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costing its opponent but, it may be, some loss of trade with the nation isolated, as the opponent would still have all of the other countries with which to deal.

As increased armament gives an increased sense of security in and dependence upon that form of protection, so, on the other hand, a decrease weakens such confidence; and, in a corresponding degree, as it falls off, the effectiveness of this sanction without physical or armed force, increases. The greatest virtue of the Isolation Plan, therefore, would appear when the absence of armament was complete.

Its effectiveness, moreover, is not to be measured by what the belligerent nations in the present war are willing to endure, now that they are angered to the point where they will suffer to almost any extreme rather than to consider possible terms for a cessation of the war, but by what they would determine before reaching that state of mind as to whether they would be warranted in facing the barrier of Isolation set up to keep them from war, rather than to attempt to settle the matter otherwise.

The facts to be established by the Tribunal before inflicting the decree, being dissociated from the questions in contest, and being simply a matter of procedure under the Convention, non-compliance would be a breach of the Convention1 and would hardly elicit sympathy from other nations, as the latter would consider, that being obligated themselves, it behooved the delinquent to fulfill the obligation on its part.

It presents but one inflexible form of punishment, the

'Mr. Balfour, on July 30th, at San Sabastian, is reported to have stated: "We must have an economic blockade *** to apply against a nation which defies the League."

extent and severity of which can be well comprehended; and the duration being only commensurate with the offense, assurance would be had in the certainty of its application.

It is probable that its application would never be made, but that it would simply stand as a possible last resort.

Distinctions

The prototype of this sanction is found in the Continental blockade, especially as it was applied on the Napoleonic side, through the warding off of the British at the line of the Continent by the land forces; but this plan contemplates three great distinctions in its applications:

(1) Its imposition would be systematically and scientifically administered by a body as nearly impartial as could be devised, composed largely of the choice of the offending nation, unless it refused to act, and only after the latter had had an opportunity to be heard.

(2) Its imposition would be made at a time when the offending nation was impotent as to armed force. (3) It would be backed by a moral solidarity.

As to its effectiveness, no comparison can be made. The Continental Blocus was not attempted until the war had assumed its full proportions and was little more than the extension of the ancient practice of cutting off the enemy by siege. Because of the fact that the opposing forces were almost equal, the attempt to apply it at the time that it was done was about as hopeless as would be that to stop some great conflagration in the midst of its course with water; and yet water would suffice, if applied

before much progress had been made. The necessary cooperation, too, was lacking, as it was never doubted by the nations in combination with Napoleon, that his efforts were not primarily for his own aggrandizement.

It has been seen in the present war how serious the effect of shutting off supplies from a nation can be, even when the latter is mightily armed at the start,

It is to be distinguished from a boycott, in that it would be imposed by an impartial body, only after the nation against which it was directed had had an opportunity to be heard, while the boycott is always applied ex parte.

Indorsements of the Isolation Plan

Two of the strongest endorsements, now too many to present, are the following:

The late Justice Brewer stated:

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"Now, if the nations in the coming conference at "The Hague, or in coming conferences, shall agree that any nation which refuses to enter into arbitration "with a nation with which it has a dispute, or which "refuses to abide by the award of the arbitrators "selected in accordance with the provisions of The "Hague Convention, or some other convention, shall "be isolated from all intercourse with and recognition "by any other nation on the face of the earth, can "you imagine any compulsion which would be more "real and peremptory than that?"

* * "there is no nation, however mighty, "that could endure such an isolation, such an out"lawry as that would be. The business interests of "the nation would compel the government to recede

"from its position and no longer remain an outlaw on "the face of the globe."

"Such a procedure would involve no military force, "no bloodshed on the part of the other nations. 66 * The very fact that it was outlawed would "place it in a position where it would have to submit; "it would be compulsion, as real as the compulsion "of a marshal with a writ in his hands." (Report of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Mohonk Lake Conference on International Arbitration [1905], p. 38.) Mr. Carnegie has expressed himself as follows regarding this plan:

"Five nations co-operated in quelling the recent "Chinese disorders and rescuing their representatives "in Pekin. It is perfectly clear that these five nations "could banish war. Suppose even three of them "formed a League of peace,-inviting all other "nations to join-and agreed that since war in any "part of the civilized world affects all nations, and "often seriously, that no nation shall go to war, but "shall refer International disputes to the Hague "Conference or other arbitral body for peaceful settle'ment, the League agreeing to declare non-intercourse with any nation refusing compliance. Imag"ine a nation cut off today from the world."

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"The relations between Britain, France and the "United States today are so close, their aims so simi"lar, their territories and fields of operation so clearly "defined and so different that these Powers might "properly unite in inviting other nations to consider “the question of such a League as has been sketched. "It is a subject well worthy the attention of their

"rulers, for of all the modes of hastening the end of 'war this appears the easiest and the best."

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"it is none the less gratifying to know that there is in "reserve a drastic mode of enforcement, if needed, "which would promptly banish war." (A Rectoral Address delivered to the Students in the University of St. Andrews, 17th of October, 1905, by Andrew Carnegie, Esq., LL. D.)

No Americans have been better qualified to express opinions upon this subject: the one, knowing so intimately the effectiveness of combinations; the other, having had experience as an arbitrator; and both possessed of such a wide acquaintanceship with foreigners, and having given so much study to the subject.

The weight of these opinions should establish the superiority of this plan in the judgment of all, until it can be shown to be defective.

Partial Disarmament, as Long as the Right to Wage War is Recognized, an Impossibility

Were the situations of all nations equal in geographical position, in area, in population, in colonial development, in commercial advantage and in every other respect, the proposition might be maintainable; but how could it be expected, that Great Britain would reduce her navy to the size of that of any other power, when her possessions, much more extensive than her home territory, lie in all of the seas? How would America consider a proposition to limit her naval force to that of France or of Japan, when she is open to attack on one ocean by the one and on another ocean by the other? If America were given a double allotment because of this fact, Germany would

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