Opinion of the court. uniformly held, except as to the State of Louisiana, where a peculiar practice prevails, that we would not look into the opinions of the courts to ascertain what had been decided.* Since that act, however, in Murdock v. Memphis,† we intimated that we might, under some circumstances, examine those opinions, when properly authenticated, as far as might be useful for the purpose of ascertaining that fact, but at the same time were careful to say that, "after all, the record of the case, its pleadings, bills of exceptions, judgments, evidence, in short, its record, whether it be a case in law or equity, must be the chief foundation of inquiry; and while we are not prepared to fix any absolute limit to the sources of inquiry under the new act, we feel quite sure it was not intended to open the scope of it to any loose range of inves tigation." We are not now called upon to fix this limit. It is sufficient for all the purposes of this case to hold as we do, that if the record shows upon its face that a Federal question was not necessarily involved and does not show that one was raised, we will not go outside of it, to the opinion or elsewhere, to ascertain whether one was in fact decided. In this case the record shows clearly upon its face that the decision of such a question was not required. The indictment was for selling lottery tickets and keeping a gaming table. The plea, although to the whole indictment, met only part of it. The charge of keeping a gaming table was left entirely unanswered. A plea to be good as a bar to the whole indictment must meet the whole case. If it does not it will be held bad upon demurrer. The demurrer to this plea was, therefore, properly sustained upon this ground. Such being the case it is a matter of no consequence to us that the court may have gone further and decided a Federal question. The decision of such a * Gibson v. Chouteau, 8 Wallace, 317; Rector v. Ashley, 6 Id. 142; Wil liams v. Norris, 12 Wheaton, 117; Railroad Company v. Marshall, 12 How ard, 165; Cousin v. Blanc, 19 Id. 202. † 20 Wallace, 688. Statement of the case. question was not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause. It follows that this writ of error must be DISMISSED. WOOD v. BAILEY, ASSIGNEE. 1. Under the eighth section of the Bankrupt Act, which enacts that "no appeal shall be allowed in any case from the District to the Circuit Court unless it is claimed and notice given thereof, . . . to the assignee... or to the defeated [sic] party in equity, within ten days after the entry of the decree or decision appealed from," the omission to give the notice within the ten days specified is fatal to the appeal. 2. The word "defeated," in the above quotation, which, as to that word, follows both the Statutes at Large and the Revised Statutes, should be construed as meaning the "opposite," "adverse," or "successful" party. APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Alabama, dismissing an appeal which one Wood sought to prosecute from a decree of the District Court sitting in bankruptcy. Bailey, assignee in bankruptcy of a bankrupt, filed a bill in chancery in the District Court against Wood, Whitfield, and others, in regard to a mortgage held by Wood, and a supposed vendor's lien claimed by the other parties, on lands owned by the bankrupt and passing to the assignee by the assignment in bankruptcy. The object of the bill was to contest the validity of these liens, and to have a sale of the land discharged of the claims asserted by the defendants. A subpœna issued on the bill and was served on all the defendants. They appeared, demurred, and answered in regular course of chancery procedure. Testimony was taken and a final decree rendered in the District Court declaring all the claims of the defendants void as liens on the land. This decree was filed in the court on the 21st day of June, 1871, though dated on the first day of that month. The record showed notices of appeal addressed to the clerk of the District Court by the counsel for Wood and by the counsel for Whitfield, both of Opinion of the court. which were dated and filed in the District Court on the said 21st of June; the day the decree was filed. But no notice of this appeal was given to Bailey the assignee, until October 28th, 1871. Upon motion of the appellee this appeal was dismissed in the Circuit Court for want of notice in time to the assignee. The question now was whether it was rightly dismissed for such cause. The eighth section of the Bankrupt Act which provides for this class of appeals declares that— "No appeal shall be allowed in any case from the District to the Circuit Court unless it is claimed and notice given thereof to the clerk of the District Court, to be entered with the record of the proceedings, and also to the assignee or creditor, as the case may be, or to the defeated [sic] party in equity, within ten days after the entry of the decree or decision appealed from."* Mr. T. H. Price, for the appellant; Mr. P. Phillips, contra. Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court. We concur with the judge of the Circuit Court, that for want of service of notice of the appeal on Bailey, the assignee, within ten days of the time of filing the decree in the District Court, the appeal must be disallowed. The language of the statute is very strong and admits of no other interpretation. No appeal shall be allowed in any case from the District to the Circuit Court, unless it is claimed and notice given to the clerk, and also to the other party, within ten days after the entry of the decree or decision appealed from. The failure to give notice to the other party within the ten days, whether claimant or assignee, is equally fatal to the appeal, as the failure to give the notice to the clerk that the appeal is claimed. This is in harmony with the policy of the Bankrupt law, second only in importance, as we have recently said in the Syllabus. case of Bailey, Assignee, v. Glover,* to the policy of equal distribution, namely, the necessity of speedy disposition of the bankrupt's assets. In that case this same provision for limiting the time for appeals is referred to as evidence of that policy. There is in the statute, as printed in the Statutes at Large, what seems to us a manifest clerical error, or verbal mistake in the use of words "defeated party" as one to be notified of the appeal, and the error is also found in the Revised Statutes, section 4981. The "defeated party in equity" is generally the one who takes the appeal, and does not, therefore, require notice, but must give it. We can see no use or sense in that word in that connection. The purpose of the act, the remainder of the section in which the word is used, and the impossibility of any other reasonable meaning, requires that the word should be construed " opposite party," or "successful party," or "adverse party;" in a word, the party who does not appeal in an equity suit, and who is interested to oppose the appeal. In any event, the party to be notified in this case was the assignee, Bailey, and he was not notified within the time which the statute makes a condition of the right of appeal, and the decree of the District Court dismissing it is AFFIRMED. DOE v. CHILDRESS. Under the fourteenth section of the Bankrupt Act-which enacts that the register shall convey to the assignee all the estate, real and personal, of the bankrupt, and that such assignment shall relate back to the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, and thereupon by operation of law, that the title to all such property and estate ... shall vest in the said assignee, although the same is then attached on mesne pro * Supra, p. 842. Statement of the case. cess as the property of the debtor, "and shall dissolve any such attachment made within four months next preceding the commencement of said proceedings "-an attachment which, under State laws, is a valid lien, laid more than four months previously to the proceedings in bankruptcy begun, is not dissolved by the transfer to the assignee in bankruptcy. And if such assignee do not intervene (which in any such case he may do), and have the attachment dissolved, or the cause transferred to the Federal court sitting in bankruptcy, but, on the contrary, allow the property to be sold under judgment in the proceedings in attachment, the purchaser, in a case free from fraud, will hold against him; that is to say, the assignee cannot attack collaterally such purchaser's title. ERROR to the Circuit Court for the Middle District of Ten nessee. Doe, lessee of Vaillant, assignee of Montgomery, a bankrupt, brought ejectment against Childress to recover land in Tennessee. The question was this: When attachment proceedings are regularly commenced, a levy made, and the property is in the possession of the sheriff before the filing of petition in bankruptcy ;-when there is no stay of proceedings or other measures in the bankrupt court to arrest the suit in the State court, there being no fraud, a sale is had under the judgment of the State court, a deed is given by the sheriff, and possession taken under it can the title acquired under such sale be attacked by the assignee collaterally in a suit at law? In other words, can the assignee allege that under these circumstances the State court had no jurisdiction to proceed in the action after an adjudication in bankruptcy, and that no title passed to the purchaser under the judgment of the State court? The defendant's title rested upon a purchase under two decrees in the Court of Chancery of the State of Tennessee. Proceedings in the suit were commenced by attachment on the 15th and 27th days of April, 1867. Decrees in them were obtained in April and June, 1868, and on the 17th of September, 1868, sales were made under the decrees. The purchaser then entered into possession, and the defendant under him now claimed title and possession by virtue of that pur |