discharging of the rain water, and there was no evidence that tended to prove the discharging of water, etc., the jury should have been instructed that the plaintiff could not recover. In actions of this kind the plaintiff must prove the very injury of which he complains. Phillips lays down the general rule in actions of tort to be that "it will be sufficient if part only of the allegations stated in the declaration be proved, provided that what is proved affords a ground for sustaining the action supposing it to have been correctly stated as proved." 1 Phillips Ev. *837. The rule has been applied in this State in Hutchinson v. Granger, 13 Vt. 386, where Redfield, J., says: "He must prove the very injury of which he complains, but not to the full extent;" and in Graves v. Severens, 40 id. 639, a full authority upon this question, where Wilson, J., adds: "In actions of tort for special damage, where the plaintiff 'ties himself up' by framing his declaratian with reference to a recovery on some special ground only, he should not be allowed to go, in evidence of any loss or damage, beyond what is expressly alleged in the declaration." If it had appeared that water had been discharged from the defendant's building upon the plaintiff's land, the law would presume that some damage resulted therefrom, and the plaintiff would have been entitled to nominal damages though no actual damage were proven. Paul v. Slason, 22 Vt. 231; Fullam v. Stearns, 30 id. 443; Cole v. Drew, 44 id. 49. Simonds v. Pollard. Opinion by Royce, J. FINANCIAL LAW. MISTAKE RECOVERED BACK. - PAYMENT BY, WHEN MONEY MAY BE Where the defendant collected from the plaintiff the amount of a draft received by it from another bank for collection, crediting the payment in its account with the latter, which draft was drawn by a paymaster for bounty money, to the order of one D., upon the assistant treasurer of the United States at New York, purporting to be indorsed by him, and was indorsed by the other bank, but not by the defendant, and it was claimed that the fact that D.'s name was a forgery was not discovered by the plaintiff until ten years afterward, and not communicated to the defendant until another year had elapsed; in an action to 'recover the money, held, that the case is clearly one of payment of money under a mutual mistake of fact, and the plaintiff is entitled to recover, there being no allegation or proof of any loss or damage to the defendant, or of any loss of remedy by the defendant against the bank from which the draft was received, by reason of the delay in discovering or communicating information of the mistake. That mere negligence, unattended with such loss or damage, cannot impair the equity of the party paying money under a mutual mistake of fact, to recover it from the other party who received it without giving any consideration therefor. The authorities are to this effect: that negligence in giving information of the mistake to the other party, with resulting loss of remedy over, is a defense, but otherwise not. The doctrine rests on the duty which the party paying owes to the other to shield him as far as possible from loss or damage resulting from the mistake, when he discovers that it is such. If the failure to perform that duty results in loss or damage to the other party, then it is inequitable that he should be obliged to refund. But if that negligence has made no difference to him then it is immaterial. See Kingston Bank v. Ellinge, 40 N. Y. 391; Mayer v. Mayor of New York, 63 id. 455; Pardee v. Fish, 60 id. 271; Union Bank v. Sixth Nat. Bank, 43 id. 456; Bank of Commerce v. Mechanics' Banking Ass'n, 52 id. 213; Continental Nat. Bank v. Nat. Bank Com., 50 id. 575. The rule declared in Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354, which precludes recovery where the mis take consists in the erroneous admission as genuine, by acceptance or payment of a draft where the signature of the drawer was forged, and the cases following it, are now regarded as exceptions to the general rule that negligence in making the payment, even where the matter mistaken was peculiarly within the plaintiff's knowledge, or one as to which he had a duty of inquiry, unattended with damage, does not defeat the action. Allen v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 59 N. Y. 19; and see Welch v. Goodwin, 123 Mass. 71. The cases of counterfeit money rest on a different principle, the theory being that delay must necessarily impair the remedies over of the party from whom the money was received. U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. New York, January, 1881. United States v. National Park Bank of New York. Opinion by Choate, D. J. (7 Fed. Rep. 852.) TITLE TO NEGOTIABLE COUPONS FROM STOLEN BONDS SOLD AFTER DUE TO BONA FIDE PURCHASER -CONFLICT OF LAW. - (1) Bonds of an American railway corporation, with negotiable coupons annexed, belonging to plaintiff, were stolen. Subsequently defendant purchased in Germany a number of the coupons then past due. The purchase was made in good faith without notice and for full value. The coupons were sent to New York for payment. In an action to determine the title to the coupons, held, that plaintiff After their maturity the was entitled to the same. coupons lost the attribute of negotiability, and they dropped into the category of ordinary property, to which title does not pass by mere delivery. The following cases among many illustrate this principle: Vermilye v. Adams Express Co., 21 Wall. 138; Evertson v. Bank of New York, 66 N. Y. 14. Although the taker of stolen coupons in good faith after maturity may get a good title as against the original owner, provided that some person in the chain of title between himself and the true owner had obtained a good title, which has been transmitted to the claimant, Grand Rapids and Indiana R. R. Co. v. Sanders, 54 How. Pr. 214, the burden is upon the purchaser to prove the facts out of which such legal claim arises. The plaintiff's title in this case is made out by showing the fact of original ownership and that the property had been stolen. If they reached the hands of a bona fide purchaser before maturity, through whom the defendant Under the evidence the claims, he must establish it. defendant took title after maturity subject to all the rights and equities of the true owner. Byles on Bills, § 166; Bank v. Green, 43 N. Y. 298; Collins v. Gilbert, 4 Otto, 754. (2) The rights of the parties are to be determined by the law in New York and not by that in Germany where the coupons were bought. Edgerly v. Bush, 81 N. Y. 199. N. Y. Sup. Ct., Spec. Term, Aug. 22, 1881. Wylie v. Speyer. Opinion by Van Vorst, J. USURY - WHERE PRINCIPAL NOT AFFECTED BY AGENT'S.-Chase authorized his agent, Alley, to loan money at the lawful rate of interest. Alley, without the knowledge or consent of Chase, took upon a loan bearing legal interest, made to Acheson, $50, either as a bonus or for his services. Held, that Chase was not responsible for the act of his agent, and the defense of usury could not be set up against him in an action to recover the amount of the loan. Chase took only his lawful per cent, and therefore has not been guilty of usury. Condit v. Baldwin, 21 N. Y. 219; Estevez v. Purdy, 66 id. 446; Rogers v. Buckingham, 33 Conn. 81; Gokey v. Knapp, 44 Iowa, 32; Brigham v. Myers, 1 N. W. Rep. 613; Tyler on Usury, chap. 13, passim. Even though Alley took the $50 for his services rendered to Chase, for which Chase would have been bound to pay, so that in that way Chase received a benefit from the taking, in no way alters the result. The stubborn fact still stands that it was not taken for the loan or forbearance of the money. It is clear that it was not usurious. Eaton v. Alger, 2 Keyes, 41; Thurston v. Cornell, 38 N. Y. 281; Beadle v. Munson, 30 Conn. 175; Smith v. Wolf, 8 N. W. Rep. 429; Tyler on Usury, 132. Minnesota Sup. Ct., Aug. 1, 1881. Acheson v. Chase. RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. CONTRACT -ILLEGAL CONSIDERATION MENT TO COMPOUND CRIME. -A. having been arrested at the instance of B. on the charge of having committed the offense of larceny by a bailee, was brought up before a magistrate and remanded. A.'s wife then induced B. to withdraw from the prosecution on A.'s wife agreeing to charge her separate real estate with the amount taken. The title deeds of the property were deposited at a bank in the joint names of the solicitors of the parties. A. being again brought before the magistrate, the latter, having been informed of the terms, allowed the prosecution to be withdrawn. A.'s wife afterward refused to perform her agreement. B. brought an action to enforce the charge, and A.'s wife counter-claimed for a declaration that she was entitled to have the deeds delivered up to her. Held (affirming the decision of Fry, J., 43 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 192), that the agreement to charge the separate property was illegal and could not be enforced, and that the defendant was entitled to the declaration for delivery of the deeds. Larceny by a bailee is a felony, but if it had been a misdemeanor, the agreement to charge in consideration of the withdrawal of the prosecution would have been void. Williams v. Bayley, 14 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 802; Keir v. Leeman, 3 L. T. Rep. 299, and 7 id. 347; Davis v. Holding, 1 M. & W. 159. Ct. of App., May 14, 1881. Whitmore v. Farley. Opinions by James, Baggalay and Lush, L. JJ. 45 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 99. NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. PENAL CODE OF CALIFORNIA. The Penal Code of California. Enacted in 1872; as amended in 1881. Annotated by Robert Desty, author of "A Compendium of American Criminal Law," Federal Procedure," etc. San Francisco: Sumner, Whitney & Co., 1881. Pp. 836. THIS THIS Code very much resembles our own; indeed, we believe was modeled after it. The present edition is of the "pocket size." The annotations are placed under the respective sections, and are not mere references, but contain succinct statements of the points decided, and embrace all the States and England. We have had occasion to praise Mr. Desty's editorial labor in former instances, and the present looks like a thorough and useful piece of work. Doubtless the book will be useful even to New York lawyers, especially as the Code has been in operation in California so long and has received considerable construction. The book is a nice specimen of printing. CRIMINAL LAW AND PRACTICE OF CALIFORNIA. Criminal Law, Pleading and Practice in the Courts of the State of California. The Penal Code of California, containing all amendments to the close of the twenty-fourth session of the Legislature (March 4, 1881), with the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to Juries, Contempts and Evidence: also an Appendix referring to Statutes containing Penal Clauses. Annotated by Clinton L. White and Wilbur F. George, of the Sacramento Bar. San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft & Company, 1881. Pp. lxvi, 725. This volume is on a similar plan to the preceding, but larger in scope, as the title page shows (although not more copiously annotated), and of the usual octavo size. What we said respecting the probable usefulness of that work to lawyers in this State is applicable to this. The annotations in both are very extensive, although very tersely expressed. Both are remarkable exhibitions of industry in collating authorities, but we very much doubt the scientific propriety of annotating a Code in this way. It cannot be denied however that they are very convenient manuals. This volume is well printed. The index covers 161 pages. LIVERMORE'S TRUSTEES' HANDBOOK. Livermore's Trustees' 'Handbook; A Manual for the use of Trustees, Executors, Administrators, Assignees for the Benefit of Creditors, Receivers, Guardians, and Committees of Lunatics, Idiots and Habitual Drunkards. Containing a brief statement of their powers and duties, rights and liabilities, with practical suggestions and information for their guidance in their management of their trusts generally, and particularly as to matters relating to their accounts, and the settlement of them, upon their application to be discharged. By Rufus P. Livermore, of the New York Bar. New York: L. K. Strouse & Co., 95 Nassau st., 1881. Pp. 103. This is a well printed manual, arranged in sections, with an index. There is much useful and accurate information in it. One of the first things, however, that a trustee ought to be informed of, is whether he has any power to employ a lawyer at the expense of the estate. On this point we look in vain for any information in this manual. This we think is-not an unfair test. At all events the omission is pretty important. Of course we cannot tell, without an examination out of proportion to the importance of the book, whether any other like defects exist in it, but such a discovery as this is apt to cast a gloom over the reviewer's enthusiasm. Cox's TRADE-MARK CASES. A Manual of Trade-mark Cases. Comprising Sebastian's Digest of Trade-mark Cases, covering all the cases reported prior to the year 1879; together with those of a leading character since that time. With Notes and References by Rowland Cox. Boston: Houghton, Miflin & Co., 1881. Pp. xxvi, 478. This book is by the author of the well known work on "The Law of Trade-marks." It is in the form of a digest, the cases being abstracted, and arranged chronologically and numbered (instead of under separate headings), with a very full and excellent index, covering 60 pages, and a table of cases. As a complete digest of trade-mark cases it has a large value for practitioners in this branch of the law, and affords a comfortable assurance that it is a trustworthy guide. More than this it does not purport to be. It is in no sense a treatise. The abstracts seem well constructed. There are some judicious notes by the American editor. The volume is elegantly printed. For sale in Albany by Banks & Bros. BENJAMIN ON SALES. A Treatise on the Law of Sale of Personal Property; with References to the American Decisions and to the French Code and Civil Law. By J. P. Benjamin, Esq., Q. C., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. Third American from latest English Edition. By Edmund H. Bennett. Boston: Houghton, Miflin & Co., 1881. Pp. lxxviii, 980. The reviewer need not measure his words about this work. It is one of the most excellent, successful and celebrated of modern law books, and did much to confer fame and success upon its eminent author. It is universally cited in this country, to which it has been made accessible by the judicious labor of the American editor, and is practically unrivalled in this branch of the law. The first American edition was issued in 1875, the second in 1877. The present edition cites over 1,500 new cases. Very few books are so admirably and copiously annotated as this. It is almost superfluous to say that it is beautifully printed, like every thing issuing from the Riverside Press. BANNING AND ARDEN'S PATENT CASES. Reports of Patent Causes decided in the Circuit Courts of the United States since January 1, 1874. By Hubert A. Banning and Henry Arden, Counsellors at Law. Volume 1. New York: L. K. Strouse & Co., 1881. Pp. xiv, 717. This volume opens a series in continuation of Fisher's Patent Cases. It contains the cases for something above a year, It will undoubtedly prove a great convenience to patent lawyers to have these cases independently reported. The volume has a full index and table of cases reported and cited. It is handsomely printed. It is thought that seven volumes will bring down the cases to date, and thereafter volumes will be published as the cases accumulate. The editorial work seems very well performed. LAWSON ON USAGES AND CUSTOMS. The Law of Usages and Customs, with Illustrative Cases. By John D. Lawson, author of "A Treatise on the Contracts of Common Carriers," etc., etc. St. Louis: F. H. Thomas & Co., 1881. Pp. lxix, 552. Mr. Lawson, well known to the profession by his former editorship of the Central Law Journal, and his recent work on "Contracts of Carriers," has here hit upon a very interesting subject of considerable practical importance. Nothing has ever been published upon the subject, except Mr. Browne's tract. Selecting thirty-three cases as his text, Mr. Lawson has annotated them with great fidelity, exhaustiveness, and discrimination. He divides his subject as follows: On the requisites of their validity; the proof necessary to establish them; their validity and effect in different relations and occupations; their admissibility to explain written and other express contracts; their inadmissibility when in conflict with contracts, statutes or laws. An idea of the amount of labor bestowed on the annotations may be derived from the fact that the table of cases cited covers 53 pages of double columns. The decisions are neatly stated, and grouped and arranged with excellent judgment. The practitioner may feel reasonably sure that nothing has escaped the editor's industrious search, while the intelligence of his treatment is evident on every page. The volume is very neatly and compactly printed. For sale in Albany by Wm. Gould & Son. Judgment affirmed with costs- The Alleghany Oil Co. v. The Bradford Oil Co.; Rider v. Miller; Lexow v. Julian; Schelly v. Diehl. Appeal dismissed without costs- People ex rel. Purvis v. Police Commissioners of New York.· Appeal dismissed with costsFisher v. Raab; Benedict v. Dixon; People ex rel. Long v. Croft. - Order affirmed without costs. (This requires an election for surrogate in New York county this fall) - People ex rel. Rosenkrantz v. Car, Secretary of State. Order granting allowance reversed and judgment modified, by striking out the allowance, and as thus modified affirmed with costs-Platt, Assignee, v. Hunter. -Order affirmed with costs- Ryle v. Falk; Todd v. Botchford.Order of Special and General Term reversed and order of judge vacated with costs of appeal to General Term and to this court -Berdell v. Berdell. Motion denied with $10 costs-Knapp v. Francis. The court adjourned until November 21. THE NOTES. HE October number of the American Law Register contains a leading article on Preferred Stock, by John D. Lawson. Also the following cases in full: Pennsylvania Lead Company's Appeal, on nuisance by lead smelting, with note by Henry Wade Rogers; Harris v. Carmody, on duress, note given by father under threat to prosecute son; with note by Marshall D. Ewell; Stillman v. Stillman, on forfeiture of alimony by remarriage; with note by Mr. Ewell; Evansville Gas Light Co. v. State, on merger of mortgage by judgment of foreclosure; with note by W. W. Thornton. We have received from F. D. Liun & Co., of Jersey City, the Life of Lord Campbell, consisting of his autobiography, journals and letters, edited by his daughter, the Hon. Mrs. Hardcastle; and from Little, Brown & Co., of Boston, "The Theory of our National Existence, as shown by the action of the Government of the United States since 1861, by John C. Hurd, LL. D., author of the Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United States." We shall endeavor at an early day to review these interesting works with the care which they deserve. The people of Connecticut have adopted a Constitutional amendment providing that judges of the Supreme and Superior courts shall be nominated to the Legislature by the governor, instead of by party caucuses. -Governor Cornell has appointed Mr. Horace Russell to fill the vacancy on the bench of the Superior Court of the city of New York, caused by the death of Judge Sanford. He sat on the same bench by appointment last year, and was defeated at the election last fall by a comparatively small majority. He is a thoroughly competent man. WHY DO LAWS INCREASE? There is nothing new under the sun, said the wise man. We were amused, the other day, in view of the loud complaint that goes up about excessive legislation, and excessive opinionwriting, and reporting, to find the following, uttered as long ago as in a note to Twyne's case, from 3 Coke, 80 (1 Sm. Lead. Cas. 1), "Why do laws increase?" and the answer is given, thus: Quæritus, ut crescunt tot magna volumina legis? Ask thou, why in such swelling volume laws do flow? In Brown v. San Francisco Gas Light Co., the California Supreme Court have just held, that "in the absence of a showing to the contrary, the law of a foreign State will be presumed to be the same as our own." This is a very broad statement. Rorer, in his recent treatise on Inter-State Law, lays it down as a rule that the above is true only as to "common law of another State." "But this presumption," says he, "does not extend generally to statute laws, or laws of a penal nature, or embodying strict provisions of forfeitures against usury." Rorer's Inter-State Law, 122. In an able article on this subject by the editor of the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL, September 10, 1881, this same conclusion is reached: "There is no doubt of the general doctrine that in the absence of proof, the common law will be presumed to prevaii in other jurisdictions. It is sometimes said that the law of the forum will be presumed to prevail. But we think this remark must be limited to common law doctrines, and cannot be applied to statutory provisions." The Supreme Court of Michigan, 19 Mich. 186, say: "We certainly cannot presume that the Legislature of another State has adopted all of our statutes, and therefore we must have proof, before we can show that they have passed any statute."-Pacific Coast Law Journal. The Albany ALBANY, NOVEMBER 12, 1881. CURRENT TOPICS. It seems for city judge out of office. There was T seems the hardest thing in the world to get a Surrogate Calvin, who tried to hold over for another year by construction, and now here is Judge Spier, who has been trying to hold over for two years, by misconstruction. We intimated pretty strongly some time ago (23 Alb. L. Jour. 462) that when the judge certified in 1874 that he was then 61 years old, and that his term would expire December 31, 1882, he knew better about it than anybody else. It seems we were mistaken. Of course we admit that his parents knew still better. The judge's parents being pious people committed the record of his age to the family Bible, and this book, after some search, having been lately discovered, reveals an entry that the judge and an accompanying brother were born on the 10th of September, 1810. The judge, unlike Col. Ingersoll, acknowledges the authority of the Holy Scriptures; and so to speak, being knocked out of time, throws up the sponge. He files his resignation, to take effect on the first of January next. To make things exactly right, ought he not to have filed it now to take effect the first of last January?—so far at least as the salary is concerned? How he became so mixed up we cannot exactly see. Possibly as there were two at his advent he grew to believe that the other ought to have preceded him two years, and that it would be only fair to distribute the numbers over a convenient and usual space of time. But at all events the result shows the danger of not having the family Bible at hand, and exhibits a laudable example of submitting to the decrees of that most excellent book. His resignation was not filed three months before election, so that the customary notice could not be given, but the election will be held all the same. The following paragraph has been the rounds: "Chief Justice Waite, in a recent letter, expresses the opinion that there are no more good law schools in this country than are necessary. "The time has gone by,' he says, 'when an eminent lawyer in full practice could take a class of students into his office and become their teacher. Once that was practicable, but now it is not. The consequence is that law schools are now a necessity.' This sounded like very good sense, and we were consequently surprised to see the following in the Albany Express: "Chief Justice Waite would not be popular in Albany. He thinks small beer of law schools, and has put forward the opinion that there are many more in this country than are necessary. This latter statement is doubtless true. Being more law schools than are necessary there is consequently a surplus of lawyers. Every male child who manifests a disposition to wrangle with all with whom VOL. 24.- No. 20. he comes in contact, and expands with years into the powerful debater of a college literary society, is believed by his misguided parents to possess qualifications which peculiarly fit him for the legal profession. The natural result of this policy has been to flood the country with a horde of blatant young men who secure a precarious and not altogether creditable subsistence from the petty litigation into which the members of certain classes are continually being drawn. If the lawyers of this country, says the Chicago Tribune, were reduced in numbers one-half, and in self-importance ninetenths, life on the Western continent would be fully as agreeable as it is at present. It is equally true of the East. And again, what a waste of time and money for many young men. There are in the city to-day a dozen young men graduates of the Albany Law School who are engaged in some mercantile or other business or looking for something to dothey have found the law a falilure." We thought, what is the trouble with the Express and Tribune? If they have been sued lately, of course they think there are too many lawyers by half. These silly utterances are usually from unsuccessful lawyers and rejected candidates for admission. The law of supply and demand regulates the matter, just as it does with the editors. No man is the worse for a legal education - it would not hurt the Express and Tribune a bit and many young men go through law school with no intention of following the profession. There is no "waste of time or money" in this. As for the chief justice, we are authorized by him to say, that he thinks he wrote the letter above attributed to him- which the Express misconstrues—and he adds, "I certainly agree to what is there said." So here is a difference of opinion between the chief justice and the Express man. Which will yield? And who knows the better? Saucy editors Albany Express and Chicago Tribune, take notice — cannot abuse us lawyers with impunity. Thus in Ludwig v. Cramer, Wisconsin Supreme Court, October 18, 1881, 10 N. W. Rep. 81, the defendants, proprietors of the Evening Wisconsin, a Milwaukee newspaper, had published of the plaintiffs, lawyers of that city, that in procuring a client to plead guilty and sign an order for their fees, they had "betrayed and sold innocence in a court of justice," and that they ought “to be held up to the world as derelict in their sense of honor and obligation unworthy of trust and confidence, and to be shunned and avoided." This was held actionable, the court thinking that even lawyers have some rights which editors are bound to respect. It was also held that the publication was not privileged as a report of a proceeding.in a court of justice. The Maine Supreme Court, in Wright v. Wheeler, 72 Me. 278, passed on a curious point. The action was on a note, and the defense was that the note was given for spirituous liquors sold in violation of law. The payee's name being William Smith, evi dence was offered to show that he was generally called and known as "Whisky Smith" or "Whisky Bill Smith." This was offered as tending to show that the holder knew or had notice of the illegal consideration when he acquired the note. Counsel argued: "Whisky' Smith indicated the business of the payee of the note in suit, the same as 'Lawyer' Wright and 'Lawyer' Folsom indicates the business of the counsel in this case." But the court thought not so, saying: "The prefix to Smith's name indicated the drinking rather than the selling of liquor." The ruling is right, but the reason is doubtful. Suppose it had been "Benzine Smith," would that have indicated the drinking rather than the selling of benzine? which very thirsty men have been known to drink. The true reason is, the use of the nickname did not carry notice that the note was given for liquors at all. It might have been given for pew rent. The 83rd volume of New York Reports contains three cases of historical interest to citizens of our State. Two of them recall the flagrant days of the Tweed regime. One of these is People ex rel. Phelps v. The Court of Oyer and Terminer of the County of New York, page 436. This is a review of 'the famous Genet case, where the defendant had been convicted of obtaining by false pretenses the signature of the mayor to a warrant. The argu 66 ment of the appeal was for years postponed by the voluntary absence" of the defendant. (See 59 'N. Y. 80; S. C., 17 Am. Rep. 315.) Returning at length, the conviction was affirmed, and he is suffering the penalty. The opinion is pronounced by Judge Finch, and shows that he can write as well on questions of fact as on questions of law. It is in every way admirable. The other of these two is Douglas v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., page 492, an action on a policy of insurance on the life of William M. Tweed. The policy was to be void if the insured should "travel upon the seas " without the previous consent of the company. Mr. Tweed "voluntarily absented" himself from the Ludlow street jail, or rather from a carriage in which the deputy sheriff was mercifully giving him an airing, and went to Vigo, Spain. He was too much in a hurry to get the consent of the company. The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Earl, affirmed the judgment for the defendant. (By the way, it is quite refreshing to see this persecuted corporation successful in one suit. Their name is frequent in our reports, and never until now, that we can remember, in a way that commends them to public approval.) The third case is Van Giessen v. Bridgford, page 348, and consists in an attempt to administer on the estate of the famous Anneke Jantz Bogardus, with an ulterior view to getting the Trinity church landed possessions in the city of New York. The court, Judge Andrews delivering the opinion, affirm the order of Surrogate Rogers, of this county, denying the application. The "assets" were a family Bible and a pair of gold earrings, said to belong to Anneke — going to show that she was a true woman-pious and fond of gauds. There was no evidence of her ownership but tradition, and there was no proof that her estate had not been administered upon. The court held that the lapse of time, and the fact that there was a probate court in New Netherlands at the date of Anneke's death, afforded a strong presumption of administration in spite of the absence of records; and that the tradition of ownership was consistent with the supposition that she had disposed of the articles before her death. Anneke's Bible did not prove so potent as that of the Spier family. In this connection Judge Andrews pays a merited compliment "to the very learned and valuable monograph of Chief Justice Daly, of the New York Common Pleas, prefixed to 1st E. D. Smith's Reports," giving a history of the courts of that day. The indications at this writing are that on Tuesday last the Republican nominees for judge of the Court of Appeals and attorney-general, Judge Finch and Judge Russell, were elected. This is based on the supposition that the Republican candidate for Secretary of State is elected, and that the other nominees have run about as well. It is not certain, however, and may not be for a day or two. It is therefore too early to congratulate anybody on being elected or on being defeated.--Chief Judge Folger has bidden farewell to his townsfolk of Geneva, and disclosed to them the correspondence showing that the late president tendered him the office of attorney-general, and in an unnamed contingency, the secretaryship of the treasury. NOTES OF CASES. N Smith v. Easton, 54 Md. 138, it is held that a dence without proof of the handwriting of the original and of its delivery for transmission. This was an action to enforce an agreement by telegraph to indorse. The court said: "The message, if any, sent by James T. Easton to that office, to be transmitted to Chesapeake City, was the original (Scott & Jarnagin, Law of Tel., § 357, and authorities there cited), and not the message which was received over the wires at Chesapeake City. The latter must be considered as a copy (id., § 361), and carries with it none of the qualities of primary evidence. Ordinarily the usual course is to show the delivery of the original message of the party, sought to be charged, at the office from which it is to be telegraphed, and then show that it was transmitted and delivered at the place of its destination. But even where the original is produced its authenticity must be established, and this either by proof of the handwriting, or by other proof establishing its genuineness. The destruction of all the messages sent from the office, on the day named, is sufficient foundation for the admissibility of secondary evidence. But this secondary evidence can only be admitted upon proof that the copy offered is a correct transcript of a message actually authorized by the party sought to be affected by its con |