visors," notwithstanding the fact that, under a general law, such supervisors become ex officio members of such board. People ex rel. Clancy v. Westchester County (1893) 139 N. Y. 524, 34 N. E. 1106.

This provision did not affect the power of the legislature to erect new towns and to provide for their government. This power can scarcely be exercised except by special law. The inhibition contained in this clause applies to existing political subdivisions, and not to laws creating new ones. The provision for the election of town officers is a necessary part of a statute creating a new town, except that a special act may sometimes apply existing general laws. This, however, cannot always be done in adjusting temporary conditions produced by a change of territorial boundaries, and the arrangement of necessary official machinery. Fort v. Cummings (1895) 90 Hun, 481, 36 N. Y. Supp. 36.

(7) Selecting, drawing, summoning, or impaneling grand or petit jurors.

The act of 1881, chap. 532, amending § 1041 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing for jurors in the city and county of Albany, is, so far as it relates to grand jurors, a local act, and void under this provision. People v. Petrea (1883) 92 N. Y. 128; People v. Fitzpatrick (1883) 30 Hun, 493.

The act of 1896, chap. 378, providing for special jurors in criminal cases, did not violate this provision. It was a general act. People v. Dunn (1899) 157 N. Y. 528, 43 L. R. A. 247, 52 N. E. 572.

See also People v. Ebelt (1905) 180 N. Y. 470, 73 N. E. 235, in which the court considers and assumes the validity of the Westchester county jury act, Laws 1892, chap. 491, as amended Laws 1893, chap. 269, which, among other things, provided for the office of commissioner of jurors in that county.

(8) Regulating the rate of interest on money.

(9) The opening and conducting of elections or designating places of voting.

(10) Creating, increasing, or decreasing fees, percentage, or allowances of public officers, during the term for which said officers are elected or appointed.

"The prospective salary or other emoluments of a public office are not the property of the officer, nor the property of the state.

. . The right to the compensation grows out of the rendition of the services, and not out of any contract between the government and the officer that the services shall be rendered by him. They may be paid for in fees at one time, in salary at another, and either may be increased or diminished in amount at any time before they are earned." Conner v. New York (1851) 5 N. Y. 285.

The act of 1876, chap. 439, relating to the expenses of judicial sales in the county of Kings, and which fixed the sheriff's fees on certain sales, was held not to apply in terms to the sheriff then in office, that the statute might lawfully operate to affect the compensation of future sheriffs, and that the legislature must have presumed this result. Kerrigan v. Force (1877) 68 N. Y. 381.

The inhibition does not take away the power of the legislature to exempt taxpayers from the payment of fees on tax sales. People ex rel. Gass v. Lee (1882) 28 Hun, 469.

In Shanley v. Brooklyn (1883) 30 Hun, 396, it is said that a patrolman on the police force is not within this provision. It applies to public officers, and has "reference to those well-known state and county officers which were elective or filled by appointment for a certain time. Policemen were local, and not the subject of general laws, nor even of a fixed tenure in office," and it was not designed to continue their compensation unchangeable. The court sustained action by a common council reducing the compensation of a patrolman under authority conferred by statute.

The provision of § 1116 of the New York consolidation act of 1882, chap. 410, authorizing the board of apportionment to fix the compensation of the crier of the supreme court, was held applicable only to subsequent appointments, and did not affect a crier then in office. Ricketts v. New York (1884) 12 Daly, 504.

"The word 'allowance' is used in the Constitution in a sense entirely different and distinct from that of salary. . . . The generic term used to cover all forms of payments made to public officers for services is invariably that of 'compensation,' and the specific term used to denote payments to officers having a fixed, definite, and stated compensation is that of 'salary.'" This clause was not intended to include persons whose services were payable by a fixed and stated compensation. "The natural interpretation of these provisions is that they were intended to include only those irregular, indefinite, and uncertain modes of compensating public servants which were indicated by words of like character and mean

ing, as those of 'fees,' 'percentage,' etc." Salaries are not included in the constitutional inhibition. Mangam v. Brooklyn (1885) 98 N. Y. 585, 50 Am. Rep. 705. See Cole v. State (1886) 102 N. Y. 48, 6 N. E. 277.

The legislature has power to vest in a police justice exclusive jurisdiction to issue all criminal process within the corporate limits. The power to take away the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace in criminal cases follows by necessity from the power to create a police justice. An act conferring such exclusive jurisdiction does not violate the provision against diminishing the fees of public officers. People ex rel. Lynch v. Duffy (1888) 49 Hun, 276, I N. Y. Supp. 896.

The commissioners appointed in street opening proceedings are not constitutional officers, and their fees may be reduced during the pendency of the proceedings. Re Wilkins Place (1898) 54 N. Y. Supp. 65.

(11) Granting to any corporation, association, or individual the right to lay down railroad tracks.

Prior to the adoption of this section of the Constitution the Gilbert Elevated Railroad Company had been incorporated, routes had been designated by commissioners, and the company was authorized to occupy certain streets in New York. "The city authorities were prohibited from giving permission to any other person or corporation to do any of the acts which were authorized by the act to be done by this corporation, and were expressly enjoined to aid the corporation in carrying out the purposes of the law." Then came the rapid transit act of 1875, chap. 606, at which time the company had already acquired the right to construct a railroad. "The rapid transit act authorized a comprehensive and independent system of rapid transit by elevated railroads through the city." Section 36 contained provisions intended to protect the rights acquired by the company under previous statutes, and also to authorize the construction of a road by another corporation. As to this company, the provisions did not constitute a fresh grant, but rather a confirmation and modification of rights already acquired. "The constitutional clause was designed to prohibit an original and independent grant of the right to lay down railroad tracks, including the powers incident thereto. . . . The legislature cannot grant this right under the guise of an amendment to an existing charter, any more

than by an original grant. It would be incompetent to grant this right to a corporation organized for a different purpose, but an act restricting and regulating an existing right to lay down railroad tracks is not a grant of that right within the meaning of this clause." Gilbert Elev. R. Co. v. Kobbe (1877) 70 N. Y. 361.

This subject was also considered with substantially the same result in Re New York Elev. R. Co. (1877) 70 N. Y. 327; Central Crosstown R. Co. v. 23d Street R. Co. (1877) 54 How. Pr. 168; People v. Long Island R. Co. (1881) 60 How. Pr. 395, where it is said that the act of 1876, chap. 187, "simply gave legislative permission to use steam as a motive power on railroad tracks already constructed, the right to relay and repair which was incident to the original grant." See also Auchincloss v. Metropolitan Elev. R. Co. (1902) 69 App. Div. 63, 74 N. Y. Supp. 534.

The legislature cannot, by a confirmatory statute, revive obsolete powers to lay down railroad tracks. It may confirm defective proceedings already taken, but it cannot authorize a company to lay down additional tracks. Patten v. New York Elev. R. Co. (1876) 3 Abb. N. C. 306, appeal dismissed in (1876) 67 N. Y. 484.

The act of 1878, chap. 206, extending the time for the construction of a railroad, was void under this clause. The time for such construction fixed by previous statutes had already expired. The corporation was extinct. The act of 1878 was not a "waiver by the legislature of a forfeiture incurred by an existing corporation, but it was the creation of a new corporation, under the guise of reviving and rehabilitating a defunct corporate body." Re Brooklyn, W. & N. R. Co. (1878) 75 N. Y. 335. The same rule was declared in Farnham v. Benedict (1887) 107 N. Y. 159, 13 N. E. 784, and in Re New York & L. I. Bridge Co. (1889) 54 Hun, 400, 7 N. Y. Supp. 445.

The power to change the route granted to a railroad company was annulled by this provision of the Constitution. Negus v. Brooklyn (1881) 62 How. Pr. 291.

This clause was violated by the act of 1885, chap. 554, authorizing the construction of an "illustrative section" of an elevated railroad. People ex rel. Harvey v. Loew (1886) 102 N. Y. 471, 7 N. E. 297.

This clause was not violated by the act of 1884, chap. 546, authorizing the city of Schenectady to close a certain street for the purpose of erecting a depot. Weinckie v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. (1891) 39 N. Y. S. R. 584, 15 N. Y. Supp. 689, affirmed in (1892) 133 N. Y. 656, 31 N. E. 625.

The consolidation of railroad corporations resulting in the organ

ization of a new corporation therefrom is not prohibited by this provision, which was designed only "to prohibit an original and independent grant of that right." Sandham v. Nye (1894) 9 Misc. 541, 30 N. Y. Supp. 552.

The New York & Long Island Bridge Company act of 1892, chap. 411, did not grant the right to lay down railroad tracks. New York & L. I. Bridge Co. v. Smith (1896) 148 N. Y. 540, 42 N. E. 1088.

A county, city, town, or village is not included in this prohibition. It does not prevent a grant to a municipality. The New York rapid transit acts were sustained. Sun Printing & Pub. Asso. v. New York (1897) 152 N. Y. 257, 37 L. R. A. 788, 46 N. E. 499.

The constitutional restriction applies where one company, for the purpose of connecting parts of its lines, seeks to use the tracks of another company for a short distance. Such use cannot be had without first obtaining the consents required by the Constitution. The second company cannot avail itself of the consents granted for the existing road. Colonial City Traction Co. v. Kingston City R. Co. (1897) 153 N. Y. 540, 47 N. E. 810.

The act of 1896, chap. 649, validating certain proceedings relating to street railroads, was not a local act under this provision. Re Buffalo Traction Co. (1898) 25 App. Div. 447, 49 N. Y. Supp. 1052, affirmed in (1898) 155 N. Y. 700, 50 N. E. 1115.

(12) Granting to any private corporation, association, or individual any exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise whatever.

An instance of the exclusive franchise prohibited by this paragraph is found in the statutes (1798, 1803, 1807, 1808, and 1811) which granted to Livingston and Fulton the sole and exclusive right to navigate boats by steam within the state. This right was sustained in Livingston v. Van Ingen (1812) 9 Johns. 507.

An interesting question relating to an exclusive franchise was presented in Hallock v. Dominy (1876) 7 Hun, 52, where the court, construing an ordinance by the board of supervisors of Suffolk county, conferring on the inhabitants of East Hampton the exclusive right to catch certain fish in that town, say that "all laws creating privileged classes are contrary to the spirit of our institutions." That the waters included in the ordinance being navigable, an attempt to confer on such inhabitants an exclusive franchise