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posed of the strongest men of the day and often likewise of those most familiar with the general subject of the contention, that were available. This is the chief reason why all of the plans thus far adopted by the Conferences of The Hague have left open the option of choosing judges in other ways.

Inspired by the success in adopting a plan, though still unratified, for the International Prize Court, in 1909, at London, providing that each of the eight great maritime powers should be represented in the court by a member to sit for six years, and the remaining thirty some nations by seven members, to be designated in rotation, efforts are still being made to organize a permanent tribunal to be called the High Court of Justice in which the great powers will have a similar preponderance.

The success of the first undertaking is, however, in no way to be used as a guide in the second. Most of the smaller nations had no navies worthy of the name, hardly expected to have a prize case, and refrained from opposition, not so much because they were indifferent as to what was done, but because they felt that it would be about as impertinent as useless to interfere. When a plan for a court for the determination of differences in general, however, is presented, they are interested and maintain that, large or small, the established unit in international intercourse is an independent nation; and, while the smaller admit that politically they are not equals of the larger, they maintain that there can be no distinction because of size in determining rights; that their rights are as dear to them as are those of a larger nation to it; and that they should be protected by the same rules of impartiality.

Few nations, beyond those that would be preferred,

would accept this plan. If it were thrust upon them, they would probably be obliged to submit to it, but it constitutes one of those matters that will never be settled until rightly settled, and it is unfortunate that it has been introduced when the necessity for it did not exist.

Attention is called to the fact that this idea of inequality in the make-up of the deciding body is a departure from the practice that had been established in international arbitrations. It had never been considered necessary that larger countries should have greater weight in the court. The principle of national equality in judicial matters was furthermore assumed as the only natural one throughout the First Conference of the Hague, and until the Second was well started.

The confidence that the smaller states were enjoying in the fact that the larger ones were recognizing that equality was complete, and constituted one of the fundamental assurances without which a plan involving the surrender by the nations of their customary mode of self-protection could not be realized.

Appeals

Thus far in arbitrations, the necessity of an appellate jurisdiction has not appeared, and there is little reason for its existence. While it is true that courts of higher jurisdiction are not constituted for the purpose of thrashing out the crude masses of litigation that come to the courts of the first instance; that the power of passing upon, and reversing, the decisions of the judges of the lower courts, and of representing a larger territorial jurisdiction, are greater honors, and that the men who are chosen to sit in them are esteemed to be of higher legal attainments, so

that these inducements might suffice to determine men of eminence to accept the positions when they would not care to sit in a court of first instance, as above considered under. A Judicial Court, nevertheless, under the present plan, by which the highest talent could be secured for the arbitration court, a nation should be satisfied with a single decision. It would only be following the example of the English, in confiding their most vital interest, that of passing upon life, to the court of first instance. Permeated with the feeling that the success of the system would depend upon the fairness of the decisions, the arbitrators would have an almost equal incentive to do all that human wisdom could, to give satisfaction.

However, should, by rare chance, some cardinal principle of international right be so disregarded that the precedent might be considered by the nations as a general menace, it would be quite possible for a group of nations to induce the nation in whose favor the decision had been made, to renounce that part of the award, or accept some compensatory satisfaction.

Expense of Appeals

The late Mr. Cramer expressed the opinion at the Boston Congress, that the expense of assembling a Court at The Hague was so great that an amendment to submit cases to Boards of Arbitration in the first instance, and to the Court of The Hague on Appeal, should be made, in order to relieve the smaller countries of such a forbidding condition. Against this argument, and in addition to the reason already given, consideration should not be lost of the fact that the wealthy countries, when not satisfied, would invariably take a second chance, just as wealthy

litigants do in municipal cases, and the small nations would find litigation still more burdensome.

The Sanction of 'Isolation, or Non-Intercourse

The facts that, in international relations, it is the nation that is the delinquent and that the nations are already segregated, are the conditions that make possible this sanction.

It is, in its essence, the only plan of punishment that has survived the test of time, where the individual is the offender: namely, imprisonment; and would be much more effective should the application be against a nation, rather than an individual.

When the offender is an individual, he must be kept on the territory of the government inflicting the punishment, and must, at the latter's expense, be sheltered, nourished and closely confined.

While the idea of imprisoning a whole nation, at first thought, may seem grotesque, for the cost of apprehending and convicting a single wrongdoer has not infrequently embarrassed a whole county financially, the means for doing it are so simple that the cost would be almost inconsiderable. In fact, it would be self-reacting, like jiu jitsu, as the offending nation would almost imprison itself.

Were a nation to be imprisoned, it would be done upon its own territory and without expense for keeping and guarding.

Should its territory be insufficient for self-maintenance, no question of sympathy would arise, as it would have brought the imprisonment upon itself voluntarily and

could terminate it at any time upon complying with the decree.

The nation in default would simply be refused an entrance to the territories of other nations, did it make the attempt to disregard the decree.

Suppose that the condemned nation did send even a fleet of merchantmen to an unprotected port of another nation with the intention of engaging in trade. Imagine its predicament, upon realizing that no person would be allowed to deal, or even to communicate, with it!

Being allowed to retain defenses on its territory, every nation, at small expense and without much provision, could ward off even an invasion, should the condemned nation be so misguided as to attempt it, without having taken years of time to prepare for it, and such preparation could always be effectively forestalled by proceeding against it under the present plan, the moment that it was suspected that the nation was making a start to arm.

Were the plan that simply intercourse between the nations in conflict should stop, no decisive result could be expected as each would have the rest of the world with which to deal and as the nationals of each country whose business would be disturbed would influence their respective governments as much as they could against the measure, and thus render it ineffective. However, were it the joint action of all the nations, the result would be such a tremendous loss to the nation or few nations thus cut off, that the latter would almost certainly comply. It can well be said to be the greatest force of the kind conceivable; for, while it would be working ruin within the nation at fault by cutting off its supply of raw materials and its international intercourse, the proceeding would not be

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