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"The Isolation Plan" not only contains the principles pertaining to arbitration, but the reasons supporting them, and YOU ARE EARNESTLY EXHORTED TO STUDY THEM; for the writer is just as confident that they are the basic rules upon which the system of arbitration will some day rest, as was Richard Wagner, that his compositions were music, during the long years when almost no one would recognize the fact. It furthermore, is in full accord with America's needs and desires.

May 20, 1919.

All consideration of this contractual obligation was lost to sight at the Paris Conference, in the impassioned demand that the enemy should pay to the utmost of its ability and the general greed there manifested; and now, the clamor arises, that the amount should be fixed, on May 1, at four hundred billion marks, gold, or one hundred times that which the enemy took from France fifty years ago, although the French have never ceased to consider that the latter exaction was crushing. As an economical conception, it is fantastic and can only result in disheartening the enemy and further endanger the tranquillity of the nations in their domestic affairs.

The above aspect is simply the legal one; "and, unless conformity to it is observed, there can be no settlement of the war that will endure.

The expedient of first establishing a foundation for such an exaggerated claim, by causing the enemy to admit that it was solely responsible for the war, can serve no useful purpose, as it can only be done under duress, and the sober-minded all over the world have always accepted the maxim that an authentic history of a great war can never be written for a generation or so afterward and they cannot be made to believe that the last war, with the years of complications that preceded it, can be an exception to that rule.

This note and this book are written from a scientific point of view, in the interest of a world order, the importance of which is far greater than any particular contention now existing, no matter how formidable that may be, and are but reiterations of principles advocated for over thirty years.

ANNEX VI

ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE COVENANT

(Revised from Articles in New York Sun of August 7th and September 9, 1919.)

The President, on the 4th inst., at Indianapolis, made the following statement as to the power of the League in reference to enforcement:

"If any member of that League, or any nation not a member, refuses to submit the question at issue either to arbitration, or to discussion by the Council, there ensues automatically, by the engagements of this Covenant, an absolute economic boycott."

Under the Covenant, a nation undertakes but three (really but two) obligations with respect to submitting its differences for settlement and makes but one engagement that it will carry out the decision: in Article 12, it agrees to submit a dispute to arbitration, or to inquiry by the Council; in Article 13, if justiciable under one of four categories, to arbitration; and in Article 15, any not settled by arbitration, to the Council (the second and third being comprehended in the first.) Only in Article 13, in the case of arbitration, is there an agreement to carry out the award. No obligation is made to carry out any "recommendation" under Article 15, and it would seem, that that term has been chosen with great care instead of the usual one, decree, that it might carry no significance of compulsion.

It, therefore, follows:

Regarding enforcement by the "boycott," provided only in Article 16, that it may take place only when a nation "resorts to war;" and, even then, only when "in disregard of its covenants (obligations) under Articles 12, 13 and 15."

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As war is permitted under these Articles in certain circumstances, and as the criterion regarding submission is its justiciability-a test, because of the indefiniteness of which the United States Senate has refused to ratify peace treaties the "boycott" cannot "automatically ensue.' The fact of such a breach, must first be established (but no conjecture can be made by what body); and furthermore, for this purpose, a unanimous decision (as provided under Article 5, this action, not being governed by an express exception to that rule) must be had, despite the fact that the delinquent Member has not lost its seat in the Council or in the Assembly.

All that can happen to a delinquent that does not submit to arbitration and takes no step in the matter, is to suffer the report of a recommendation unfavorable to it, under Article 15, if the complaining nation chooses to apply to the Council or Assembly, for an inquiry. No power is conferred on the Council in this Article to order a "boycott" or any other punishment, and other extraordinary consequences would follow:

If the report were unanimous, the Members of the League, and not the delinquent nation, would incur an obligation; as they "will not go to war with (against) any party to the dispute which complies;"

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If the report were not unanimous, the Members would reserve to themselves the right to take such action as

they shall consider necessary." If, therefore, the rule of interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, were applied, the Members would curiously not be as free to act when unanimous, as when not.

If any action were taken, it would not be done through the Council, or the Assembly, but directly by the nations as Members. How often could a sufficiently large number of them to make a boycott effective, arrive at an agreement to impose it, if called upon to act after the commission of the offense-not war, against a nation friendly perhaps to many of them, and too, when no provision is made in the Covenant for their meeting as Members of the League.

The delinquent Member could only be expelled from the League, under the last paragraph of Article 16, for a refusal to carry out an award in case it had submitted to arbitration.

Therefore, under the Covenant, not only the "boycott" is almost wholly an illusion, but also all other effective means of compulsion.

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