the indirect taxation was merely an incident to the exercise by the state of an acknowledged power of government. . . The inclusion of United States bonds in the valuation under the laws for the taxation of inheritances for the purpose of ascertaining the tax was a valid exercise of the legislative power of a state, and did not constitute a taxation of Federal securities;" but it was held in this case that by the transfer tax act of 1892, chap. 399, such securities could not be included in the estimate of the valuation of the decedent's estate. Re Sherman (1897) 153 N. Y. 1, 46 N. E. 1032, followed in Re Plummer (1900) 47 App. Div. 625, 62 N. Y. Supp. 1145, affirmed in (1900) 161 N. Y. 631, 57 N. E. 1122, affirmed in (1900) 178 U. S. 115, 44 L. ed. 998, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829.

That portion of its capital which a New York bank has invested in the stock, bonds, or other securities of the United States is not liable to taxation by the state. People ex rel. Bank of Commerce v. Tax Comrs. (1862) 2 Black, 620, 17 L. ed. 451; Bank Tax Case (1864) 2 Wall. 200, 17 L. ed. 793. But a state may, under certain limitations, tax the shares in the hands of shareholders. Van Allen v. Assessors (1865) 3 Wall. 573, 18 L. ed. 229; New York v. Tax & A. Comrs. (1866) 4 Wall. 244, 18 L. ed. 344. Federal certificates of indebtedness cannot be taxed by the state. The Banks v. New York (1868) 7 Wall. 16, sub nom. New York ex rel. Bank of New York Nat. Bkg. Asso. v. Connelly, 19 L. ed. 57. Nor national bank notes. Bank of New York v. New York County (1868) 7 Wall. 26, 19 L. ed. 60.

Validation.-The legislature may validate an irregular assessment for local improvement and make the amount a lien on the property assessed. Mann v. Utica (1872) 44 How. Pr. 334. See also Smith v. Buffalo (1895) 90 Hun, 118, 35 N. Y. Supp. 635; Terrel v. Wheeler (1890) 123 N. Y. 76, 25 N. E. 329.

The legislature has power to validate a tax notwithstanding the omission of the assessors to verify the assessment roll. The assessors had jurisdiction to make the assessment, the legislature might have dispensed with the certificate of the assessors, and the tax would have been valid without it. People ex rel. Flower v. Bleckwenn (1889) 55 Hun, 169, 7 N. Y. Supp. 914, affirmed in (1891) 129 N. Y. 637, 29 N. E. 1031; Re Lamb (1889) 51 Hun, 633, 4 N. Y. Supp. 858, affirmed in (1890) 121 N. Y. 703, 24 N. E. 1100. But the legislature cannot, by a validating act, confirm a sale made under a void assessment. Cromwell v. MacLean (1890) 123 N. Y. 474, 25 N. E. 932. See also State v. Kings County (1891) 125 N. Y. 312, 26 N. E. 272.

The legislature may validate assessments for taxes, notwithstanding the omission of property primarily liable to taxation. Van Deventer v. Long Island City (1893) 139 N. Y. 133, 34 N. E. 774.

"Assessments for municipal improvements are a species of tax, the imposition of which is within the power of the legislature, unlimited, except as specifically restrained by the Constitution, and that where an assessment for municipal purposes is irregular, the legislature itself, without notice to the persons assessed, may make the assessment or may authorize a reassessment." If the thing omitted which constitutes the defect sought to be removed is something which the legislature might have dispensed with by a previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one. If the irregularity consists in doing some act or doing it in the mode which the legislature might have made immaterial by a prior statute, it may do so by a later one. Hatzung v. Syracuse (1895) 92 Hun, 203, 36 N. Y. Supp. 521; Hagner v. Hall (1896) 10 App. Div. 587, 42 N. Y. Supp. 63; Loomis v. Little Falls (1901) 66 App. Div. 299, 72 N. Y. Supp. 774; Williams v. Albany (1887) 122 U. S. 154, 30 L. ed. 1088, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1244; Ziegler v. Flack (1886) 22 Jones & S. 69; Re Van Antwerp (1874) 56 N. Y. 261; People ex rel. Richmond v. Wilson (1888) 21 N. Y. S. R. 120, 3 N. Y. Supp. 326, affirmed in (1890) 121 N. Y. 684, 24 N. E. 1098.

The legislature may cure defects in proceedings by the comptroller for the sale of land for unpaid taxes. People v. Francisco (1902) 76 App. Div. 262, 78 N. Y. Supp. 423.

VESTED RIGHTS.

In general.-"Every right resting in perfect obligation is vested, and such a right being conferred by statute renders it no more sacred than if it were sanctioned merely by the law of nature or the common law." Butler v. Palmer (1841) 1 Hill, 324

Actions.-"A cause of action or defense given by a statute, founded on grounds of public policy, conferred no vested right which could not be taken away by a similar statute, and . . . a repeal of a law which gave such right of action or defense terminated all claim to such recovery or defense, although the contract was made previously." Washburn v. Franklin (1861) 24 How. Pr. 515; citing Curtis v. Leavitt (1887) 15 N. Y. 9; Central Bank v. Empire Stone Dressing Co. (1858) 26 Barb. 23; People v. Livingston (1831) 6 Wend. 526.

"A party has no vested right in a defense based upon an infor

mality not affecting his substantial equities," and the legislature may constitutionally take away such defenses. Tifft v. Buffalo (1880) 82 N. Y. 204.

"There is nothing in the Constitution which directly or impliedly gives any litigant a vested right to the trial of an equity case by a judge without a jury.” Underhill v. Manhattan R. Co. (1891) 27 Abb. N. C. 478, 18 N. Y. Supp. 43, sustaining § 970 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

As to a party's right to interpose a defense, see Sibley v. Sibley (1902) 76 App. Div. 132, 78 N. Y. Supp. 743.

The act of 1892, chap. 514, relating to an attorney's qualifications as a witness on the probate of a will to which he is a subscribing witness, does not, because retrospective, affect vested rights. The statute is remedial. Re Gagan (1892) 47 N. Y. S. R. 444, 20 N. Y. Supp. 426. See Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Meyer (1904) 198 U. S. 508, 519, 49 L. ed. 1146, 1149, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 754

Adverse possession.-The occupancy and possession of land for twenty-five years was held to entitle the owner to the continued enjoyment of his property as against city authorities who claimed that a part of the land was included in a public street. They must first acquire possession by regular process of law. Varick v. New York (1819) 4 Johns. Ch. 53.

Appeal. After the rights of the parties under a judgment have become fixed by the lapse of the time prescribed by statute for taking an appeal, the legislature cannot give a new right of appeal. Germania Sav. Bank v. Suspension Bridge (1899) 159 N. Y. 362, 54 N. E. 33.

Contracts.-A newspaper publisher who had fully performed his contract for the publication of certain legal notices was held not affected by the statute prohibiting the payment of a claim or the rendition of a judgment therefor, unless an appropriation had been made for that purpose. Wood v. New York (1866) 34 How. Pr. 501.

The acceptance of a bid on a contract for the construction of a sewer gave the contractor a vested right of which he could not be deprived without compensation. In Re Protestant Episcopal Public School (1870) 58 Barb. 161, (1872) 47 N. Y. 556.

Corporations. While ordinarily privileges and franchises granted to a private corporation are vested rights, and cannot be devested or altered nor its charter amended without its consent, the rule does not apply where the act of incorporation reserves the right of amendment or repeal. McLaren v. Pennington (1828) 1 Paige, 102.

The charter of the Mohawk Bridge Company, Laws 1805, chap. 127, prohibited any ferry within one mile of the bridge at Schenec

tady. This did not prevent the legislature from authorizing the erection of a railroad bridge within that distance, and the use of it for ordinary railroad purposes. The bridge company's franchise was not exclusive, and the legislature was not deprived of the "power to provide for the conveyance of freight or passengers from one part of the state to another by an improvement which was entirely unknown at the time when the grant to the bridge company was made." Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica & S. R. Co. (1837) 6 Paige, 554

As to the vested rights of members of mutual benefit associations, see Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Aberle (1896) 18 Misc. 257, 41 N. Y. Supp. 638.

A franchise granted by town authorities to a gaslight company is not affected by a subsequent incorporation of a part of the town as a village. The company's rights continue under the village government. People ex rel. Woodhaven Gaslight Co. v. Deehan (1897) 153 N. Y. 528, 47 N. E. 787.

Damages. An award of damages on laying out a public street gives the owner of the land a vested right in the sum awarded, and his right cannot be defeated by a discontinuance of the proceedings. Hawkins v. Rochester (1828) 1 Wend. 53, 19 Am. Dec. 462, citing Re Beekman Street, 20 Johns. 269. In Re Anthony Street (1839) 20 Wend. 618, 32 Am. Dec. 608, it was held that the right did not become fixed until the confirmation of the report making the award, and that the court might, before final confirmation, grant leave to discontinue the proceedings.

After the right has become complete by confirmation, it cannot be devested by a repeal of the statute under which the damages were awarded. People ex rel. Fountain v. Westchester County (1848) 4 Barb. 64.

Where the right to damages has become vested by the lapse of time prescribed by statute, an amendment imposing other conditions cannot have a retroactive effect. Ganson v. Buffalo (1864) 2 Abb. App. Dec. 236.

Declaratory laws.-"A statute is never construed to operate retrospectively so as to take away a vested right." Sayre v. Wisner (1832) 8 Wend. 661, citing Dash v. Van Kleeck (1811) 7 Johns. 477. In Salters v. Tobias (1832) 3 Paige, 338, the court say that “in this country, where the legislative power is limited by written constitutions, declaratory laws, so far as they operate upon vested rights, can have no legal effect in depriving an individual of his rights, or to change the rule of construction as to a pre-existing law." They

are entitled to respect as expressions of legislative opinion, but can have no binding effect on the court.

Divorce.-A party has a vested right in a judgment for alimony, and it cannot be affected by subsequent legislation authorizing the court to vary or modify it. Walker v. Walker (1898) 155 N. Y. 77, 49 N. E. 663; Livingston v. Livingston (1903) 173 N. Y. 377, 61 L. R. A. 800, 93 Am. St. Rep. 600, 66 N. E. 123; Goodsell v. Goodsell (1903) 82 App. Div. 65, 81 N. Y. Supp. 806.

Evidence. "There can be no vested right in a mere rule of evidence," and a presumption declared by statute may be abrogated by its repeal. Hickox v. Tallman (1860) 38 Barb. 608.

A rule of evidence is defined as the "mode and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances upon which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial procedure." While the legislature may undoubtedly change or alter a rule of evidence, this power cannot be invoked as against the immunity guaranteed to a witness under § 2460 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which declared that an answer by a witness could not be used against him in any other action or proceeding, civil or criminal, and a subsequent amendment omitting the word "civil" could not take away such immunity. Lapham v. Marshall (1889) 51 Hun, 36, 3 N. Y. Supp. 601.

Execution.-The act of 1801, chap. 66, in relation to imprisonment for debt, provided for the discharge of an imprisoned debtor on his making an assignment of his property, prohibited subsequent executions against his person, and also prohibited an action on the judgment, but authorized subsequent property executions indefinitely with certain exemptions. The act of 1808, chap. 163, modified the former act by prohibiting an action on the judgment, but continuing the immunity from arrest. In Spencer v. Richardson (1810) 7 Johns. 116, the court said the act of 1808 did not invalidate the effect of the debtor's discharge, and did not violate any immunity vested in him by the act of 1801, but afforded an additional means of reaching his property.

Exemptions.-A citizen has no vested right in an exemption from taxation because of the performance of prescribed military service. A statute authorizing such exemption is subject to repeal at any time by the legislature. People ex rel. Cunningham v. Roper (1866) 35 N. Y. 629; People ex rel. Sears v. Board of Assessors (1881) 84 N. Y. 610.

Extra allowance.-The provision of the Code of Procedure (1851), $308, giving the plaintiff a right to an extra allowance in a difficult