for the enforcement of contract obligations. Conkey v. Hart (1856) 14 N. Y. 22. See also Tyler v. Heidorn (1866) 46 Barb. 439.

The act of 1857, chap. 344, providing for security on the transfer of a cause from a district court to the court of common pleas in New York, did not impair the obligation of a contract. It affected the remedy only. Johnson v. Ackerson (1870) 40 How. Pr. 222, affirmed in (1871) 3 Daly, 430.

A statute which gave to persons claiming to have paid an illegal tax an opportunity to present to the board of supervisors a claim for reimbursement did not vest in such persons any absolute right beyond legislative control, and a repeal of the statute did not impair the obligation of a contract. People ex rel. Canajoharie Nat. Bank v. Montgomery County (1876) 67 N. Y. 109, 23 Am. Rep. 94.

State contract.-A contractor cannot compel the state to proceed with the erection of a public building under a contract with him. The state, like an individual, may abandon an enterprise which it has undertaken and refuse to allow the contractor to proceed, or it may commit the completion of the contract to its own immediate servants and agents, or make a new contract with other persons without any default by the original contractor. While the state might thus violate the contract, its obligation is not impaired, and the original party would have a claim against the state for damages, which would doubtless be recognized and protected by the legislature. Lord v. Thomas (1876) 64 N. Y. 107.

In Danolds v. State (1882) 89 N. Y. 36, 42 Am. Rep. 277, the same principle was applied, and the plaintiff whose contract before its completion had been terminated by the state was awarded prospective profits. The court said the "contracts were binding upon the state; it could refuse to perform them on its part and arrest the performance of them by the contractors, but it could in no way destroy or get rid of the obligation of them."

Statute of limitations.-The act of 1885, chap. 405, requiring actions to be brought within six months against the city of Brooklyn or its registrar of arrears to compel the execution of a lease upon any sale for taxes and assessments or water rates made more than eight years prior to the passage of the act, and requiring the cancelation of sales upon which no leases shall have been given and no action commenced, did not violate this constitutional provision. It was a statute of limitations, and fixed a reasonable time for the enforcement of contracts. Wheeler v. Jackson (1887) 44 Hun, 410, affirmed in (1887) 105 N. Y. 681, (1890) 137 U. S. 245, 34 L. ed. 659, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 76.

VOL. IV. CONST. HIST.-18.

The statute of limitations acts only on the remedy, and does not affect the obligation of a contract. A repeal of a statute removes the bar, and gives the creditor an indefinite period within which to commence an action. In this case it was held that an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage given to secure promissory notes might be brought within twenty years, although the time had passed within which an action at law might be brought on the notes. Hulbert v. Clark (1891) 128 N. Y. 295, 14 L. R. A. 59, 28 N. E. 638.

Supreme court reporter.-A contract for the publication of the reports of decisions of the supreme court of this state, made with the reporter, is protected by the constitutional prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts, and the legislature cannot increase the burdens imposed by the contract, nor deprive the parties of the benefit of its provisions. It is not a public contract, but the individual contract of the reporter, who receives no compensation from the state. Banks v. Hun (1897) 20 App. Div. 501, 47 N. Y. Supp. 193.

Trusts. The obligation of a contract is not impaired by an act authorizing the chancellor to discharge a trustee under a will and appoint a new trustee. "There is no matter of contract involved in the substitution of new trustees with the assent of the chancellor in the place of those named in a testamentary devise, unless the act be one which infringes some vested right of the trustees," nor does the substitution affect the interest of the beneficiaries. Williamson

v. Suydam (1867) 6 Wall. 723, 18 L. ed. 967.

Wills.-"General regulations for the descent and transmission of property, in case of the death of the possessor, to his widow, heirs, and next of kin, cannot be regarded as constituting a contract with them so as to bring those laws within the prohibition of the Constitution of the United States, nor as vesting the expectants under such laws with rights or privileges within the meaning of the Constitution of the state." Re Lawrence (1848) 1 Redf. 310, per McVean, surrogate.

OFFICERS.

The legislature, in order to suppress dueling, had power to impose, as a penalty for a violation of the act, a forfeiture of the right to hold any post of profit, trust, or emolument. Barker v. People (1824) 3 Cow. 686, 15 Am. Dec. 322.

In the case of the Lieutenant-Governor's Claim (1829) 2 Wend. 213, 216, the court of errors held that the legislature had no power

to deprive that officer of the right equally with the other members of the court to express his opinion and to vote in the decision of every question arising therein.

In Re Members of Court of Errors (Chancellor's Case) (1830) 6 Wend. 158, the same court held that, notwithstanding the provision of the revised statutes that no judge of any appellate court shall take part in the decision of any case or matter which shall have been determined by him when sitting as a judge of any other court,. the chancellor might decide or take part in the decision of a case determined by him when sitting as a circuit judge.

The legislature is not restricted in power by the Constitution from: controlling or changing the term or the fees of an office, or from abolishing altogether an office created by it. People ex rel. Wilbur v. Eddy (1870) 57 Barb. 593; People v. Devlin (1865) 33 N. Y. 269; 88 Am. Dec. 377; Coulter v. Murray (1873) 4 Daly, 506. This subject was considered in Gertum v. Kings County (1888) 109 N. Y. 170, 16 N. E. 328, in connection with the abolition of the town of New Lots and the absorption of its territory in the city of Brooklyn. It was conceded that while the town existed the legislature could not abolish the office of justice of the peace nor shorten the term; but this rule did not prevent the legislature from abolishing the town and merging it in a city. See People ex rel. Devery v. Coler (1903) 173 N. Y. 103, 65 N. EF. 956.

It is no defense to an indictment against inspectors of election for a violation of duty that they deemed the act under which the election was held unconstitutional. They are ministerial officers, and cannot sit in judgment on the constitutionality of the law. Hall v. People (1882) 90 N. Y. 498.

The legislature has power to impose on an election officer a penalty for refusing to serve. Brooklyn v. Scholes (1883) 31 Hun, 110. The legislature has power to authorize the summary removal of a municipal officer. People ex rel. Gere v. Whitlock (1883) 92 N. Y. 191.

The legislature may prohibit the appointment of more than two members of the state civil service commission from the same political party. Rogers v. Buffalo (1890) 123 N. Y. 173, 9 L. R. A. 579, 25 N. E. 274, and may require the selection of members of the board of police commissioners from different political parties. Pearce v. Stephens (1897) 18 App. Div. 101, 45 N. Y. Supp. 422.

The legislature had power to provide that the decision of the commissioner of public safety in a city of the second class, dismissing a member of the police force upon charges preferred against

him, should be final and conclusive, and not subject to review by any court. The office of policeman is a legislative, and not a constitutional office. People ex rel. Miller v. Peck (1902) 73 App. Div. 89, 76 N. Y. Supp. 328.

POLICE POWER.

In general.-Blackstone defines police power (4 Com. 162) as "the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the individuals of the state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners, and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations."

In Varick v. Smith (1835) 5 Paige, 137, 28 Am. Dec. 417, Chancellor Walworth says that the legislature is the sole judge as to the expediency of making police regulations interfering with the natural rights of our citizens, which regulations are not prohibited by the Constitution.

Discussing the validity of the oleomargarine act of 1884, chap. 202, Justice Dykman, writing the opinion in People v. McGann (1884) 34 Hun, 358, says the police power "is a power vested in the legislature to ordain such laws and ordinances as shall be deemed essential and necessary for the welfare, health, and property of the public. The underlying foundation of the power is the principle that all property must be so used that it shall not become injurious to others. All reasonable restraints may be imposed for the attainment of this end which may be deemed necessary by the lawmaking power, even though they amount to absolute prohibition, and the propriety of such restrictions is a legislative question entirely free from all judicial control." In People v. King (1888) 110 N. Y. 418, I L. R. A. 293, 6 Am. St. Rep. 389, 18 N. E. 245, the court say that "the police power covers a wide range of particular unexpressed powers reserved to the state, affecting freedom of action, personal conduct, and the use and control of property."

Each successive legislature must, from necessity, "be left untrammeled, except by the restraints of the fundamental law, and when called upon to act upon subjects which concern the health, morals, or interests of the people as affected by a public use of property for which compensation is exacted by its owners, they are unlimited by constitutional restraint," and the "authority of the legislature in the exercise of its police powers could not be limited or restricted by the provisions of contracts between individuals or corporations."

Buffalo East Side R. Co. v. Buffalo Street R. Co. (1888) 111 N. Y. 132, 2 L. R. A. 384, 19 N. E. 63, sustaining the act of 1875, chap. 600, fixing street railroad fares in Buffalo.

Amusements.-The legislature has power to regulate places of amusement and require them to be licensed. Wallack v. New York (1874) 3 Hun, 84, affirmed in (1876) 67 N. Y. 23, where it was held that an action to restrain the enforcement of penalties provided by the law on the ground of its invalidity could not be maintained; at least, until such invalidity had been judicially determined.

Animals at large. The legislature had no power to authorize the summary seizure of animals trespassing within a private enclosure, as provided by the act of 1862, chap. 459. Rockwell v. Nearing (1866) 35 N. Y. 302.

The act of 1867, chap. 814, amending the act of 1862, to prevent animals from running at large in the highways, was a valid exercise of police power. Campbell v. Evans (1869) 54 Barb. 566, affirmed in (1871) 45 N. Y. 356.

Buildings.-The New York act of 1885, chap. 454, restricting to 80 feet the height of dwelling houses intended for the use of more than one family, on streets exceeding 60 feet in width, was a valid exercise of police power, but it did not apply to hotels. People ex rel. Kemp v. D'Oench (1888) 111 N. Y. 359, 18 N. E. 862.

Business-In People v. McGann (1884) 34 Hun, 358, the supreme court sustained the oleomargarine act of 1884, chap. 202, as a valid exercise of police power; but the court of appeals took a different view, and in People v. Marx (1885) 99 N. Y. 377, 52 Am. Rep. 34, 2 N. E. 29, condemned the act as unconstitutional because it interfered with the right of the citizen to carry on a lawful business. This case has already been cited under the head of "Liberty," in the article on due process of law. People v. Meyer (1903) 89 App. Div. 185, 85 N. Y. Supp. 834, sustains the act of 1902, chap. 385, amending § 26 of the agricultural law, prohibiting the sale of oleomargarine under specified circumstances.

Discussing the validity of the act of 1884, chap. 272, which prohibited the manufacture of cigars in tenement houses, and rejecting the argument that the legislature could pass the act "in the exercise of the police power which every sovereign state possesses," the court (Re Jacobs [1885] 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636) say that the police power "is very broad and comprehensive and is exercised to promote the health, comfort, safety, and welfare of society. Its exercise in extreme cases is frequently justified by the maxim Salus populi suprema lex est. Under it the conduct of an individual and the use of property may be regulated so as to interfere to some