to new and foreign circumstances. For want of such experience England was destined to lose her colonies in the Western hemisphere. For want of it mistakes were committed which imperilled the empire she was building up in the East. The Regulating Act provided insufficient guidance as to points on which both the Company and the supreme court were likely to go astray; and the charter by which it was supplemented did not go far to supply its deficiencies. The language of both instruments was vague and inaccurate. They left unsettled questions of the gravest importance. The Company was vested with supreme administrative and military authority. The Court was vested with supreme judicial authority. Which of the two authorities was to be paramount? The court was avowedly established for the purpose of controlling the actions of the Company's servants, and preventing the exercise of oppression against the natives of the country. How far could it extend its controlling power without sapping the foundations of civil authority? The members of the supreme council were personally exempt from the coercive jurisdiction of the court. But how far could the court question and determine the legality of their orders?

Both the omissions from the Act and its express provisions were such as to afford room for unfortunate arguments and differences of opinion.

What law was the supreme court to administer? The Act was silent. Apparently it was the unregenerate English law, insular, technical, formless, tempered in its application to English circumstances by the quibbles of judges and the obstinacy of juries, capable of being an instrument of the most monstrous injustice when administered in an atmosphere different from that in which it had grown up.

To whom was this law to be administered? To British subjects and to persons in the employment of the Company. But whom did the first class include? Probably only the class now known as European British subjects, and probably not the native inhabitants of India' residing in the three

" ཝོ། 1

the one r capacity the Company
of an irreponable despot, in f
bound by the provision, of cheste
It was natural that the l
act in the former capacit
Oriental principle of govent G
di like and suspicion by Esc
found unintelligable and wor
steeped in the tradition

In the latter haf familar with atutiongr

priate formula for die

has been to pale at

there were, as Sir heads of difference Supreme court.

court to exercise jurisation, to the extent of

if a writ was served Pt culminated in what in which the sheriff and to execute a writ against Company of sepoys acting The action of the council ties in England, and thus the victory of the council

Pina case, in which the supreme court gave judgement 11. hea juan nges to a native plaintiff in an action against not the Pa na provincial council, acting in its judicial

In pey's judgement in this case was made one of the ids of nopeachment against him, but is forcibly defended Sir James Stephen against the criticisms of Mill and ethers, as being not only technically sound, but substantially just, Hastings endeavoured to remove the friction between lesupreme court and the country courts by appointing Impey judge of the court of Sadr Diwani Adalat, and thus vesting in him the appellate and revisional control over the country courts which had been nominally vested in, but never exercised by, the supreme court. Had he succeeded, he would have anticipated the arrangements under which, some eighty years later, the court of Sadr Diwani Adalat and the supreme court were fused into the high court. But Impey compromised himself by drawing a large salary from his new office in addition to that which he drew as chief justice, and his acceptance of a post tenable at the pleasure of the Company was held to be incompatible with the independent position which he was intended to occupy as chief justice of the supreme court.

In the year 1781 a Parliamentary inquiry was held into Amending Act of the administration of justice in Bengal, and an amending 1781. Act of that year1 settled some of the questions arising out

of the Act of 1773.

The governor-general and council of Bengal were not to be subject, jointly or severally, to the jurisdiction of the supreme court for anything counselled, ordered, or done by them in their public capacity. But this exemption did not apply to orders affecting British subjects 2.

The supreme court was not to have or exercise any jurisdiction in matters concerning the revenue, or concerning any act done in the collection thereof, according to the usage and practice of the country, or the regulations of the governorgeneral and council 3.

1 21 Geo. III, c. 70.

2 See Digest, s. 106.

3 Ibid. s. 101.

provinces, except such of them as were residem it

of Calcutta.

But the point was by no means (IC

What constituted employment by the CreYot

a native landowner farming revenues so ei provei,

doubtful cases on whom lay the burden of pro to, vensation from or subjection to the jurisdiction!

These were a few of the questions falsif by charter, and they inevitably led to scout co the council and the court.

In the controversies which follows: James Stephen observes, three am between the supreme council and te These were, first the claims C diction over the whole native popius Pi making them plead to the job deton on them. The quarrer

was known as the Cossiju El cam his officers, when 'cupun

th

public himself, farm, or ordinary ssession or

inity for the

oved by the

neil, or by a

n to become in any matter

any matter

t in actions for ent of the parties.

Pames, &c., of

jurisdiction in

1 and singular the heritance and all matters of

Party, shall be

y the laws and

Gentus by the one of the parties hows and usages of

217