12. The function of the body that would administer it would simply be to establish a fact which should be determined in less than a day.

13. The punishment would be so severe, certain and thoroughly known in advance, that no nation would ever allow itself to arrive at a position where it would be condemned to undergo it.

14. General disarmament would afford the necessary assurance that dependence would be placed in the system, which dependence can never be established while any degree of armament is permitted, save, of course, for internal police purposes and the prevention of piracy on the seas. 15. It would necessitate practically no expense. 16. It would make war budgets unnecessary.

17. It would afford the only means for the nations to remain solvent after the great war and avoid internal turmoil.

18. Its adoption could be effected without any change to the organic or constitutional laws of the several nations.

19. General disarmament would accomplish the chief objectives of the opposing sides in the great war: the abolition of British navalism and German militarism: the only objects which can be worth the price of the war. 20. General disarmament would afford the only kind of a peace that would deserve the qualification "perpetual." 21. It could be introduced almost immediately; as a code of international law, which could only be worked out after years of conferring, and so, might be dragged along until differences arose which would make the whole combination impossible - would not be a pre-requisite (although certain fundamental principles should be defined at the outset).

22. It combines also the means by which a few of the Great Powers could force all of the others to disarm and conform to the Convention.

Interdependence

One of the great effects of the war has been to render almost superfluous discussions which otherwise would have continued for years: for instance, those relating to the desirability of some judicial organization for the maintenance of international order, of some force more effective than moral sanction, or public opinion, back of it, and of general disarmament.

Even the advantages of war in fostering a virile race and in unsettling old institutions, whereby new and improved ones may take their places, are no longer upheld, so appalling have been the shocks which the sacrifices of life, health, morals, happiness and property have occasioned.

Attention will fortunately soon turn to the problems of reconstruction in a way that will abolish war.

Confidence, however, in treaties or conventions having for their object the establishment of peace, “perpetual peace," has been so shattered, that it is inconceivable that nations will again go through the form of preparing and executing another one, which, at the same time, will permit of the retention of armaments. No one would consider it genuine; but, should general disarmament be included, even the most incredulous could not fail to regard the instrument with a new respect, if not with a firm belief in its efficacy.

General disarmament, it is recognized, cannot be accomplished, unless there is an effective plan for settling all

disputes without war, and they must be introduced simultaneously.

Under this plan, it is maintained, general disarmament would be possible through the adoption of a compulsory court system (preferably arbitral courts, as explained hereafter); the strongest support conceivable for the courts would be the sanction of isolation; and general disarmament would be the condition that would give the high value to this sanction.

If, therefore, the start could be made with general disarmament, this sanction could be applied before any conflagration would get under way; as the least move of a nation to arm, especially were it in conflict with another, would constitute, in itself, a cause for arbitration, to be followed quickly by a decree of non-intercourse.

Under the present conditions, with arms at hand, recourse to them is the first thought when rights are invaded; because, when passion is aroused, the uncontrollable spirits wish immediately to hurl the most destructive weapon at their foe. Were arms not within reach, a sufficient vent for feelings would be found in marshalling the arguments for a deliberate test of right under rules of logic; and passion itself, at the very instant that it began to well up, would be turned off by the simple reflection that the matter was one to be settled by arbitration and award. Individuals in civilized countries now do this; and there is no reason why nations should not conform to the same practice.

[In order to avoid repetition of the arguments and permit of the grouping of them under their respective heads for convenience in reference, the relationship of the

several features of the plan will not be pursued further at this point.]

The Tribunal

No compulsory system of law is conceivable without an executive power vested in some one. It is to be assumed, too, that the nations are not ready to divest themselves of a portion of their sovereignty by placing it in the hands of a World Emperor, or even a World President. If it were suggested that it be reposed in a joint committee, the same objection would apply. Fortunately, the executive duties under the present plan would be so reduced that they could be performed efficiently by a body of such restricted authority, limited to such a short term of service and constituted with so little concern for the persons who would compose it, that the thought of superiority in connection with the office would hardly enter the mind.

Its functions might be limited to inquiries of three descriptions, namely: (1) The refusal of a nation to arbitrate; (2) The refusal of a nation to comply with the decision of a court of arbitration; and (3) The commission of fraud by an arbitrator. Should an affirmative verdict be found in either the first or second of these cases, it would decree that all intercourse should cease between the offending nation and all others, would publish the decree and maintain it until the nation complied. In the third case, it would try the question of fraud only, and, should it find in the affirmative, it would order a retrial before a new board of arbitration.

This body should undoubtedly be the Court at The Hague, acting through a Tribunal composed of a limited number of the Members other than those who had acted

as arbitrators and nationals of the countries involved in the contest, who might be chosen by striking off names from the entire Roll in rotation, in the order in which the nations interested had entered their appearances in the proceedings at the Court.

This body would have no competency to entertain the questions in dispute; the fact to be established would require no lengthy session, possibly but a short sitting; no special fund would be required to execute the decree; and no nation would be obliged to amend its constitution, or organic law, to permit it to conform with the requirements of the decree.

(Regarding the composition of The Court of The Hague, see below, under Sovereignty.)

Arbitration

The institution of arbitration is taken from experience; it is the only course that has been followed where international differences have been adjudicated; many instances of such action are now recorded; and it has given general satisfaction. Almost never has there been a failure in compliance with an award.

Mr. Leon Bourgeois, the head of the French Delegation to the Second Conference of The Hague, reporting for the Committee on the plan for the establishment of a judicial court, nevertheless first stated (italicized by the writer):

"If there are at present no judges at The Hague, it is because the Conference of 1899, taking into consideration the whole field open to arbitration, intended to leave to the parties the duty of choosing their judges, which choice is essential in all cases of peculiar gravity. We should not like to see the court