or extraordinary case, was complete on the rendition of the verdict, and conferred on him a vested right, which could not be taken away by a subsequent repeal of this provision. Cook v. New York Floating Dry Dock Co. (1858) 1 Hilt. 556.

Highways. Where land is taken by the public for a highway, and compensation is made to the owner, the easement becomes a vested right in the public, and the legislature has no power to donate the easement to an adjoining owner. People ex rel. Failing v. Highway Comrs. (1869) 53 Barb. 70.

Inheritance tax.-A surrogate's decree establishing the liability of certain religious corporations for the payment of an inheritance tax on property received by them is not affected by subsequent legislation amending the original statute imposing the tax and exempting religious corporations from taxation. Re Wolfe (1892) 66 Hun, 389, 21 N. Y. Supp. 515.

Judgments.-"There is no such vested right in a judgment in the party in whose favor it is rendered as to preclude its re-examination and vacation in the ordinary modes provided by law, even though an appeal from it may not be allowed;" and the award of commissioners in proceedings under the right of eminent domain, even when approved by the court, possesses no greater sanctity. Garrison v. New York (1874) 21 Wall. 196, 22 L. ed. 612, construing the New York act of 1871, chap. 57, and other statutes, relating to public improvements in the city of New York.

Labor law. A person who performed labor for a municipal corporation was held entitled to the prevailing rate of wages, notwithstanding the subsequent amendment of the labor law, which omitted municipal corporations from the statute. McCann v. New York (1900) 52 App. Div. 358, 65 N. Y. Supp. 308, (1901) 166 N. Y. 587, 59 N. E. 1125.

Married women.-A husband's interest in his wife's property, which he acquired under the common law, was not devested by the act of 1848, chap. 200, for the more effectual protection of the property of married women. The act was unconstitutional. White v. White (1849) 5 Barb. 474.

The amendment of 1849, chap. 375, applicable to the wife's future acquisitions, was sustained in Sleight v. Read (1854) 18 Barb. 159.

The legislature had no power by the act of 1848, in relation to the property of a married woman, to deprive a husband of a legacy which had become vested in him prior to the passage of the law. Westervelt v. Gregg (1854) 12 N. Y. 202, 62 Am. Dec. 160.

In Berley v. Rampacher (1856) 5 Duer, 183, it was said that the

act of 1853, chap. 576, "exempting the husband from his commonlaw liability, ought not to be construed as affecting the vested rights of creditors. So construed it would be unconstitutional and void." But in Foote v. Morris (1853) 12 N. Y. Legal Obs. 61, it was held that a creditor acquired no such vested right in a contingent liability of a future husband when the debt was contracted as to render the statute of 1853 inoperative.

Marriage and the birth of issue prior to the New York married women's enabling act of 1848 did not give a vested right as tenant by the curtesy, so as to prevent the application of such act. Re Mitchell (1891) 61 Hun, 372, 16 Supp. 180.

Municipal corporations.-In People v. Morris (1835) 13 Wend. 325, 330, Judge Nelson says "it is an unsound and even absurd proposition that political power, conferred by the legislature, can become a vested right as against the government in any individual or body of men. It is repugnant to the genius of our institutions and the spirit and meaning of the Constitution, for by that fundamental law all political rights not there defined and taken out of the exercise of legislative discretion were intended to be left subject to its regulation. . . . Political power conferred by the legislature is a public trust, to be executed not for the benefit or at the will of the trustee, but for the common weal." Municipal corporations "are severally political institutions, erected to be employed in the internal government of the state. There is no contract between the government and governed. . . . The only interest involved is the public interest. . . . We know of no vested rights of political power in any citizen or body of citizens, except those conferred by the Constitution. That is our Bill of Rights, and is analogous to those granted to kingdoms or minor communities, such as towns and cities, by princes and superior lords on the continent, or by the Crown of England." This discussion arose in a case involving the effect of the provisions of the revised statutes regulating licenses to grocers to sell intoxicating liquors, and it was held that the statute applied to cities and villages previously incorporated, and superseded charter provisions authorizing such licenses by municipal officers.

Vested rights possessed by a city are as indestructible by legislative act as the property rights of citizens. Speaking of the Fortysecond street reservoir the court say that "the weight of authority is to the effect that the property which New York holds in its proprietary or private character, though originally derived from the power claiming the ultimate title, and which concerns the private advantage of the corporation as a distinct legal personalty, is

stamped with so many of the rights and powers of natural persons or private corporations as that the city cannot be deprived of this reservoir without due process of law and without just compensation." The Dongan charter of 1686 is cited as authority for the opinion that New York became the owner of waste lands within the city boundaries, and the city's title is said to have been confirmed by the Montgomery charter of 1730, and by the Constitutions of 1777, 1821, and 1846. Justice Macomber quotes from Kent's Notes to the New York Charter some observations on Magna Charta, and also a remark that "corporate franchises in this country rest on a basis which ought to be at least as solid as Magna Charta, for they are founded on grants which are contracts." Webb v. New York (1882) 64 How. Pr. 10.

New York. The Cornbury charter of 1708 conferred certain perpetual ferry privileges between the city and Long Island. Hamilton ferry and South ferry having been established under this and other grants, it was held that the city had acquired vested rights therein which could not be taken away by the legislature. Fulton ferry having been established at the time of the grants to New York, became vested in the city by an indefeasible title. Benson v. New York (1850) 10 Barb. 223.

The power of the state over a city street was considered in People ex rel. New York & H. R. Co. v. Havemeyer (1874) 4 Thomp. & C. 365. The company was incorporated in 1831, and in 1832 a contract was made between it and the city of New York in relation to the occupation of certain streets. This contract was in effect annulled by statute in 1859. The act of 1872, chap. 702, which provided for the alteration of a street occupied by the company, prescribing the alterations to be made, and imposing a share of the expense on the city, was sustained as a valid exercise of legislative power. The city at one time had "control over the occupation by the railroad of the street by the force of a power conferred. The body which gave it the power could withdraw it and exercise it for itself. It has done so, and that takes no inherent or vested right from the city."

Officers.-The incumbent has no vested right in an office. People ex rel. Wilbur v. Eddy (1870) 57 Barb. 593; People v. Devlin (1865) 33 N. Y. 273, 88 Am. Dec. 377; People ex rel. Fisk v. Board of Education (1893) 69 Hun, 212, 23 N. Y. Supp. 473, (1894) 142 N. Y. 627, 37 N. E. 565.

In Ricketts v. New York (1884) 67 How. Pr. 320, it was held that the board of estimate and apportionment of New York had no

power, during his term, to reduce the compensation of the supreme court crier which had been fixed by the board of supervisors.

In the absence of constitutional or statutory restraints, the power of appointment implies the power of removal, when no definite term is attached to the office by law. People ex rel. Cline v. Robb (1891) 126 N. Y. 180, 27 N. E. 267, construing statutes giving to veterans preference in appointments in the state prisons.

The holder of a teacher's certificate in Brooklyn at the time of the creation of Greater New York had no vested right which entitled him to appointment to a position in the schools of the new city, as against regulations which the board of education had authority to prescribe under the charter. Re Stebbins (1899) 41 App. Div. 269, 58 N. Y. Supp. 468.

By the act of 1901, chap. 534, amending the second class cities charter of 1898, chap. 182, an alderman became entitled to a salary. This was a vested right which could not be taken away by subsequent legislation, declaring that the statute giving the salary should not take effect until a specified date, and that an alderman should not be entitled to salary prior to that date. His right to the salary became complete when the original amendatory statute took effect. Young v. Rochester (1902) 73 App. Div. 81, 76 N. Y. Supp. 224.

Pardons.-A person convicted of a criminal offense has no vested right in a commutation which the governor is authorized by statute to grant for good behavior or otherwise. Re Whalen (1892) 47 N. Y. S. R. 313, 19 N. Y. Supp. 915.

Penalties.-A person has no vested right in penalties imposed by the Federal revenue laws for the omission to stamp a written instrument. Hoppock v. Stone (1867) 49 Barb. 524.

Pension.-A pension is a mere gratuity and confers no vested right. People ex rel. Price v. Woodbury (1902) 38 Misc. 189, 77 N. Y. Supp. 241.

Railroads.-The farm crossings provision of the general railroad act of 1841, chap. 140, did not apply to existing corporations. They had already acquired the right of way and made compensation to landowners for any obstruction to the use of their land which might result from the operation of the railroad. Milliman v. Oswego & S. R. Co. (1850) 10 Barb. 87.

A franchise authorizing a street railroad in a city does not prevent a similar franchise to another company to occupy the same street provided there is no actual interference with the rights of the first company. The first franchise was not exclusive. Brooklyn City & N. R. Co. v. Coney Island & B. R. Co. (1861) 35 Barb. 364.

Tax deed. The act of 1882, chap. 287, declaring that after fifteen years a tax deed should be conclusive evidence of the regularity of the tax proceedings, did not deprive the owner of any vested rights in property. Chamberlain v. Taylor (1885) 36 Hun, 24.

Tax sale. The legislature, by an attempted extension of time to redeem from a tax sale, cannot, without providing compensation, impair the right which a purchaser has acquired to an absolute deed, or to a lease for a limited term on a failure to redeem within a specified time. Dikeman v. Dikeman (1845) 11 Paige, 484

WILLS.

The legislature has long exercised the power to regulate, to some extent, the transfer of property by will, including especially the power to prescribe formalities relative to the execution, revocation, and probate of wills, the settlement of estates, and also restrictions and limitations on legacies and devises. Trusts, powers, uses, remainders and reversions, accumulations of estates, the suspension of the power of alienation, restraints on gifts to corporations, and other regulations incident to the devolution of the property of decedents have also received legislative attention, developing through many years, resulting in a comprehensive body of laws on these subjects, which are intended to represent and illustrate the present condition and needs of society. The general authority of the legislature over these subjects can scarcely be doubted, and would probably not be questioned.

The courts have had little occasion to consider questions of the power of the legislature over property transferred by will in particular instances, but in Re New York Protestant Episcopal Public School (1864) 31 N. Y. 574, the court, per Chief Judge Denio, after observing that "the legislature has no constitutional power to cause land to be sold for the purpose of disentangling an estate, where the parties entitled to future estates are under no disability, and are competent to act for themselves," say that this "may be done where the rights of infants, lunatics, etc., are concerned," and that it is "firmly established that the legislature has full power to order sales