and it might be difficult, for this reason, to secure the ratification and adhesion of any such nation to it.

It might be said in opposition to this, that such a Convention could be accepted with safety, for a nation could always escape, as submission to the jurisdiction of the court was optional in each instance.

Legislation, or its equivalent, treaty or convention making, of such a character, although not without precedent, is to be deprecated, however, as it is not real, and attempts by the nations to deceive themselves are not acts of intelligence.

Such a court would require a calendar and delays of years in reaching causes might very soon result, as sometimes a single one would consume many months.

From the fact that all international differences would be submitted to this body composed of a few men, the attitude would inevitably result that it was higher than any other world organization; and, because of its powers, rulers would neglect no opportunity to show deference to its members.

It would be responsible to no power, unless to conventions, perhaps periodic; it could count upon exercising almost any act of discretion, without further comment than the creation of some convention which would provide a different rule for future cases; and it could rest assured that the nations could not act in such harmony as to operate anything like a recall of its members.

It would, from these causes, always tend toward arrogancy; for no situation could be presented to human frality with greater elevation from ordinary positions of life and fewer restraints in the exercise of power.

(See also, below, under The United States Supreme Court as a Model.)

The Arbitration and Court Systems Compared

The following are some of the objections to the Court system and advantages of the commission system:

Over forty nations would wish to adhere to the Convention to be adopted and, unless the principle of inequality in representation should be established, which would not be probable, each nation would expect at least one representative on the bench of that court. This would necessitate, either the creation of a body of judges, which, if all were to sit at a time, would be so large, that it would be liable to be swayed by the eloquence of the adovcates before it and even of its own members, rather than to be governed by quiet deliberation; or, the division of the court into smaller groups, or senats, in which case dissatisfaction in the apportionment would be inevitable.

The expense of the maintenance of a court of such size would doubtless rise to a figure out of all proportion with the importance of the cases that would be submitted to it.

If only the great powers were to present members, the smaller ones would be dissatisfied; and, if all were given that right in turn, complaint would often be made that the members presented were not men of such world-wide experience as would qualify them to assume such positions.

For instance, maritime matters might arise, and the majority of the members of the court at a given time might be from countries that had practically no modern marine experience.

No nation would like to present causes to a court in which it would regularly find one or more persons, who,

it supposed, were inimical to it; and, even should the privilege of recusing judges be given, it would not like to be called upon to exercise that privilege regularly against any member.

The position of the judges could not be that of such indifference as to the parties before them as is that, for instance, of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court, who usually see before them simply unknown individuals. Only nations, some forty in number, would appear before the international court, and it could not be expected but that the judges in time would acquire a leaning toward some and away from others.

They would probably live together at the Hague, or some small European capital; they would be dependent largely upon their own society for mental recreation, and no nation would feel that it would be fair to be obliged to submit to a tribunal in which its adversary had a representative on the bench and it had none; or, even if he were not to sit, to a set of judges who had been associating for four or six years with such representative and had probably had their ideas colored by his remarks. International disputes develop gradually as a rule; they become subjects of general intelligence, such that the members of the court could not remain in ignorance of them, and casual remarks at opportune moments can do much in shaping opinion.

The most competent men, if such competency is to be measured by an intimate experience with affairs such as those that would be drawn into question, could be had to sit in a case the duration of which could be approximated in advance; whereas men, unless they had passed the height of their professional activities, would not alter their careers, separate themselves from their countries and locate

at The Hague to await the uncertain business that would be brought there.

The word "uncertain" is used for the reason, that, even should a court of permanent judges be established, there can be little doubt but that any future Convention would contain the exception, already introduced in The Hague Conventions, permitting, in important cases, the choice of judges in other ways, by which men could be obtained more expert in the matter or in the impartiality of whose sentiments more confidence might be felt; and only minor causes would go to the regular judges.

The selection from the world at large could be adequately safeguarded through the compilation by each nation, or generally, of biographies of the Members of the Court and other persons eligible to sit as arbitrators, giving not only their accomplishments, but the sentiments expressed in their writings and otherwise; so that, when a nation presented a name, each other nation interested in the controversy could judge at once whether it could expect the competency and impartiality that it sought, and guide itself accordingly in retaining or striking off the name from the panel.

On the other hand, this scrutiny into the careers of such men would serve to prompt them to act with the greatest judgment and impartiality of which they were capable, for the world could afford no higher honor to a man than to call him repeatedly to fulfill such a function.

The commission system would also do away with the useless delays in waiting for a case to be reached upon the calendar, for a nation might institute commissions for the hearing of any number of causes at a time.

Arbitration commissions readily permit the presence

among the commissioners of nationals of the countries in dispute and this feature is well worth consideration, before discarding the practice. The functions of the nationals, however, should not include the right to vote, unless the number were such that they could not change the vote of the impartial members, but should be essentially consultative. In this capacity they can be of great use in the deliberations by preventing the oversight of contentions of their countries, which fact becomes obvious when there is no provision for appeal.

When a body of men is given the task of determining a question, it is usually undertaken by a process of elimination; and a plausible leader can often so pass over a point as to quickly dismiss it from further consideration. It may be that its importance becomes most apparant in connection with some point which will come up later, but having been already considered and dismissed, only an interested party will stem the current of impatience at its recall, and persist with it. Could each nation be permitted to have present at all conferences, one or more of its strongest and best informed men on the subject, questions would be apt to be determined only after the last doubt had been set at rest.

The fact, too, that were the judges permanent, the appointments would invariably be made from the foremost men of each nation, which would mean from men who had then reached the height of their careers, and perhaps who had already retired from active life, would signify that in a few years age would begin to weigh upon them and they would cease to keep thoroughly in touch with the conditions of the times. If matters were of great moment, the nations concerned would wish the entire court to be com