the claim which the Lords of Trade in 1706 had declared to be untenable. This dispute was also referred to the home government, and the Lords of Trade, in a communication to Governor Hunter, dated November 13, 1711, say that "as to the assembly's pretence, that the council cannot amend a money bill, it is groundless and will not be allowed of here, the council having an equal right with them in granting money, there being nothing in Her Majesty's commission to you, under the great seal of this Kingdom to the contrary, by virtue of which commission they only sit as an assembly, and therefore you will do well to acquaint them herewith, that they may no longer insist upon what is so ill-grounded." Even this did not. convince the assembly, and it persevered in its intention to exercise the powers of the House of Commons in relation to money bills. Forty years afterwards, November, 1751, the council originated and passed a money bill which was sent to the assembly for its concurrence, but the assembly rejected it on the ground that the bill "apparently intrenches on the great essential and undoubted right of the representatives of the people of this colony, to begin all bills for raising and disposing of money."

This is only another instance out of many that might be cited of the independence of the New York colonial assembly. It was often quite troublesome to the home government, especially relating to questions involving the expenditure of money. Even frequent dissolutions of the assembly and new elections made little difference in the situation. The home government often complained that the New York assembly was setting a bad example for the other colonies in asserting so much independence, and it is clear that in no colony were the rights of English freemen more steadily inaintained than in New York.

§ 14. [Enacting clause.]-The enacting clause of all

bills shall be "The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows," and no law shall be enacted except by bill.

[Const. 1777, art. 31; 1846, art. 3, § 14.]

The evolution of political ideas under a parliamentary form of government may be studied in the enacting clause. The simple statement that the people, represented in the legislature, "do enact as follows," is a solemn declaration that ours is a republican form of government, and that the people, through their chosen representatives, declare the law which shall regulate the affairs of the state. This method of declaring the will of the people is removed only one degree from the highest expression of that will in the adoption of a constitution intended to be the fundamental law, and to control not only their own action, but the action of their agents in the legislature and elsewhere in administering the government. The preamble to the Constitution is the enacting clause of that instrument, and by it, as in this state, the people have declared that they "do establish this Constitution."

An enacting clause contains a statement of the authority by which the law is made. I need not here quote the formal introduction to an edict or decree under an absolute government, showing the name, title, and sovereignty of the ruler. Its general purpose is the same as that of an enacting clause; namely, to state the source and authority of the law. Having derived our legislative structure from the British parliamentary system, it would be interesting to examine the sources and development of that system, especially so far as concerns the policy of popular representation in the lawmaking body. Such examination, however, would perhaps not be altogether profitable nor satisfactory, especially when we recall Blackstone's statement that "the original or first institution of ParliaVOL. IV. CONST. HIST.-24

ment is one of those matters which lie so far hidden in the dark ages of antiquity that the tracing of it out is a thing equally difficult and uncertain." Referring to the Saxon policy of representation in the witena-gemote, which embodied the essential attributes of the present Parliament and of our modern legislature, he says: "It indisputably appears, that parliaments, or general councils, are coeval with the kingdom itself;" but he observes that "how those parliaments were constituted and composed is another question, which has been matter of great dispute among our learned antiquaries; and, particularly, whether the commons were summoned at all; or, if summoned, at what period they began to form a distinct assembly."

Parliamentary representation in some form was a Saxon inheritance, and it was perpetuated in Magna Charta (1215), in which King John covenanted to call, on forty days' notice, a "common council of the kingdom" for certain governmental purposes, and to summon the "Archbishops, Bishops, Abbots, Earls, and great Barons" and also "all those who hold of us in chief." The parliamentary policy thus established appears fifty-two years later in the reign of Henry III. in the statute of Marlebridge or Marlborough, 1267, the introduction to which recites, among other things, that "the said King, our Lord, providing for the better Estate of his Realm of England, and for the more speedy ministration of justice, as belongeth to the office of King; and the more discreet men of the said Realm being called together, as well of the higher as of the lower estate, by whom it was provided, enacted, agreed, and ordained," etc. Here was a great council of which the King was only one element, but, as the acknowledged head of the nation, he assumes to seek the advice of the various representatives of the people, and together, King and representatives, they enact

the statute. Eight years later, 1275, in the enactment of the statute of Westminster I., in the third year of Edward I., a different view of the relations between the Crown and the Parliament is presented, for, in the introduction to that statute, we are told that "by his Council, and by the Assent of the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbots, Priors, Earls, Barons, and the commonalty of the Realm thither summoned," the King "willeth and commandeth," etc. This shows that, while many high officers and other representatives of the people were called into consultation, the statute was deemed the act of the King himself, and an expression of royal authority, rather than of the power or judgment of the people. So in the statute of Gloucester, 1278, the King asserts his royal authority in the statement that "the King himself, providing for the wealth of his Realm, and the more full ministration of justice as to the office of a King belongeth, the more discreet men of the Realm, as well of high as of low degree, being called thither, does establish and ordain," etc. Here the King makes the law, but with the advice, more or less influential, of the members of the council, or Parliament.

Without studying in detail the development of this subject, it may be worth while to note that in 1365 a statute was passed which recited that "our Lord, King Edward, at his parliament holden at Westminster by the assent of the Prelates, Dukes, Earls, Barons, and Commons of his Realm, there assembled, hath made and ordained the things underwritten." Here the King receives more than advice, as indicated in the earlier statute, and procures the "assent" of the parliamentary representatives, and the statute expressly states that it is enacted with this assent. Here was a clear assertion of the principle of the parliamentary authority maintained by the early Saxon councils, in which the representatives of the people not only took part in the ordinary affairs of

the kingdom, but especially declared their right to regulate the taxation of freemen. Every reader will recall instances of the influence which this principle of the right of taxation has had in shaping modern political society. I have already called attention to the assertion of this principle not only by the English Parliament, but by the early colonial assemblies in New York. In 1402 the enacting clause was stated in the following form: "Our Lord, the King, with the assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and at the special instance and request of the commons, assembled at the Parliament," etc.

The New York legislative system was established in 1683 by the election of an assembly. At that time the enacting clause in English statutes was stated as follows: "Be it enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, and by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same,' etc. The parliamentary system embracing the King, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the commons, had long before this time been permanently established, and the enacting clause shows that statutes were passed by the authority of Parliament, and not, as indicated in the earlier statutes above cited, upon the authority of the King, with the advice or with the assent of Parliament. The English enacting clause in 1905 is the same as the last clause above quoted.

The New York colonial assembly passed its first statute on the 30th of October, 1683, and, adopting the English rule so far as practicable, the enacting clause was stated in the following form: "Be it enacted by the Governor, council, and Representatives now in General Assembly met and assembled, and by the authority of the same." The council here mentioned was the governor's executive council, which was given legislative