our author this vague and indefinite original power is, if we look closely, found to be composed of four elements, undistinguished the one from the other, and to be by no means that simple ultimate power which his followers usually assume, supported in this assumption by their master's example. It reflects, it discriminates, it approves, it commands. Which of these functions truly exhibits to our view the separate moral faculty?

In concluding this brief critical survey of Butler's argument, we are struck by the fact that he owed more to Shaftesbury and Aristotle than to any other philosopher. To Shaftesbury he owes, among other things, the idea of an inner constitution and harmonious end, while a reminiscence of Aristotle runs through his whole conceptions. His His principles of action' are, generally speaking, the non-rational impulses and affections of Aristotle; and where Aristotle placed controlling reason actively seeking a mean in all passions of the soul, Butler placed the Principle of Reflection—an internal sense discharging the function of reason and also of a conscience. Even this position, however, he does not steadily and consistently adhere to; and the consequence is, that, after the most careful study, we close his book with the feeling that a powerful thinker has taken a firm grasp of moral truths, but that by contenting himself with the complex where he should have sought the simple, and by assuming where it was necessary to prove, he has failed to give forth a system which can stand the test of a close analysis.

TRANSITION TO BENTHA M.

DAVID HUME (DIED 1776).

WERE we writing a history of moral speculation, we should here have to trace the influence of Locke, Leibnitz, and Wolf on the ethical thought of Europe. Our purpose, however, is much more limited. Having traced the rapid development of the Intuitional theory in reaction against the extreme sensationalism and cynical utilitarianism of Hobbes, we now propose to turn our attention to the revival of his doctrines in a new and much modified form by Bentham, and his successors in our own day, Mr. Mill and Mr. Bain. Intuitionalism continued to be well represented and ably taught by Adam Smith, Reid, Stewart, Brown (under certain reservations), and others; while Hartley, Tucker, and Paley stood forth as the most prominent exponents of the opposite school. The most interesting of the brilliant thinkers who crowded the latter half of the eighteenth century was David Hume. While giving the weight of his influence to utilitarianism, he more than any other illustrates the inroad which the writers whose labours we have reviewed had made on the Hobbistic doctrine. An anti-Hobbist he certainly is, and yet we are so far from classing him with Intuitionalists, that we find in him the philosophic groundwork of Benthamism. Although we do

not propose to give a full exposition of his theory, a few words will help to indicate the historical connexion in this country between the eighteenth and the nineteenth century.

Notwithstanding the lucidity of David Hume's style, it is not always at once obvious how far his argument is intended to carry his readers, or what are the distinctive features of his theory. This arises, perhaps, from the attitude of analytic inquirer rather than of synthetic system-builder which he assumes. In ethics, this peculiarity of Hume's reasoning is, as might be expected from the complex nature of the subject, especially conspicuous. The following may be accepted as an accurate though brief statement of the conclusions to which he came, it being understood that his mode of expression is translated into more modern phraseology.

1. The Criterion of Morality Hume finds to be, so far as transitive or social acts are concerned, Utility; Utility, however, being only a means towards an end, and that end being the happiness and interests of society. The happiness and interests of society, accordingly, are the end and criterion of the Right in all social acts. Similarly, those acts which are not social have for their end and criterion the happiness and interests of the individual.

2. The foundation of what may be distinctively called the 'Morality' of acts, viz., their approvableness, or the reverse, is, (a.) in the case of acts social, the

Sentiment of Humanity or Benevolence, which is the source of the pleasure we feel when acts are seen to attain the useful end. Sometimes it is merely the agreeable feeling which we have on seeing them in operation. But here Hume is manifestly loose in his analysis; for all cases of the 'agreeable' in the matter of transitive acts are resolvable into the satisfaction of the sentiment of Humanity. For example, the qualities of Decency, Cleanliness, Manner, Manners, Wit, which are referred to by Hume, are all of manifest objective utility. (b.) In the case of acts not social, the foundation of approvableness is the agreeableness of them to the person who performs them, and, consequently, to others who behold them in him. This presumes, of course, the doctrine of sympathy as essential to moral judgments, but he does not give the doctrine any prominence, or appear to see its full importance, except in one passage, where he says,--The 'immediate sensation [of the social qualities] to the person possessed of them is agreeable others enter into the same humour, and catch the sentiment by a contagion or natural sympathy; and as we cannot forbear loving whatever pleases, a kindly emotion arises towards the person who communicates so much satisfaction." Those people are 'virtuous' and 'meritorious' who practise qualities which thus stir up in us agreeable feelings when we contemplate them and their operation. [The principal intransitive qualities cited as meritorious are

1

1 Sect. vii.' Of Qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves.'

Tranquillity, Greatness of Mind, Courage, Delicacy of Taste.]

3. The ground of Obligation to do the act which contributes to the end-the happiness of society or the interests and happiness of the individual agent, as the case may be—is this, that all men, if they will only see it, will find their account' in so acting. The virtuous is a pleasant, attractive, and much-rewarding mental condition; and it seems very absurd not to maintain oneself constantly in it. If men decline to do so, they will suffer from the disapprobation of their fellow-men, and from want of peace in themselves.

4. Reason instructs in the tendency of acts, and its operation is especially needful in all questions of Justice. When these are reduced to their simple elements, their relation to the happiness of society will be seen, and the Sentiment of Humanity will then affix to them the character of approvable or disapprovable. He maintains that presumed Justice only may be, whereas Benevolence must be always, useful to society; and that it is therefore difficult to say when an act is to be approved as Just.

Hume's position may be thus briefly summed up :'Morality is determined by Sentiment;' and 'Virtue' is 'whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation.' The next question in morals is, 'What actions have this influence on the spectator's sentiment?' And the answer is, 'Those which produce happiness and pro