the chain of evidence will be indissolubly completed, the guilty will be irretrievably caught in the snare of the evidence of his guilt.

I believe that in my first and in this my second book I have proved the deed itself beyond dispute. The motives of the deed I lay bare in this concluding section on war-aims. That the deed was completed but was unsuccessful, that the ends were sought but not attained, is to be attributed to a kind dispensation of Providence, and not to any merit on the part of the perpetrators. The moral judgment of their contemporaries and of posterity is in no way influenced by the failure of the misdeed. We have seen in the second section by reference to the aims which chauvinistic Germany proclaimed before the outbreak of war, what their success would have bestowed on us, and we shall find confirmation of this in this last section, by reference to the war-aims proclaimed during the war by the leading German statesman. The second and third section of this work, taken together, will teach us what war-aims were kept in view by the authoritative circles in Germany before and during the war-so long as the war-map appeared to favour their plans-what they sought to attain with a view to "Germany's security against future attacks,' what guarantees for Germany's power they intended to create in the East and the West, what contempt they felt for all ideas of an organisation of the European community of nations, resting on law.

Despite the already assured failure of Germany's intentions, this retrospective survey of these intentions will remain an important stone in the crushing edifice of guilt raised against the rulers and the governors of Germany. It will reveal to the eyes of the peoples of the world-and above all to the German people itself, when it shall one day have awakened from its leaden sleep-the bitter, but salutary, truth:

All the unspeakable and immeasurable sacrifices which the German people have made, have been made for the worst cause for which a nation has ever seized arms. It

was not a German national war-no, it was a Hohenzollern war of conquest that was criminally provoked in the summer of 1914. The victory of the Hohenzollerns would have meant the defeat of the German people, it would have been the prelude to the downfall of the old European civilisation. The failure of the Hohenzollerns will become the salvation of the German people, the delivery of Europe, the opening of a new and happier era in the history of mankind.

CHAPTER I

BETHMANN THE ANNEXATIONIST

A

COMMENTS ON THE CHANCELLOR'S SPEECH OF DECEMBER 9TH, 19151

THE proceedings of the Reichstag on December 9th, 1915 -the prelude to a new approval of 500 million pounds, bringing the total sum approved for the war by Germany until then up to 2,000 millions 2-again offered the edifying spectacle of a representative assembly which is united and prepared to intervene with life and wealth on behalf of their basely attacked Fatherland, and to secure for it all possible military, economic and political securities against similar attacks for the future.

"For the German Government this struggle is what it was from the beginning, and what the Government in all its announcements has asserted it to be: a war of defence of the German people. This war must only be ended with a peace which, as far as can be humanly foreseen, will offer us security against its recurrence. In this we are all at one; that is our strength, and so shall it remain." (Stormy and long sustained applause in the House and on the Tribunes.)

This essay, hitherto unpublished, was written in the middle of December, 1915, and amplified by insertions relating to later events.

Meanwhile, in each of the sessions May-June and September-October, 1916, a further 600 millions, and in each of the sessions February and July, 1917, a further 750 millions, making in all 4,700 million pounds, have been approved.

25

On this note of enthusiasm ended the speech of the Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg on December 9th, 1915.

The guarantees against future attacks, of which the Chancellor spoke at the conclusion of his speech had previously been described by him with sufficient clearness:

"Neither in the East nor in the West must our enemies of to-day have at their disposal doors of invasion by which they may to-morrow renew their threats against us more sharply than before." (Renewed applause and hand-clapping.)

"I cannot say what guarantees the Imperial Government will demand, for example, in the Belgian question, what bases of power they will consider necessary for these guarantees. But there is one thing which our enemies should bear in mind: the longer and the more bitterly they wage this war against us, the greater will be the guarantees which we must demand." (Stormy approval in the House and hand-clappings on the Tribunes.)

"It is well known that France advanced loans to Russia only on the express condition that Russia should construct her Polish fortifications and railways against us, and it is equally well known that England and France regarded Belgium as a territory on which to deploy against us. Against this we must make ourselves secure from a political and military as well as from an economic standpoint. What is necessary for this purpose must be attained." (Stormy and renewed applause and clapping of hands in the House and on the Tribunes.)

In plain language, the Imperial Government intends to proceed with powerful annexations in the East and the West and to link Belgium, Poland, as well as a part of the Russian Baltic provinces in one form or another to the German Empire. All this, of course, it is understood is "only for the purpose of obtaining guarantees against future attacks." Any idea of conquest was and is utterly remote from peace-loving

Germany. "It is not desire for conquest that urges us on; we are animated by the unbending will to keep for ourselves and for all coming generations the place on which God has set us"-such were the words of the Imperial speech from the Throne on August 4th, 1914. To-day it is something else that is said: to-day it is no longer a question of keeping the place which God has assigned to us, but of extending it as far as possible, of setting ourselves, by means of violent jostling to the right and the left, in the place of others who might also maintain, and could at least do so with as much. right as we, that divine Providence had been their servant in choosing them their place.

It will be seen that the question of the cause and the origin of the war is not merely a question of the past, which—as many falsely consider-has no longer a practical, but merely historical significance. It is, on the contrary, an eminently practical and vital question, since its determination in one sense or another continues to operate in the future also, and furnishes the measure by which to ascertain whether the waraims are or are not justified. The party attacked has the natural and entirely justified object of protecting himself against future attacks. The aggressor has no need of such protection and can lay no claim to it. The enemies who have plunged him into misfortune sit within his own country, and against these he must himself find his own protection.

We pacifists and socialists regard as useless and ineffective any protection against attacks from without, so long as it rests on power and not on law. The worshippers of power, however, who unfortunately still constitute in Germany the great majority in the dominant and leading circles, still refuse to have anything to do with guarantees of peace by the protection of the law and by the peaceful organisation of the nations. They will refuse to know anything of this until their people, and other peoples, beat this knowledge into them by unmistakable methods, and verify in their case the proverb "He who refuses to hear must be made to feel."