ing his rights under the subsequent one, and that he might foreclose the first mortgage. Held, that the action was not maintainable. C., when he discovered that there was a mortgage held by S., had two courses open to him, first, to apply to have the record vacated and his first mortgage restored; second, to rely upon the second mortgage he had received from L. He chose the latter course, and did it knowing all the facts. He sold under his second mortgage, took the title to himself, assuming it was a valid sale, brought his action and recovered the balance due on the note, deducting the sum for which he bought the premises. Finding that S. proposed to rely on her legal rights, he seeks the relief of a court of equity on the ground that he has made a mistake. The position he finds himself in is one of his own choosing and taken with full knowledge of all the facts; and he is not entitled to the relief he seeks. Shotwell v. Murray, 1 Johns. Ch. 512; Storrs v. Barker, 6 id. 166; Thomas v. Bartow, 48 N. Y. 193; Banto v. Garmo, 1 Sand. Ch. 383; 1 Story Eq., § 138. See, also, Bruce v. Bonney, 12 Gray, 507; Hutchinson v. Swartsweller, 31 N. J. Eq. 205. Childs v. Stoddard. Opinion by Endicott, J. INSURANCE LAW. FIRE POLICY-ON VESSEL DOES NOT COVER LIABILITY FOR GENERAL AVERAGE. — The appellee insurance company issued its policy of insurance to the appellant to indemnify it for loss by fire on its steamer George Appold. On the 20th October, 1877, while the steamer was loading at the port of Savannah, a fire was discovered in a cargo of cotton stored in its forehold, and to save the steamer and cargo from destruction the vessel was submerged. The damages to the vessel were estimated at $2,500, and to the cargo at $10,500. The steamer was insured by other fire insurance companies besides the appellee. The cargo was insured under marine policies. The damage to the cargo was adjusted by general average at the port of Baltimore, and a proportion of this loss was assessed upon the steamer. The appellant sued the appellee to recover not only the sum found to be the actual loss inflicted on the steamer by the fire, but also the general average assessment upon the vessel, as an immediate consequence of the fire. The appellee and the other fire insurance companies tendered themselves ready to pay the amount of the actual damage to the steamer but denied the appellant's right to recover for the general average loss upon the cargo, as a risk not within the terms of the policy. Held, that the appellant was not entitled to recover the general average assessment upon the steamer for loss upon the cargo. The insurer of a stock of goods may be liable for damages caused by water, although the water was used to extinguish a fire upon the house in which such goods are stored. And upon the same principle it has been held that the insurer of a house is liable for its destruction, when such destruction was absolutely necessary to arrest the progress of a fire in a city. City Fire Ins. Co. v. Corlies, 21 Wend. 367; Wetherall v. Marine Ins. Co., 49 Me. 200; Geisek v. Crescent Mutual Ins. Co., 19 La. Ann. 297; Hillier v. Allegheny Co. Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Penn. 470; Thompson v. Montreal Ins. Co., 6 U. C., Q. B. 319. In these and other like cases, the law presumes that the parties, from the very nature of things, must have contemplated the natural and physical consequences resulting from the peril insured against. So in this case, the appellee is not only liable for the damages to the ship from actual combustion, but also for damages to the vessel resulting directly from the means used to extinguish the fire. But the liability of the insurer arising in cases where the peril insured against has been the proximate cause of the loss has never been held to cover damages to other property not insured by the policy. General average is a contribution by all the parties in a sea adventure, to a loss suffered for the common benefit of all. In such cases, where any sacrifice is deliberately and voluntarily made, or any expense is fairly and bona fide incurred, to prevent total loss, or some greater disaster, it is but just and right that the sacrifice or expense should be borne relatively by the owner of the ship, freight and cargo, to the end that the loss may fall equally upon all the parties in interest. Birkley v. Presgrave, 1 East, 228; Hallett v. Wigram, 9 C. B. 580; Fletcher v. Alexander, 37 L. J. (C. P.) 196; L. R., 3 C. P. 380. For risks thus assumed, and which may be said to be coextensive with the perils of the sea-embracing general average, salvage, and abandonment, the insured pays a premium more than five times greater than the premium against loss by fire alone. The policy sued on in this case limits the liability of the appellee to losses to the steamer itself by fire, and upon such a policy the appellant is not entitled, either upon principle or upon authority, to recover the amount which under the law of general average he was obliged, as owner of the vessel, to contribute to the cargo, even though the damages to the cargo were occasioned by the means used to extinguish the fire in the vessel. Maryland Court of Appeals, March 30, 1880. Merchants and Miners' Transportation Co. v. Associated Fireman's Insurance Co. Opinion by Robinson, J. (53 Md. 448.) WARRANTY-AGREEMENT TO USE SPECIFIC OILS NOT BROKEN BY TRIFLING VARIATION. It was stated upon the form of application for insurance, and provided in the policy, that such application was a part of the contract, and a warranty on the part of the insured; and by such application he agreed to use only lard and sperm oil for lubricating in the mill insured, and also stated that there was a forcing 'pump on the premises, designed expressly for extinguishing fires, and agreed to have it at all times in condition for use, with a proper supply of good hose on hand. Held, that these were promissory warranties, in the nature of conditions subsequent. While a trifling departure from the letter of such a condition, a merely technical breach, or (probably) an accidental or involuntary failure to perform the condition, not sanctioned by or known to the insured, and which did not increase the risk, would not be held to defeat the policy, yet any substantial breach would defeat it. If the insured in this case, in the usual course of business, ordered lard and sperm oil for lubricating purposes, and believed that they obtained and were using such oil, and if the oil used contained lard and sperm oil, and though compounded with a product of petroleum, was as good and safe as lard and sperm oil, there was no substantial breach of the condition concerning lubricators. Wisconsin Supreme Court, Feb. 8, 1881. Copp v. German-American Insurance Co. Opinion by Lyon, J. MARINE POLICY -PAROL EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE TO EXPLAIN INSURANCE PROCURED BY AGENT OF UN DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL. (1) Parol evidence is admissible to ascertain the parties intended to be insured by a written insurance contract, although on the face of the contract there is no ambiguity concerning the same. (2) The Citizens' Insurance Company, a corporation of Indiana, doing an insurance business at Evansville, in that State, issued an open policy, No. 38, to its own agents, Drew & Bennett, at Evansville, to cover all risks indorsed thereon, or certified in insurance slips to be covered thereby. It appointed Hudson & Bro., of Ohio, to solicit and obtain risks for it in the latter State, and to avoid the laws of that State in relation to foreign insurance companies doing business in the State, issued slips to Hudson & Bro. covering such property, under the policy No. 38, issued to its agents at Evansville, as Hudson & Bro. might agree to insure. Hudson & Bro. obtained a risk from the referred to: Fox v. Hawkes 42 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 622; Grant v. Grant, 3 Beav. 623; Richardson v. Richardson, L. R., 3 Eq. 686; Morgan v. Mallison, 23 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 336. Ch. Div., April 2, 1881. Re BreBreton v. Woolven. Opinion by Hall, V. C. 44 ton. NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. BISHOP ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE. Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce, with the Evidence, Practice, Pleadings and Forms; also of Separations without Divorce, and of the Evidence of Marriage in all issues. By Joel Prentiss Bishop. Sixth edition, revised and enlarged. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1881. Two vols. Pp. xxxi, 723; ix, 753. plaintiff, Daniels, of $2,500 upon 2,500 bushels of salt, RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. THE HE first edition of this great work was published in 1852, the fifth in 1873. The author states that the present cites 2,315 cases additional to the fifth edition, in which 4,032 were cited. A work which is standard after the lapse of a generation, dispenses with praise and defies criticism. Mr. Bishop is perhaps the most original and independent, and certainly one of the most influential, writers who have shed light on our jurisprudence. The present work is perhaps his very best, certainly his most authoritative and influential. The practitioner might as well try to do without it as to get across Styx without Charon. Mr. Bishop is sometimes a blunt and opinionated guide, but after all The book is elehe is a guide, and not a blind one. gantly printed. Let no one fail to read Mr. Bishop's "Introductions." In fact it is not wise to omit reading any thing that he has ever written. WILLIAMSON'S STATE LAWS RELATING TO WILLS. A Synopsis of the Testamentary Laws of all the States and CRIMINAL LAW -TRIAL- CUMULATIVE SENTENCE VALID. - The appellant was indicted for perjury; the indictment contained two counts, the first alleging perjury committed on the trial of an action of ejectment in 1871, the second alleging perjury committed in some proceedings in chancery in 1868. The assign- This ought to be a useful pocket volume. It is based ments of perjury in the two counts were not identical, on a series of eighteen questions, which are separately but the object of the proceedings in 1868 and in 1871 answered by competent lawyers of the several States was the same, namely, to establish the appellant's right and Territories. But to show how unreliable, after all, to certain landed estates. The jury found a general such compendiums must be, take the 18th question and verdict of guilty upon both counts of the indictment, answer addressed to this State: Must devises or beand the appellant was thereupon 'sentenced to seven quests to persons or bodies politic, for charitable or years' penal servitude upon each count, the second religious uses, be made a definite time before death?" term to commence upon the expiration of the first term. Instead of answering this, the book has the following: Held (affirming the judgment of the court below), that "A devise or bequest for charitable or religious uses such a sentence might be lawfully passed, although the by a person having a husband, wife, child, or parent, is statute (2 Geo. 2, chap. 25, § 2, as amended by the sub-good only to the extent of one-half the estate." This sequent acts), makes seven years' penal servitude the is true, and should be added to the direct answer to maximum punishment for a single perjury. Held, fur- the question, which ought to be: "Yes, two months." ther, that the statute of George 2 does not require the See Lefevre v. Lefevre, 59 N. Y. 434, 449. infliction of a common-law punishment in addition to that prescribed by the statute. Cases referred to: Regina v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527; Rex v. Robinson, 1 Mood. C. C. 413; Tweed v. Lipscombe, 60 N. Y. 559; Young v. The King, 3 T. Rep. 98; Rex v. Jones, 2 Campb. 131; Rex v. Kingston, 5 East, 41. House of Lords, March 11, 1881. Castro v. The Queen. Opinion by Lord Chan. Selborne, Lord Blackburn and Lord Watson, 44 T. Rep. (N. S.) 350. BENEDIKT ON BRAINS OF CRIMINALS. Anatomical Studies upon Brains of Criminals. A contribution to Anthropology, Medicine, Jurisprudence and Psychology. By Moriz Benedikt, Professor at Vienna. Translated from the German, by E. P. Fowler, M. D., New York, Department of Translation New York Medico-Chirurgical Society. New York: Wm Wood & Co., 1881. Pp. xvi, 17-185. The conclusion of this book is thus expressed by the author: "It is self-evident that the observations here collected are the result of an a priori conviction that the constitutional criminal is a burdened individual; that he has the same relation to crime as his next blood GIFT WORDS IMPORTING INTENTION TO MAKE, DO NOT RAISE A TRUST. - Words importing a present intention on the part of a husband to make a gift to his wife cannot be held to operate as a declaration of trust. There is no difference in this respect between an intended gift to a wife and an intended gift to a stran-kin, the epileptic, and his cousin, the idiot, have to ger. Richards v. Delbridge, L. Rep. 18 Eq. 11, followed; Baddeley v. Baddeley, 38 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 906; L. Rep., 9 Ch. Div. 113, [not followed. Other cases their encephalopathic condition and its results. Even in these this incumbrance does not signify actual disease, but a predisposition to it only." The book is supplied with a large number of cuts of the brains of criminals, with measurements, observations, and comparisons, but is written in a purely technical phraseology, so as to be almost unintelligible to the unprofessional reader. Doubtless it will be of great interest to the medical profession. It is disfigured by a little of the angry personalities which are apparently inevitable among German scientific inquirers. But we agree with the author, that "for the criminalist it is necessary that their heads should not be hollow." CORRESPONDENCE. A CORRECTION. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: In your last issue, in your comments on the case of Stewart v. Shannon, Executrix, etc., you say that "His services were rendered during a period of four months." The complaint said thirteen months. While the verdict was larger than we anticipated, the jury did not so clearly break away from all our ordinary ideas of the value of a lawyer's services, as your comments would indicate. People are already sufficiently impressed with "the millions" there are in the practice of law, but if they should ever get an idea that even great big fellows can get $178.50 a day and that by the verdict of a jury, the distress and discomfort it would cause some is so appalling, that it might be well to make a note of this correction. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: In speaking of the rule which, in criminal cases, requires the court, before sentence, to ask the prisoner whether he has any thing to say, you omit to cite Messner v. People, 45 N. Y. 1. There the Court of Ap peals held, that unless the record showed that this question had been put, the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Judg) Allen thought that the proceedings should be remitted, to give judgment on the conviction. Judge Peckham, in a very sound dissenting opinion, thought that the ceremony was utterly useless, as it undoubtedly is. There is really no possible use in putting this question. And the decision of the Connecticut court, that its omission is not error, is very full of good sense. It is to be regretted that such is not the law here. M. NOTES. THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL very properly condemns the practice of giving banquets to the judges, or any of the officers of the courts, in whom reside any discretionary power whatever. We desire to add our hearty approval of such condemnation. While very many judges re beyond the reach of any influence other than that exercised by strict justice and precedent, it must be confessed that very many are not so exempt; and while the social amenities of professional life are pleasantly fostered by banquets and other social conventions in honor of individuals, still the gain hardly compensates for the risks taken, either that weak judges be influenced or strong ones degraded to even a position where suspicion may attach to the purity of their motives. We have heard of a judge sitting upon an Ohio woolsack to whom some of the members of the bar presented a house and lot. We have also heard that these same members, or some of them, have obtained, and can obtain, some of the most extraordinary orders and rulings, and that their great success and consequent easy circumstances depend, not upon their ability as lawyers, but upon the important fact that they contributed largely to the "Fund." Be this as it may, it is very certain that a judge, who lacks the independence to refuse a gift, will lack the nerve to refuse any favor the giver may demand. Ohio Jaw Journal. Mr. Seward, in his Autobiography, gives the following account of his first case in court: "My début at Auburn obtained for me a reputation which, though I was thankful for it at the time, I had no reason to be proud of. A convict discharged from the State prison there in the morning was warned to leave the town immediately. Reaching the suburb, he discovered an open door, entered it, and proceeded to rifle a bureau. Taking alarm, he rushed out, carrying with him only a few valueless rags. He was indicted for this petty larceny, which, being a second offense, was punishable with a new term in the State prison. I was assigned by the court to the defense of the unfortunate wretch. The theft and the detection were completely proved. The stolen articles lay on the table. The indictment described thom as one quilted holder of the value of six cents,' and 'one piece of calico of the value of six cents.' I called upon a tailor as an expert, who testified that the holder was sewed, not 'quilted,' and that the other article was white jean, and not 'calico' at all. The bystanders showed deep interest in the argument which the defense produced, and were gratified when they found that the culprit escaped a punishment which they thought would be too severe for the transgression." Legal oratory is sui generis, but eminent pleaders have always observed one rule which is inculcated by all writers upon oratory in general, namely, "say what you have to say and then sit down." In this Province, as elsewhere, no doubt, garrulous, voluble lawyers abound; not, we should say, in the higher ranks of the profession, but among the inferior members whose appearance in court is rather infrequent. Some lawyers imagine that an argument to be powerful must be lengthy, and a greater mistake was never made. Tacitus in his De oratore refers to a practice which obtained under the Roman emperors of limiting the speeches of advocates to two hour-glasses in certain cases and to a half glass in other cases, a custom which now prevails in many courts, and notably in the New York Court of Appeals, where the addresses of counsel are limited to one hour.* It is quite possible that such rules may at times work injustice, but a court should at least be allowed to exercise a certain discretion to limit the tedious harangues of longwinded practitioners. When one hears that a Montreal lawyer, whose most famous achievement is a speech of two hours on a motion in the Circuit Court, lately blocked the business of the Court of Appeals by speaking for over a day and a half in a comparatively unimportant case, one is inclined to censure the tribunal which permitted such an outrage quite as much as the lawyer who perpetrated it. With printed evidence and a well-prepared factum there can possibly be no necessity for any such infliction; and if the court had peremptorily ordered the orator to desist, it would have given great satisfaction to those of the profession whose business was delayed in consequence, and have proved a salutary warning to others disposed to lengthy speeches. The fact that such an occurrence is the exception at the Montreal bar is our excuse for referring to it.-Montreal Star. *Two hours is the limit, but more than one is rarely taken. -ED. ALB. L. J. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, JULY 16, 1881. CURRENT TOPICS. kind. One enterprising journalist has discovered that the district attorney has high hopes of giving Guiteau a double punishment by construing the two shots as two different and separate assaults! This is either a very imaginative journalist or a very sanguine public prosecutor. If Guiteau had struck the President twenty blows with his fist, that, forsooth, THE question whether Guiteau is insane is likely would have constituted twenty independent assaults and batteries; or if he had stabbed him twenty to prove a very interesting one when it comes to be passed upon in court. There can be no doubt that he is of weak and eccentric mind; that he is a most accomplished office-seeker, dead-beat and impostor; that he is possessed of an unparalleled impudence and egotism. In these respects however he only exceeds many other professional impostors and office-hunters. In the history of his life, so far as it has been disclosed, up to the time of his crowning villany, there seems to be nothing indicating that his intellect was so disordered that he could not tell right from wrong, and was not responsible for the commission of a criminal offense. When the circumstances of the attempted assassination are considered, the matter becomes more doubtful. In favor of his insanity is the apparent absence of adequate motive. He has been described as a disappointed and angry office-hunter, but there seems no proof that he was either disappointed or angry. He does not seem to have complained of his failure to get office, at least, he seems not to have expressed any great degree of anger about it, and toward the President he expresses no malice, but only kindness and sympathy, and avows that his deed is intended to bring about a change of ad-parently a very necessary man in commerce, and Senministration and for the political good of the country. He expresses great sympathy for the wife of his intended victim, and avows that he is directed of Heaven, and carrying out the decree of God. He commits the act publicly, with calmness and firmness. Add to this that he did not attempt to escape. Great stress will justly be laid on these latter circumstances. It was quite possible for him to have done the deed secretly and to have escaped, at least, temporarily. All this however is not inconsistent with a capacity to judge between right and wrong. And here come in two very significant circumstances. He made his preparations in the expectation of going to jail, and he evinced fear of being lynched. This would indicate that he was conscious that he was committing an act that was held morally wrong and for which he was likely to be punished. It is evident from this recital, that if he had committed the assault upon an ordinary individual, in revenge for the seduction of his wife, daughter, or sister, a jury would have no hesitation in finding him as mad as a March hare. But an unprovoked assault upon the President is a very different thing in the public mind. The man and the deed and the state of mind are the same, but "circumstanes alter cases," in practice. ator Robertson will be in party patronage, by virtue of his appointment as collector of the port of New York; but would an assault upon either of them be any more heinous than upon one of Mr. Vanderbilt's brakemen, or one of Senator Robertson's baggage-searchers? Is General Hancock's life any less sacred or important in a moral view than General Garfield's because General Garfield got a few more votes for the presidency? God recognizes no sacred or necessary men. Capital punishment should never be inflicted simply to satisfy an outraged public sentiment of affection or reverence, or to deter men from putting the public to inconvenience. It would be absurd, for example, to punish a libel on the President more severely than a libel on a common citizen. One murder is no worse than another, although one may be attended by a more wide-spread regret and abhorrence than another. Meanwhile our good President hangs between life and death, and the prayers of all classes of men go up constantly for his recovery. Last The Richmond Dispatch publishes a letter from Judge Hughes in answer to Senator Ingalls' circular of inquiries concerning a bankrupt act. week we published Senator Ingalls' circular, with a correspondent's answers. Judge Hughes favors a National Bankrupt Act, but he would have an en So great is the public anger and terror that the air is full of ridiculous suggestions for the punish-tirely different scheme of practice from that under ment of this crime and future crimes of the same VOL. 24.- No. 3. the recent acts. He answers the specific inquiries It more nearly have suited the circumstances. would be just as reasonable to argue that our Saviour meant book-keepers, accountants, and copyists, when he said, "woe unto you, scribes!" The revisers would have done well to find another word for "lawyers." It is noteworthy, by the way, that this same lawyers' church has the largest average attendance of any of the churches or chapels in the city of London proper, except St. Paul's. There are only about eighty churches and chapels in the corporation limits, and the average attendance on each is about 152. St. Paul's has 1,950, and the Temple church has 650. This shows well for the lawyers. In another column is the opinion of the General Term of the Supreme Court of the First Departbe instituted in New York city before a justice of ment, holding that supplementary proceedings may the Supreme Court, under section 2434 of the Code. In answer to a correspondent some time ago we expressed the same view. Indeed, we were then, as the court are now, "at a loss to see any difficulty in ascertaining the true sense and intention of this section." There seems to be hardly a debatable question about it. But it is this sort of quibbling that gives currency to the idea that it is very difficult to codify the law. as follows: "1. To the first I answer that the officers ought not to be compensated by salaries, but by fees which should be such as are now fixed by law for services of officials rendered in chancery proceedings. 2. To the second I answer that there should be no such officer as register in bankruptcy, and that if there be one, his powers should be reduced. If instead of a register, a commissioner in chancery be directed to be appointed in each case by the court, his powers should be such as are now conferred by law upon master commissioners in chancery. 3. To the third I answer that the amount of indebtedness necessary to bankruptcy should be increased to five hundred dollars at least. 4. To the fourth I answer that I think composition settlements should be continued; but that every settlement should be subject, in every feature, to the scrutiny and approval of the court. 5. To the fifth I answer that I think a liberal discretion ought to be intrusted to the courts in the matter of the discharge of bankrupts, subject, however, to limitations carefully prescribed by law." He also says: "The District Courts should, as to proceedings in bankruptcy, be constituted courts of chancery, and bankruptcy proceedings in them should be required by law to be conducted according to the forms and rules of the ordinary chancery practice. The proceeding in each case would thereby become a proceeding by General Creditors' Bill,' modified by such rules of law or of court as might be deemed or found to be expedient. Every step in each case should be taken under the direct, responsible supervision of the court in which it was pending," etc. It will be seen that he differs in toto from our correspondent. We must say we decidedly prefer our correspondent's views, both on principle and for practice. It seems to us a conclusive objection to Judge Hughes' scheme that the district judges have no time for this additional burden. He acknowledges that it would "devolve considerable more labor" upon them than the old system, but he thinks they are equal to it. We entirely differ from him. The idea of saddling these proceedings with an intricate and tedious chancery practice seems to us perfectly intolerable. Judge Hughes thinks also that the exemptions ought to be uniform in all the States. He argues that credit is given to men, among other things, with reference to exemptions. It is our belief that the creditor practically never thinks of them. But while we see no especial virtue, perhaps there is no especial harm, in such a pro-mediately in front of the judge and clerk, and vision. One of our London exchanges informs us that the clergyman officiating at the old Temple church, in London, the favorite resort of the lawyers for spiritual instruction, preached on the text, "woe unto you, lawyers!" No offense was taken by the congregation, and no falling off was observed in the contributions of the day. Certainly there should have been no offense taken, for the words of the Divine preacher did not refer to lawyers, in the ordinary sense, but to teachers of the church law and ceremonial, and the expression, "clergymen," would When Dickens wrote his American Notes our countrymen were greatly aggrieved by his ridicule of our National habits of spitting and cocking our heels up. There was a very general denial that we were guilty of these breaches of decorum, at least, in public, or to any greater extent than other people. In a recent number of the Chicago Legal Adviser we find the following touching plea of guilty to the latter charge on the part of our own profession: "After the summer vacation, it is expected that the several courts will be located in the new court-house. In anticipation of this, it is ventured to remark, in a friendly way, that the hope is expressed that the members of the bar will not, as some have been known to do in the present courthouse on Adams street, convert the tables and railings of the various court-rooms into foot-stools. Outside of a question of manners and good breeding, this should not be done. Such scenes have been witnessed almost daily. It does not become the dignity of a lawyer to perch his feet on the railing im expect them to have any favorable estimation of the party or his breeding. Pride in having our courtrooms neat and clean should possess every lawyer. It should not become necessary in our State courts, as has been done in the United States court, to place a sign on each table, not to place your feet on the table. Let self-respect and good breeding govern each attorney in this respect." On the matter of expectoration we have credible information that there has been apprehension, on the part of the janitors of our new State capitol, that our legislators would extinguish the furnace fires by spitting down the registers. In the warm weather it has |