Opinion of the court. Ignorance of the danger before them is no sufficient excuse, as the owner appoints the master and is bound to select one of competent skill and knowledge, to transport goods and merchandise shipped on board in safety, which necessarily imposes the obligation to employ a master mariner who knows enough about the route to avoid the known obstructions and to choose the most feasible track for his route. Knowledge of the kind, in river navigation, is peculiarly essential, as the current frequently shifts from one side towards the other, and the track of navigation is often obstructed by snags, sand-bars, and shoals, which no degree of skill would enable the mariner or pilot to avoid without a prior knowledge of their existence. Cross-currents between the piers of bridges which span the river somewhat diagonally are not infrequent, and as they are not always fully appreciable to the casual observer, it is important that master mariners should know of their existence and something of their force, in order that they may be able to steer their steamer or other vessel properly through such a passage. Neither the master nor pilot, in this case, knew that there was any such cross-current between these piers, and consequently took no precaution to guard against its influence. Carriers of merchandise by water, seeking general employment, are to be regarded as common carriers, and like common carriers by land, in the absence of any legislative provision prescribing a different rule, are in general to be held responsible as insurers, and consequently are liable in all events and for every loss or damage to the merchandise, unless it happened by the act of God, the public enemy, or by the act of the shipper, or by some other cause or accident, without any fault or negligence on their part, as expressly excepted in the bill of lading or contract of shipment. Standard authorities show that the first duty of the car rier, and one that is implied by law, is to provide a seaworthy vessel, well furnished with proper motive power, and furni ture necessary for the voyage. Necessary equipment is as requisite as that the hull of the vessel should be stanch and Opinion of the court. strong, and she must also be provided with a crew adequate in number and competent for their duty with reference to all the exigencies of the intended route, and with a competent and skilful master, of sound judgment and discretion, and with sufficient knowledge of the route and experience in navigation to be able to perform in a proper manner all the ordinary duties required of him as master of the vessel. Owners of vessels, employed as such carriers, must see to it that the master is qualified for his situation, as they are responsible for his want of skill and knowledge in that behalf and for his negligence and bad seamanship. In the absence of any special agreement to the contrary or exception in the bill of lading or contract of shipment, his duty extends to all that relates to the loading as well as the safekeeping, due transportation, and right delivery of the goods, and for the faithful performance of all those duties the ship is liable as well as the master and owners.* 5. Differences of opinion may arise as to the merits of the fourth assignment of errors, and inasmuch as enough is alleged in those which precede and follow it to show that the decree of the Circuit Court must be reversed, the court here does not find it necessary to determine the question whether the speed of the steamer, in view of the conflicting testimony upon the subject, was or was not greater than the exigencies of the impending peril would justify. 6. Nor is it necessary to express any decided opinion. whether the fifth assignment of error is or is not supported by the evidence exhibited in the case, but it is deemed proper to say that there is much reason to conclude that it was the course of the current that forced the craft to the leeward, and not the gust of wind, as was supposed by those in charge of the deck of the steamer at the time the barge was sunk. Enough appears to show that the bridge there does not span the river directly across the current, and that the ten * Abbott on Shipping, 344; Laveroni v. Drury, 8 Exchequer, 166; Clark v. Barnwell, 12 Howard, 272; The Cordes, 21 Id. 27; King v. Shepherd, 8 Story, 349; 8 Kent, 213; 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 7th ed. 887; 1 Smith's Mercantile Law, 886. Opinion of the court. dency of the current is to force the vessel passing down the river to the leeward, and the evidence is full to the point that neither the master nor the pilot had any knowledge that they would have to encounter any such difficulty in attempting to effect the passage between those piers. Support to that proposition is found in the fact that they did not think it necessary to adopt any precaution to prevent such a disaster, except to see that the craft headed midway between the piers of the narrow passage and to give the steamer a full head of steam, so as to make the passage as quick as possible, which shows beyond all doubt that little or no use could be made of the helm during the passage, except to steady the craft on the course adopted just before they entered the passage between the piers where the disaster occurred. Reliable means to ascertain with certainty what force it was which caused the craft to make leeway during the pas sage is not exhibited in the record, nor is it necessary to decide that point, as it was plainly a rash act to undertake to steer the craft through that passage on a windy day when the banks of the river were full, in the face of the dangers which the evidence satisfies the court would necessarily be encountered in such an attempt. Neither the state of the water nor of the wind was such as to furnish any just excuse for the master or pilot, as they might have chosen the other passage or have taken proper and seasonable measures to leave back one of the barges for the next trip. Shipowners are responsible for such a disaster if it results from the ignorance, unskilfulness, or negligence of the master or those in charge of the vessel. Where the master, being ignorant of the coast, sailed past the port to which he was destined and ran into another port in the possession of the enemy and was captured, the Court of King's Bench unanimously decided that the implied warranty to provide a master of competent skill was broken by sending out one who was unable to distinguish between the two ports.* * Tait v. Levi, 14 East, 482. Syllabus. Ignorance and unskilfulness being proved, the attempt to set up inevitable accident is vain, as such a defence can never be sustained even in a collision case, unless it appears that neither party is in fault. Loss or damage occasioned by such a disaster, where it appears that those in charge of the deck were incompetent to perform the required duty, either from inexperience or want of knowledge of the route, or from negligence or inattention, cannot be regarded as being the result of natural causes, nor as falling within the exception contained in the bill of lading or contract of ship ment. Different definitions are given of what is called inevitable accident, on account of the different circumstances attending the disaster, but there is no decided case which will support such a defence where it appears that the disaster was occas:oned by the incompetency, unskilfulness, or negligence of the master or pilot in charge of the deck.* Service was not made in this case upon the barge, and of course the decree must be founded upon the fault of the steamer and those who were responsible for the unskilfulness and bad judgment exercised in her navigation. DECREE REVERSED with costs, and the cause remanded with directions to enter a decree for the libellants and for further proceedings in conformity TO THE OPINION OF THE COURT. JEROME V. MCCARTER. 1. The amount of a supersedeas bond as well as the sufficiency of the security are matters to be determined by the judge below, under the provisions of the twenty-ninth rule. 2. The discretion thus exercised by him will not be interfered with by this court. * The Morning Light, 2 Wallace, 560; Union Steamship Co. v. Nev fork Steamship Co., 24 Howard, 818. Statement of the case. 8. If, however, after the security has been accepted, the circumstances of the case, or of the parties, or of the sureties upon the bond have changed, so that security which at the time it was taken was "good and sufficient" does not continue to be so, this court, on proper application, may so adjudge and order as justice may require. ON motion of Mr. G. F. Edmunds, to increase the amount of a bond given on appeal and for additional security. The case was thus: McCarter, the holder of a third mortgage, given by the Lake Superior Ship Canal, Railroad, and Iron Company, on about 400,000 acres of lands-pine lands, hard-wood lands, iron lands, copper lands, and farming lands-in Michigan, filed a bill in the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, to foreclose his mortgage. Subsequently to this the company was decreed bankrupt, and one Jerome and another having been appointed its assignees, they were brought in by supplemental bill. On the 15th of June, 1874, the complainant got a decree of foreclosure. The decree directed the sale of the canal, corporate franchises, and two land grants, to pay $1,057,686, and also what might be due to one hundred and twenty bondholders whose debts were not included in the above amount. The sale was to be made subject to prior liens of $1,500,000 and upwards (apparently about $2,000,000), so that with the decree of $1,057,686, the property, if sold, would, in order to pay all charges against it, have to produce $3,057,686, or at least $2,500,000. The prior incumbrances were carrying interest at the rate of 10 per cent. a year. An appeal was soon afterwards applied for to Swayne, J., to operate as a supersedeas. A body of affidavits was produced on the side of the defendant, from men of business, men of science, and men of wealth, to show an immense value in the mortgaged property, that its value far exceeded the amount of the decree and all prior liens, taking these at their principal sums and adding all the interest that had aiready accrued or would accrue during the litigation, and moreover that the property, from the anticipation of finding new mines on it, was rising in value. A body of |