any provision of the Constitution; and when this point is decided their duty is performed." People ex rel. Rochester v. Briggs (1872) 50 N. Y. 553.

A right derived from the exercise of legislative authority is as much within the power of that body to change, modify, or abrogate, as it was in the first instance to enact it. People ex rel. McCarthy v. French (1881) 10 Abb. N. C. 418.

An "expenditure may in fact be improvident and the work may prove to be useless to the public, but the legislature, as the depository of the sovereign powers of the people, must necessarily be the judge of the propriety and utility of making it. . . . The judicial department cannot institute an inquiry concerning the motives and purposes of the legislature in order to attribute to it a design contrary to that clearly expressed or fairly implied in the bill, without disturbing or impairing, in some measure, the powers and functions assigned by the Constitution to each department of the government." Waterloo Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Shanahan (1891) 128 N. Y. 345, 14 L. R. A. 481, 28 N. E. 358.

"The legislature could not declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes." Mongeon v. People (1874) 55 N. Y. 613.

Denying to the legislature the power to prescribe how much a citizen shall pay for a substitute in the national Army, Justice Clerke, in Powers v. Shepard (1865) 45 Barb. 524, says that "constitutional government, under whatever form it may exist, is not based on the idea that all the conduct and acts and interests of a citizen are the proper subjects of legislation. On the contrary, the tendency of such a system is to confine the action of government within as limited a sphere as is consistent with the maintenance of the peace, good order, and progress of society. It recognizes the great truth that the most important and sacred purposes and interests of society are not within the domain of civil law, but are regulated by the power of self-adjustment which God has implanted in it through the balancing and antagonism of the varied needs and aspirations of the individuals of whom it is composed." This decision was reversed in 49 Barb. 418, 48 N. Y. 540, but without affecting the force of the foregoing suggestions concerning the limitations on legislative power.

Retrospective statutes.-Chancellor Kent (then Chief Justice) says in Dash v. Van Kleeck (1811) 7 Johns. 477, 5 Am. Dec. 291, that it is a "principle in the English common law, as ancient as the law itself, that a statute, even of its omnipotent Parliament, is not to

have a retrospective effect." This rule has been applied in numerous cases, including Sayre v. Wisner (1832) 8 Wend. 662 (dower); Palmer v. Conly (1847) 4 Denio, 374 (penalties); Calkins v. Calkins (1848) 3 Barb. 305 (mortgage redemption); Jackson ex dem. Hicks v. Van Zandt (1815) 12 Johns. 168 (act of 1782, abolishing entails); People v. Columbia County (1833) 10 Wend. 363 (actions by people); Hackley v. Sprague (1833) 10 Wend. 114 (effect of revised statutes); Luhrs v. Eimer (1880) 80 N. Y. 171 (inheritance from alien); Re Protestant Episcopal Public School (1870) 58 Barb. 161, affirmed without considering this point in (1872) 47 N. Y. 556 (New York sewerage, act of 1865).

The owner of land which has been overflowed by a reservoir constructed by a canal company cannot be compelled by a subsequent statute to submit to an appraisal of his damages by commissioners appointed by the supreme court. Such a statute is retroactive and deprives the landowner of a right to a trial by jury. Re Townsend (1868) 39 N. Y. 171.

In Re Beams (1859) 17 How. Pr. 459, Justice Ingraham, while conceding "the manifest impropriety of the passage of laws which, in their operation, were to affect existing rights," sustained the act of 1858, chap. 338, which authorized proceedings to obtain relief from fraud or irregularity in assessments for local improvements in New York, and held that relief might be obtained under it for assessments made before its passage, saying that the act was sufficiently comprehensive to embrace assessments both before and after its passage, and that no rights had been acquired which were affected by it.

This act was under consideration from another point of view in Re Palmer (1869) 40 N. Y. 561, where it was held that the act of 1869, chap. 883, amending § 11 of the Code of Procedure, prohibiting thereafter appeals to the court of appeals from any order or judgment in any proceeding under the act of 1858, was retroactive, and applied to appeals then pending in the court of appeals. "Ordinarily a statute only speaks for the future, and where vested rights are involved the legislature cannot affect the present or the past; but there are many remedial statutes that mainly affect past transactions, and are enacted for that purpose. Statutes confirming illegal or irregular proceedings of various public officers are of this character, and can have no relation to other than past transactions." The act of 1871, chap. 695, providing relief from illegal assessments, was given a retrospective effect. People ex rel. Pells v. Ulster County (1875) 65 N. Y. 300. The same principle

was applied in People v. Francisco (1902) 76 App. Div. 262, 78 N. Y. Supp. 423, construing the effect of a comptroller's deed under 132 of the tax law.

The retroactive effect of statutes was considered in O'Reilly v. Utah, N. & C. Stage Co. (1895) 87 Hun, 407, 34 N. Y. Supp. 358, construing §§ 1903 and 1904 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to actions to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, and it is there said that "statutes affecting remedies, or rules of procedure for enforcing rights, are declared to be retroactive on grounds which would be deemed insufficient to give a retroactive effect to statutes enlarging or restricting substantive rights." But the constitutional amendment on this subject, added in 1894 (art. 1, 18), which abrogated the money limitation in such actions, was held not retroactive, applying the general rule applicable to statutes (New York & O. Midland R. Co. v. Van Horn [1874] 57 N. Y. 473), that a "law is never to have retroactive effect unless its express letter or clearly manifested intention requires that it should have such effect. If all its language can be satisfied by giving it prospective operation, it should have such operation only."

The drainage act of 1895, chap. 384, passed to carry into effect the drainage provision of the Constitution of 1894, was held not retroactive, and it could not be used to sustain proceedings, otherwise invalid, taken and then pending for the purpose of draining agricultural lands under previous statutes which limited the right to cases affecting the public health. Re Penfield (1896) 3 App. Div. 30, 37 N. Y. Supp. 1056.

"It is the duty of courts to assume that the legislature did not intend to violate the Constitution, and to so construe this statute as to bring it within the constitutional limitations, if possible. The presumption is that such a retrospective operation as to affect rights already accrued was not intended, unless the words used admit of no other reasonable conclusion." It was held that the legislature could not authorize an appeal from a judgment after the existing statutory time had elapsed, for the reason that the rights of the parties under the judgment had become fixed, and could not be made the subject of legislative action. Germania Sav. Bank v. Suspension Bridge (1899) 159 N. Y. 362, 54 N. E. 33, citing Burch v. Newbury (1852) 10 N. Y. 374, 394 (appeals in equity cases under 8 460 of the Code of Procedure of 1849); Dunlop v. Edwards (1850) 3 N. Y. 341 (appeals under § 457 of the Code of Procedure of 1849); Benton v. Wickwire (1873) 54 N. Y. 226 (mechanic's lien). In Bay v. Gage (1862) 36 Barb. 447, the court considered the

subject of retrospective statutes, and said that "whether a law is prospective or retrospective is a question of construction, in the absence of any express declaration in the act by which it is determined. Laws are not unconstitutional simply for the reason that they are retrospective. Retrospective laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect vested rights, or partake of the character of ex post facto laws, are not forbidden by the Constitution." The act of 1861, chap. 221, amending the revised statutes in relation to the effect of a judgment in ejectment, was held not retroactive. "Considerations of propriety as to the right of reviewing judgments are not sufficient to raise the presumption that the law was intended to act upon judgments previously recovered." The court cited People v. Carnal (1852) 6 N. Y. 463, where it was held that the statute which authorized a writ of error in behalf of the people, to review a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, did not authorize such a writ to review a judgment rendered prior to its passage. Ely v. Holton (1857) 15 N. Y. 595, involving the construction of an amendatory act authorizing a further appeal in certain cases, but it was given only a prospective effect.

Statutes presumed valid.-"Before the court will deem it their duty to declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional, a case must be presented in which there can be no rational doubt." Ex parte M'Collum (1823) 1 Cow. 550; Morris v. People (1846) 3 Denio, 382; Beecher v. Allen (1849) 5 Barb. 169; People ex rel. Rochester v. Briggs (1872) 50 N. Y. 553; Kerrigan v. Force (1877) 68 N. Y. 381; Central Crosstown R. Co. v. Twenty-third Street R. Co. (1877) 54 How. Pr. 168; People ex rel. Hatfield v. Comstock (1879) 78 N. Y. 356; Sweet v. Syracuse (1891) 129 N. Y. 316, 27 N. E. 1081, 29 N. E. 289; Schneider v. Rochester (1895) 90 Hun, 171, 35 N. Y. Supp. 786; Fort v. Cummings (1895) 90 Hun, 481, 36 N. Y. Supp. 36; Rathbone v. Wirth (1896) 6 App. Div. 277, 40 N. Y. Supp. 535; Ziegler v. Corwin (1896) 12 App. Div. 60, 42 N. Y. Supp. 855; Gilbert Elev. R. Co. v. Handerson (1877) 70 N. Y. 361. "Every presumption is in favor of the validity of legislative acts." New York & L. I. Bridge Co. v. Smith (1896) 148 N. Y. 540, 42 N. E. 1088; Re New York Elev. R. Co. (1877) 70 N. Y. 327, 342; Wright v. Hart (1905) 103 App. Div. 218, 93 N. Y. Supp. 60.

"Every act of the legislature must be upheld by the courts unless it be in substantial conflict with some provision of the Constitution." Pearce v. Stephens (1897) 18 App. Div. 101, 45 N. Y. Supp. 422; People ex rel. Simpson v. Wells (1905) 181 N. Y. 252.

In construing a statute the court must assume "that the legis

lature had evidence before it which created the demand" for the particular legislation, and if any state of circumstances would justify the statute, the court must presume that it existed. Re Annon (1888) 50 Hun, 413, 2 N. Y. Supp. 275, affirmed in (1889) 117 N. Y. 1, 5 L. R. A. 559, 15 Am. St. Rep. 460, 22 N. E. 670.

It is to be presumed that an act was not passed by the legislature without mature reflection and full consideration of the provisions contained in it and of the well-settled constitutional principles relating to it. Roosevelt v. Godard (1868) 52 Barb. 533.

"If it cannot be made to appear that a law is in conflict with the Constitution by argument deduced from the language of the law itself, or from matters of which a court can take judicial notice, then the act must stand. The testimony of expert or other witnesses is not admissible to show that, in carrying out a law enacted by the legislature, some provision of the Constitution may possibly be violated. . . . If the act upon its face is not in conflict with the Constitution, then extraneous proof cannot be used to condemn it." People ex rel. Kemmler v. Durston (1890) 119 N. Y. 569, 7 L. R. A. 715, 16 Am. St. Rep. 859, 24 N. E. 6, citing People ex rel. Bolton v. Albertson (1873) 55 N. Y. 50; People ex rel. Wood v. Draper (1857) 15 N. Y. 532; Re New York Elev. R. Co. (1877) 70 N. Y. 327, 342.

ATTORNEYS.

In Re O'Neill (1882) 90 N. Y. 584, the court say "they have no doubt of the power of the legislature to admit persons not citizens to practise as attorneys and counselors of the courts of this state," but it was held that, under the statute and rules of the court of appeals then in force, an alien could not be admitted as an attorney.

COMMERCE.

Congress has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate navigation between the several states, but cannot control navigation employed in an internal commerce which does not concern other states. North River S. B. Co. v. Livingston (1824) 1 Hopk. Ch. 170, affirmed in (1825) 3 Cow. 713.

A bond to indemnify the city of New York against expenses which might be incurred in maintaining immigrants is valid, and not repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States. Candler v. New York (1828) 1 Wend. 493.