland, the Russian Baltic provinces, etc. The Conservatives, who on this occasion did not participate in the joint statement of the civil parties, remained aloof, merely because Bethmann's annexationism does not go nearly far enough to please them. They occupy, as is well known, the platform of the Pan-German programme of world conquest. In the Reichstag sitting of May, 1917, we are thus confronted with the same picture as on every other occasion. The whole of Germany continues to assert that it is waging a war of defence; the whole of Germany needs for its future. security increase of territory, and it is only as to the extent of this increase that opinions vary.1

I shall consider later (Appendix: "Bethmann and Michaelis") the famous resolution of the Reichstag Majority passed on July 19th, 1917, in favour of an understanding, which contradicts all the former announcements of the civil parties during the first three years of war, and I shall also discuss the attitude of the new Chancellor towards this resolution.

THE PEACE DEMANDS OF THE ENTENTE POWERS

These demands of the aggressor and the conqueror are contrasted with the demands of the parties attacked, whose lands are still in part in the power of the aggressor. Their demands are laid down in the two Notes of the Entente Powers of December 30th, 1916, and January 10th, 1917 -in the former in a general form, in the latter in a more precise statement.

As I have elsewhere proved, from the beginning of the war and to-day more than ever there has stood in the forefront of the peace demands of the Entente Powers the pacifist world programme: the demand for a league of nations to guarantee and secure the peace of the world on the basis of law in place of violence—a league which will be equipped with the necessary means of compulsion for giving effect to its organisation of law, which will exclude the right of military self-help in the case of its individual members, and which will have as a logical consequence the proportionate reduction of the armaments of all States. This dominant pacifist section of the Entente programme has advanced more than ever into the foreground by virtue of the adhesion of the United States to the group of the Entente Powers and by the victory of the Russian Revolution over Tsarism. Neither America nor the new-born Russia is in this war seeking any special advantages whatever, whether of a territorial or of any other nature. Their express and exclusive aim is the organised assurance of the world's peace, which can only be placed on a firm and enduring basis by the exclusion of any annexation resting on violence, any oppression or restriction of free nations. There is no doubt that the co-operation of these two greatest and most powerful republics in the world in the peace programme of the Entente Powers, on which a new agreement will be necessary, will lead to a material modification of this programme, and will remove from it any remnant of aims of force and conquest. Even now, while I am writing these lines (May, 1917), this development is progressing. Already we see that the English and French statesmen are surrendering

certain territorial demands in their programme, to which they had been forced by Imperial Russia, and that they also are recognising as their essential war-aim the leading AmericanRussian peace-formula: a league of nations; no annexations and no levies.

In these circumstances I consider myself relieved from the necessity of considering in detail the Notes of the Entente Powers of December, 1916, and January, 1917, so far as they contain the special peace demands of the individual allies. The discussion of all these individual questions would extend far beyond the limits of this final recapitulatory chapter of my book. Such a discussion would also be purposeless, because it relates to a subject which is in a state of constant flux in consequence of the new grouping on the side of the Entente Powers and has already assumed an altered form as a result of the events which have ensued. For me personally there is further the decisive consideration that I repudiate on principle all territorial alterations and transpositions which do not rest on the free and the freely expressed will of the nations, all Imperialist considerations of political power, no matter from what side they are advanced. The question of future military security-the chief consideration which is ordinarily advanced in connection with such demands-does not exist for me. It cannot exist for me, as I regard every drop of blood shed in this war as having been shed in vain, if in the future also the security of States is to rest on a military guarantee and not a guarantee of law. The nations are not entrenchments; they are not bulwarks so that the one can be applied to protect the other. They are not the objects, but the subjects, of the formation of States. Each one in its own right has to determine its own destiny, it has to govern itself within, and maintain its freedom and independence without. These are the old democratic pacifist principles, which have now been introduced into practical statecraft by President Wilson and the Russian Revolution. These are the principles which dispose of all opportunist Imperialist considerations, which at a stroke lead us from the narrow horizon of the egotism of the individual State into

the free atmosphere of the interests of the world and of humanity.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN JUDGING THE PEACE DEMANDS OF THE AGGRESSOR AND OF THE PARTY ATTACKED

The purpose of my observations in this final chapter is not the discussion of the individual peace-aims of this or of that party but only, as I have already pointed out in the Introduction, the determination of certain guiding lines, according to which the demands of belligerent parties in general are to be judged, according to the rôle which the one party or the other plays in the war in question. The demands of the aggressor are to be judged differently from those of the party attacked. Even if externally they may appear more or less the same, the two are nevertheless, internally and in their essence, fundamentally different and they are therefore to be appraised on a different standard, not only from the point of view of international law but also from that of ethics. Proceeding from this criterion I propose in the following paragraphs to develop a kind of theory for judging the peace conditions of an aggressor on the one hand and of the party attacked on the other, to provide a critical guide for the present peace discussions and for the latter peace negotiations. The principles are in their universality entirely independent of the military course of events, that is to say of the greater or less degree in which it is practicable to give effect to the peace conditions in question.

I summarise this theory in six principles.

First Principle.-The aggressor in a war is never entitled, whether his attack ends in success or failure, to demand from the party attacked compensation of any kind in the political, the military, the economic or any other sphere. Second Principle.-The party attacked is entitled to demand restitution to his previous position (restitutio in integrum);

in addition to this, complete compensation for all the damage suffered; finally, adequate guarantees and securities against future attacks.

Third Principle.-If the aggressor-in violation of the above principles (Nos. 1 and 2)-offers a peace, which, instead of complying with the justifiable demands of the party attacked, still seeks gains of any kind for himself the aggressor, such a step does not really constitute a peace offer, but is merely a specious offer. When, therefore, the party attacked declines such an offer, and continues the struggle, it is not he, but the aggressor, who is responsible for its continuance.

Fourth Principle.-If the party attacked, either spontaneously or in answer to a peace offer (real or specious) on the part of the aggressor, puts forward counter-demands, which are kept within the limits of his rights as defined in No. 2 above, his action is not incorrect. If, therefore, the aggressor declines such justifiable demands on the part of his opponent, in this case also it is not the party attacked but the aggressor who is responsible for the continuance of the struggle.

Fifth Principle.-If, on the other hand, the aggressor agrees to all the justifiable demands of the party attacked (on the standard of the principle indicated in 2), and if at the same time he renounces any demand for gain of his own (on the standard of the principle under 1), the refusal of such an offer of peace would transfer the guilt for the continuance of the war to the party attacked. Sixth Principle.-If in their peace-demands the aggressor and the party attacked violate in an equal degree the principles set out under 1 and 2-the aggressor the principle under I, the party attacked that under 2— the responsibility for the continuance of the war cannot be laid in an overwhelming measure on either of the two sides. So far as the continuance of the war is concerned, their offences on the two sides cancel each other; so far as the beginning of the war is considered, the initial guilt of the aggressor, as the originator of the war, remains unaltered.