Nuisances. The metropolitan sanitary district act of 1866, chap. 74, which authorized the board of public health to abate nuisances. Summary proceedings for the abatement of nuisances are due process of law within the meaning of the Constitution. Cooper v. Schultz (1866) 32 How. Pr. 107; Metropolitan Bd. of Health v. Heister (1868) 37 N. Y. 661.

The act of 1892, chap. 646, prohibiting in certain localities the business of fat rendering or other specified noxious manufactures. People v. Rosenberg (1893) 67 Hun, 52, 22 N. Y. Supp. 56. The judgment of conviction was reversed on other points in (1893) 138 N. Y. 410, 34 N. E. 285.

Recognizance.-The remedy under the act of 1844, chap. 315, which authorizes a summary judgment on a forfeited recognizance. The execution of a recognizance was a voluntary act, and a waiver of ordinary legal proceedings for its enforcement. People v. Quigg (1874) 59 N. Y. 83.

Summons, substituted service.-Section 435 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing for a substituted service of summons. Continental Nat. Bank v. Thurber (1893) 74 Hun, 632, 26 N. Y. Supp. 956, affirmed in (1894) 143 N. Y. 648, 37 N. E. 828.

Taxes.-The act of 1873, chap. 119, which authorized boards of supervisors to determine claims for taxes erroneously paid on account of disputed town boundaries. The remedy was cumulative. A town is not deprived of its property without due process of law, and the taxpayers specially interested and the towns were entitled to be heard before the board of supervisors. This, if on reasonable notice, was due process of law. People ex rel. Witherbee v. Essex County (1877) 70 N. Y. 228.

The provisions of the tax law authorizing the collector to levy and sell, for an unpaid tax, any property in the possession of the person from whom the tax is due. "Possession under the statute is not merely a badge of ownership, it is title, so as to subject the property to seizure and sale for a tax against the possessor. Although the right to take the plaintiff's property for the tax was not adjudged in a judicial proceeding, the act of the legislature and the acts of the administrative officers thereunder, is, we think, due process of law within the meaning of the Constitution." Hersee v. Porter (1885) 100 N. Y. 403, 3 N. E. 338.

The act of 1881, chap. 689, relating to certain public improvements in the town of New Lots, Kings county, directing a levy of the amount due to the state on account of the cancelation of taxes which had been held to be invalid, and directing the apportionment

of the amount on property therein specified, after a hearing by the owners thereof. The property owners were not entitled to be heard as to the aggregate amount to be collected; that subject was within the discretion of the legislature, and the amount could not be changed by any hearing. "The legislature determines expenditures and amounts to be raised for their payment. . . It may err, but the courts cannot review its discretion." Spencer v. Merchant (1885) 100 N. Y. 585, 3 N. E. 682, affirmed in (1887) 125 U. S. 345, 31 L. ed. 763, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 921.

The act of 1882, chap. 287, making a tax deed in certain counties conclusive after a lapse of fifteen years. It does not assume to cure jurisdictional defects. "It raises a conclusive presumption of regularity, but leaves the question of the assessor's jurisdiction and authority unaffected." Ensign v. Barse (1887) 107 N. Y. 329, 14 N. E. 400, 15 N. E. 401.

The provisions of the Lewis county tax law (chap. 153, Laws 1884, as amended by chap. 215, Laws 1885) prohibiting the owner of land on which the tax has been returned as unpaid, from peeling bark or cutting timber on such land until the tax is paid, subject to a penalty of $500. It is not an unwarrantable interference with the use of property by its owner. He owes a duty to the state, which has a right to preserve the property on which the lien and the tax attaches, and prevent its destruction until the tax is paid. Prentice v. Weston (1888) 111 N. Y. 460, 18 N. E. 720.

Statutes transferring from the comptroller to county treasurers power to sell land for unpaid taxes do not deprive persons of property without due process of law. People v. Ulster County (1885) 36 Hun, 491.

The provision of the charter of the city of New Rochelle, 1899, chap. 128,208, fixing the lineal assessment for a local improvement begun under the previous village charter. People ex rel. Scott v. Pitt (1901) 64 App. Div. 316, 72 N. Y. Supp. 191, affirmed in (1902) 169 N. Y. 521, 58 L. R. A. 372, 62 N. E. 662.

The special franchise tax law of 1899, chap. 712. New York ex rel. Brooklyn City R. Co. v. State Tax Comrs. (1905) 199 U. S. 48, 50 L. ed. 79, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 713, affirming (1903) 174 N. Y. 417, 63 L. R. A. 884, 67 N. E. 69.

Trusts. The act of 1893, chap. 452, which provided, among other things, that when the beneficiary of the income of personal property should become entitled to the remainder in the trust fund, he might execute a release or conveyance thereof to himself, whereupon the trust estate should cease and determine and the whole estate should be merged in the remainder, or reversion. Re Heinze (1897) 20 Misc. 371, 46 N. Y. Supp. 247. The same subject is considered in

Oviatt v. Hopkins (1897) 20 App. Div. 168, 46 N. Y. Supp. 959, and Newcomb v. Newcomb (1900) 33 Misc. 191, 200, 68 N. Y. Supp. 430.

Vinegar act.-The vinegar law of 1889, chap. 515. People v. Girard (1895) 145 N. Y. 105, 45 Am. St. Rep. 595, 39 N. E. 823.

White Plains.-The White Plains act of 1890, chap. 315, authorizing the trustees to change the grade of streets. An abutting owner has no vested interest in the grade of a street, and a change of such grade is not the taking of private property. Smith v. White Plains (1893) 67 Hun, 81, 22 N. Y. Supp. 450.

NOT DUE PROCESS.

Animals.-The act of 1862, chap. 459, to prevent animals running at large, so far as it assumes to give the owner of premises the right to seize and sell animals trespassing thereon. "The legislature transcends the limits of its authority when it enacts that one citizen may take, hold, and sell the property of another, without judicial process, and without notice to the owner, as a mere penalty for a supposed private injury." Rockwell v. Nearing (1866) 35 N. Y. 302.

An ordinance of the city of Brooklyn providing that the owner of a dog that attacked a person elsewhere than on the owner's premises might be required immediately to kill such dog, but which ordinance did not require notice to the owner or an opportunity to be heard. The common council had no power to make an ordinance authorizing the destruction of property without notice. People ex rel. Shand v. Tighe (1894) 9 Misc. 607, 30 N. Y. Supp. 368, Sp. T. Gaynor, J.

Appeal. "An appeal brought pursuant to a statute which authorizes an appeal after the time provided by law had expired, or authorizes a further appeal after the only appeal authorized by law had been brought and finally decided, although it might result in the reversal of the judgment, and be in form a judicial proceeding, would not be what is known as due process of law, which is not satisfied by a judgment based upon an unconstitutional statute. A judgment is a contract which is subject to interference by the courts so long as the right of appeal therefrom exists, but when the time within which an appeal may be brought has expired, it ripens into an unchangeable contract, and becomes property, which can be disposed of or affected only by the act of the owner or through the power of eminent domain. It is then beyond the reach of legislation affecting the remedy, because it has become an absolute right,

which cannot be impaired by statute." Germania Sav. Bank v. Suspension Bridge (1899) 159 N. Y. 362, 54 N. E. 33.

Cause of action.-"A vested right of action is property in the same sense in which tangible things are property, and it is equally protected against arbitrary interference. Where it springs from contract, or from the principles of the common law, it is not competent for the legislature to take it away. Every man is entitled to a certain remedy in the law for all wrongs against his person or his property, and cannot be compelled to buy justice, or to submit to conditions not imposed upon his fellows as a means of obtaining it. . . Forfeitures of rights and property cannot be adjudged by legislative act, and confiscations without a judicial hearing after due notice would be void as not being due process of law." Cody v. Dempsey (1903) 86 App. Div. 335, 83 N. Y. Supp. 899, reaffirming as to 640d of the Penal Code the views expressed by the same court in Grossman v. Caminez (1903) 79 App. Div. 15, 79 N. Y. Supp. 900, cited in the note on police power.

Commitment.-A final commitment under the act of 1892, chap. 467, to St. Saviour's Sanitarium of an alleged inebriate female without notice or hearing, and without her presence at any stage of the proceeding. The objection that the proceeding was without notice was not cured by the provision in the act that nothing therein contained should be construed to limit the right of the courts to review the detention by habeas corpus. She was entitled to notice at some stage of that proceeding before final judgment. People ex rel. Ordway v. St. Saviour's Sanitarium (1898) 34 App. Div. 363, 56 N. Y. Supp. 431.

Compulsory arbitration.-After a claim against a city has been rejected by the courts as invalid, the legislature cannot direct its submission to and determination by arbitrators without the city's consent. Such an arbitration is not due process of law. Baldwin

v. New York (1865) 45 Barb. 359; People ex rel. Baldwin v. Haws (1862) 37 Barb. 440.

Contempt.-A person cannot be punished by imprisonment for contempt without notice and an opportunity to be heard before a court clothed with authority to act and decide the questions involved. Before a party can be adjudged guilty of contempt for the nonpayment of alimony, a personal demand must be made upon him, and an order to show cause must also be served upon him personally; service upon his attorney is not sufficient. Goldie v. Goldie (1902) 77 App. Div. 12, 79 N. Y. Supp. 268.

An order striking out a defendant's answer in an action for

divorce because of his refusal to pay alimony and counsel fees. The right to defend an action is property, and is protected by the 14th Amendment. Sibley v. Sibley (1902) 76 App. Div. 132, 78 N. Y. Supp. 743.

Corporations.-A statute cannot be sustained which assumes to validate subscriptions to the capital stock of a railroad company because the cash payment required to make the subscription valid has not in fact been paid. The legislature cannot thus make a binding contract where none existed before; it would take property without due process of law. New York & O. Midland R. Co. v.

Van Horn (1874) 57 N. Y. 473.

The act of 1886, chap. 271, directing that property and franchises of a dissolved street surface railroad corporation be sold at public auction to any other corporation possessing similar powers; and the act of 1886, chap. 310, directing that the affairs of any corporation dissolved by statute be wound up in an action for that purpose, to be brought by the attorney general, with a sale of its property by a receiver. The consents acquired by the dissolved corporation were property, and "the attempt to transfer them to a third party by the mere force of the statute, without the consent or knowledge of their lawful owners, was an effort to change their ownership without due process of law." People v. O'Brien (1888) 111 N. Y. 1, 2 L. R. A. 255, 7 Am. St. Rep. 684, 18 N. E. 692.

A decree of the General Assembly of Knights of Labor of America, annulling the charter of a local assembly, and confiscating its property. "Bills confiscating the property of citizens or of associations, without judicial process, are forbidden by the Constitution; and no person, corporation, or association authorized to acquire and hold property, can be devested of it by the fiat of any organization, nor in any way without its consent, or by due process of law." Wicks v. Monihan (1891) 130 N. Y. 232, 14 L. R. A. 243, 29 N. E. 139, following Austin v. Searing (1859) 16 N. Y. 112, 69 Am. Dec. 665, where the same rule was applied in relation to the action of the Grand Lodge of Odd Fellows, in annulling the charter of a local lodge.

The act of 1897, chap. 281, amending § 394 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which had the effect to reduce from six years to three years the time within which an action might be brought against a director of a moneyed corporation to enforce a common law liability. The legislature may shorten statutes of limitation, but it must allow a reasonable time for suits upon existing causes of action. A