from taxation, except for State purposes. There, as here, it was objected that this exemption, by relieving certain specified property from taxation, brought the case within the prohibition of the act of Congress, and thus vitiated the tax sought to be enforced. This court held otherwise.

The act of Congress was not intended to curtail the State power on the subject of taxation. It simply required that capital invested in national banks should not be taxed at a greater rate than like property similarly invested. It was not intended to cut off the power to exempt particular kinds of property, if the legislature chose to do so. Homesteads, to a specified value, a certain amount of household furniture (the six plates, six knives and forks, six teacups and saucers, of the old statutes), the property of clergymen to some extent, schoolhouses, academies, and libraries, are generally exempt from taxation. The discretionary power of the legislature of the States over all these subjects remains as it was before the act of Congress of June, 1864. The plain intention of that statute was to protect the corporations formed under its authority from unfriendly discrimination by the States in the exercise of their taxing power. That particular persons or particular articles are relieved from taxation is not a matter to which either class can object.

The third objection is equally untenable. The statute referred to does not purport to relieve any property from taxation. It provides a mode for ascertaining the average capital of the merchant, and for giving a license to carry on the business of a merchant. He is required to pay an ad valorem tax on all his capital, and a license tax in addition.

The observations already made are pertinent under this head. Judgment affirmed.

REED v. INSURANCE COMPANY.

1. A policy of insurance on a vessel at and from Honolulu, via Baker's Island, to a port of discharge in the United States, contained a clause, "the risk to be suspended while vessel is at Baker's Island loading." Held, in view of the circumstances which must be supposed to have appeared to the parties at the time of making the contract, that the meaning of the clause is that the risk was to be suspended while the vessel was at Baker's Island for the purpose of loading, whether actually engaged in the process of loading or not.

2. Although a written agreement cannot be varied by proof of the circumstances out of which it grew, and which surrounded its adoption, they may be resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining its subject-matter, and the standpoint of the parties in relation thereto.

3. Quære, Can a demand arising out of contract be enforced by a libel in personam in admiralty when a suit to recover it, if brought in a State court of concur rent jurisdiction, would be barred by the Statute of Limitations?

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland.

The circumstances of this case, as gathered from the pleadings and evidence, particularly the agreed statement made by the parties themselves, are substantially as follows:

In November, 1867, the libellant, Samuel G. Reed, of Boston, was owner of the ship "Minnehaha," then lying at Honolulu, in the Sandwich Islands, and about to sail from that place in ballast via Baker's Island, with the intention of there taking in a cargo of guano, to a port of discharge in the United States. Baker's Island is a small rocky island in mid-ocean, nearly under the equator, and about two thousand miles south-westerly from the Sandwich Islands, having no harbor or anchorage, and only frequented for its guano. When ships arrive there, they are moored in the open sea, in an exposed and perilous position. The mooring is effected by means of a heavy stationary anchor, weighing five thousand six hundred pounds, fastened to a coral reef in about one hundred fathoms of water, to which anchor a large buoy is attached by a heavy pendant chain. This chain is braced by two other chains, each over a thousand feet long, attached to anchors fastened to another coral reef nearer to the island. By still another chain the ship is moored to the first-mentioned pendant chain as long as she remains at the island; and her cargo is sent aboard from the

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island in small boats. The place is subject to strong currents and heavy gales, and vessels are, in consequence of the weather, frequently obliged to put to sea while loading.

On the 6th of January, 1868, the libellant, through a firm of insurance brokers in New York, made application by mail to the Merchants' Mutual Insurance Company of Baltimore for insurance on the said ship "Minnehaha," in the following

terms:

66

Application for insurance is hereby made by Johnson & Higgins, as agents, in the name of Samuel G. Reed, account of whom it may concern. Loss, if any, payable to them or order. For [$5,000, at seven per cent net] on ship ‘Minnehaha,' valued at $60,000, at and from Honolulu, via Baker's Island, to a port of discharge in the United States not east of Boston, with liberty to use Hampton Roads for orders; the risk to be suspended while vessel is at Baker's Island loading."

This application was enclosed in the following letter:

"OFFICE OF JOHNSON & HIGGINS, &C., ":87 Wall Street, New York,

"GEORGE R. COALE, Esq., Secretary:

"Jan. 6, 1868.

"DEAR SIR,-Enclosed please find two applications for Samuel G. Reed: viz., one on the Minnehaha' (our companies here are averse to Baker's Island risks, and for that reason the owners suspend the risk while at Baker's Island loading. The Atlantic have taken a large line on vessel and freight at seven per cent, with scrip); also, one on the Guiding Star,' now loading under inspection of Captains Ellis and Story, for underwriters. Please let us know how much your companies will take on each, and the lowest respective rates. Should like to hear by telegraph,

"Yours respectfully,

"JOHNSON & HIGGINS, "Per TOOKER."

In pursuance of this application, the company issued the policy on which the present suit is brought, the operative clause of which is in these words:

"The Merchants' Mutual Insurance Company of Baltimore have insured, and do hereby insure, agreeably to order, Samuel G. Reed, for account of whom it may concern, lost or not lost, at and from Honolulu, via Baker's Island, to a port of discharge in the United

States not east of Boston, with liberty to use Hampton Roads for orders, the risk to be suspended while vessel is at Baker's Island loading, $5,000, upon the body, tackle, &c., of the good ship 'Minnehaha.'"

The ship sailed in ballast from Honolulu the 7th of Novem ber, 1867, and arrived near Baker's Island on the afternoon of the twentieth day of that month. She came to her mooring near the island in safety; shortly after which a heavy gale and heavy surf arose, and continued with violence until the 3d of December, when the ship parted her moorings, and was totally wrecked and lost. At no time after her arrival at that island was it possible to discharge ballast or receive cargo, or commence the process of loading, or even the preparation for loading.

Proof of loss and of interest and adjustment was duly presented to the company, and payment demanded therefor and refused.

On May 20, 1872, Reed exhibited his libel in the District Court of the United States for the District of Maryland against said company. That court upon hearing dismissed the cause; and the Circuit Court having affirmed the decree, the libellant brought the case here.

The Statute of Limitations in force in Maryland provides as follows:

"All actions of account, actions of assumpsit or on the case, actions of debt on simple contract, or for rent in arrears, detinue, and replevin, all actions for trespass for injuries to real or personal property, shall be commenced or sued within three years from time the cause of action accrues."

Mr. Frederick E. Bryant and Mr. Charles B. Goodrich for the appellant.

1. The policy covers the voyage during which the loss occurred, and the appellant is prima facie entitled to recover the amount of such loss. The vessel was insured from Honolulu, via Baker's Island, to her port of discharge; and the intention of the assured and insurer that she should stop there is thus clearly manifested.

2. The excepting clause, "the risk to be suspended while the vessel is at Baker's Island loading," has no bearing upon

the rights of the parties; because no loading was made or attempted. The appellee gives to that clause a broader signification than its terms justify, and makes it include a suspension of the risk before the process of loading began. If it be ambiguous (which we deny), it should receive a construction least favorable to the company. 2 Parsons, Contr. 19 (ed. 1860); Dann v. Spurrier, 3 B. & P. 399; Doe v. Dixon, 9 East, 15; Throckmorton v. Wacy, Plowd. 154; Melvin v. Prop., &c. on Merrimack River, 5 Met. (Mass.) 27. Usage is never admissible to contradict what is plain. Hearne v. Marine Insurance Co., 20 Wall. 492; Haskins v. Warren, 115 Mass. 535; Dickenson v. Gay, 7 Allen (Mass.), 34; Black v. Bachelder, 120 Mass. 171. Nothing can be plainer than that the risk was to be suspended only while the vessel was at Baker's Island loading. Any other construction would do violence to the rule that full force and effect should be given to every word of a written contract. 2 Parsons, Contr. 16, 17 (ed. 1860); Evans v. Sanders, 8 Port. (Ala.) 497; Stratton v. Pettit, 16 C. B. 520.

The statement made in the letter of Johnson & Higgins, which accompanied the application for the policy, that the New York companies were averse to Baker's Island risks, &c., even if fraudulently made, which it was not, is immaterial, and does not vitiate the insurance, as neither the appellee nor its agent was thereby influenced to take the risk. 1 Phillips, Ins., sects. 539-541; Salem India-Rubber Co. v. Adams, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 256; 1 Parsons, Mar. Ins. 465; Flinn v. Tobin, 1 Moo. & M. 367; Flinn v. Headlam, 9 B. & C. 693.

In regard to the position taken on the other side, that the lapse of time bars this suit, it is submitted that statutes of limitation are, like all statutes in derogation of the common law, construed strictly. This, moreover, is a proceeding in admiralty. The act of Maryland cannot affect the status of the appellant in a court of the United States, nor even furnish any analogy to control the exercise of its jurisdiction. The company has not been injured by delay, and sustaining the bill will not produce public inconvenience. The imputed laches, therefore, furnisli no legal or equitable ground for depriving him of his right to a determination of the case upon its merits. Pickering v. Lord Stamford, 2 Ves. Jr. 583; Allore v. Jewell,